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The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom
"The revolution will be Twittered!" declared journalist Andrew Sullivan after protests erupted in Iran in June 2009. Yet for all the talk about the democratizing power of the Internet, regimes in Iran and China are as stable and repressive as ever. In fact, authoritarian governments are effectively using the Internet to suppress free speech, hone their surveillance techniques, disseminate cutting-edge propaganda, and pacify their populations with digital entertainment. Could the recent Western obsession with promoting democracy by digital means backfire?
In this spirited book, journalist and social commentator Evgeny Morozov shows that by falling for the supposedly democratizing nature of the Internet, Western do-gooders may have missed how it also entrenches dictators, threatens dissidents, and makes it harder - not easier - to promote democracy. Buzzwords like "21st-century statecraft" sound good in PowerPoint presentations, but the reality is that "digital diplomacy" requires just as much oversight and consideration as any other kind of diplomacy.
Marshaling compelling evidence, Morozov shows why we must stop thinking of the Internet and social media as inherently liberating and why ambitious and seemingly noble initiatives like the promotion of "Internet freedom" might have disastrous implications for the future of democracy as a whole.
In this spirited book, journalist and social commentator Evgeny Morozov shows that by falling for the supposedly democratizing nature of the Internet, Western do-gooders may have missed how it also entrenches dictators, threatens dissidents, and makes it harder - not easier - to promote democracy. Buzzwords like "21st-century statecraft" sound good in PowerPoint presentations, but the reality is that "digital diplomacy" requires just as much oversight and consideration as any other kind of diplomacy.
Marshaling compelling evidence, Morozov shows why we must stop thinking of the Internet and social media as inherently liberating and why ambitious and seemingly noble initiatives like the promotion of "Internet freedom" might have disastrous implications for the future of democracy as a whole.
432 pages, Kindle Edition
First published November 16, 2010
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About the author
Evgeny Morozov
29Ìýbooks303ÌýfollowersEvgeny Morozov is a contributing editor to Foreign Policy and runs the magazine's "Net Effect" blog about the Internet's impact on global politics. Morozov has been a visiting scholar at Stanford University, a Schwartz fellow at the New America Foundation, a Yahoo! fellow at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, a fellow at George Soros's Open Society Institute, and the Director of New Media at Transitions Online.
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March 23, 2020
On Epistemology in Democracy
Global experience over the last decade is clear: internet social technology poses a far greater threat to democracies than it does to the world’s authoritarian regimes. Morozov was one of the first to recognize this as a likely possibility years before Donald Trump executed his coup of the American Republican Party and Vladimir Putin mounted his successful cyber-attack on the US elections.
The prevailing wisdom before Twitter and Facebook and the virtually infinite blogosphere was that the free flow of information and opinion was a path not just to factual general truth about the world but to the specific truth of liberal democracy. The internet was “Radio Free Europe on steroids.� Information that was ‘dis-intermediated� from the interference of government and the constraints of cost would, it was presumed, promote massive popular unrest and lead to “regime change from within.� The Fukuyama thesis that a global liberal/capitalist society was inevitable would be realized.
This sort of “c²â²ú±ð°ù-±«³Ù´Ç±è¾±²¹²Ô¾±²õ³¾â€� not only misunderstands the technology of the internet, it also misunderstands the vulnerabilities of liberal democracy and the interests of corporate capital. Democratic states are only formally constructed on constitutions. What matters practically in their functioning is a complex network of institutions - the press and other news media, political parties, lobbyists, and technical experts from the corporate world and academia to name only a few. Elections and their protocols are largely the result of how these other pivotal institutions function (or don’t), not the other way round. We depend upon them to filter, and sift, and verify what purport to be facts of the world.
But the internet has a major institutional advantage over these traditional sources of public information: cost. Social apps are private and commercially developed. Bloggers get sponsors or produce their editorials for nothing. It looks therefore like the perfect link between corporate capitalism and liberal democracy. The flaw in this train of thought is that corporate commerciality has little interest in the distinction between fact and fiction. What sells, sells. To put the matter succinctly: truth has precisely zero commercial value.
By by-passing other institutions, the internet eliminates the myriad of epistemological checks and balances that exist in a democratic culture. Trump’s Twitter feed is unedited and doesn’t come packaged with editorial comment, except for his own. The man is his own ‘trusted source.� His followers are willing customers who have been conditioned by a lifetime of sophisticated advertising to accept self-serving assertions as statements of fact. Twitter has no interest in the veracity of his tweets, just their effect on the size of their customer base.
And as Russian and Chinese hackers have demonstrated beyond doubt, fake news can be inserted freely into technological networks for many purposes other than self-promotion. The absence of epistemological filtering means that all ideas and opinions are equal. In fact, the more outrageous, the more popular, and therefore the more commercial, the higher commercial value they have. The internet is not Radio Free Europe on steroids; it is The National Enquirer delivered to every house and on every billboard in the country. Whatever tendency there is in the United States to believe in conspiracies - from Communists under the bed to fluoride diluting natural essences - has been magnified by orders of magnitude.
I’m not competent to know whether Morozov’s suggestions for overcoming the epistemological nakedness of the net are sensible. Or even if they are still relevant after our experience during the 8 years since his book was published. What is clear, however, is that very few technological or sociological pundits have a clue about the likely impact of technology, especially its impact on political systems. That, and that there are a lot more surprises in store.
Postscript:
Global experience over the last decade is clear: internet social technology poses a far greater threat to democracies than it does to the world’s authoritarian regimes. Morozov was one of the first to recognize this as a likely possibility years before Donald Trump executed his coup of the American Republican Party and Vladimir Putin mounted his successful cyber-attack on the US elections.
The prevailing wisdom before Twitter and Facebook and the virtually infinite blogosphere was that the free flow of information and opinion was a path not just to factual general truth about the world but to the specific truth of liberal democracy. The internet was “Radio Free Europe on steroids.� Information that was ‘dis-intermediated� from the interference of government and the constraints of cost would, it was presumed, promote massive popular unrest and lead to “regime change from within.� The Fukuyama thesis that a global liberal/capitalist society was inevitable would be realized.
This sort of “c²â²ú±ð°ù-±«³Ù´Ç±è¾±²¹²Ô¾±²õ³¾â€� not only misunderstands the technology of the internet, it also misunderstands the vulnerabilities of liberal democracy and the interests of corporate capital. Democratic states are only formally constructed on constitutions. What matters practically in their functioning is a complex network of institutions - the press and other news media, political parties, lobbyists, and technical experts from the corporate world and academia to name only a few. Elections and their protocols are largely the result of how these other pivotal institutions function (or don’t), not the other way round. We depend upon them to filter, and sift, and verify what purport to be facts of the world.
But the internet has a major institutional advantage over these traditional sources of public information: cost. Social apps are private and commercially developed. Bloggers get sponsors or produce their editorials for nothing. It looks therefore like the perfect link between corporate capitalism and liberal democracy. The flaw in this train of thought is that corporate commerciality has little interest in the distinction between fact and fiction. What sells, sells. To put the matter succinctly: truth has precisely zero commercial value.
By by-passing other institutions, the internet eliminates the myriad of epistemological checks and balances that exist in a democratic culture. Trump’s Twitter feed is unedited and doesn’t come packaged with editorial comment, except for his own. The man is his own ‘trusted source.� His followers are willing customers who have been conditioned by a lifetime of sophisticated advertising to accept self-serving assertions as statements of fact. Twitter has no interest in the veracity of his tweets, just their effect on the size of their customer base.
And as Russian and Chinese hackers have demonstrated beyond doubt, fake news can be inserted freely into technological networks for many purposes other than self-promotion. The absence of epistemological filtering means that all ideas and opinions are equal. In fact, the more outrageous, the more popular, and therefore the more commercial, the higher commercial value they have. The internet is not Radio Free Europe on steroids; it is The National Enquirer delivered to every house and on every billboard in the country. Whatever tendency there is in the United States to believe in conspiracies - from Communists under the bed to fluoride diluting natural essences - has been magnified by orders of magnitude.
I’m not competent to know whether Morozov’s suggestions for overcoming the epistemological nakedness of the net are sensible. Or even if they are still relevant after our experience during the 8 years since his book was published. What is clear, however, is that very few technological or sociological pundits have a clue about the likely impact of technology, especially its impact on political systems. That, and that there are a lot more surprises in store.
Postscript:
February 14, 2013
Morozov is on a crusade against 'Internetic-centric foreign policy' and 'cyber-utopianism', which he describes as a constellation of power interests linking Silicon Valley tech companies (Google, Twitter, Facebook) with Cold Warriors (Cheney, Clinton, Rumsfeld) in a profoundly misguided and dangerous effort to promote democracy overseas through technology. He argues that rather than being an unalloyed force for freedom, the internet can be used in many ways that strengthen authoritarian regimes.
The evidence for that last claim is overwhelming: I doubt a single case of 'internet abuse' between 2005 and 2010 has been left out of the book. For that first claim, that the tech companies and Cold Warriors are in alliance, Morozov's evidence is much more hand-wavey. A few speeches, a few NSA sponsored trips, some conference reports.
What this book does not have, and what it really needs, is a theory to organize these disparate elements into a coherent whole. Political power and the governance of internet technologies are complex issues, but the role of the public intellectual to render these complex issues, if not simple, at least comprehensible. Morozov gestures at the fact that the tools used to crack down on pedophiles, terrorists, media piracy, and spam in the West are the same tools used to crack down on activists and dissidents in authoritarians regimes, but he doesn't explain what this conflict means for those of us who would enjoy both a free world and an orderly internet. Likewise, he doesn't address why some states are 'democracies' and some states are 'authoritarian'. Sure, the US just throws Code Pink activists out of Senate hearings while Russia murders journalists, but why is some power legitimate and some illegal?
Most tellingly, for someone who is all about promoting 'cyber-realism', he is blurry on the specifics of what should be done (aside from localizing policy-which leads to embarrassing situations like the ). These days, both democracies and authoritarian regimes use the internet for the same reason they use trucks to transport soldiers, or have their citizens breath air; it'd be impossible not to. But a covert organization has different information strategies from a mass protest, and a mass protest is different from a revolutionary army or transitional government.
This lack of theory exacerbates the other problem with a lack of theoretical perspective; the inability to incorporate new information. This book was published in 2011, which means it was probably written in 2010, but Morozov hasn't substantially updated his thinking to include the Arab Spring and divergent outcomes in Tunisia, Libya, Bahrain, Egypt, Syria etc. (the fact that they're different might mean that he's right, but still, they all occurred simultaneously...) Wikileaks barely gets a mention, despite the diplomatic cable leaks beginning in February 2010. If there was a theory to The Net Delusion, you could ask how new information fits into or changes the framework. Even in a popular book that is less rigorous than an academic treatise, you need to do more to contextualize your ideas than wave at Foucault, Langdon Winner, George F. Kennan and so on.
The evidence for that last claim is overwhelming: I doubt a single case of 'internet abuse' between 2005 and 2010 has been left out of the book. For that first claim, that the tech companies and Cold Warriors are in alliance, Morozov's evidence is much more hand-wavey. A few speeches, a few NSA sponsored trips, some conference reports.
What this book does not have, and what it really needs, is a theory to organize these disparate elements into a coherent whole. Political power and the governance of internet technologies are complex issues, but the role of the public intellectual to render these complex issues, if not simple, at least comprehensible. Morozov gestures at the fact that the tools used to crack down on pedophiles, terrorists, media piracy, and spam in the West are the same tools used to crack down on activists and dissidents in authoritarians regimes, but he doesn't explain what this conflict means for those of us who would enjoy both a free world and an orderly internet. Likewise, he doesn't address why some states are 'democracies' and some states are 'authoritarian'. Sure, the US just throws Code Pink activists out of Senate hearings while Russia murders journalists, but why is some power legitimate and some illegal?
Most tellingly, for someone who is all about promoting 'cyber-realism', he is blurry on the specifics of what should be done (aside from localizing policy-which leads to embarrassing situations like the ). These days, both democracies and authoritarian regimes use the internet for the same reason they use trucks to transport soldiers, or have their citizens breath air; it'd be impossible not to. But a covert organization has different information strategies from a mass protest, and a mass protest is different from a revolutionary army or transitional government.
This lack of theory exacerbates the other problem with a lack of theoretical perspective; the inability to incorporate new information. This book was published in 2011, which means it was probably written in 2010, but Morozov hasn't substantially updated his thinking to include the Arab Spring and divergent outcomes in Tunisia, Libya, Bahrain, Egypt, Syria etc. (the fact that they're different might mean that he's right, but still, they all occurred simultaneously...) Wikileaks barely gets a mention, despite the diplomatic cable leaks beginning in February 2010. If there was a theory to The Net Delusion, you could ask how new information fits into or changes the framework. Even in a popular book that is less rigorous than an academic treatise, you need to do more to contextualize your ideas than wave at Foucault, Langdon Winner, George F. Kennan and so on.
April 19, 2013
Few things delight me as much as a contrarian.
I enjoy reading Wired magazine; its a welcome blast of techno-optimism every month. And yet... Wired magazine stands out for its high concentration of "the Internets shower the masses with freedom and young entrepreneurs will solve all of life's minor inconveniences"! Wired is not alone in this attitude and is not the worst; its just an easy target for me because I actually read it. I avoid the other stuff.
Evgeny Morozov picks apart many of the assumptions that are held by those entranced by "cyber-utopianism". This book reminds me that, yes, the Internet kicks ass, but it is a tool that can misused by individuals, corporations, and governments. As Morozov says, "technology is NOT neutral". For example, my axe is awesome. It splits wood and opens wine bottles. It is also very dangerous in the hands of urban dwellers who think that axes were made for solving zombie infestations. Technology can be used to "spread freedom and diminish the power of autocracies". Technology can be used to rapidly distribute disinformation and increase the effectiveness of political oppression.
Morozov reminds me to take a deep breath, slow down, and remember to think things through. The Internet is amazing, but not all the time. Sometimes the Internet is a real jerk.
I enjoy reading Wired magazine; its a welcome blast of techno-optimism every month. And yet... Wired magazine stands out for its high concentration of "the Internets shower the masses with freedom and young entrepreneurs will solve all of life's minor inconveniences"! Wired is not alone in this attitude and is not the worst; its just an easy target for me because I actually read it. I avoid the other stuff.
Evgeny Morozov picks apart many of the assumptions that are held by those entranced by "cyber-utopianism". This book reminds me that, yes, the Internet kicks ass, but it is a tool that can misused by individuals, corporations, and governments. As Morozov says, "technology is NOT neutral". For example, my axe is awesome. It splits wood and opens wine bottles. It is also very dangerous in the hands of urban dwellers who think that axes were made for solving zombie infestations. Technology can be used to "spread freedom and diminish the power of autocracies". Technology can be used to rapidly distribute disinformation and increase the effectiveness of political oppression.
Morozov reminds me to take a deep breath, slow down, and remember to think things through. The Internet is amazing, but not all the time. Sometimes the Internet is a real jerk.
February 25, 2011
Morozov is debunking the notion that internet access = internet freedom. In fact, he tells us that internet "freedom" is a term with no meaning in the conventional sense since it implies that users are free to say what they like and use the technology for their own ends. But, his argument goes, if one user (an authoritarian regime, say, with a reason to dampen enthusiasm for democratic reforms) controls any points of internet access, or subverts the open sharing of ideas on social networking platforms to their own ends, "freedom" immediately becomes compromised.
Morozov compiles an extraordinary collection of examples from around the world of how this is happening now, and challenges (especially U.S.) policy makers to acknowledge that funding bloggers or promoting social networking sites is not an adequate response in and of itself to authoritarian regimes and/or dictatorships. He argues persuasively that U.S. Secretary of State Clinton’s speeches on Internet freedom do not adequately address the issues of authoritarian control, and suggests that only by closely aligning stated country-specific political policies with the promotion of Internet access in these same countries will produce the results the U.S. government seeks.
In other words, we have to stop talking out of both sides of our face. We can’t suppose that financing a corrupt regime on the one hand and supplying financing for anti-regime bloggers on the other is going to produce creditable results. And when it comes to Internet freedoms, one size does not fit in all cases. Some governments have embraced the Internet revolution so thoroughly that they are closely intertwined in the social networking sites, uncovering dissidents and following their adherents. Some have only the crudest knowledge of and reaction to social networking: witness the Internet shutdown for several days during the protests against Egyptian government.
At first I thought Morozov was arguing for international regulation of the Internet and perhaps even self-policing by internet services providers. But I realized he is far too realist to imagine that international regulation (were it even possible) would be practically ineffective and asking internet service providers to police is even more frightening than the authoritarian regimes he opposes. But his contention that the Internet too often “empowers the strong and disempowers the weak� is probably true. However, adding even fractionally to the access of the disempowered means proportionally huge gains in their knowledge and connectivity with ideas and others sharing their beliefs. As messy and inadequate a poorly-regulated Internet may be, it has undoubtedly had some effect on information dissemination to good effect. It is now up to those shackled masses to bend their minds to the task of building better governance than that which they have had to suffer in the past.
Morozov compiles an extraordinary collection of examples from around the world of how this is happening now, and challenges (especially U.S.) policy makers to acknowledge that funding bloggers or promoting social networking sites is not an adequate response in and of itself to authoritarian regimes and/or dictatorships. He argues persuasively that U.S. Secretary of State Clinton’s speeches on Internet freedom do not adequately address the issues of authoritarian control, and suggests that only by closely aligning stated country-specific political policies with the promotion of Internet access in these same countries will produce the results the U.S. government seeks.
In other words, we have to stop talking out of both sides of our face. We can’t suppose that financing a corrupt regime on the one hand and supplying financing for anti-regime bloggers on the other is going to produce creditable results. And when it comes to Internet freedoms, one size does not fit in all cases. Some governments have embraced the Internet revolution so thoroughly that they are closely intertwined in the social networking sites, uncovering dissidents and following their adherents. Some have only the crudest knowledge of and reaction to social networking: witness the Internet shutdown for several days during the protests against Egyptian government.
At first I thought Morozov was arguing for international regulation of the Internet and perhaps even self-policing by internet services providers. But I realized he is far too realist to imagine that international regulation (were it even possible) would be practically ineffective and asking internet service providers to police is even more frightening than the authoritarian regimes he opposes. But his contention that the Internet too often “empowers the strong and disempowers the weak� is probably true. However, adding even fractionally to the access of the disempowered means proportionally huge gains in their knowledge and connectivity with ideas and others sharing their beliefs. As messy and inadequate a poorly-regulated Internet may be, it has undoubtedly had some effect on information dissemination to good effect. It is now up to those shackled masses to bend their minds to the task of building better governance than that which they have had to suffer in the past.
March 28, 2011
I remember reading an article saying how the , and I was cynical on how some pundits claim that this same internet is introducing democracy to despotic regimes through Facebook and the Twitter Revolution and whatnot (). This book brings it all together.
It also makes a compelling case that evaluating the social effects of a new technology without taking into account existing social institutions is a pointless exercise.
It's interesting that this has all been done before. People thought that clipped messages in telegraph communication would be the end of the English language and thoughtful discourse, the OMG and LOL of the 19th century. People thought that the radio would mean a golden age of democracy because politicians can speak directly to the people, but also allowed totalitarian demagogues like Hitler and Stalin to come about. Warren Buffet has a form of economic corollary to how
This book uses a lot of intellectual firepower to address the narrow issue of whether the internet really inevitably means democracy. It obliquely goes into a lot of other issues, and I wish this book would address them head on, in particular, which institutions and social structures are most effective at harnessing the internet to promote or prevent democracy. But overall, a really good read.
On a 2009 visit to Shanghai, Barack Obama was all too happy to extol the virtues of the Internet, saying that "the more freely information flows, the stronger society becomes, because the citizens of countries around the world can hold their own governments accountable. They can begin to think for themselves. That generates new ideas. It encourages creativity." In contrast, when he spoke to the graduates of Hampton University in Virginia less than six months later, Obama communicated almost an entirely different message, complaining about “a 24/7 media environment that bombards us with all kinds of content and exposes us to all kinds of arguments, some of which we don’t always rank that high on the truth meter. . . . With iPods and iPads and Xboxes and Playstations . . . information becomes a distraction, a diversion, a form of entertainment, rather than a tool of empowerment, rather than the means of emancipation.�
It also makes a compelling case that evaluating the social effects of a new technology without taking into account existing social institutions is a pointless exercise.
[Raymond] Williams worried that placing technology at the center of our intellectual analysis is bound to make us view that what we have traditionally understood as a problem of politics, with its complex and uneasy questions of ethics and morality, as instead a problem of technology, either eliminating or obfuscating all the unresolved philosophical dilemmas. . . . [T]echnical determinism also prevents us from acknowledging what is political about technology itself (the kind of practices and outcomes it tends to favor), as its more immediately observable features usually occupy the lion’s share of the public’s attention, making it difficult to assess its other, more pernicious features.
It's interesting that this has all been done before. People thought that clipped messages in telegraph communication would be the end of the English language and thoughtful discourse, the OMG and LOL of the 19th century. People thought that the radio would mean a golden age of democracy because politicians can speak directly to the people, but also allowed totalitarian demagogues like Hitler and Stalin to come about. Warren Buffet has a form of economic corollary to how
This book uses a lot of intellectual firepower to address the narrow issue of whether the internet really inevitably means democracy. It obliquely goes into a lot of other issues, and I wish this book would address them head on, in particular, which institutions and social structures are most effective at harnessing the internet to promote or prevent democracy. But overall, a really good read.
Want to read
November 5, 2018Published in 2011 but with a chapter titled 'Why the KGB Wants you to Join Facebook' and with articles like this: appearing in the NYT, I am thinking this might be worth a closer look...
January 31, 2016
Compelling, instructive and deeply researched, The Net Delusion courageously challenges the perception that the Internet has wrought only positive change and calls into question the playbook of those who seek to democratize the world through its promotion.
Morozov cites many examples of technology being heralded as a utopia-generator and freedom-enhancer: the telegraph, radio, TV, etc. only to have the dream busted each time.
The Internet may have brought people together, but it hasn’t changed human nature. So it is with the Internet, theft becomes identity theft, crime becomes cyber-crime, child porn becomes child porn file sharing, chain letters become spam and drug dealing in the alley moves to online markets.
People are finding each other, no question about it. With remarkable ease, terrorists, racists and anti-vaccers and science deniers can hook up, seal off their world from the slightest mote of logic and blast their views across the Web to locate fertile ground in other weak minds.
Much of the first portion of the book exhaustively illustrates that the Iranian “Twitter Revolution� of 2009 was mostly hype, an attractive news story that was almost completely unfounded. Even if social media tools such as mobile phones, Facebook and Twitter enable dissidents to better organize, those same tools are easily utilized by authoritarian governments against them. The cost of organizing online is a visibility that makes identification and tracking of activists simple. Use the web to find the names of the activists, use cell phone data to find out where they are, then round them up for arrest.
Worse still, there is evidence suggesting the Internet is depoliticizing people with its limitless entertainment options. Dictators are finding there is less dissent in their population the more porn and YouTube they get access to. For many authoritarian governments it simply doesn’t make sense to censor. Give them porn and action movies and suddenly there are less people in the street holding signs.
This well-written study convincingly argues the praise and potential heaped upon the Internet is premature and the impact on democracies not yet fully understood. It also spotlights the fact that Silicon Valley has a vested interest in growing the importance of all things digital since they are businesses, not humanitarian enterprises. Letting the digerati worm their way into political decision-making is extremely ill advised.
If we are a people hypnotized by gadgetry and distraction, Morozov provides the industrial-strength finger snap needed to wake us from the Web narcotic.
Morozov cites many examples of technology being heralded as a utopia-generator and freedom-enhancer: the telegraph, radio, TV, etc. only to have the dream busted each time.
The Internet may have brought people together, but it hasn’t changed human nature. So it is with the Internet, theft becomes identity theft, crime becomes cyber-crime, child porn becomes child porn file sharing, chain letters become spam and drug dealing in the alley moves to online markets.
People are finding each other, no question about it. With remarkable ease, terrorists, racists and anti-vaccers and science deniers can hook up, seal off their world from the slightest mote of logic and blast their views across the Web to locate fertile ground in other weak minds.
Much of the first portion of the book exhaustively illustrates that the Iranian “Twitter Revolution� of 2009 was mostly hype, an attractive news story that was almost completely unfounded. Even if social media tools such as mobile phones, Facebook and Twitter enable dissidents to better organize, those same tools are easily utilized by authoritarian governments against them. The cost of organizing online is a visibility that makes identification and tracking of activists simple. Use the web to find the names of the activists, use cell phone data to find out where they are, then round them up for arrest.
Worse still, there is evidence suggesting the Internet is depoliticizing people with its limitless entertainment options. Dictators are finding there is less dissent in their population the more porn and YouTube they get access to. For many authoritarian governments it simply doesn’t make sense to censor. Give them porn and action movies and suddenly there are less people in the street holding signs.
This well-written study convincingly argues the praise and potential heaped upon the Internet is premature and the impact on democracies not yet fully understood. It also spotlights the fact that Silicon Valley has a vested interest in growing the importance of all things digital since they are businesses, not humanitarian enterprises. Letting the digerati worm their way into political decision-making is extremely ill advised.
If we are a people hypnotized by gadgetry and distraction, Morozov provides the industrial-strength finger snap needed to wake us from the Web narcotic.
April 9, 2012
Really important book for the modern age- Morozov exposes the cliches that policymakers use when talking about the internet and explains the harm such oversimplifications can cause. However, the poor writing style of this book detracted from my reading experience- the book needs more editing, for typos, awkward phrasings, abused idioms, and grammatical errors unfortunately abound. Some of the ideas, as well, were poorly developed and some terms were never defined (like democracy! He kept using it in different ways to mean different things without explaining which!) and the like. He also picks on poor Jared Cohen a lot- the ex-state department worker serves Morozov as a scapegoat for all policymakers who believe the Internet is good for democracy.
These flaws do not detract from the value of this book. I was expecting an angry screed about the evils of the internet, like many books written these days. The Net Delusion is something far better. He thinks that cyber-utopianists, people who over-idealize the internet's potential, are actually limiting it because looking at it as a magic power that works fine on its own will stop us from coming up with smart ways to regulate it and make sure its good aspects are allowed to flourish and not its bad ones.
There were many times while reading this book where I stopped to think deeper into a point he brought up that I had never thought of before. Overall, a clear-headed and thoughtful look at the realities of modern political life in the technological arena, from someone who has experienced the pros and cons in his own work as well as exhaustively researching the issue.
These flaws do not detract from the value of this book. I was expecting an angry screed about the evils of the internet, like many books written these days. The Net Delusion is something far better. He thinks that cyber-utopianists, people who over-idealize the internet's potential, are actually limiting it because looking at it as a magic power that works fine on its own will stop us from coming up with smart ways to regulate it and make sure its good aspects are allowed to flourish and not its bad ones.
There were many times while reading this book where I stopped to think deeper into a point he brought up that I had never thought of before. Overall, a clear-headed and thoughtful look at the realities of modern political life in the technological arena, from someone who has experienced the pros and cons in his own work as well as exhaustively researching the issue.
October 28, 2018
I loved the idea and premise of the book but this is the biggest crap I’ve ever read, it took me three months to read it and took away any reading desire for the next three months. Really, it seems that he could express his idea in a 60 pages book and I would have been enlightened in the same way but would have saved hours of painful reading.
I must give the guy that the book is incredibly well documented so if you want to read one quote of after another for 320 pages this is the best thing you can ever read.
My recommendation find an online article that summarises the book, you will learn things and won’t end up hating the author for wasting your time.
I must give the guy that the book is incredibly well documented so if you want to read one quote of after another for 320 pages this is the best thing you can ever read.
My recommendation find an online article that summarises the book, you will learn things and won’t end up hating the author for wasting your time.
May 13, 2013
Long story short - the internet and technology is a double edged sword that can be used for promoting a free exchange of ideas and philosophies and can be used by authoritarian governments to track opposition groups and individuals, spread misinformation, and distract the people.
And the author really seems to dislike Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
I found the book interesting, in the beginning, although not quite as original and earth shattering as the author seemed to believe. The somewhat patronizing and condescending assumptions about the reader and "the West" got old halfway through, and by the second half of the book I was skimming and speed reading my way to the end.
That the internet can be used for surveillance, suppression of free speech, and propaganda purposes is not news, to anyone who has been paying attention. The details and examples the author gives are useful and might make one more intensely aware of the uses of technology, and that some "in the West" and in the U.S. government might be giving too much credit to twitter and the internet in terms of what good it can do to further democracy and the spreading of ideas and social change.
This book seems to be a cross between serious policy analysis and popular commentary (with the required commentator's snarkiness masquerading as clever).
And the author really seems to dislike Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
I found the book interesting, in the beginning, although not quite as original and earth shattering as the author seemed to believe. The somewhat patronizing and condescending assumptions about the reader and "the West" got old halfway through, and by the second half of the book I was skimming and speed reading my way to the end.
That the internet can be used for surveillance, suppression of free speech, and propaganda purposes is not news, to anyone who has been paying attention. The details and examples the author gives are useful and might make one more intensely aware of the uses of technology, and that some "in the West" and in the U.S. government might be giving too much credit to twitter and the internet in terms of what good it can do to further democracy and the spreading of ideas and social change.
This book seems to be a cross between serious policy analysis and popular commentary (with the required commentator's snarkiness masquerading as clever).
March 2, 2013
Morozov has done extensive and excellent research on how the Internet is heralded as a democratizing tool on theory but how things happen in practice. He has looked at the wide context surrounding events such as the "Iranian Twitter Revolution", something we cannot say of many journalists and certainly not of Internet gurus. It also gives a good overview of people´s expectations to various technologies throughout history such as the telegraph and the airplane.
It is a serious book that is probably not amongst the favorites of the digerati because it looks at reality and does not preach wishful thinking. Yet for anybody truly interested in an intellectual evaluation of the possibilities of the Internet, this is a must read.
It is a serious book that is probably not amongst the favorites of the digerati because it looks at reality and does not preach wishful thinking. Yet for anybody truly interested in an intellectual evaluation of the possibilities of the Internet, this is a must read.
October 11, 2017
The book's core thesis is that it's counterproductive to speak about the internet as having universal pro-democracy impacts when it produces situationally-dependent results. It does this by detailing ways that the internet reinforces authoritarian states first, theorizing connections second, and offering anything like a solution a distant third.
An interesting corrective to utopian views of the internet, and an ode to complexity. It's weird that it has a Malcolm Gladwell quote on the cover.
An interesting corrective to utopian views of the internet, and an ode to complexity. It's weird that it has a Malcolm Gladwell quote on the cover.
March 20, 2022
interesting book on the dark side of internet, but it tends to become repetitive and unstructured at some point, so I tended to swipe through the last 100 pages.
September 26, 2018
Granted The Net Delusion is almost a decade old now, its relevance has really come into its own in the past two years where the US has had a kind of social media comeuppance on the grandest scale; i.e. the obsession with the Russian meddling in the 2016 elections and the dissemination of “fake news� across social channels are part of the core of what Morozov talks about in this book to express why cyber-utopianism is not just naïve arrogance, but dangerous in its idealism. Perhaps no current event better encapsulates the extremely dangerous elements of free, unfettered social media than the genocide of the Rohingya in Myanmar. Facebook is synonymous with the internet in the region and on the platform xenophobic propaganda against Muslims spreads like Staph, crowding out moderating voices, and rotting the minds of its Buddhist-majority population. To be clear, anti-Muslim propaganda on Facebook did not start the genocide in Myanmar, but it has helped normalize it, made it acceptable, if not noble to the general populace.
I love a cynic, especially one so effective at his arguments and Morozov is just that as he systematically exposes the flawed philosophy and politics of internet-centrism and cyber-utopianism, showing how our liberal democratic society likes to see a reflection of ourselves in other nations, and by doing so, blind ourselves to weaknesses in a system, and often blind ourselves to the reality of on-the-ground movements and needs in regional fights for liberty and civil rights from oppressive regimes. Being a book from 2011, Morozov returns again and again to the “Twitter Revolution� in Iran in 2009, which, in the West, was portrayed as the paragon of the democratizing power of internet freedom. The reality was, as the West was navel-gazing about how Twitter empowered a movement, American social media, at most, merely amplified the news to the West while providing an authoritarian regime with photos of dissidents, names, locations, etc. that could (and were) then used to crush resistance.
Perhaps one of the more alarming parts of this book was on state censorship. Morozov talks about the ways we live in algorithms. Sometimes referred to as “filter bubbles,� companies like Google aggregate vast amounts of data about our online behaviors to more effectively sell us stuff, show us things we might like. In essence, your personal tastes live as algorithms on server farms across this globe, being utilized for capitalistic gains. We think of it in terms of exposure: a machine learns our behavior to get us to look at more stuff—or, rather, buy more stuff. But what if a state decided to use machine learning to do the inverse? Selective, targeted censorship. While state-wide censorship is easy to pinpoint, attack and circumvent by dissidents with the technical knowhow, algorithmic censorship becomes, in essence, invisible as censorship becomes a bubble specific to a targeted individual. It’s a nightmare vision of where our own liberal democracy could go if regulation goes the wrong way, and authoritarianism’s grip strengthens over our institutions.
While Morozov’s argument through the book is compelling, he shies away from making any kind of suggestions on ways to move forward with regard to politicking and regulating, critical thinking, or capitalistic mechanisms that could step in as a corrective to the utopianism of the technologic revolution we live in. For all it’s bluster, he doesn’t quite get to identifying a root cause to this utopian idealism. But, perhaps, he doesn’t have to as we’re now seeing shifting attitudes in the choppy wake of a sham election in our own democratic safe-haven, where our own tools of democratization have been turned against us. Now that we stare down the barrel of that social media gun, I wonder if we’ll make reasonable regulatory moves. Or if we’ll turn a blind eye to this Russian Roulette.
I love a cynic, especially one so effective at his arguments and Morozov is just that as he systematically exposes the flawed philosophy and politics of internet-centrism and cyber-utopianism, showing how our liberal democratic society likes to see a reflection of ourselves in other nations, and by doing so, blind ourselves to weaknesses in a system, and often blind ourselves to the reality of on-the-ground movements and needs in regional fights for liberty and civil rights from oppressive regimes. Being a book from 2011, Morozov returns again and again to the “Twitter Revolution� in Iran in 2009, which, in the West, was portrayed as the paragon of the democratizing power of internet freedom. The reality was, as the West was navel-gazing about how Twitter empowered a movement, American social media, at most, merely amplified the news to the West while providing an authoritarian regime with photos of dissidents, names, locations, etc. that could (and were) then used to crush resistance.
Perhaps one of the more alarming parts of this book was on state censorship. Morozov talks about the ways we live in algorithms. Sometimes referred to as “filter bubbles,� companies like Google aggregate vast amounts of data about our online behaviors to more effectively sell us stuff, show us things we might like. In essence, your personal tastes live as algorithms on server farms across this globe, being utilized for capitalistic gains. We think of it in terms of exposure: a machine learns our behavior to get us to look at more stuff—or, rather, buy more stuff. But what if a state decided to use machine learning to do the inverse? Selective, targeted censorship. While state-wide censorship is easy to pinpoint, attack and circumvent by dissidents with the technical knowhow, algorithmic censorship becomes, in essence, invisible as censorship becomes a bubble specific to a targeted individual. It’s a nightmare vision of where our own liberal democracy could go if regulation goes the wrong way, and authoritarianism’s grip strengthens over our institutions.
While Morozov’s argument through the book is compelling, he shies away from making any kind of suggestions on ways to move forward with regard to politicking and regulating, critical thinking, or capitalistic mechanisms that could step in as a corrective to the utopianism of the technologic revolution we live in. For all it’s bluster, he doesn’t quite get to identifying a root cause to this utopian idealism. But, perhaps, he doesn’t have to as we’re now seeing shifting attitudes in the choppy wake of a sham election in our own democratic safe-haven, where our own tools of democratization have been turned against us. Now that we stare down the barrel of that social media gun, I wonder if we’ll make reasonable regulatory moves. Or if we’ll turn a blind eye to this Russian Roulette.
January 22, 2012
Morozov attacks both cyber-utopians (if there are any still out there) and neoliberal triumphalists who want to credit the Internet for, well, just about anything that benefits them. These critiques sound very much like mainstream globalization debates with some anti-capitalist rhetoric refocused toward the Internet and digital media communication technologies. That is, nothing new. But this book is nevertheless an important critique for how Morozov, through his lively style and effective use of contemporary examples, brings these debates to a wider audience. His research, analysis, and arguments help us understand critically popular constructions, in the media and the markets, of the net and technology. And in that way, this book reads like a collection of highly literate magazine essays--good ones.
If there is a weakness in his argument, however, it is in how he measures effect. For example, he claims that the 2009 Iranian uprising failed -- and thus Twitter could not have any substantive role in the movement -- because it had no impact on the state. As Jeffery Juris, an anthropologist who has studied social movements firsthand, claims, this is "perhaps the most obvious way" to assess effect. Perhaps a less obvious, but more telling way, would have been to see down the road if Internet-supported participation in these social movements created any changes in the political discourse or in protestors' identities. That is, had Morozov offered a more sophisticated analysis and discussion of the role the Internet has played in such events, we might be better positioned to accept his claim about our own delusions.
If there is a weakness in his argument, however, it is in how he measures effect. For example, he claims that the 2009 Iranian uprising failed -- and thus Twitter could not have any substantive role in the movement -- because it had no impact on the state. As Jeffery Juris, an anthropologist who has studied social movements firsthand, claims, this is "perhaps the most obvious way" to assess effect. Perhaps a less obvious, but more telling way, would have been to see down the road if Internet-supported participation in these social movements created any changes in the political discourse or in protestors' identities. That is, had Morozov offered a more sophisticated analysis and discussion of the role the Internet has played in such events, we might be better positioned to accept his claim about our own delusions.
May 12, 2013
If it were possible, I'd go for 4 and a half stars for this book. It's a very interesting read about the state of internet all around the world but especially in authoritarian countries. While some things are already a bit outdated, it offers a lot food for thought, brings up issues I never even stopped to think about and in general discusses the way we use and talk about internet in a fascinating way. It draws parallels between historical and current events and is a must read for anyone who is interested in politics, current events and/or the internet and its power. It's thoroughly researched and covers the pros and cons of every issue. The only negative thing I have to say is that some of the chapters were a bit too long and might worked better if some things were left out, especially since not all of those things seemed to be fully relevant to what was discussed in the chapter.
February 9, 2011
This is an interesting book that makes good points. Sure, it sets up straw men, but the "the Internet will save the world" crowd can really get ahead of itself, so refuting seemingly ridiculous arguments is sometimes in order here. Where the net delusion goes wrong is in trying to take its hard headed pessimism too far, and ending up contradicting itself. The Internet cant be both an ineffective way for progressives to organize popular protest and an effective way for reactionaries to organize political protests. It's also unclear why opposing free speech because unpleasant people say unpleasant things is a good idea. (the snide remarks in parenthetical statements at the end of each paragraph were also a bit excessive.)
September 30, 2017
Bana diyor ki "her gün senin için üretilen eğlenceli ve anlamsız içerikler yüzünden apolitik oluyorsun." Ulan ben marul gezdiren Çinlileri görmek için ölürüm be.
Sadece Blinkist'den baktım. Galiba kitabı almam gerekiyor.
Sadece Blinkist'den baktım. Galiba kitabı almam gerekiyor.
February 20, 2018
Interesting read and very relevant to what is happening in the cyber world today. Morozov wrote this book in 2011 and I would be curious to see what he had to say about last year's election and the way in which the Internet has changed in the past 7 years.
March 1, 2013
The first throes of modern Internet nostalgia have descended, and with it, the weight of reconciling not only life pre-‘net but the fresh idealism that always accompanies a shift in telecommunications (see: telegraph, telephone). Twitter’s constant deluge of compressed inanities and pointless musings have supplanted Usenet’s core of dedicated, experienced and technically savvy users. The internet used to have some barriers to entry; most of them were financial. If you were “online� it was because you wanted to be. But being plugged in back in the 1980s and 1990s didn’t imbue you with the title “Networking Scion� and lay upon your brow the gift of intelligent discourse.
Is it the 24 hour news cycle or the 140 character limit that is compressing the time requirement of nostalgia, or has it always been this way?
The Net Delusion struggles against the common Western interpretation that life in the West is the Ur-template that can be extrapolated to life everywhere on the planet, while still maintaining that our online vices and negative habits won’t translate to the rest of the world. It is an absurdity to hold the Internet as a cesspool filled with anonymous, negative commentary and meaningless snark but also the last best hope of a free and connected global village. U.S. Foreign policy is not immune to this internet-dissonance:“Concerns over getting oil out of Azerbaijan won’t give way to concerns over getting tweets from the Azeri opposition anytime soon, if only because Washington has long made a strategic decision not to undermine the friendly Azeri regime.� The impetus and undercurrent of The Net Delusion is the belief that the West is attempting to repurpose the tools of the last major global conflict—the Cold War—simply replacing samizdat with blogs and awaiting the fall of the digital Berlin Wall collapse. Even the metaphors have been refashioned: "Ever since a 1997 article in Wired magazine dubbed this system “the Great Firewall of China,� most Western observers have relied on such mental imagery to conceptualize both the problem and the potential solutions." This makes for great headlines and catchy phrases, but it doesn't seem to bear much causal relationship to actual history:
If you’re a Western user of the Internet,The Net Delusion will fill in some dark spots. There is a repetitious cadence to the ideas, which is to its benefit. It does take the mind a few attempts to grasp the basic concept presented precisely because it is contrary to everything being tossed around right now. In a few years, the rosy glow of nostalgia will color this era as simplistic: the dawn of participatory networks, maybe—or perhaps the fomenting of new wave of digital sectarian violence? Whatever broad brush the present is painted with in the future, the tenant of The Net Delusion will remain to as true then as it is now; the internet is not a tool unique to freedom—it’s just a tool:
Other types of governments can use it too.
Is it the 24 hour news cycle or the 140 character limit that is compressing the time requirement of nostalgia, or has it always been this way?
The brevity of the telegraph’s messages didn’t sit well with many literary intellectuals either; it may have opened access to more sources of information, but it also made public discourse much shallower. In 1889, the Spectator, one of the empire’s finest publications, chided the telegraph for causing “a vast diffusion of what is called ‘news,� the recording of every event, and especially of every crime, everywhere without perceptible interval of time. The constant diffusion of statements in snippets...must in the end, one would think, deteriorate the intelligence of all to whom the telegraph appeal.�It’s in spotting the exceptionalism that The Net Delusion does it most subtle and finest work. The Internet, the “American� internet, is often touted as a tool of disdain—used by the dregs of society—to bandy about wretched opinions, pointless gossip, and non-stop distraction. The caricature of the prototypical internet user has spawned a thousand memes—what they all have in common is a supreme lack of self-awareness; the internet isn’t a special club for the lonely and the broken, and the toxic self-destruction splashed across the Internet in an attempt to portray all Internet users negatively from other users on the Internet is deluded.
It’s only Americans and Europeans Google is presumed to be making stupid; for everyone else, it’s presumed to be a tool of enlightenment. While many in the West concede that the Internet has not solved and may have only aggravated many negative aspects of political culture—consider the rise of the “death panels�-kind of discourse—they are the first to proclaim that when it comes to authoritarian states, the Internet enables their citizens to see through the propaganda.This internet exceptionalism—Orientalism in the digital age—does have an impact, conceptually:
The carefree way in which Western policymakers are beginning to throw around metaphors like “virtual walls� or “information curtains� is disturbing. Not only do such metaphors play up only certain aspects of the “Internet freedom� challenge (for example, the difficulty of sending critical messages into the target country), they also downplay other aspects (the fact that the Web can be used by the very government of the target country for the purposes of surveillance or propaganda).
The Net Delusion struggles against the common Western interpretation that life in the West is the Ur-template that can be extrapolated to life everywhere on the planet, while still maintaining that our online vices and negative habits won’t translate to the rest of the world. It is an absurdity to hold the Internet as a cesspool filled with anonymous, negative commentary and meaningless snark but also the last best hope of a free and connected global village. U.S. Foreign policy is not immune to this internet-dissonance:“Concerns over getting oil out of Azerbaijan won’t give way to concerns over getting tweets from the Azeri opposition anytime soon, if only because Washington has long made a strategic decision not to undermine the friendly Azeri regime.� The impetus and undercurrent of The Net Delusion is the belief that the West is attempting to repurpose the tools of the last major global conflict—the Cold War—simply replacing samizdat with blogs and awaiting the fall of the digital Berlin Wall collapse. Even the metaphors have been refashioned: "Ever since a 1997 article in Wired magazine dubbed this system “the Great Firewall of China,� most Western observers have relied on such mental imagery to conceptualize both the problem and the potential solutions." This makes for great headlines and catchy phrases, but it doesn't seem to bear much causal relationship to actual history:
Any information-centric account of the end of the Cold War is bound to prioritize the role of its users—dissidents, ordinary protesters, NGOs—and downplay the role played by structural, historical factors—the unbearable foreign debt accumulated by many Central European countries, the slowing down of the Soviet economy, the inability of the Warsaw Pact to compete with NATO....but if it turns out that the dissidents did not play much of a role in toppling communism, then the popular expectations about the new generation of Internet revolutions may be overblown as well.The conflation of “net neutrality� with “Internet Freedom� furthers the international confusion of what direction, exactly, the Internet is headed, be it through government intervention, government control, or human impulse. That much of the modern Internet is built from American technology does not help refute the image that rather than "neutrality" or "freedom," internet access represents American imperialism, expansion; cyber-global Manifest Destiny. "Even though Google does not publicize this widely, Keyhole, the predecessor to Google Earth, which Google bought in 2005, was funded through In-Q-Tel, which is the CIA’s for-profit investment arm. That Google Earth is somehow a CIA-funded vehicle for destroying the world is a recurring theme in rare comments given by those working in security agencies of other countries." The perception, however untrue, of being painted as American agents is just as damaging for dissidents in authoritarian regimes. When—as the international article from Reuters stated�"The U.S. State Department said on Tuesday it had contacted the social networking service Twitter to urge it to delay a planned upgrade that would have cut daytime service to Iranians who are disputing their election," it's hard to avoid the specter of undue influence of idealism in "neutral" corporations.
Moeed Ahmad, director of new media for Al-Jazeera, stated that fact-checking by his channel during the protests could confirm only sixty active Twitter accounts in Tehran, a number that fell to six once the Iranian authorities cracked down on online communications. This is not to understate the overall prominence of Iran-related news on Twitter in the first week of protests...it’s just that the vast majority of them were not authored or retweeted by those in Iran.Twitter's impact was less for Iranians who were disputing the elections and more for Westerners congratulating themselves on push-button digital activism. The Internet isn’t a targeted samizdat, and a political message will likely only find those already predisposed to political action. With the internet comes entertainment:
[Researchers] found that those East German youth who could receive Western television were, overall, more satisfied and content with the regime; the ones who could not receive Western television were much more politicized, more critical of the regime, and, most interestingly, more likely to apply for exit visas. Thus, they wrote, “in an ironic twist for Marxism, capitalist television seems to have performed the same narcotizing function in communist East Germany that Karl Marx had attributed to religious beliefs in capitalism societies when he condemned religion as ‘opium of the people.’�If popular opinion is taken as true, Western Democracies a depicted as effective governmental forms while their constituents are moronic, mouthbreathing basement dwellers who are incapable of parsing truth from propaganda, grown slothful and stupid on Huxleian bacchanalian excess. Totalitarian and Authoritarian governments are plodding, bumbling bloated corpses ready to fall, leading a driven and austere population, each and every one ready to give their freedom, lives, and family for the chance to blog their opinions and vote.
From the government’s perspective, it’s far better to keep young Russians away from politics altogether, having them consume funny videos on Russia’s own version of YouTube, RuTube (owned by Gazprom, the country’s state-owned energy behemoth), or on Russia.ru, where they might be exposed to a rare ideological message as well. Many Russians are happy to comply, not least because of the high quality of such online distractions. The Russian authorities may be onto something here: The most effective system of Internet control is not the one that has the most sophisticated and draconian system of censorship, but the one that has no need of censorship whatsoever.The Internet is being treated like an analogue of the physical world when it suits the narrative to do so, and a unique location—cyberspace—the remainder of the time. It is treated like the communications tool that it is almost never.
Nations are now arguing about whether Google Earth Renders their borders in accordance with their wishes. Syria and Israel continue battling about how the contested Golan Heights territory should be listed in Facebook’s drop-down menus. Indian and Pakistan bloggers have been competing to mark parts of the contested territory of Kashmir as belonging to either of the two countries on Google Maps.It seems more likely that the Internet will not dissolve nations and boundaries but further emphasis sects, enclaves, niches, or groups of like-minded individuals—confirmation bias, justification, and propaganda, coupled with the uncoupling of distance to time, will allow self-selection and group identity across an international landscape.
Tweets will not dissolve all of our national, cultural, and religious differences; they may actually accentuate them. The cyber-utopian belief that the Internet would turn us into uber-tolerant citizens of the world, all too eager to put our vile prejudices on hold and open up our minds to what we see on our monitors, has proved to be unfounded. In most cases, the only people who still believe in the ideal of an electronic global village are those who would have become tolerant cosmopolitans even without the Internet: the globe-trotting intellectual elite.
If you’re a Western user of the Internet,The Net Delusion will fill in some dark spots. There is a repetitious cadence to the ideas, which is to its benefit. It does take the mind a few attempts to grasp the basic concept presented precisely because it is contrary to everything being tossed around right now. In a few years, the rosy glow of nostalgia will color this era as simplistic: the dawn of participatory networks, maybe—or perhaps the fomenting of new wave of digital sectarian violence? Whatever broad brush the present is painted with in the future, the tenant of The Net Delusion will remain to as true then as it is now; the internet is not a tool unique to freedom—it’s just a tool:
In 2009 police in Azerbaijan reprimanded forty-three people who voted for an Armenian performer (Armenia and Azerbaijan are at war over the disputed Nagorno-Karabach territory) in the popular Eurovision contest, summoning some of them to police headquarters, where they were accused of undermining national security, and forced to write official explanations. The votes were cast by SMS.
Other types of governments can use it too.
May 26, 2013
The following is a joint review of two books by Evgeny Morozov and is cross-posted in both review sections.
This is going to be a very atypical review. In reading The Net Delusion and Click Here, I was attempting to develop a cohesive personal position on the problems of internet advocacy. There is a lot of literature and scholarly articles on the benefits of using the internet in the cause of advocacy, either as a method of raising awareness or as a means to a fundraising end, but there is very little in the way of criticism outside of the shallow critique of ‘Slacktivism.� Morozov’s books offered a more cutting look at my subject area, but failed, by and large, to dig deeper or offer a cohesive alternative. This is broadly true of both books, but is more apparent in Click Here.
Because both books failed to meet my personal metric for usefulness, it is difficult for me to recommend them. Even ignoring that, both books left me with a bad taste in my mouth, not because Morozov’s ideas are wrong or uninteresting, but because he is such a hostile author. That hostility, directed against politicians, pundits, academics, and above all else the Techno-Literati of Silicon Valley, is an enormous barrier-to-entry for readers who haven’t already bought into Morozov’s aggressive architecture. Again, Click Here is the worst offender, with The Net Delusion appearing relatively calm and reasoned. But let’s go ahead and get into the books.
The Net Delusion is a hard-hitting critique of the United Sates� infatuation with the idea that the freedom of information can destabilize and eventually destroy authoritarian regimes. The book’s central example is the failure of the 2009 Iranian protests to accomplish anything notable, in spite of significant organizational help from Twitter and other social networking sites. Well, the help is debatable, but Morozov goes on to claim that the internet can be detrimental to democratic revolution, either because of the regime’s control of public opinion, as in China, or because the perceived freedom of information that the internet brings suppresses the desire for more freedom/political involvement, as in many former Soviet states.
Morozov does have other points, and does an excellent job of applying each one to a particular nation or regime. Obviously the use of the internet in Venezuela, where Hugo Chavez had built an impressive following on Twitter and had iron control of the cell phone networks, is going to be different from the use of the internet in China. And that’s the real crux of Morozov’s argument: that it is irresponsible for the United States to be basing foreign policy on the ill-defined and overly broad use of internet technology, when the internet situation varies so much from nation to nation. His criticism of Hillary Clinton’s blithe use of internet technology as a substitute for a cohesive foreign policy stance is easily the most compelling argument in either book.
Still, at the end of his attack, Morozov doesn’t have any better ideas. He warns against the dangers of internet-centrism and cyber-utopianism which work to blind us to the failings or shortcomings of new internet technologies, but offers nothing in return but a call for increased vigilance and better situational assessments. It is true that his argument that we cannot apply a single solution to these wildly varied problems negates the need for a single, all-encompassing fix, but at the same time there is something disingenuous about a desire to effect change that has no ideas, good or bad.
The shape of Morozov’s argument also makes it very hard to criticize. Of course increased scrutiny is a good idea, but it was a good idea before Morozov voiced it and it will continue to be a good idea whether you read his books or not. In the meantime, the reality of the world is that sometimes we do not have sufficient time to do the due diligence on these incredibly complicated scenarios and a lack of action can be as dangerous as the wrong action. There’s a larger argument here that I’ll get to at the end, but for the moment let’s shift to Morozov’s other book.
To Save Everything, Click Here shares many themes with The Net Delusion but focuses on the apparent threat of ‘technological solutionism.� Morozov has borrowed the term from the world of architecture where it refers to the desire to solve all problems regardless of how minor or inconsequential they are. In the context of the appended ‘technological,� the term targets companies like Google, Apple and Microsoft who endeavor to solve what they perceive as global problems by increasing efficiency; typically in the context of data use or organization.
Morozov comes down hard on this style of technology because he feels that it separates us from our ability to make mistakes, and sometimes solves problems that don’t exist, or worse, creates new problems where there were none. His most compelling arguments revolve around the ideas of political transparency and the notion that when politicians know we’re watching, they tend to value the opinions of the masses over their own judgment, for better or for worse. There is a legitimate concern here. Research has shown that individuals are very likely to engage in self-censoring or modified personal behavior when they are under high degrees of scrutiny AND they are aware of the observers� desires, as is the case when politicians are observed by their heavily polled constituency. There is already some evidence to show that when the Federal Reserve System made its sessions public, fewer dissenting opinions were heard by the Board.
Unfortunately once you get beyond Morozov’s legitimate political concerns, the rest of his argument looks pretty tenuous. Not because his points are ill-constructed or wrong, but because Morozov becomes increasingly belligerent as he rambles across a wide swath of largely irrelevant technical examples and some obviously stilted historical summations. Morozov writes the book as if it were an extended blog post, with no notion of academic decorum, or even a modicum of respect for those who disagree with him. It should be noted that Morozov is employed as a writer and blogger for Foreign Policy magazine. Morozov’s distain for Silicon Valley, TED Talks and cyber-anything undermines the legitimacy of his arguments by rejecting all other viewpoints as either juvenile or just stupid.
To back up his monomaniacal diatribe, Morozov cherry-picks the worst examples of tech-punditry and holds them up to his version of the best of the best in social criticism, historical analysis and peer review. This one-sided vision of technology Morozov ends up creating is no better than the cyber-utopian or internet-centric visions that he argues against. It’s just bombast and hyperbole mixed with contempt and served as gospel.
One thing that is interesting is that Morozov, who spends much of both books warning us of the dangers of painting things with too broad a brush, offers only the most general of advice on how to deal with the challenges he presents. Whether he is cautioning against treating all authoritarian states the same way or opposing the desire to treat ‘the internet� as a universal solution to all of our problems, his solution is the same: Don’t. There is no deeper analysis offered to separate out useful mental groupings from those that are close-minded. The human ability to group diverse things into categories and then draw conclusions from their similarities is one of the fundamental aspects of innovation and the basis for scientific progress. While jumping to conclusions is rarely praised, it is the same set of skills that enables logical leaps or the seemingly crazy hypotheses that can end up moving our understanding of the world forward.
These values, values that Morozov argues in defense of, are the same negative aspects that he vilifies when placed in the echo chamber of Silicon Valley. Organizing and sorting information is an incredibly useful ability and our technological progress owes a lot to past technologies that have made it easier to sort and retrieve information. The internet, or rather the collection of technologies that make up the internet, is just another in a long series of advances that does the same thing, admittedly on a much larger scale. While Morozov is correct in his assertion that ‘the internet� should not be the solution to every problem we face, particularly in the fields of politics and interpersonal communication, he is also too quick to dismiss the ability of individuals to police the emerging facets of our networked society that disturb us. I believe we are uniquely able to look at the growing mass of information that makes up the internet and make use of it, rather than the other way around. No matter how you spin it, the internet is governed by human traits and that, more than anything else, will define the shape of our technology in the years to come.
This is going to be a very atypical review. In reading The Net Delusion and Click Here, I was attempting to develop a cohesive personal position on the problems of internet advocacy. There is a lot of literature and scholarly articles on the benefits of using the internet in the cause of advocacy, either as a method of raising awareness or as a means to a fundraising end, but there is very little in the way of criticism outside of the shallow critique of ‘Slacktivism.� Morozov’s books offered a more cutting look at my subject area, but failed, by and large, to dig deeper or offer a cohesive alternative. This is broadly true of both books, but is more apparent in Click Here.
Because both books failed to meet my personal metric for usefulness, it is difficult for me to recommend them. Even ignoring that, both books left me with a bad taste in my mouth, not because Morozov’s ideas are wrong or uninteresting, but because he is such a hostile author. That hostility, directed against politicians, pundits, academics, and above all else the Techno-Literati of Silicon Valley, is an enormous barrier-to-entry for readers who haven’t already bought into Morozov’s aggressive architecture. Again, Click Here is the worst offender, with The Net Delusion appearing relatively calm and reasoned. But let’s go ahead and get into the books.
The Net Delusion is a hard-hitting critique of the United Sates� infatuation with the idea that the freedom of information can destabilize and eventually destroy authoritarian regimes. The book’s central example is the failure of the 2009 Iranian protests to accomplish anything notable, in spite of significant organizational help from Twitter and other social networking sites. Well, the help is debatable, but Morozov goes on to claim that the internet can be detrimental to democratic revolution, either because of the regime’s control of public opinion, as in China, or because the perceived freedom of information that the internet brings suppresses the desire for more freedom/political involvement, as in many former Soviet states.
Morozov does have other points, and does an excellent job of applying each one to a particular nation or regime. Obviously the use of the internet in Venezuela, where Hugo Chavez had built an impressive following on Twitter and had iron control of the cell phone networks, is going to be different from the use of the internet in China. And that’s the real crux of Morozov’s argument: that it is irresponsible for the United States to be basing foreign policy on the ill-defined and overly broad use of internet technology, when the internet situation varies so much from nation to nation. His criticism of Hillary Clinton’s blithe use of internet technology as a substitute for a cohesive foreign policy stance is easily the most compelling argument in either book.
Still, at the end of his attack, Morozov doesn’t have any better ideas. He warns against the dangers of internet-centrism and cyber-utopianism which work to blind us to the failings or shortcomings of new internet technologies, but offers nothing in return but a call for increased vigilance and better situational assessments. It is true that his argument that we cannot apply a single solution to these wildly varied problems negates the need for a single, all-encompassing fix, but at the same time there is something disingenuous about a desire to effect change that has no ideas, good or bad.
The shape of Morozov’s argument also makes it very hard to criticize. Of course increased scrutiny is a good idea, but it was a good idea before Morozov voiced it and it will continue to be a good idea whether you read his books or not. In the meantime, the reality of the world is that sometimes we do not have sufficient time to do the due diligence on these incredibly complicated scenarios and a lack of action can be as dangerous as the wrong action. There’s a larger argument here that I’ll get to at the end, but for the moment let’s shift to Morozov’s other book.
To Save Everything, Click Here shares many themes with The Net Delusion but focuses on the apparent threat of ‘technological solutionism.� Morozov has borrowed the term from the world of architecture where it refers to the desire to solve all problems regardless of how minor or inconsequential they are. In the context of the appended ‘technological,� the term targets companies like Google, Apple and Microsoft who endeavor to solve what they perceive as global problems by increasing efficiency; typically in the context of data use or organization.
Morozov comes down hard on this style of technology because he feels that it separates us from our ability to make mistakes, and sometimes solves problems that don’t exist, or worse, creates new problems where there were none. His most compelling arguments revolve around the ideas of political transparency and the notion that when politicians know we’re watching, they tend to value the opinions of the masses over their own judgment, for better or for worse. There is a legitimate concern here. Research has shown that individuals are very likely to engage in self-censoring or modified personal behavior when they are under high degrees of scrutiny AND they are aware of the observers� desires, as is the case when politicians are observed by their heavily polled constituency. There is already some evidence to show that when the Federal Reserve System made its sessions public, fewer dissenting opinions were heard by the Board.
Unfortunately once you get beyond Morozov’s legitimate political concerns, the rest of his argument looks pretty tenuous. Not because his points are ill-constructed or wrong, but because Morozov becomes increasingly belligerent as he rambles across a wide swath of largely irrelevant technical examples and some obviously stilted historical summations. Morozov writes the book as if it were an extended blog post, with no notion of academic decorum, or even a modicum of respect for those who disagree with him. It should be noted that Morozov is employed as a writer and blogger for Foreign Policy magazine. Morozov’s distain for Silicon Valley, TED Talks and cyber-anything undermines the legitimacy of his arguments by rejecting all other viewpoints as either juvenile or just stupid.
To back up his monomaniacal diatribe, Morozov cherry-picks the worst examples of tech-punditry and holds them up to his version of the best of the best in social criticism, historical analysis and peer review. This one-sided vision of technology Morozov ends up creating is no better than the cyber-utopian or internet-centric visions that he argues against. It’s just bombast and hyperbole mixed with contempt and served as gospel.
One thing that is interesting is that Morozov, who spends much of both books warning us of the dangers of painting things with too broad a brush, offers only the most general of advice on how to deal with the challenges he presents. Whether he is cautioning against treating all authoritarian states the same way or opposing the desire to treat ‘the internet� as a universal solution to all of our problems, his solution is the same: Don’t. There is no deeper analysis offered to separate out useful mental groupings from those that are close-minded. The human ability to group diverse things into categories and then draw conclusions from their similarities is one of the fundamental aspects of innovation and the basis for scientific progress. While jumping to conclusions is rarely praised, it is the same set of skills that enables logical leaps or the seemingly crazy hypotheses that can end up moving our understanding of the world forward.
These values, values that Morozov argues in defense of, are the same negative aspects that he vilifies when placed in the echo chamber of Silicon Valley. Organizing and sorting information is an incredibly useful ability and our technological progress owes a lot to past technologies that have made it easier to sort and retrieve information. The internet, or rather the collection of technologies that make up the internet, is just another in a long series of advances that does the same thing, admittedly on a much larger scale. While Morozov is correct in his assertion that ‘the internet� should not be the solution to every problem we face, particularly in the fields of politics and interpersonal communication, he is also too quick to dismiss the ability of individuals to police the emerging facets of our networked society that disturb us. I believe we are uniquely able to look at the growing mass of information that makes up the internet and make use of it, rather than the other way around. No matter how you spin it, the internet is governed by human traits and that, more than anything else, will define the shape of our technology in the years to come.
November 19, 2018
Morozov views that Western policymakers' opinions regarding internet freedom very much reflects their Cold War upbringing, in part thinking that the internet is like the samizdat. In reality, the internet can be used by both democracy promoters and anti-democracy groups to both promote their own causes.
Furthermore, Morozov also highlights how the internet can be used by authoritarian governments for surveillance and censorship, citing Russian and Chinese examples.
Some parts of this book can be very eye-opening. In one part, Morozov states that we should now consider the Orwell-Huxley debate obsolete, because in a world with internet, the government can do both: provide mind-lulling entertainment that distracts the masses from politics and censor speech at the same time.
Writing from 2010, this book holds the prescient opening salvo for policies regarding "internet freedom" and "cyber-utopianism". We see some of what this book suggests these days, with China's social rating system and various strongmen "poli-tainment" experienced by millions all over the world, especially the oppressed Global South.
One letdown from the book is that it holds back from venturing to policy recommendations, but instead provides a manifesto for what a "cyber-realist" (vs. a "cyber-utopianist") would look like and what positions they would hold. However, I figure that this letdown is not so big, and should not detract from the overall rating of the book. 4.75/5.
Furthermore, Morozov also highlights how the internet can be used by authoritarian governments for surveillance and censorship, citing Russian and Chinese examples.
Some parts of this book can be very eye-opening. In one part, Morozov states that we should now consider the Orwell-Huxley debate obsolete, because in a world with internet, the government can do both: provide mind-lulling entertainment that distracts the masses from politics and censor speech at the same time.
Writing from 2010, this book holds the prescient opening salvo for policies regarding "internet freedom" and "cyber-utopianism". We see some of what this book suggests these days, with China's social rating system and various strongmen "poli-tainment" experienced by millions all over the world, especially the oppressed Global South.
One letdown from the book is that it holds back from venturing to policy recommendations, but instead provides a manifesto for what a "cyber-realist" (vs. a "cyber-utopianist") would look like and what positions they would hold. However, I figure that this letdown is not so big, and should not detract from the overall rating of the book. 4.75/5.
May 15, 2021
I finished this a few years too late, and maybe you did, too: a lot of Morozov's assertions about the dark potential of the internet were on full display since the mid-2010s. He alludes the rise of Trumpian misinformation, Russian ops within Facebook, the purges in Sri Lanka and Burma, the billions of dollars spent on the domestic surveillance state, and the professionalization of cyber-crime through Silk Road and ransomware firms. All these things run counter to the cyber-utopianism that serves as this book's foil, and reading this today, in 2021, I feel a bit late to the party.
But I think the value is that *these lessons are still germane today.* For a designer such as myself, it is a reminder that we must consider not the intended use of our product, but whether it meets the needs of humans in the context that they will use it in. Technological determinism is a faulty construct with a political subtext: tech is good, it arcs toward justice in all things, and that anything can be solved on a technical means. This absolves Silicon Valley and tech firms of their actions, and our policymakers of reviewing their assumptions or actions.
Read this for a wholly different look at the internet in the context of technological development throughout human history. Prepare to be sobered, maybe a little wounded, but at least you'll be clear-eyed afterwards.
But I think the value is that *these lessons are still germane today.* For a designer such as myself, it is a reminder that we must consider not the intended use of our product, but whether it meets the needs of humans in the context that they will use it in. Technological determinism is a faulty construct with a political subtext: tech is good, it arcs toward justice in all things, and that anything can be solved on a technical means. This absolves Silicon Valley and tech firms of their actions, and our policymakers of reviewing their assumptions or actions.
Read this for a wholly different look at the internet in the context of technological development throughout human history. Prepare to be sobered, maybe a little wounded, but at least you'll be clear-eyed afterwards.
April 1, 2011
The ideas in this book are not unique. Social networking has many advantages, but people tend to exaggerate their performance and importance. In a general setting, this might hurt a corporations marketing plan, but Morozov does something different here. He discusses the problems with applying this notion that social networking and free internet in oppressed areas is the miracle drug that will free everyone. He argues that other causes lead to a successful revolution and to believe that the use of Twitter to organize and effective lead a revolution is foolish and dangerous, in particular to those on the front lines doing the tweeting. In fact, over reliance on its importance will counteract the revolutions efforts. Morozov is also very pessimistic in this book. Turning away from the warzone, he examines the lives of those supporting the revolution. He feels that they would support a revolution based on appearances and impressing their friends rather than truly feeling for the cause. To him, this kind of support is worse than no support at all as it also exaggerates the importance of events. Morozov seems to argue that we aren’t these freedom loving free thinkers, but selfish self-centered narcissists who don’t really care about revolutions or movements unless the support impresses their friends. This kind of cynicism rather ruins the book. Furthermore, he argues that a free internet has just lead to more passivity as people would prefer to look at lolcats online than start a revolution or do something more meaningful.
“While we thought the Internet might give us a generation of “digital renegades� it may have given us a generation of “digital captives�, who know how to find comfort online, whatever the political realities of the physical world.� P. 70
Believing that free internet, communication, and social networking is extremely effective for starting a revolution is a fallacy. In fact, the use of these tools can lead to exposure for those tweeting the revolution, in some ways counterbalancing that revolution by exposing the leaders, their friends, and associates. Furthermore, how that same information can be used by the regime to fool other participants aiding in rounding them up. Most of his examples are based on the failed Iranian Green Revolution, in which he argues that there weren’t that many people tweeting from within Iran and it wasn’t the best means of communication, and those that used it (90% of those who did) were captured by authorities.
It’s interesting to note that since this book has been published, many of Morozov’s assumptions are put immediately to the test, and I believe it passes that test in this context. He compares how western government used media to subvert Soviet regimes in Eastern Europe. He demonstrates that many western nations are attempting to do the same thing to dictatorships in the Middle East and other countries and how that philosophy is a flawed one. In this section I think there is a clear distinction in how the regimes fell in the Soviet Union and how they fell recently in Tunisia, Egypt, but NOT in Libya.
Excerpt from section:
“On this reading, the East German regime was simply unwilling to crack down on the first wave of protests in Leipzig, well aware that it was heading for a collective suicide. Furthermore, in 1989, unlike in 1956 or 1968, the Kremlin, ruled by a new generation of leaders who still had vivid memories of the brutality of their r predecessors, didn’t think that bloody crackdowns were a good idea, and East Germany’s senior leaders were too weak and hesitant to do it alone.� P. 53
Western nations also have a level of hypocrisy according to Morozov. They want to have increased access to the internet and social networking believing that this freedom will lead to democracy and countries to act more like them. When they find that the technology only emboldens others to expand THEIR influence as opposed to adopting the West’s viewpoints, quiet censorship takes place.
The Revolution will not be tweeted is the section of the book receiving so much attention, particularly from Malcolm Gladwell. In this section, he compares Twitter and Facebook to coffeehouses in the 18th century and Kierkegaard’s disdain for them. He believes that the short chatter instead of long and deep thought does not lead to action. Someone who does something because they saw it on twitter is less likely to do take action because of the cause is important, but that all their friends are doing it. Peer pressure controls that action more than the increased attention to the issue through social networking. This particular section is rather condescending and probably has received the most criticism over the work, but the essay section provides the seed to the entire book. It is only one component, but it wraps up his entire discussion very thoroughly. Social networking is a tool that can be used along with all the other tools available and its use for any action on its own is questionable.
"A further clarification might be in order at this point. The border between cyber-utopianism and cyber-naivete is a blurry one. In fact, the reason why so many politicians and journalists believe in the power of the Internet is because they have not given this subject much thought. Their faith is not the result of a careful examination of how the Internet is being used by dictators or how it is changing the culture of resistance and dissent. On the contrary, most often it's just unthinking acceptance of conventional wisdom, which posits that since authoritarian governments are censoring the Internet, they must be really afraid of it. Thus, according to this view, the very presence of a vibrant internet culture greatly increases the odds that such regimes will collapse." (I'm not sure I agree with this section. I think the believe is that freedom of expression leads to democratic action. This is a tool that helps expand that freedom of expression. However, he is right that the tool doesn't make it happen, the absence of oppression makes that happen).
“While we thought the Internet might give us a generation of “digital renegades� it may have given us a generation of “digital captives�, who know how to find comfort online, whatever the political realities of the physical world.� P. 70
Believing that free internet, communication, and social networking is extremely effective for starting a revolution is a fallacy. In fact, the use of these tools can lead to exposure for those tweeting the revolution, in some ways counterbalancing that revolution by exposing the leaders, their friends, and associates. Furthermore, how that same information can be used by the regime to fool other participants aiding in rounding them up. Most of his examples are based on the failed Iranian Green Revolution, in which he argues that there weren’t that many people tweeting from within Iran and it wasn’t the best means of communication, and those that used it (90% of those who did) were captured by authorities.
It’s interesting to note that since this book has been published, many of Morozov’s assumptions are put immediately to the test, and I believe it passes that test in this context. He compares how western government used media to subvert Soviet regimes in Eastern Europe. He demonstrates that many western nations are attempting to do the same thing to dictatorships in the Middle East and other countries and how that philosophy is a flawed one. In this section I think there is a clear distinction in how the regimes fell in the Soviet Union and how they fell recently in Tunisia, Egypt, but NOT in Libya.
Excerpt from section:
“On this reading, the East German regime was simply unwilling to crack down on the first wave of protests in Leipzig, well aware that it was heading for a collective suicide. Furthermore, in 1989, unlike in 1956 or 1968, the Kremlin, ruled by a new generation of leaders who still had vivid memories of the brutality of their r predecessors, didn’t think that bloody crackdowns were a good idea, and East Germany’s senior leaders were too weak and hesitant to do it alone.� P. 53
Western nations also have a level of hypocrisy according to Morozov. They want to have increased access to the internet and social networking believing that this freedom will lead to democracy and countries to act more like them. When they find that the technology only emboldens others to expand THEIR influence as opposed to adopting the West’s viewpoints, quiet censorship takes place.
The Revolution will not be tweeted is the section of the book receiving so much attention, particularly from Malcolm Gladwell. In this section, he compares Twitter and Facebook to coffeehouses in the 18th century and Kierkegaard’s disdain for them. He believes that the short chatter instead of long and deep thought does not lead to action. Someone who does something because they saw it on twitter is less likely to do take action because of the cause is important, but that all their friends are doing it. Peer pressure controls that action more than the increased attention to the issue through social networking. This particular section is rather condescending and probably has received the most criticism over the work, but the essay section provides the seed to the entire book. It is only one component, but it wraps up his entire discussion very thoroughly. Social networking is a tool that can be used along with all the other tools available and its use for any action on its own is questionable.
"A further clarification might be in order at this point. The border between cyber-utopianism and cyber-naivete is a blurry one. In fact, the reason why so many politicians and journalists believe in the power of the Internet is because they have not given this subject much thought. Their faith is not the result of a careful examination of how the Internet is being used by dictators or how it is changing the culture of resistance and dissent. On the contrary, most often it's just unthinking acceptance of conventional wisdom, which posits that since authoritarian governments are censoring the Internet, they must be really afraid of it. Thus, according to this view, the very presence of a vibrant internet culture greatly increases the odds that such regimes will collapse." (I'm not sure I agree with this section. I think the believe is that freedom of expression leads to democratic action. This is a tool that helps expand that freedom of expression. However, he is right that the tool doesn't make it happen, the absence of oppression makes that happen).
August 30, 2015
A lot of salient points, which probably explains why reading it was so slow going.
_______________
The Internet penetrates and shapes all walks of political life, not just the ones conducive to democratisation.
All metaphors come with costs, for the only way in which they can help us grasp a complex issue is by downplaying some other, seemingly less important aspects of that issue.
Any information-centric account of the end of the cold war is bound to prioritise the role of its users - dissidents, ordinary protesters, NGOs, and downplay the role played by structural, historical factors - unbearable foreign debt accumulated, slowing down of the soviet economy, inability of the warsaw pact to compete with NATO.
Lessons from Russia: The most effective system of internet control is not the one that has the most sophisticated and draconian system of censorship, but the one that has no need for censorship whatsoever (people are sufficiently distracted (or entertained).
Seen in Vietnam: 'The vietnamese firewall allows youngsters to consume plenty of porn but not Amnesty International reports'
New media and the Internet excel in suppressing boredom, which reduces the likelyhood of people turning to (boring) politics.
As long as most virtual activities are tied to physical infrastructure - keyboards, mics, screens - no advances in encryption technology could eliminate all the risks and vulnerabilities.
In the current situation of 24-hour stimulation and expression of opinion, Kierkegaard's words become relevant " Only the person who is essentially capable of remaining silent is capable of speaking essentially."
At some point awareness must convert into action, and this is where tools like Twitter and Facebook prove much less useful.
A completely free internet is not desirable, because then there would be no barriers to protect citizens from practices and services deemed illegal.
The weak form of internet freedom focuses on defending online freedom of expression (promoting negative liberty, freedom from something), while the strong version seeks to promote freedom via the internet (positive liberty, freedom to do something).
Tweets will not dissolve our national, cultural or religious differences, they may actually accentuate them. In most cases the only people who still believe in the ideal of an electronic global village are those who would have become tolerant cosmopolitans even without the Internet: the globe-trotting intellectual elite.
Social networks aren't good to be treasured in themselves. After all the mafia, prostitution and gambling rings and youth gangs are social networks too, but no one would claim their existence is a net good.
The Internet is useless without a strong functional state to institutionalise the rule of law, observe legislation to promote access to information, facilitate viable and diversified economies to support mixed media systems, ensure functional and independent tribunals that support the public's right to know, control corruption inside and outside newsrooms, and stop violence against reporters, sources and citizens.
The historical amnesia engendered by a speed-obsessed society invites propagandistic and fictional retellings of our past, where political history is simply recounted to the direct advantage of presently dominant political and economic groups.
When facts no longer shape reactions, policymakers are likely to produce wrong responses.
Crowdsourcing only produces trustworthy data when it is apolitical (e.g. location of trapped people during natural disasters). The accuracy of such reports is impossible to verify and easy to manipulate.
Then and now, declarations of technology's benign omnipotence have been nothing more than thinly veiled attempts at creating a favourable regulatory climate.
The recognition of a revolutionary nature of a technology is a poor excuse not to regulate it. Smart regulation is a first sign that society is serious about the technology in question and believes it is here to stay; that it is eager to think through the consequences; and that it wants to find ways to unleash and harvest its revolutionary potential.
Adopted technology is adapted by the adopting society to their social processes. In other words, dictators can co-opt the internet to strengthen their surveillance, propaganda and censorship.
the issue with internet gurus is that no matter how deep their knowledge of the architecture of the internet and its diverse and playful culture, it doesn't make up for their inadequate understanding of how societies, let alone non-Western societies, function.
Technological fixes, because they attack symptoms but don't root out causes, have unforeseen and deleterious side effects that may be worse than the social problem they were intended to solve.
Reframing social problems as technological problems distracts policymakers from tackling problems that are nontechnological in nature and cannot be reframed. Policymakers may end up identifying and solving problems that are easily solvable rather than those that require immediate attention.
The wicked problem : Failed fixes have long-term and largely unpredictable implications far beyond its original context.
The two worse things that experts can do while explaining technology to the general public are first to give the readers the impression that they understand something they do not understand, and second to give the impression that a theory has been established as true when it has not.
It's far from clear whether good intentions plus stupidity or evil intentions plus intelligence have wrought more harm in the world. Incompetent people with good intentions rarely suffer the qualms of conscience that sometimes inhibits the doings of competent people with bad intentions.
_______________
The Internet penetrates and shapes all walks of political life, not just the ones conducive to democratisation.
All metaphors come with costs, for the only way in which they can help us grasp a complex issue is by downplaying some other, seemingly less important aspects of that issue.
Any information-centric account of the end of the cold war is bound to prioritise the role of its users - dissidents, ordinary protesters, NGOs, and downplay the role played by structural, historical factors - unbearable foreign debt accumulated, slowing down of the soviet economy, inability of the warsaw pact to compete with NATO.
Lessons from Russia: The most effective system of internet control is not the one that has the most sophisticated and draconian system of censorship, but the one that has no need for censorship whatsoever (people are sufficiently distracted (or entertained).
Seen in Vietnam: 'The vietnamese firewall allows youngsters to consume plenty of porn but not Amnesty International reports'
New media and the Internet excel in suppressing boredom, which reduces the likelyhood of people turning to (boring) politics.
As long as most virtual activities are tied to physical infrastructure - keyboards, mics, screens - no advances in encryption technology could eliminate all the risks and vulnerabilities.
In the current situation of 24-hour stimulation and expression of opinion, Kierkegaard's words become relevant " Only the person who is essentially capable of remaining silent is capable of speaking essentially."
At some point awareness must convert into action, and this is where tools like Twitter and Facebook prove much less useful.
A completely free internet is not desirable, because then there would be no barriers to protect citizens from practices and services deemed illegal.
The weak form of internet freedom focuses on defending online freedom of expression (promoting negative liberty, freedom from something), while the strong version seeks to promote freedom via the internet (positive liberty, freedom to do something).
Tweets will not dissolve our national, cultural or religious differences, they may actually accentuate them. In most cases the only people who still believe in the ideal of an electronic global village are those who would have become tolerant cosmopolitans even without the Internet: the globe-trotting intellectual elite.
Social networks aren't good to be treasured in themselves. After all the mafia, prostitution and gambling rings and youth gangs are social networks too, but no one would claim their existence is a net good.
The Internet is useless without a strong functional state to institutionalise the rule of law, observe legislation to promote access to information, facilitate viable and diversified economies to support mixed media systems, ensure functional and independent tribunals that support the public's right to know, control corruption inside and outside newsrooms, and stop violence against reporters, sources and citizens.
The historical amnesia engendered by a speed-obsessed society invites propagandistic and fictional retellings of our past, where political history is simply recounted to the direct advantage of presently dominant political and economic groups.
When facts no longer shape reactions, policymakers are likely to produce wrong responses.
Crowdsourcing only produces trustworthy data when it is apolitical (e.g. location of trapped people during natural disasters). The accuracy of such reports is impossible to verify and easy to manipulate.
Then and now, declarations of technology's benign omnipotence have been nothing more than thinly veiled attempts at creating a favourable regulatory climate.
The recognition of a revolutionary nature of a technology is a poor excuse not to regulate it. Smart regulation is a first sign that society is serious about the technology in question and believes it is here to stay; that it is eager to think through the consequences; and that it wants to find ways to unleash and harvest its revolutionary potential.
Adopted technology is adapted by the adopting society to their social processes. In other words, dictators can co-opt the internet to strengthen their surveillance, propaganda and censorship.
the issue with internet gurus is that no matter how deep their knowledge of the architecture of the internet and its diverse and playful culture, it doesn't make up for their inadequate understanding of how societies, let alone non-Western societies, function.
Technological fixes, because they attack symptoms but don't root out causes, have unforeseen and deleterious side effects that may be worse than the social problem they were intended to solve.
Reframing social problems as technological problems distracts policymakers from tackling problems that are nontechnological in nature and cannot be reframed. Policymakers may end up identifying and solving problems that are easily solvable rather than those that require immediate attention.
The wicked problem : Failed fixes have long-term and largely unpredictable implications far beyond its original context.
The two worse things that experts can do while explaining technology to the general public are first to give the readers the impression that they understand something they do not understand, and second to give the impression that a theory has been established as true when it has not.
It's far from clear whether good intentions plus stupidity or evil intentions plus intelligence have wrought more harm in the world. Incompetent people with good intentions rarely suffer the qualms of conscience that sometimes inhibits the doings of competent people with bad intentions.
September 13, 2022
While I was not blown away by the concepts and ideas presented in this book, I am still glad I read it. The main thesis statement here is that we cannot apply a blanket statement to such a broad and reaching force in our world like the Internet. I had completely understood this in the context of other cultural forces in our world, but I had never considered it in terms of the internet, so that was interesting to consider. I do think this book was great for it's time, but it is overall outdated for a reader in 2022.
September 30, 2024
No body can handle the absolute truth and freedom even the west
Keep in mind while you are reading this book that it was written before the Arabian spring, before snowdon, before AI and before the shadow ban that is happening since October 2023
Keep in mind while you are reading this book that it was written before the Arabian spring, before snowdon, before AI and before the shadow ban that is happening since October 2023
October 25, 2018
This was a fascinating read. It takes some time to really get into because the first few chapters are a bit dated - this book was published in 2011 and written in 2010 and thus focuses heavily on political situations from which we are now quite removed. However, as the book progresses and broadens its scope, the lessons, warnings, and information Morozov provides is truthfully more relevant than ever, and the book is a challenging undertaking in examining deep structures of our current political and social landscape that too often go completely unremarked upon. His perspective is at times too centrist-liberal for me - a few too many lukewarm mentions of regime change without nearly enough pondering about the actual justice (or lack thereof) or regime change, and some, but not nearly enough, consideration of the tendencies of our state, and Western states as a whole to fall into these same (or similar) situations he describes as being symptomatic of authoritarian states.
August 15, 2011
(Z mojego blogu:
Jednocześnie w dwóch niezwykle ważnych i opiniotwórczych amerykańskich magazynach, „Foreign Policy� i „Foreign Affairs� ukazały się duże artykuły krytykujące politykę Internet Freedom zainicjowaną przed rokiem przez Hillary Clinton. W styczniu ub.r., po sławnych chińskich atakach na Google i kilkadziesiąt innych amerykańskich korporacji, po których nastąpił otwarty konflikt Google’a z władzami Chin Clinton ogłosiła, że USA będą bronić wolności internetu jak niepodległości. Internet bowiem stał narzędziem rewolucyjnej walki aktorów wszystkich kolorowych rewolucji, by wspomnieć tylko Mołdowę i Iran. W ramach polityki Internet Freedom rząd USA zdecydował się m.in. wspomóc przygotowanie oprogramowania anonimizacyjnego Haystack oraz wspierać różne dysydenckie inicjatywy w internecie (Haystack okazał się totalnym niewypałem).
Niby wszystko OK, pierwsze problemy pokazał w ub.r. Malcolm Gladwell w „New Yorkerze� w tekście „Small Change. Why the Revolution Won’t Be Tweeted�. Gladwell pokazał, jak znikoma była rola tzw. social media w irańskiej rebelii, choć została ona okrzyknięta rewolucją twittera. Teraz Evgeny Morozov w „Foreign Policy� i Clay Shirky w „Foreign Affairs� idą głębiej i dalej w swej krytyce entuzjazmu otaczającego rewolucyjny potencjał internetu i opartą na tym entuzjazmie politykę Internet Freedom.
Obaj autorzy dowodzą bowiem, że polityka Internet Freedom wolności w krajach takich, jak Iran, Rosja, Białoruś zaszkodziła. Białorusin Morozov doskonale zna realia posowieckiej sceny politycznej i pokazuje, w jaki sposób były przez autorytarne władze interpretowane różne pro-internetowe wypowiedzi � komunikat, że Departament Stanu podczas zamieszek w Iranie poprosił zarząd Twittera o to, by wstrzymał prace nad modernizacją serwisu, by go nie wyłączać ani na chwilę i nie hamować rewolucji został odczytany jednoznacznie: internet stał się bronią ofensywną w rękach amerykańskiego rządu, a amerykańskie korporacje jego najemnikami. Ponieważ zaś podstawowa infrastruktura internetu należy właśnie do Amerykanów, należy się od nich uniezależnić, blokując dostęp do takich serwisów jak Facebook, Twitter, Gmail i YouTube oferując w zamian lokalne, kontrolowane przez lokalne służby specjalne.
Drugi wniosek, jaki wyciągnęli dyktatorzy polegał na odkryciu, że za pomocą internetu można walczyć z dysydentami � na miejsce każdego bloga dysydenckiego pojawia się kilka blogów prorządowych, nie mówiąc o akcjach flamingu i trollingu. W końcu nasilenie inwigilacji i innych działań o charakterze czysto policyjnym, które doprowadziły do represji wobec setek opozycjonistów w Iranie, Rosji, Białorusi, etc. (Morozov pisze elegancko: zachodni entuzjaści internetu chodzą do talkshow, dysydenci idą do więzienia).
Analiza Morozova jest wyciągiem z jego wydanej niedawno bardzo ciekawej książki „The Net Delusion�. Zawiera ona niezliczone, bardzo szczegółowe analizy przypadków, w jaki sposób internet był wykorzystywany politycznie, z jakim skutkiem, etc. Shirky z kolei w swym eseju w „Foreign Affairs� pokazuje, że internet ma kolosalną rolę polityczną, zarówno w krajach demokratycznych, jak i autorytarnych. Jego znaczenie polega na tym, że umożliwia rekonstrukcję sfery publicznej rozumianej jako przestrzeń konwersacji, która prowadzi do budowy więzi społecznych. Z tego punktu widzenia potencjał polityczny mają nawet najzwyklejsze serwisy zrzeszające ludzi w różnych sprawach � podczas buntów wołowinowych w Korei jedną z platform, która umożliwiła koordynację protestu koreańskim nastolatkom był serwis fanowski jakiego piosenkarza pop. W sumie Shirky przypomina to, co już pisałem w książce „Antymatrix� sześć lat temu (m.in. analizując przypadek mobilizacji politycznej w Korei w 2002 r. podczas ówczesnych wyborów prezydenckich) � kluczem do działania są więzi społeczne. Shirky pokazuje jednak, że polityka Internet Freedom spowodowała wzrost podejrzliwości władz autorytarnych wobec internetu w ogóle. Ba, nawet rządy demokratyczne nie kryją pokusy poddania internetu większej kontroli.
Jednocześnie w dwóch niezwykle ważnych i opiniotwórczych amerykańskich magazynach, „Foreign Policy� i „Foreign Affairs� ukazały się duże artykuły krytykujące politykę Internet Freedom zainicjowaną przed rokiem przez Hillary Clinton. W styczniu ub.r., po sławnych chińskich atakach na Google i kilkadziesiąt innych amerykańskich korporacji, po których nastąpił otwarty konflikt Google’a z władzami Chin Clinton ogłosiła, że USA będą bronić wolności internetu jak niepodległości. Internet bowiem stał narzędziem rewolucyjnej walki aktorów wszystkich kolorowych rewolucji, by wspomnieć tylko Mołdowę i Iran. W ramach polityki Internet Freedom rząd USA zdecydował się m.in. wspomóc przygotowanie oprogramowania anonimizacyjnego Haystack oraz wspierać różne dysydenckie inicjatywy w internecie (Haystack okazał się totalnym niewypałem).
Niby wszystko OK, pierwsze problemy pokazał w ub.r. Malcolm Gladwell w „New Yorkerze� w tekście „Small Change. Why the Revolution Won’t Be Tweeted�. Gladwell pokazał, jak znikoma była rola tzw. social media w irańskiej rebelii, choć została ona okrzyknięta rewolucją twittera. Teraz Evgeny Morozov w „Foreign Policy� i Clay Shirky w „Foreign Affairs� idą głębiej i dalej w swej krytyce entuzjazmu otaczającego rewolucyjny potencjał internetu i opartą na tym entuzjazmie politykę Internet Freedom.
Obaj autorzy dowodzą bowiem, że polityka Internet Freedom wolności w krajach takich, jak Iran, Rosja, Białoruś zaszkodziła. Białorusin Morozov doskonale zna realia posowieckiej sceny politycznej i pokazuje, w jaki sposób były przez autorytarne władze interpretowane różne pro-internetowe wypowiedzi � komunikat, że Departament Stanu podczas zamieszek w Iranie poprosił zarząd Twittera o to, by wstrzymał prace nad modernizacją serwisu, by go nie wyłączać ani na chwilę i nie hamować rewolucji został odczytany jednoznacznie: internet stał się bronią ofensywną w rękach amerykańskiego rządu, a amerykańskie korporacje jego najemnikami. Ponieważ zaś podstawowa infrastruktura internetu należy właśnie do Amerykanów, należy się od nich uniezależnić, blokując dostęp do takich serwisów jak Facebook, Twitter, Gmail i YouTube oferując w zamian lokalne, kontrolowane przez lokalne służby specjalne.
Drugi wniosek, jaki wyciągnęli dyktatorzy polegał na odkryciu, że za pomocą internetu można walczyć z dysydentami � na miejsce każdego bloga dysydenckiego pojawia się kilka blogów prorządowych, nie mówiąc o akcjach flamingu i trollingu. W końcu nasilenie inwigilacji i innych działań o charakterze czysto policyjnym, które doprowadziły do represji wobec setek opozycjonistów w Iranie, Rosji, Białorusi, etc. (Morozov pisze elegancko: zachodni entuzjaści internetu chodzą do talkshow, dysydenci idą do więzienia).
Analiza Morozova jest wyciągiem z jego wydanej niedawno bardzo ciekawej książki „The Net Delusion�. Zawiera ona niezliczone, bardzo szczegółowe analizy przypadków, w jaki sposób internet był wykorzystywany politycznie, z jakim skutkiem, etc. Shirky z kolei w swym eseju w „Foreign Affairs� pokazuje, że internet ma kolosalną rolę polityczną, zarówno w krajach demokratycznych, jak i autorytarnych. Jego znaczenie polega na tym, że umożliwia rekonstrukcję sfery publicznej rozumianej jako przestrzeń konwersacji, która prowadzi do budowy więzi społecznych. Z tego punktu widzenia potencjał polityczny mają nawet najzwyklejsze serwisy zrzeszające ludzi w różnych sprawach � podczas buntów wołowinowych w Korei jedną z platform, która umożliwiła koordynację protestu koreańskim nastolatkom był serwis fanowski jakiego piosenkarza pop. W sumie Shirky przypomina to, co już pisałem w książce „Antymatrix� sześć lat temu (m.in. analizując przypadek mobilizacji politycznej w Korei w 2002 r. podczas ówczesnych wyborów prezydenckich) � kluczem do działania są więzi społeczne. Shirky pokazuje jednak, że polityka Internet Freedom spowodowała wzrost podejrzliwości władz autorytarnych wobec internetu w ogóle. Ba, nawet rządy demokratyczne nie kryją pokusy poddania internetu większej kontroli.
January 6, 2014
I discovered Morozov via this he had with then Slate.com technology columnist Farhad Manjoo. Manjoo was playing checkers, Morozov was playing Go. (See what I did there).
Morozov is a refreshing voice in a cultural climate where internet/technology-worship is the norm. It seems that there is hardly a problem that technology can't solve, and with Washington mired in partisan gridlock, Silicon Valley looks like a veritable Shangrila for our aspirations for a more truly democratic world.
Morozov raises several objections to the unthinking belief that "internet freedom" is the solution to all the world's ills, that is if we could just get more people more access to an uncensored and unfiltered internet liberal democracy will inevitably follow. He labels those who advocate for such a strategy as "cyber-utopians." The problem with such and ideology and ideologues is that they tend to ignore that the world's problems are ultimately incredibly complex and their solutions are equally complex demanding political solutions more than technological ones. Twitter may have helped spark the "Green Revolution" in Iran, but it also allowed authorities to identify and imprison dissidents. Bloggers can criticize their repressive governments, but they can also urge the government to take harsh actions against fellow-citizens deemed unpatriotic. I can use iCloud to "find my phone" but repressive regimes can use it to find the phones of those labelled enemies of the state. It isn't difficult to imagine a genocide abetted by a social media service like Twitter, much like radio helped foment the Rwandan genocide of the 1990s.
The problem with such "internet centrism" is that it functions like a magic wand that we - Westerners - think we can wave at the world's problems, when in fact such problems might be exacerbated by the internet. Will Russians really want to get rid of Putin when they can watch crazy dashboard camera videos and download endless hours of pornography? Another problem with internet centrism is that we assume that the internet is primarily a political tool in repressive societies while ignoring that it is largely an entertainment and commercial tool in our own.
Morozov adduces countless examples to support him claims, though the main weakness of the book is Morozov's failure to articulate his political/ideological position. One can infer that he is largely an advocate of Western-style liberal democracy, but he argues again and again that technology has moral dimensions that must be attended to in our public debates about the role of technology in our democratic institutions. What is supposed to undergird and guide those morals? How are various and competing moral claims to be adjudicated? Utilitarianism? Hedonism? Contractualism? Religion? Perhaps internet centrism is an inevitable consequence of our pluralistic democracy where moral claims have largely been excluded from public debate as matters of private preference. The atrophy of our moral reasoning that has resulted from this shift goes a long way in explaining the non-existence of shallowness of our public discourse regarding the internet and its role in the pursuit of certain common goals in the 21st century.
Morozov is a refreshing voice in a cultural climate where internet/technology-worship is the norm. It seems that there is hardly a problem that technology can't solve, and with Washington mired in partisan gridlock, Silicon Valley looks like a veritable Shangrila for our aspirations for a more truly democratic world.
Morozov raises several objections to the unthinking belief that "internet freedom" is the solution to all the world's ills, that is if we could just get more people more access to an uncensored and unfiltered internet liberal democracy will inevitably follow. He labels those who advocate for such a strategy as "cyber-utopians." The problem with such and ideology and ideologues is that they tend to ignore that the world's problems are ultimately incredibly complex and their solutions are equally complex demanding political solutions more than technological ones. Twitter may have helped spark the "Green Revolution" in Iran, but it also allowed authorities to identify and imprison dissidents. Bloggers can criticize their repressive governments, but they can also urge the government to take harsh actions against fellow-citizens deemed unpatriotic. I can use iCloud to "find my phone" but repressive regimes can use it to find the phones of those labelled enemies of the state. It isn't difficult to imagine a genocide abetted by a social media service like Twitter, much like radio helped foment the Rwandan genocide of the 1990s.
The problem with such "internet centrism" is that it functions like a magic wand that we - Westerners - think we can wave at the world's problems, when in fact such problems might be exacerbated by the internet. Will Russians really want to get rid of Putin when they can watch crazy dashboard camera videos and download endless hours of pornography? Another problem with internet centrism is that we assume that the internet is primarily a political tool in repressive societies while ignoring that it is largely an entertainment and commercial tool in our own.
Morozov adduces countless examples to support him claims, though the main weakness of the book is Morozov's failure to articulate his political/ideological position. One can infer that he is largely an advocate of Western-style liberal democracy, but he argues again and again that technology has moral dimensions that must be attended to in our public debates about the role of technology in our democratic institutions. What is supposed to undergird and guide those morals? How are various and competing moral claims to be adjudicated? Utilitarianism? Hedonism? Contractualism? Religion? Perhaps internet centrism is an inevitable consequence of our pluralistic democracy where moral claims have largely been excluded from public debate as matters of private preference. The atrophy of our moral reasoning that has resulted from this shift goes a long way in explaining the non-existence of shallowness of our public discourse regarding the internet and its role in the pursuit of certain common goals in the 21st century.
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