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The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy
In this essay, Hegel attempted to show how Fichte's Science of Knowledge was an advance from the position of Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, and how Schelling (and incidentally Hegel himself) had made a further advance from the position of Fichte.
Hegel finds the idealism of Fichte too abstractly subjective and formalistic, and he tries to show how Schelling's philosophy of nature is the remedy for these weaknesses. But the most important philosophical content of the essay is probably to be found in his general introduction to these critical efforts where he deals with a number of problems about philosophical method in a way which is of general interest to philosophers, and not merely interesting to those who accept the Hegelian "dialectic method" which grew out of these first beginnings. Finally, the Difference essay is important in the development of "Nature-Philosophy" as a movement in the history of science.
Walter Cerf is professor emeritus of philosophy at the City University of New York. H.S. Harris is professor of philosophy and humanities at Glendon College, York University.
[ISBN: 0887068278 / 9780887068270].
Hegel finds the idealism of Fichte too abstractly subjective and formalistic, and he tries to show how Schelling's philosophy of nature is the remedy for these weaknesses. But the most important philosophical content of the essay is probably to be found in his general introduction to these critical efforts where he deals with a number of problems about philosophical method in a way which is of general interest to philosophers, and not merely interesting to those who accept the Hegelian "dialectic method" which grew out of these first beginnings. Finally, the Difference essay is important in the development of "Nature-Philosophy" as a movement in the history of science.
Walter Cerf is professor emeritus of philosophy at the City University of New York. H.S. Harris is professor of philosophy and humanities at Glendon College, York University.
[ISBN: 0887068278 / 9780887068270].
213 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1801
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470 people want to read
About the author
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
1,907Ìýbooks2,377ÌýfollowersGeorg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) was a German philosopher and one of the founding figures of German Idealism. Influenced by Kant's transcendental idealism and Rousseau's politics, Hegel formulated an elaborate system of historical development of ethics, government, and religion through the dialectical unfolding of the Absolute. Hegel was one of the most well-known historicist philosopher, and his thought presaged continental philosophy, including postmodernism. His system was inverted into a materialist ideology by Karl Marx, originally a member of the Young Hegelian faction.
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
May 11, 2021
Updated review: The difference essay is a worthwhile read, a fairly pivotal text in the development of German Idealism. This time round I read specifically to ferret out Hegel's thoughts regarding Kant at this phase in his development, and there are definitely some interesting comments. The text is somewhat programmatic and broad, and reads more like an inchoate manifesto, so the criticisms of Kant lack technical rigour. Regardless, we find here a Schellingian Hegel (although, he already moves beyond Schelling in some areas: see for example his characterisation of the indifference point as a purely negative zero rather than Schelling's more positive A=A) who argues that reflective philosophy (that of Kant and Fichte) is one sided and neglects nature. The solution at this point is to see transcendental philosophy not as the only science, but as a coequal science along with the philosophy of nature, and in fact they transition into each other at the indifference point. A point at which is reason, and we must in some sense strive to remain within it. These two sciences are manifestations of the absolute from different sides so to speak, formulated in what struck me as a very spinozistic manner. I think Hegel is sometimes unfair to Kant, he makes some sweeping statements, and some of his comments are plainly mysterious. For example, at one point he states 'But Kant has not given up the distinction between what is in itself possible and what is real' - even from a Hegelian viewpoint I must wonder what it even means to give up the distinction between what is possible and what is real, even taking into consideration his musings on the intellectus archetypus.
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One of Hegel's earliest works. It involves a survey of the contemporary philosophy of the time along with a focus on explication and critique of Fichte's system from a Schellingian viewpoint. There is also a brief critique of Reinhold.
The explication of Fichte is dense and difficult compared to modern scholarship, but rewarding. In particular, the treatment of Fichte by another in the German idealist tradition allows a greater insight of the internal logic at work.
He majority of the discussion revolves around Fichte's self positing Ego and it's operation.
The greatest merit however, is the critical evaluation. It highlights the point of departure for the objective idealists.
The criticism of Fichte involves the demonstration of the excessive subjectivism and formalism of his doctrine.
The subject-object of Fichte is shown to be only a subjective one. Fichte only posited self consciousness (one of the opposites) with in the Absolute (made it the absolute). He attempts to nullify one opposite (the objective) and make the former infinite. In doing so, he only preserves the opposition instead of positing both in the Absolute (which is what Schelling did).
Only by making the opposition real, via positing both in the Absolute, can one generate a system and principle that is both formal and material at the same time. By positing only one of the terms as the Absolute, Fichte reduced the opposition to merely ideal, and if the opposition is ideal and absolute, identity remains a formal principle since it cannot claim recognition as subject-object. Without the positing of both terms, one cannot transition between the other either.
A very interesting work from Hegel's early period and one helpful for studying early German idealism.
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One of Hegel's earliest works. It involves a survey of the contemporary philosophy of the time along with a focus on explication and critique of Fichte's system from a Schellingian viewpoint. There is also a brief critique of Reinhold.
The explication of Fichte is dense and difficult compared to modern scholarship, but rewarding. In particular, the treatment of Fichte by another in the German idealist tradition allows a greater insight of the internal logic at work.
He majority of the discussion revolves around Fichte's self positing Ego and it's operation.
The greatest merit however, is the critical evaluation. It highlights the point of departure for the objective idealists.
The criticism of Fichte involves the demonstration of the excessive subjectivism and formalism of his doctrine.
The subject-object of Fichte is shown to be only a subjective one. Fichte only posited self consciousness (one of the opposites) with in the Absolute (made it the absolute). He attempts to nullify one opposite (the objective) and make the former infinite. In doing so, he only preserves the opposition instead of positing both in the Absolute (which is what Schelling did).
Only by making the opposition real, via positing both in the Absolute, can one generate a system and principle that is both formal and material at the same time. By positing only one of the terms as the Absolute, Fichte reduced the opposition to merely ideal, and if the opposition is ideal and absolute, identity remains a formal principle since it cannot claim recognition as subject-object. Without the positing of both terms, one cannot transition between the other either.
A very interesting work from Hegel's early period and one helpful for studying early German idealism.
May 22, 2021
Not an easy read, and not a good book to start with Hegel. If you love German idealism history this book is a must.
Is funny because the whole subject of the book starts with Kant (all German idealism including Hegel, except Schelling, despised Kant). Kant leaves open a door in the critique of pure reason regarding the spontaneity of the intellect. This pure form of apperception, which Kant is not sure if call "spontaneity", is the condition to which all objects of our intuition must be subjected. With this pure form is that we can apply the categories to the objects, but, and a BIG BUT, only as phenomena.
The German idealism is like a naughty boy that disobeys dad: “who is Kant to tell us that it only applies to phenomena? There must be something more, something that allows us to go beyond, even to the thing in itself.�
Of course Fichte, Reinhold, Schelling were young fellows that didn’t like to take orders, even less from an old and grumpy guy. But as all naughty boys, they were wrong all the time (Hegel was the only one that found something interesting about Kant's discovery, but only with the help of Aristotle).
Fichte tries to use the “intellectual intuition�, the supreme power that could create things and is only allowed to God, and gave the power to the “I�. Obviously, he only constructs logical and subjective nonsense (as surely Kant also found himself, that was why he forbade that use), Hegel mocks this solution in the book.
Schelling, smart and well known in greek philosophy, uses his dialectic knowledge to destroy Fichte's assumption and start again with the absolute, a new and more powerful version of Spinoza substance. The “absolute� is the bridge that connects the intellect with the things, the subject with the object. But even this solution is still not satisfactory.
Hegel knows that if anyone can connect the points then also will have the system, the elusive prize that Kant never allowed himself to have.
The book is dark, but if you read the letters between Schelling-Fichte and Schelling-Hegel you’ll understand why the horrible style: envy, hypocrisy, a lot of “good feelings�, nothing of the jargon that they use in their books. Hegel knew that he was in a duel with his fellows, in this book he kills Fichte to ingratiate Schelling (Hegel was looking for a job), later he will attack in the night where all cows are dark.
Hegel’s style tries to be darker than Schelling’s style, only to show that he also knows how to walk the walk. But the repetitions are terrible, he wrote the same point again and again and again, only changing the words to be darker than before (Schopenhauer didn’t know about this book, lucky Hegel because Schopenhauer would be more than happy to use it and show exactly why Hegel was a quack)
Besides that is a good primer to a more advanced reading of Hegel (please do not start Here, you can do well starting with the lectures of philosophy history by Hegel, especially the final course about Jacobi, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling)
More mature Hegel surely would like to destroy the book, but only a century later it was read again. Good read, only for strong palates.
Is funny because the whole subject of the book starts with Kant (all German idealism including Hegel, except Schelling, despised Kant). Kant leaves open a door in the critique of pure reason regarding the spontaneity of the intellect. This pure form of apperception, which Kant is not sure if call "spontaneity", is the condition to which all objects of our intuition must be subjected. With this pure form is that we can apply the categories to the objects, but, and a BIG BUT, only as phenomena.
The German idealism is like a naughty boy that disobeys dad: “who is Kant to tell us that it only applies to phenomena? There must be something more, something that allows us to go beyond, even to the thing in itself.�
Of course Fichte, Reinhold, Schelling were young fellows that didn’t like to take orders, even less from an old and grumpy guy. But as all naughty boys, they were wrong all the time (Hegel was the only one that found something interesting about Kant's discovery, but only with the help of Aristotle).
Fichte tries to use the “intellectual intuition�, the supreme power that could create things and is only allowed to God, and gave the power to the “I�. Obviously, he only constructs logical and subjective nonsense (as surely Kant also found himself, that was why he forbade that use), Hegel mocks this solution in the book.
Schelling, smart and well known in greek philosophy, uses his dialectic knowledge to destroy Fichte's assumption and start again with the absolute, a new and more powerful version of Spinoza substance. The “absolute� is the bridge that connects the intellect with the things, the subject with the object. But even this solution is still not satisfactory.
Hegel knows that if anyone can connect the points then also will have the system, the elusive prize that Kant never allowed himself to have.
The book is dark, but if you read the letters between Schelling-Fichte and Schelling-Hegel you’ll understand why the horrible style: envy, hypocrisy, a lot of “good feelings�, nothing of the jargon that they use in their books. Hegel knew that he was in a duel with his fellows, in this book he kills Fichte to ingratiate Schelling (Hegel was looking for a job), later he will attack in the night where all cows are dark.
Hegel’s style tries to be darker than Schelling’s style, only to show that he also knows how to walk the walk. But the repetitions are terrible, he wrote the same point again and again and again, only changing the words to be darker than before (Schopenhauer didn’t know about this book, lucky Hegel because Schopenhauer would be more than happy to use it and show exactly why Hegel was a quack)
Besides that is a good primer to a more advanced reading of Hegel (please do not start Here, you can do well starting with the lectures of philosophy history by Hegel, especially the final course about Jacobi, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling)
More mature Hegel surely would like to destroy the book, but only a century later it was read again. Good read, only for strong palates.
September 2, 2019
"A phenomenon such as [Schleiermacher's] Speeches on Religion may not immediately concern the speculative need. Yet they and their reception - and even more so the dignity that is beginning to be accorded, more or less clearly or obscurely, to poetry and art in general in all their true scope - indicate the need for a philosophy that will recompense Nature for the mishandling that it suffered in Kant and Fichte's systems, and set Reason itself in harmony with Nature, not by having Reason renounce itself or become an insipid imitator of Nature, but by Reason recasting itself into Nature out if its own inner strength" (p. 83).
"The essence of philosophy ... is a bottomless abyss for personal idiosyncrasy. In order to reach philosophy it is necessary to throw oneself into it à corps perdu - meaning by 'body' here, the sum of one's idiosyncrasies. For Reason, finding consciousness caught in particularities, only becomes philosophical speculation by raising itself to itself, putting its trust only in itself and the Absolute which at that moment becomes its object. In this process Reason stakes nothing but finitudes of consciousness. In order to overcome these finitudes and construct the Absolute in consciousness, Reason lifts itself into speculation, and in the groundlessness of the limitations and personal peculiarities it grasps its own grounding within itself" (p. 88).
"Reason, therefore, does not view the philosophical systems of different epochs and different heads merely as different modes [of doing philosophy] and purely idiosyncratic views. Once it has liberated its own view from contingencies and limitations, Reason necessarily finds itself throughout all the particular forms. ... The true peculiarity of a philosophy lies in the interesting individuality which is the organic shape that Reason has built for itself out of the material of a particular age. The particular speculative Reason [of a later time] finds in it spirit of its spirit, flesh of its flesh, it intuits itself in it as one and the same and yet as another living being. Every philosophy is complete in itself, and like an authentic work of art, carries the totality within itself. Just as the works of Apelles or Sophocles would not have appeared to Raphael and Shakespeare - had they known them - as mere preparatory studies, but as a kindred force of the spirit, so Reason cannot regard its former shapes as merely useful preludes to itself" (pp. 88-9).
"Dichotomy is the source of the need for philosophy" (p. 89); "The task of philosophy is to construct the Absolute for consciousness" (p. 94).
"Reason presents itself as the force of the negative Absolute, and hence as a negating that is absolute; and at the same time, it presents itself as the force that posits the opposed objective and subjective totality. Reason raises the intellect above itself, driving it toward a whole of the intellect's own kind. Reason seduces the intellect into producing an objective totality. ... In all this, reflection appears to be merely intellect [Verstand], but this guidance toward the totality of necessity is the contribution and secret efficacy of Reason. Reason makes the intellect boundless, and in this infinite wealth the intellect and its objective world meet their downfall" (pp. 94-5).
"Only so far as reflection has connection with the Absolute is it Reason and its deed a knowing. Through this connection with the Absolute, however, reflection's work passes away; only the connection persists, and it is the sole reality of the cognition. There is therefore no truth in isolated reflection, in pure thinking, save the truth of its nullification. But because in philosophizing the Absolute gets produced by reflection for consciousness, it becomes thereby an objective totality, a whole of knowledge, an organization of cognitions. Within this organization, every part is at the same time the whole; for its standing is its connection with the Absolute" (pp. 97-8).
"Common sense cannot understand speculation; and what is more, it must come to hate speculation when it has experience of it; and, unless it is in the state of perfect indifference that security confers, it is bound to detest and persecute it" (pp. 99-100); "The only aspect of speculation visible to common sense is its nullifying activity; and even this nullification is not visible in its entire scope. If common sense could grasp this scope, it would not believe speculation to be its enemy. For in its highest synthesis of the conscious and the non-conscious, speculation also demands the nullification of consciousness itself. Reason thus drowns itself and its knowledge and its reflection of the absolute identity, in its own abyss: and in this night of mere reflection and of the calculating intellect, in this night which is the noonday of life, common sense and speculation can meet one another" (p. 103).
"Speculation does indeed elevate finite things - matter, the Ego - to the infinite and thus nullifies them: matter and Ego so far as they are meant to embrace totality, are no longer matter and Ego. Yet the final act of philosophical reflection is still lacking: that is to say, the consciousness of the nullification of these finite things" (p. 101).
"Postulating Ideas is out of the question" (p. 111).
"Speculative philosophy in its turn, rejects every semblance of being a mediating position that popular philosophy seeks to confer on its principle of the absolute non-identity of the finite and the infinite. That which has died the death of dichotomy philosophy raises to life again through the absolute identity. And through Reason, which devours both [finite and infinite] and maternally posits them both equally, philosophy strives towards the consciousness of this identity of the finite and the infinite, or in other words, it strives towards knowledge and truth" (p. 195).
"The essence of philosophy ... is a bottomless abyss for personal idiosyncrasy. In order to reach philosophy it is necessary to throw oneself into it à corps perdu - meaning by 'body' here, the sum of one's idiosyncrasies. For Reason, finding consciousness caught in particularities, only becomes philosophical speculation by raising itself to itself, putting its trust only in itself and the Absolute which at that moment becomes its object. In this process Reason stakes nothing but finitudes of consciousness. In order to overcome these finitudes and construct the Absolute in consciousness, Reason lifts itself into speculation, and in the groundlessness of the limitations and personal peculiarities it grasps its own grounding within itself" (p. 88).
"Reason, therefore, does not view the philosophical systems of different epochs and different heads merely as different modes [of doing philosophy] and purely idiosyncratic views. Once it has liberated its own view from contingencies and limitations, Reason necessarily finds itself throughout all the particular forms. ... The true peculiarity of a philosophy lies in the interesting individuality which is the organic shape that Reason has built for itself out of the material of a particular age. The particular speculative Reason [of a later time] finds in it spirit of its spirit, flesh of its flesh, it intuits itself in it as one and the same and yet as another living being. Every philosophy is complete in itself, and like an authentic work of art, carries the totality within itself. Just as the works of Apelles or Sophocles would not have appeared to Raphael and Shakespeare - had they known them - as mere preparatory studies, but as a kindred force of the spirit, so Reason cannot regard its former shapes as merely useful preludes to itself" (pp. 88-9).
"Dichotomy is the source of the need for philosophy" (p. 89); "The task of philosophy is to construct the Absolute for consciousness" (p. 94).
"Reason presents itself as the force of the negative Absolute, and hence as a negating that is absolute; and at the same time, it presents itself as the force that posits the opposed objective and subjective totality. Reason raises the intellect above itself, driving it toward a whole of the intellect's own kind. Reason seduces the intellect into producing an objective totality. ... In all this, reflection appears to be merely intellect [Verstand], but this guidance toward the totality of necessity is the contribution and secret efficacy of Reason. Reason makes the intellect boundless, and in this infinite wealth the intellect and its objective world meet their downfall" (pp. 94-5).
"Only so far as reflection has connection with the Absolute is it Reason and its deed a knowing. Through this connection with the Absolute, however, reflection's work passes away; only the connection persists, and it is the sole reality of the cognition. There is therefore no truth in isolated reflection, in pure thinking, save the truth of its nullification. But because in philosophizing the Absolute gets produced by reflection for consciousness, it becomes thereby an objective totality, a whole of knowledge, an organization of cognitions. Within this organization, every part is at the same time the whole; for its standing is its connection with the Absolute" (pp. 97-8).
"Common sense cannot understand speculation; and what is more, it must come to hate speculation when it has experience of it; and, unless it is in the state of perfect indifference that security confers, it is bound to detest and persecute it" (pp. 99-100); "The only aspect of speculation visible to common sense is its nullifying activity; and even this nullification is not visible in its entire scope. If common sense could grasp this scope, it would not believe speculation to be its enemy. For in its highest synthesis of the conscious and the non-conscious, speculation also demands the nullification of consciousness itself. Reason thus drowns itself and its knowledge and its reflection of the absolute identity, in its own abyss: and in this night of mere reflection and of the calculating intellect, in this night which is the noonday of life, common sense and speculation can meet one another" (p. 103).
"Speculation does indeed elevate finite things - matter, the Ego - to the infinite and thus nullifies them: matter and Ego so far as they are meant to embrace totality, are no longer matter and Ego. Yet the final act of philosophical reflection is still lacking: that is to say, the consciousness of the nullification of these finite things" (p. 101).
"Postulating Ideas is out of the question" (p. 111).
"Speculative philosophy in its turn, rejects every semblance of being a mediating position that popular philosophy seeks to confer on its principle of the absolute non-identity of the finite and the infinite. That which has died the death of dichotomy philosophy raises to life again through the absolute identity. And through Reason, which devours both [finite and infinite] and maternally posits them both equally, philosophy strives towards the consciousness of this identity of the finite and the infinite, or in other words, it strives towards knowledge and truth" (p. 195).
January 13, 2010
An early essay of Hegel's which is well worth reading, particularly the opening chapter. Although he drops some of the ideas from this essay in his (more) fully worked out thought, it's good evidence of what he took his task to be: philosophy is the activity which seeks to reconcile dichotomies such as, for moderns at least, object and subject; reason and nature. This is particularly important now, he says, when the dichotomies have become fixed and people have given up hope of overcoming them. Sadly for Hegel, I'm not sure his later work managed to convince everyone that all the dichotomies have been overcome. But it's a noble aim.
His criticisms of Fichte are impenetrable, but yield the odd nugget of gold, particularly when he attacks Fichte's practical philosophy as giving us a world of atomized individuals ruled over in every interaction by cops and politicians. He's much too soft on Schelling (but made up for it with the 'night in which all cows are black line' in the Phenomenology.) And the ending section on Reinhold is of use only to people who care about Reinhold, i.e., four or five people alive today.
I didn't read the translator's substantial introductions, but they're probably quite helpful, especially as to the more arcane points in Schelling's thought. For instance, the claim that "electricity, reconstructed from the inside, posits the sexual difference of organisms," p 169. Indeed it does, Mr Hegel. Indeed it does.
His criticisms of Fichte are impenetrable, but yield the odd nugget of gold, particularly when he attacks Fichte's practical philosophy as giving us a world of atomized individuals ruled over in every interaction by cops and politicians. He's much too soft on Schelling (but made up for it with the 'night in which all cows are black line' in the Phenomenology.) And the ending section on Reinhold is of use only to people who care about Reinhold, i.e., four or five people alive today.
I didn't read the translator's substantial introductions, but they're probably quite helpful, especially as to the more arcane points in Schelling's thought. For instance, the claim that "electricity, reconstructed from the inside, posits the sexual difference of organisms," p 169. Indeed it does, Mr Hegel. Indeed it does.
May 3, 2025
love the introduction by cerf so much!!! it's so cool!!! and i love how easy hegel is to read in comparison with fichte and schelling
August 10, 2022
Pretty good, helpful to understand how Hegel thought through the idealist tradition
March 13, 2021
This is an incredibly dense early work from Hegel � I would call it it compact if it weren’t for the dangling postscript on Reinhold, which seems practically useless for the modern reader (though Hegel’s humor shines here. I have to admit, I love philosophical cat-fights).
As my first full reading of Hegel outside of excerpts and fragments, I can pleasantly report that this essay dispelled some of the unwarranted prejudices I held towards Hegel’s work, which I certainly developed as a byproduct of lots of French theory. The section elaborating Fichte’s system, though quite technical, puts a magnifying glass up to the theoretical workings of German Idealism so as to clear up many difficulties for me. Hegel’s critique of Fichte’s conception of legal authority proves to me that his interpretation of Kantian political thought is more of a break than a continuation, though I’m willing to be proven wrong by Hegel’s later work.
The section on Schelling was a slight letdown, as I would have preferred a more explicit outline of the Schellingian system. It seems that in this work that Hegel has not quite distinguished his own system from Schelling’s, but that’s really to be expected from juvenilia. All in all, a very lucid document of the height of German Idealist thought.
As my first full reading of Hegel outside of excerpts and fragments, I can pleasantly report that this essay dispelled some of the unwarranted prejudices I held towards Hegel’s work, which I certainly developed as a byproduct of lots of French theory. The section elaborating Fichte’s system, though quite technical, puts a magnifying glass up to the theoretical workings of German Idealism so as to clear up many difficulties for me. Hegel’s critique of Fichte’s conception of legal authority proves to me that his interpretation of Kantian political thought is more of a break than a continuation, though I’m willing to be proven wrong by Hegel’s later work.
The section on Schelling was a slight letdown, as I would have preferred a more explicit outline of the Schellingian system. It seems that in this work that Hegel has not quite distinguished his own system from Schelling’s, but that’s really to be expected from juvenilia. All in all, a very lucid document of the height of German Idealist thought.
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March 18, 2023Interesting early text from Hegel. There are some very sweeping characterisations of Fichte and Schelling which I am unqualified to assess, but as a presentation of oppositions, in order to highlight Hegel's understanding of "the Understanding" and "Reason" it is quite interesting. Here we likely also see Hegel's particular understanding of the history of idealism as culminating essentially in his thought, which is now being reacted against (quite rightly probably).
The introduction in this particular edition was quite good, though the translation seems a little...dubious? The copy I read had multiple typos and odd choices of words, despite being a library copy. Not sure what happened there.
On re-read I figure I'll try the Harris version. But Surber's 60 page introduction (not counted on the goodread's page because they are in roman numerals) should not be overlooked given its scholarly rigour and clarity, as well as a nice evaluation the history.
Dense, but overall an interesting text.
The introduction in this particular edition was quite good, though the translation seems a little...dubious? The copy I read had multiple typos and odd choices of words, despite being a library copy. Not sure what happened there.
On re-read I figure I'll try the Harris version. But Surber's 60 page introduction (not counted on the goodread's page because they are in roman numerals) should not be overlooked given its scholarly rigour and clarity, as well as a nice evaluation the history.
Dense, but overall an interesting text.
June 16, 2024
Im ersten Teil ist viel Grundsätzliches zum philosophischen Ansatz Hegels. Dann ne Kritik an Fichte, ne Abfeierei von Schelling, wobei er da schon n Stück weiter geht als derselbe. Zum Schluss kriegt Reinhold aufs Maul in nem Ton, der doch an die ein oder andere marxistische Polemik gemahnt. Richtig gut, aber wahrscheinlich ziemlich undurchdringlich, wenn man sich nicht vorher bisschen mit Fichte und Schelling vertraut gemacht hat. Der Text ist aber auch nicht einfach mit dem reifen Hegel zu identifizieren, denn das Entscheidende, die Gesellschaft, wird hier noch gar nicht mitgedacht. Dazu klebt er noch zu sehr an Schelling. Es bleibt also noch wesentlich ahistorisch, wenngleich vor allem im ersten Teil schon größere Keime zur geschichtlichen Anschauung da sind.
February 10, 2024
The dullest of Hegel's writings I've read. Makes sense all things considered. Of historical value to only the most dedicated disciples of German Idealism.
April 25, 2025
notes
Philosophy as a description of reality written down:
Philosophy as a description of reality written down:
“Philosophy is not only a truth or a true description; it is rather, or should be, a description of the True [�.] Truth (Wahrheit) is the correct and complete ‘revelation� (= description) of Being and of the Real through coherent Discourse (Logos)� (A. Kojève, The Idea of Death in the Philosophy of Hegel 1933-34, p.115, in: Interpretation a Journal of Political Philosophy 1973, Volume 3, Issue 2,3)However, reality is contradictory, with negative action, change and becoming:
“the task of philosophy consists in uniting these presuppositions: to posit being in non-being, as becoming� (G W F Hegel, The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy 1801, p.93, State University Press of New York, 1977)Out of this contradictory reality emerges the Science of History, the critique of political economy, in examining historical material (how the first mover makes the first move, inorganic to organic, zero to 1):
“philosophizing must aim to posit this manifold as internally connected, and there necessarily arises the need to produce a totality of knowing, a system of science.� (G W F Hegel, p.113)This system is not accomplished by single individuals, but of all humanity in its development:
“As soon as we have realized - and ultimately no one has helped us do so more than Hegel himself - that the task of philosophy thus posed only means that a single philosopher should accomplish what can only be accomplished by the whole human race in its progressive development - as soon as we realize this, there is an end to all philosophy in the hitherto accepted sense of the word. We abandon ‘absolute truth�, which is unattainable along this path or by any single individual, and instead we pursue attainable relative truths along the path of the positive sciences and of the syntheses of their results by means of dialectical thought. With Hegel philosophy as such comes to an end: on the one hand, because in his system he recapitulates its whole development in the most splendid fashion, and on the other, because he shows us, albeit unconsciously, the way out of this labyrinth of systems to real positive knowledge of the world.� (F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy 1886, p.11, FLP, Peking, 1976)As follows, philosophy as isolated individuals thinking, is over just as soon as it has begun:
“the science exhibits itself as a circle returning upon itself, the end being wound back into the beginning, the simple ground� (G W F Hegel, Science of Logic 1812, p.842, Routledge, 2010)In the final analysis:
“With the appearance of Marxism as the scientific world outlook of the proletariat ends the old period in the history of philosophy, when philosophy was the occupation of isolated individuals, the possession of philosophical schools consisting of a small number of philosophers and their disciples, detached from life and the people, and alien to the people. Marxism is not such a philosophical school. On the contrary, it supersedes the old philosophy � philosophy that was the property of a small elite, the aristocracy of the intellect. It marked the beginning of a completely new period in the history of philosophy, when it became a scientific weapon in the hands of the proletarian masses in their struggle for emancipation from capitalism.� (A. A. Zhdanov, On Literature, Music and Philosophy 1948, p.80, NEPH, Toronto, 2022)
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