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Crashes and Crises: Lessons from a History of Financial Disasters
Professor Connel Fullenkamp of Duke University guides listeners through four centuries of economic disasters - from tulip mania in the 1600s to the Great Recession of 2007-2009. Each of his 24 lectures covers a notable incident of financial misfortune or folly that is worthy of a Hollywood thriller. You hear how Charles Ponzi conducted the moneymaking scam that bears his name; how mining companies in the Old West sprang up like Internet start-ups, with a similar imbalance of winners and losers; how hyperinflation destroyed Germany’s economy at the beginning of 1920s and how its resulting stock market crash nearly sank America’s stock market.
You also hear how the Great Depression deepened through a wave of bank panics; how, in more recent times, the US savings and loan industry went belly-up; how Orange County in California went bankrupt, how Japan’s hard-charging economy came to a screeching halt; how currency crises swept the globe; how subprime mortgages nearly sparked a second Great Depression; and much more. You also learn how technology has transformed stock trading, how cryptocurrencies work, and why we live in an era of financial instability.
As well as entertaining you with riveting stories, Professor Fullenkamp inoculates you against the gullibility, overconfidence, and herd mentality that have trapped even Wall Street professionals in misguided investments that lost billions. You won’t have any trouble staying awake through these stimulating lectures. And, armed with the knowledge of how to stay out of harm’s way, you may even sleep better at night.
PLEASE NOTE: When you purchase this title, the accompanying PDF will be available in your Audible Library along with the audio.
You also hear how the Great Depression deepened through a wave of bank panics; how, in more recent times, the US savings and loan industry went belly-up; how Orange County in California went bankrupt, how Japan’s hard-charging economy came to a screeching halt; how currency crises swept the globe; how subprime mortgages nearly sparked a second Great Depression; and much more. You also learn how technology has transformed stock trading, how cryptocurrencies work, and why we live in an era of financial instability.
As well as entertaining you with riveting stories, Professor Fullenkamp inoculates you against the gullibility, overconfidence, and herd mentality that have trapped even Wall Street professionals in misguided investments that lost billions. You won’t have any trouble staying awake through these stimulating lectures. And, armed with the knowledge of how to stay out of harm’s way, you may even sleep better at night.
PLEASE NOTE: When you purchase this title, the accompanying PDF will be available in your Audible Library along with the audio.
12 pages, Audible Audio
First published August 17, 2018
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February 16, 2019
These twenty-four lectures explore various financial crises that have occurred since the early 1600s. The lectures describe both the actions and personalities behind the events. Some are simply the consequence of people doing what at the time seemed to be in their best interests with unintended consequences. Others have the appearance of scandals with individuals utilizing deceptive practices. But even in cases of apparent villains it can be argued that their intent wasn't sinister. In most of the major Ponzi schemes the perpetrators ended up broke in the end, whereas if their intents had been to steal they could have absconded with much wealth.
About half the the cases discussed happened during my life time—since WWII—and were stories I had some memory of from news reports. It was interesting to have these events described in greater detail and with the additional insight that comes from a past-tense perspective. Even some of the earlier stories were events I had some knowledge of from reading history—from my parents in the case of the 1930s Great Depression.
It's interesting how it's possible to see clearly in past-tense what caused the financial problems, but it's not so clear in future tense prior to it happening. That isn't necessarily true in the case of financial bubbles. People know that the market is overpriced during bubbles, but they buy into the market in order the ride the wave up intending to sell to a greater fool before the prices drop—quickly. Before these lectures I had thought I was smart to have anticipated the dot-com bubble bursting. These lectures told me I was no smarter than average.
The first lecture emphasizes the role of human nature in financial events and describes technological innovations, including cryptocurrencies and high-frequency trading, which by themselves are not dangerous but are tools enabling people to make their human mistakes larger and faster than was the case in the past. The final lecture switches into speculative future tense by considering whether China’s rapid financial development, which relies on institutions commonly called shadow banks, could lead to crisis.
The following is a list of the lecture titles and a brief description of their contents. Most of the descriptions are edited versions of the descriptions on the Great Courses website:
Lecture 1 � , , and the Future of Disaster
Crashes and crises are a normal part of financial activity. Technology may have the potential to reduce, or even prevent, some financial disasters by improving the amount of information available to investors and regulators, but it also creates new ways for people to push the financial system beyond its limits.
Lecture 2 � The Con Men and
Ponzi schemes—named after its most famous practitioner—have tremendous power to draw in large numbers of people, even when the victims probably should know better. This lecture examines a few of the most significant Ponzi frauds of the past century.
Lecture 3 � A Boom in Busts
There is tension in our views of the financial markets between today’s modern, unstable financial markets and the more docile, predictable financial markets of the past. Perhaps surprisingly, the unpredictable� and sometimes chaotic—nature of contemporary financial markets seems to be a norm that has prevailed throughout much of history, while the outlier, in historical terms, is the days of financial stability and predictability that existed not long ago.
Lecture 4 � The Tulip Bubble
The Dutch tulip bubble, which took place in late 1636, doesn’t have much in common with other financial bubbles in history, and evidence suggests that it wasn’t as extreme as often portrayed. The prices of some tulips did rise spectacularly, but not the prices of all tulips, and not the ones you might expect. Speculative frenzies like the tulip bubble are referred to by economists as asset price bubbles.
Lecture 5 � The South Sea Bubble
The South Sea Company went from an obscure British trading organization in the early 18th century, with a share price of £128, to England’s most important company, with its shares trading at more than £1000—over the course of just 6 months. The company was at the center of one of history’s most interesting stock bubbles, one largely built on stock price manipulation and corruption. The South Sea bubble is a complex, fascinating story about the early days of the stock market in England and a cautionary tale about the dangers of mixing private enterprise and government finance.
Lecture 6 � The Mississippi Bubble
In 1720, a Scotsman named John Law was put in charge of the entire French economy and given free rein to put his ideas about money, banking, and finance into effect. Law did get the French economy moving, but along the way, he also helped create one of history’s most famous, and least understood, financial bubbles: the Mississippi bubble. This market dislocation didn’t have much to do with Mississippi, but it does show what can happen when governments put radical economic theories into practice on a large scale.
Lecture 7 � Holes in the Ground: Mining Stock Frauds
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the world of minerals exploration and mining was a magnet for some of the greatest talent in America, including the most talented con artists. The schemes they cooked up ensnared countless small investors, as well as some of the greatest business leaders in the country.
Lecture 8 � The Panic of 1907
This lecture digs into the concept of financial panics by focusing on one that changed the course of American economic policy: the panic of 1907, which introduces us to one of the most famous financiers in American history—John Pierpont Morgan—and brought about an end of the era of financial panics.
Lecture 9 � Hyperinflation in Germany and Zimbabwe
One definition of hyperinflation is inflation of 50% a month or higher. Hyperinflation destroys wealth on a massive scale. Fortunately, it’s fairly rare. But it’s important to learn about the causes of hyperinflations so that we can recognize the warning signs. And the circumstances that produce hyperinflation aren’t very exotic. In fact, they’re alarmingly familiar.
Lecture 10 � The Crash of 1929
The decade prior to 1929 was thought of by some people as a "new era" of growth that was different from previous times. As asset prices got pushed up beyond historic norms, people tended to think that the established rules of economics and finance just didn’t apply anymore.
Lecture 11 � The Great Contraction of 1931�1933
Between 1931 and early 1933, a third of all banks in the United States failed, culminating in President Franklin Roosevelt’s declaration of a 4-day national bank holiday, in which all bank transactions were involuntarily suspended. The nation’s stock exchanges also closed. This was the peak moment in a financial earthquake that economists Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz called the Great Contraction—which probably didn’t cause the Great Depression, but the wave of bank failures driving it was one of the leading contributors to the Depression’s depth and length. Meanwhile, a parallel crisis was taking place in a different financial institution known as a building and loan association; this early meltdown in the nation’s mortgage markets helped make the Depression significantly worse.
Lecture 12 � The
In the 1980s and 90s many of the laws governing S&Ls were lifted to allow some relief from their being tied to multi-year mortgages at low interest rates (i.e. lower than prevailing interest rates at the time). Free of these controls, many S&Ls got into financial trouble. During the years of 1986 to 1995, 1,043 out of the 3,234 savings and loan associations in the United States failed.
Lecture 13 � The Crash of 1987
The Monday of October 19, 1987 is often referred to as Black Monday because that is when stock markets around the world crashed. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) fell exactly 508 points to 1,738.74 (22.61%). The crash began in Hong Kong and spread west to Europe, hitting the United States after other markets had already sustained significant declines.
Lecture 14 � Japan’s Lost Decade
In the 1980s, the Japanese economic machine seemed unstoppable. Big Japanese companies looked like they would keep growing and dominate their respective markets forever, and Japanese banks were aggressively expanding into the United States. But within a decade, the Japanese economy imploded. Its banking system was at the heart of the collapse, plunging the country into stagnation for more than 2 decades. The Japanese banking catastrophe was really a crisis of the entire Japanese economic model, including the role played by the government.
Lecture 15 � Bankers Trust Swaps
The most popular financial derivative is the interest rate swaps, which are heavily used precisely because they’re so helpful, easy to understand, and safe to use. In fact, they haven’t been implicated in major financial crises or disasters—except for one. In 1993 and 1994, a large New York financial institution known as Bankers Trust was sued multiple times by customers with whom it had entered into interest rate swap agreements and had lost tens of millions of dollars. This was more than these large, well-known companies thought was possible, and they suspected they had been cheated. When the facts of the cases came to light, the Bankers Trust swaps became one of the most fascinating and colorful financial scandals of the 1990s.
Lecture 16 � Asia, Greece, and Global Contagion
When a currency falls in value by a dramatic amount in a short period of time, the event is called a currency crisis. During a currency crisis, the prices of imported goods and services skyrocket in the country that has undergone the devaluation. The resulting drop in aggregate demand is usually quick and deep, causing a nasty recession, and the country’s financial system is often paralyzed. A big drop in the value of a country’s currency makes its exports much cheaper and, therefore, more competitive in global markets, meaning that countries that undergo currency crises are likely to eventually recover as their exports grow. But in the short term, a devaluation causes intense economic and financial pain for nearly everyone in the country. On net, the benefits typically do not outweigh the costs. Most countries would rather avoid a currency crisis if they can. But that seems to be very difficult.
Lecture 17 � The Orange County, California, Bankruptcy
Robert Citron was the treasurer and tax collector of Orange County, California, for more than 23 years. He was considered a superstar among state and county money managers because of the consistently high returns he earned. But he also seemed to be the kind of person who didn’t want the government looking over his shoulder too closely, especially when it came to how he managed the Orange County investment pool. He reported to the county Board of Supervisors about the fund only once a year and overcame several organized attempts to impose more oversight on him. After all, people couldn’t argue with Citron’s success. But in late 1994, he suddenly disclosed massive losses on the Orange County investment pool, forcing the county to declare bankruptcy� the largest municipal default in US history up to then.
Lecture 18 � The Dotcom Bubble
The dotcom boom signaled a fundamental and permanent change taking place in the economy. One consequence was that it made the job of valuing companies more difficult than it already was. The realization that the internet had opened up tremendous new business opportunities—combined with uncertainty about how to put a reliable dollar value on what amounted to a land rush—opened the door to overvaluation and speculation. Several types of bad behavior in the market also helped propel stock prices from high to absurd and then sublime.
Lecture 19 � Rogue Traders at and
Rogue-trading cases are fundamentally all the same in terms of the risk-management mistakes that allow a trader to go rogue. This lecture examines two of the most famous—and costly—rogue-trading episodes in recent history: the stories of Jérôme Kerviel, whose unauthorized trading cost the French bank Société Générale more than $6 billion, and Nick Leeson, whose trading bankrupted Baring Brothers.
Lecture 20 � Unhedged! Long-Term Capital Management
(LTCM) was a hedge fund that had existed for barely 4 years when it went into a death spiral, yet even the possibility of its demise threatened to take down most of Wall Street with it. The rise and fall of LTCM is a virtual showcase of risk-management errors—mistakes made by the hedge fund as well as by the banks that it did business with. And while cutting-edge financial modeling played a role in the firm’s collapse, what really spelled its demise was that LTCM and its banks ignored some of the most basic rules of finance.
Lecture 21 � The and Value at Risk
One great irony of modern finance is that many risk-management tools have ended up inflicting huge damage on companies, the markets, and the economy. This is the case with one the most important innovations in financial risk management: a model called value at risk (VaR). While VaR is the workhorse of modern financial risk management, it has kicked its owners pretty hard on multiple occasions.
Lecture 22 � The Goldilocks Economy and Three Bads
In the 1990s and early 2000s, economists referred to the United States as a Goldilocks economy because it was enjoying a long spell of economic growth that wasn’t too hot or too cold—not too fast nor too slow—but just right. Economists concluded that, thanks to their wise counsel, not only was growth solid, but unemployment was historically low and inflation was moderate. In hindsight it's apparent that the economists' fine-tuning had its flaws. The "three bads" were bad monetary policy, bad private-sector behavior, and bad financial regulation.
Lecture 23 � Subprime Debt and the Run on Wall Street
In a classic bank run, a rumor starts that the bank doesn’t have the resources to pay back its depositors—who react by running to the bank as fast as they can to withdraw their money while it still has cash on hand. By 2007, it was thought that bank runs had become a thing of the past, but the phenomenon was still alive and well elsewhere in the financial markets, although some of the details had changed to keep up with the times. Now, instead of bank deposits, what was in flux were short-term securities, and instead of lining up at the door, the demands to cash out were submitted instantaneously via electronic communications.
Lecture 24 � China’s Shadow Banks
China’s domestic financial system didn’t suffer contagion effects in 2008, or during earlier economic brushfires around the world, because it was largely closed off. But China isn’t less susceptible to crashes and crises than any other country. Thanks to its capital controls, any problems will be largely home-grown—but that’s reason enough to worry. In recent years, a new type of home-grown financial institution has become key to the Chinese financial system and economic growth. China’s shadow banks—and the tremendous expansion of credit that they’ve contributed to—have many observers worried that China will be the next big economy to experience a major financial meltdown.
About half the the cases discussed happened during my life time—since WWII—and were stories I had some memory of from news reports. It was interesting to have these events described in greater detail and with the additional insight that comes from a past-tense perspective. Even some of the earlier stories were events I had some knowledge of from reading history—from my parents in the case of the 1930s Great Depression.
It's interesting how it's possible to see clearly in past-tense what caused the financial problems, but it's not so clear in future tense prior to it happening. That isn't necessarily true in the case of financial bubbles. People know that the market is overpriced during bubbles, but they buy into the market in order the ride the wave up intending to sell to a greater fool before the prices drop—quickly. Before these lectures I had thought I was smart to have anticipated the dot-com bubble bursting. These lectures told me I was no smarter than average.
The first lecture emphasizes the role of human nature in financial events and describes technological innovations, including cryptocurrencies and high-frequency trading, which by themselves are not dangerous but are tools enabling people to make their human mistakes larger and faster than was the case in the past. The final lecture switches into speculative future tense by considering whether China’s rapid financial development, which relies on institutions commonly called shadow banks, could lead to crisis.
The following is a list of the lecture titles and a brief description of their contents. Most of the descriptions are edited versions of the descriptions on the Great Courses website:
Lecture 1 � , , and the Future of Disaster
Crashes and crises are a normal part of financial activity. Technology may have the potential to reduce, or even prevent, some financial disasters by improving the amount of information available to investors and regulators, but it also creates new ways for people to push the financial system beyond its limits.
Lecture 2 � The Con Men and
Ponzi schemes—named after its most famous practitioner—have tremendous power to draw in large numbers of people, even when the victims probably should know better. This lecture examines a few of the most significant Ponzi frauds of the past century.
Lecture 3 � A Boom in Busts
There is tension in our views of the financial markets between today’s modern, unstable financial markets and the more docile, predictable financial markets of the past. Perhaps surprisingly, the unpredictable� and sometimes chaotic—nature of contemporary financial markets seems to be a norm that has prevailed throughout much of history, while the outlier, in historical terms, is the days of financial stability and predictability that existed not long ago.
Lecture 4 � The Tulip Bubble
The Dutch tulip bubble, which took place in late 1636, doesn’t have much in common with other financial bubbles in history, and evidence suggests that it wasn’t as extreme as often portrayed. The prices of some tulips did rise spectacularly, but not the prices of all tulips, and not the ones you might expect. Speculative frenzies like the tulip bubble are referred to by economists as asset price bubbles.
Lecture 5 � The South Sea Bubble
The South Sea Company went from an obscure British trading organization in the early 18th century, with a share price of £128, to England’s most important company, with its shares trading at more than £1000—over the course of just 6 months. The company was at the center of one of history’s most interesting stock bubbles, one largely built on stock price manipulation and corruption. The South Sea bubble is a complex, fascinating story about the early days of the stock market in England and a cautionary tale about the dangers of mixing private enterprise and government finance.
Lecture 6 � The Mississippi Bubble
In 1720, a Scotsman named John Law was put in charge of the entire French economy and given free rein to put his ideas about money, banking, and finance into effect. Law did get the French economy moving, but along the way, he also helped create one of history’s most famous, and least understood, financial bubbles: the Mississippi bubble. This market dislocation didn’t have much to do with Mississippi, but it does show what can happen when governments put radical economic theories into practice on a large scale.
Lecture 7 � Holes in the Ground: Mining Stock Frauds
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the world of minerals exploration and mining was a magnet for some of the greatest talent in America, including the most talented con artists. The schemes they cooked up ensnared countless small investors, as well as some of the greatest business leaders in the country.
Lecture 8 � The Panic of 1907
This lecture digs into the concept of financial panics by focusing on one that changed the course of American economic policy: the panic of 1907, which introduces us to one of the most famous financiers in American history—John Pierpont Morgan—and brought about an end of the era of financial panics.
Lecture 9 � Hyperinflation in Germany and Zimbabwe
One definition of hyperinflation is inflation of 50% a month or higher. Hyperinflation destroys wealth on a massive scale. Fortunately, it’s fairly rare. But it’s important to learn about the causes of hyperinflations so that we can recognize the warning signs. And the circumstances that produce hyperinflation aren’t very exotic. In fact, they’re alarmingly familiar.
Lecture 10 � The Crash of 1929
The decade prior to 1929 was thought of by some people as a "new era" of growth that was different from previous times. As asset prices got pushed up beyond historic norms, people tended to think that the established rules of economics and finance just didn’t apply anymore.
Lecture 11 � The Great Contraction of 1931�1933
Between 1931 and early 1933, a third of all banks in the United States failed, culminating in President Franklin Roosevelt’s declaration of a 4-day national bank holiday, in which all bank transactions were involuntarily suspended. The nation’s stock exchanges also closed. This was the peak moment in a financial earthquake that economists Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz called the Great Contraction—which probably didn’t cause the Great Depression, but the wave of bank failures driving it was one of the leading contributors to the Depression’s depth and length. Meanwhile, a parallel crisis was taking place in a different financial institution known as a building and loan association; this early meltdown in the nation’s mortgage markets helped make the Depression significantly worse.
Lecture 12 � The
In the 1980s and 90s many of the laws governing S&Ls were lifted to allow some relief from their being tied to multi-year mortgages at low interest rates (i.e. lower than prevailing interest rates at the time). Free of these controls, many S&Ls got into financial trouble. During the years of 1986 to 1995, 1,043 out of the 3,234 savings and loan associations in the United States failed.
Lecture 13 � The Crash of 1987
The Monday of October 19, 1987 is often referred to as Black Monday because that is when stock markets around the world crashed. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) fell exactly 508 points to 1,738.74 (22.61%). The crash began in Hong Kong and spread west to Europe, hitting the United States after other markets had already sustained significant declines.
Lecture 14 � Japan’s Lost Decade
In the 1980s, the Japanese economic machine seemed unstoppable. Big Japanese companies looked like they would keep growing and dominate their respective markets forever, and Japanese banks were aggressively expanding into the United States. But within a decade, the Japanese economy imploded. Its banking system was at the heart of the collapse, plunging the country into stagnation for more than 2 decades. The Japanese banking catastrophe was really a crisis of the entire Japanese economic model, including the role played by the government.
Lecture 15 � Bankers Trust Swaps
The most popular financial derivative is the interest rate swaps, which are heavily used precisely because they’re so helpful, easy to understand, and safe to use. In fact, they haven’t been implicated in major financial crises or disasters—except for one. In 1993 and 1994, a large New York financial institution known as Bankers Trust was sued multiple times by customers with whom it had entered into interest rate swap agreements and had lost tens of millions of dollars. This was more than these large, well-known companies thought was possible, and they suspected they had been cheated. When the facts of the cases came to light, the Bankers Trust swaps became one of the most fascinating and colorful financial scandals of the 1990s.
Lecture 16 � Asia, Greece, and Global Contagion
When a currency falls in value by a dramatic amount in a short period of time, the event is called a currency crisis. During a currency crisis, the prices of imported goods and services skyrocket in the country that has undergone the devaluation. The resulting drop in aggregate demand is usually quick and deep, causing a nasty recession, and the country’s financial system is often paralyzed. A big drop in the value of a country’s currency makes its exports much cheaper and, therefore, more competitive in global markets, meaning that countries that undergo currency crises are likely to eventually recover as their exports grow. But in the short term, a devaluation causes intense economic and financial pain for nearly everyone in the country. On net, the benefits typically do not outweigh the costs. Most countries would rather avoid a currency crisis if they can. But that seems to be very difficult.
Lecture 17 � The Orange County, California, Bankruptcy
Robert Citron was the treasurer and tax collector of Orange County, California, for more than 23 years. He was considered a superstar among state and county money managers because of the consistently high returns he earned. But he also seemed to be the kind of person who didn’t want the government looking over his shoulder too closely, especially when it came to how he managed the Orange County investment pool. He reported to the county Board of Supervisors about the fund only once a year and overcame several organized attempts to impose more oversight on him. After all, people couldn’t argue with Citron’s success. But in late 1994, he suddenly disclosed massive losses on the Orange County investment pool, forcing the county to declare bankruptcy� the largest municipal default in US history up to then.
Lecture 18 � The Dotcom Bubble
The dotcom boom signaled a fundamental and permanent change taking place in the economy. One consequence was that it made the job of valuing companies more difficult than it already was. The realization that the internet had opened up tremendous new business opportunities—combined with uncertainty about how to put a reliable dollar value on what amounted to a land rush—opened the door to overvaluation and speculation. Several types of bad behavior in the market also helped propel stock prices from high to absurd and then sublime.
Lecture 19 � Rogue Traders at and
Rogue-trading cases are fundamentally all the same in terms of the risk-management mistakes that allow a trader to go rogue. This lecture examines two of the most famous—and costly—rogue-trading episodes in recent history: the stories of Jérôme Kerviel, whose unauthorized trading cost the French bank Société Générale more than $6 billion, and Nick Leeson, whose trading bankrupted Baring Brothers.
Lecture 20 � Unhedged! Long-Term Capital Management
(LTCM) was a hedge fund that had existed for barely 4 years when it went into a death spiral, yet even the possibility of its demise threatened to take down most of Wall Street with it. The rise and fall of LTCM is a virtual showcase of risk-management errors—mistakes made by the hedge fund as well as by the banks that it did business with. And while cutting-edge financial modeling played a role in the firm’s collapse, what really spelled its demise was that LTCM and its banks ignored some of the most basic rules of finance.
Lecture 21 � The and Value at Risk
One great irony of modern finance is that many risk-management tools have ended up inflicting huge damage on companies, the markets, and the economy. This is the case with one the most important innovations in financial risk management: a model called value at risk (VaR). While VaR is the workhorse of modern financial risk management, it has kicked its owners pretty hard on multiple occasions.
Lecture 22 � The Goldilocks Economy and Three Bads
In the 1990s and early 2000s, economists referred to the United States as a Goldilocks economy because it was enjoying a long spell of economic growth that wasn’t too hot or too cold—not too fast nor too slow—but just right. Economists concluded that, thanks to their wise counsel, not only was growth solid, but unemployment was historically low and inflation was moderate. In hindsight it's apparent that the economists' fine-tuning had its flaws. The "three bads" were bad monetary policy, bad private-sector behavior, and bad financial regulation.
Lecture 23 � Subprime Debt and the Run on Wall Street
In a classic bank run, a rumor starts that the bank doesn’t have the resources to pay back its depositors—who react by running to the bank as fast as they can to withdraw their money while it still has cash on hand. By 2007, it was thought that bank runs had become a thing of the past, but the phenomenon was still alive and well elsewhere in the financial markets, although some of the details had changed to keep up with the times. Now, instead of bank deposits, what was in flux were short-term securities, and instead of lining up at the door, the demands to cash out were submitted instantaneously via electronic communications.
Lecture 24 � China’s Shadow Banks
China’s domestic financial system didn’t suffer contagion effects in 2008, or during earlier economic brushfires around the world, because it was largely closed off. But China isn’t less susceptible to crashes and crises than any other country. Thanks to its capital controls, any problems will be largely home-grown—but that’s reason enough to worry. In recent years, a new type of home-grown financial institution has become key to the Chinese financial system and economic growth. China’s shadow banks—and the tremendous expansion of credit that they’ve contributed to—have many observers worried that China will be the next big economy to experience a major financial meltdown.
February 17, 2020
This is a decent overview of the history of speculations and crashes, but it doesn't do much in the way of analysis. I think the Kingdelberger book is much more worthwhile
Read
July 1, 2020Ugh, that was so dull... Felt like taking medicine. I bought this in the hopes that it might help me better understand how the pandemic and other emerging risks might trigger crashes, but this was mostly focused on events caused by fraudulent behavior and complicated (read: bad) securities/strategies, rather than systemic or structural problems. I went barking up the wrong tree.
April 21, 2023
Excellent lectures that are easy to follow, even with minimum previous knowledge on economics. He explains some of the terms, current events relevant to each of the crises and crashes, as well as what led to them happening and reason, plus all the signs that were ignored and the effects it had on society at the time with lessons to be learned in the future. Really enjoyed it.
He also narrated it well.
He also narrated it well.
May 3, 2023
The courses cover 24 financial market crashes and crises by giving a brief explanation of what happened, why and key takeaways. The course starts with the recent hot topics for Fintech and Crypto. The discussed further topics are: The Con Men Charles Ponzi and Ivar Kreuger, The Great Depression, The Tulip Bubble, The South Sea Bubble, The Mississippi Bubble, Mining Stock Frauds, The Panic of 1907, Hyperinflation in Germany and Zimbabwe, The Crash of 1929, The Great Contraction of 1931-1933, The Savings and the Loan Crisis, The Crash of 1987, Japan's Lost Decade, Bankers Trust Swaps, Asia, Greece, and Global Contagion, The Orange County, California, Bankruptcy, The Dotcom Bubble, Rogue Traders at SocGen and Barings, Unhedged! Long-Term Capital Management, The London Whale and
Value at Risk, The Goldilocks Economy and Three Bads, Subprime Debt and the Run on Wall Street, China's Shadow Banks. Some interesting parts from the lectures for me are:
Ponzi schemes tend to have 3 ingredients that make them almost irresistible:
1) The person in charge is either very charismatic or intelligent - and often both. Our admiration for the person gives credibility to the investment plan and makes us believe that the person is honest.
2) The principles of the investment are publicly disclosed. This amplifies our perceptions of credibility and honesty. And other people do seem to have made lots of money by investing with this person. This “proof� pushes several of our psychological buttons at once and is a powerful inducement to open up our own wallets and take the plunge. Unfortunately, it’s mostly a show.
3) These schemes promise too much to too many people. In other words, even if they’re based on reputable investments, they eventually spread the winnings too thin, run out of money, and collapse.
Most of the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange during the 1920s didn’t issue quarterly financial reports, and a third of them didn’t issue any financial reports at all. And the reports that were issued lacked detail; many of them could fit on a postcard.
In many cases, countries suffer more than one type of crisis at once. For example, a currency crisis can be caused by a banking crisis, or a banking crisis can be caused by a sovereign debt crisis. According to the IMF database, in 68 recorded instances, countries experienced twin crises; that is, they contended with 2 of the 3 types of crisis simultaneously. In 8 instances, financially battered countries experienced all 3 crises at once.
A financial panic is the frantic attempt to find or get liquidity. In finance, liquid assets are those that flow from person to person, because most people will accept them as payment for goods and services or to settle debts. In other words, the more liquid an asset is, the better it serves as a medium of exchange. Cash is usually the most liquid asset. Liquidity has at least 2 different meanings in finance:
1 . The quality of being easily exchanged, usually for cash. For example, most bank deposits have high liquidity because they’re easy to exchange for cash at just about any time, by making a withdrawal. Personal checks and government bonds are also highly liquid. On the other hand, assets like land may have low liquidity if it takes a long time to find a buyer who is willing to pay a fair price.
2 . The condition of having enough liquid assets to be able to pay off your anticipated expenses. When we perform a financial analysis on a company, we ask whether the firm has enough liquid assets to pay off its bills over the next 12 months. A company may own lots of assets, such as factories and land, but still not have very much cash on hand. In that case, we’d say that the company isn’t very liquid.
Liquidity, in the sense of having enough liquid assets on hand, is essential to the successful operation of a business. If you run out of liquid assets, then you can’t pay for supplies or wages to your employees. You can’t actually do anything to earn the money you need.
There are 2 basic views of stock valuation.
1 . Fundamentals view: The main drivers of equity prices are profit growth and interest rates. The faster corporate earnings grow, the more shareholders will receive in dividends, and the higher the stock price will rise. On the other hand, higher interest rates make bonds attractive as substitutes for stocks, so the demand for stocks will fall as rates rise. In addition, as interest rates—and inflationary pressures—grow, any stock dividend to be paid to shareholders in the future will have less value today. So, there’s a well-established negative, or inverse, relationship between interest rates and stock prices.
2 . Method of comparables: The price of a share should be some multiple of its earnings. For example, a stock might be considered fairly priced if its market price is 10 times its annual earnings per share. This multiple is only a rule of thumb and also depends on the growth rate of the earnings. But if investors expect higher-than-average earnings growth for a company, then its ratio of price to earnings might increase to 11, 12, or even more—to account for the expected future rate of growth. In other words, a higher stock price might be justified today if future earnings are now expected to grow more quickly.
Both of these stock-valuation methods depend on a calculation of the anticipated growth in corporate earnings.
Trading is organized into 3 functions, commonly called offices in financial lingo: front office, middle office, and back office.
1 . The front office consists of the traders, and all their gear, as well as the people who support them by crunching numbers and working out theoretical models. In other words, the front office thinks up the trades and executes them. Rogue traders are always found in the front office, because you have to be able to trade to be a rogue trader.
2 . The back office handles all the chores that must be performed once a trade is set. It also does all the record keeping.
3 . The middle office consists of risk managers who set the trading limits for the overall operation as well as for individual traders and who make sure that the traders operate within these limits. The middle office sets the risk-management policy, but the day-to-day enforcement rests with the back office.
Value at Risk, The Goldilocks Economy and Three Bads, Subprime Debt and the Run on Wall Street, China's Shadow Banks. Some interesting parts from the lectures for me are:
Ponzi schemes tend to have 3 ingredients that make them almost irresistible:
1) The person in charge is either very charismatic or intelligent - and often both. Our admiration for the person gives credibility to the investment plan and makes us believe that the person is honest.
2) The principles of the investment are publicly disclosed. This amplifies our perceptions of credibility and honesty. And other people do seem to have made lots of money by investing with this person. This “proof� pushes several of our psychological buttons at once and is a powerful inducement to open up our own wallets and take the plunge. Unfortunately, it’s mostly a show.
3) These schemes promise too much to too many people. In other words, even if they’re based on reputable investments, they eventually spread the winnings too thin, run out of money, and collapse.
Most of the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange during the 1920s didn’t issue quarterly financial reports, and a third of them didn’t issue any financial reports at all. And the reports that were issued lacked detail; many of them could fit on a postcard.
In many cases, countries suffer more than one type of crisis at once. For example, a currency crisis can be caused by a banking crisis, or a banking crisis can be caused by a sovereign debt crisis. According to the IMF database, in 68 recorded instances, countries experienced twin crises; that is, they contended with 2 of the 3 types of crisis simultaneously. In 8 instances, financially battered countries experienced all 3 crises at once.
A financial panic is the frantic attempt to find or get liquidity. In finance, liquid assets are those that flow from person to person, because most people will accept them as payment for goods and services or to settle debts. In other words, the more liquid an asset is, the better it serves as a medium of exchange. Cash is usually the most liquid asset. Liquidity has at least 2 different meanings in finance:
1 . The quality of being easily exchanged, usually for cash. For example, most bank deposits have high liquidity because they’re easy to exchange for cash at just about any time, by making a withdrawal. Personal checks and government bonds are also highly liquid. On the other hand, assets like land may have low liquidity if it takes a long time to find a buyer who is willing to pay a fair price.
2 . The condition of having enough liquid assets to be able to pay off your anticipated expenses. When we perform a financial analysis on a company, we ask whether the firm has enough liquid assets to pay off its bills over the next 12 months. A company may own lots of assets, such as factories and land, but still not have very much cash on hand. In that case, we’d say that the company isn’t very liquid.
Liquidity, in the sense of having enough liquid assets on hand, is essential to the successful operation of a business. If you run out of liquid assets, then you can’t pay for supplies or wages to your employees. You can’t actually do anything to earn the money you need.
There are 2 basic views of stock valuation.
1 . Fundamentals view: The main drivers of equity prices are profit growth and interest rates. The faster corporate earnings grow, the more shareholders will receive in dividends, and the higher the stock price will rise. On the other hand, higher interest rates make bonds attractive as substitutes for stocks, so the demand for stocks will fall as rates rise. In addition, as interest rates—and inflationary pressures—grow, any stock dividend to be paid to shareholders in the future will have less value today. So, there’s a well-established negative, or inverse, relationship between interest rates and stock prices.
2 . Method of comparables: The price of a share should be some multiple of its earnings. For example, a stock might be considered fairly priced if its market price is 10 times its annual earnings per share. This multiple is only a rule of thumb and also depends on the growth rate of the earnings. But if investors expect higher-than-average earnings growth for a company, then its ratio of price to earnings might increase to 11, 12, or even more—to account for the expected future rate of growth. In other words, a higher stock price might be justified today if future earnings are now expected to grow more quickly.
Both of these stock-valuation methods depend on a calculation of the anticipated growth in corporate earnings.
Trading is organized into 3 functions, commonly called offices in financial lingo: front office, middle office, and back office.
1 . The front office consists of the traders, and all their gear, as well as the people who support them by crunching numbers and working out theoretical models. In other words, the front office thinks up the trades and executes them. Rogue traders are always found in the front office, because you have to be able to trade to be a rogue trader.
2 . The back office handles all the chores that must be performed once a trade is set. It also does all the record keeping.
3 . The middle office consists of risk managers who set the trading limits for the overall operation as well as for individual traders and who make sure that the traders operate within these limits. The middle office sets the risk-management policy, but the day-to-day enforcement rests with the back office.
February 14, 2019
Excellent review of financial problems
It made me rethink some of my beliefs about how the market works.
I felt like it did a good job of working through the causes of financial crises through the 20th and 21st centuries. The primary focus is on the US, but it did talk about some other interesting problems and their causes. It also gave basic information on some of the tools used by experts in the stock market to leverage and hedge their bets.
It made me rethink some of my beliefs about how the market works.
I felt like it did a good job of working through the causes of financial crises through the 20th and 21st centuries. The primary focus is on the US, but it did talk about some other interesting problems and their causes. It also gave basic information on some of the tools used by experts in the stock market to leverage and hedge their bets.
March 29, 2020
Watch a detailed review along with my favorite ideas and takeaways at:
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February 13, 2020This is a high quality, content packed lecture series. I just couldn't finish it, because it was too depressing.
July 13, 2020
Whenever I read something about certain symptoms of a disease, I feel that I have the disease, though with symptoms in a milder, less perceptible form. For example, stomach ailments, Alzheimer’s, amnesia, anxiety, and many different kinds of phobias. I have them all. The only thing I am sure I don’t have is skin cancer. What a relief. However Asians are susceptible to osteoporosis, and somehow I feel that I have it, in an unnoticeable form, which is surely going to manifest one way or another sometime in the future.
Now I am listening to (or rather watching) a book about financial disasters in the past–I shouldn’t have done this and I know it but I just can’t stop myself–and I feel that the world is heading towards disasters now. The past several months are only harbingers. It is said one year of hyperinflation will devalue $10,000 to $77. How frightening. No matter what is going to happen, it won’t be as bad as what my grandma went through during and after WWII. According to her, she lost everything she carried during their march to the mountains to escape the rumored bombings and the advancing armies. When she finally managed to come back, hyperinflation ate up the rest of her savings and possessions. Nobody accepted cash anymore since it’s worthless. A whole cartload of cash couldn’t buy one little bag of rice. Every trade is a barter. I can imagine myself barter away my possessions to exchange for a meal on a lucky day. On an unlucky one, nobody wants my books, clothes, cooking utensils, or any of the household appliances. Perish the thought.
I can’t go through “Crashes and Crises: Lessons from a History of Financial Disasters� without thinking what I would do if I were involved in any of the disasters listed here. One can do nothing but cry but tears sound so futile in face of crises like these. This may sound very naive and laughable–my question is: is any of these disasters reversible? Most of the financial transactions are on paper only, right? So it is possible that contracts can be renegotiated, money returned, lost compensated, isn’t it? For example, the two Ponzi schemes are theoretical reversible, right? If the money is not spent, it can be returned to the rightful owner, not one cent lost. Also in the case of Orange County Bankruptcy, Robert Citron was greedy and reckless, but all his manipulations are on paper only, right? Not a cent was being thrown away. Couldn’t everybody involved, every party implicated, came together to negotiate a deal to reduce the damage?
Several years ago I read about a news concerning a complaint from Malaysian government that currency traders do serious damage to the stability of the Ringgit. Smaller countries are easy targets and their financial markets could collapse because of rogue traders. I didn’t understand how and why this happened, but now these lectures try to explain the underlying stories. I don’t comprehend the whole thing, which reminds me that I probably want to read the Wikipedia page of the case of George Soros taking on Bank of England.
Now I am listening to (or rather watching) a book about financial disasters in the past–I shouldn’t have done this and I know it but I just can’t stop myself–and I feel that the world is heading towards disasters now. The past several months are only harbingers. It is said one year of hyperinflation will devalue $10,000 to $77. How frightening. No matter what is going to happen, it won’t be as bad as what my grandma went through during and after WWII. According to her, she lost everything she carried during their march to the mountains to escape the rumored bombings and the advancing armies. When she finally managed to come back, hyperinflation ate up the rest of her savings and possessions. Nobody accepted cash anymore since it’s worthless. A whole cartload of cash couldn’t buy one little bag of rice. Every trade is a barter. I can imagine myself barter away my possessions to exchange for a meal on a lucky day. On an unlucky one, nobody wants my books, clothes, cooking utensils, or any of the household appliances. Perish the thought.
I can’t go through “Crashes and Crises: Lessons from a History of Financial Disasters� without thinking what I would do if I were involved in any of the disasters listed here. One can do nothing but cry but tears sound so futile in face of crises like these. This may sound very naive and laughable–my question is: is any of these disasters reversible? Most of the financial transactions are on paper only, right? So it is possible that contracts can be renegotiated, money returned, lost compensated, isn’t it? For example, the two Ponzi schemes are theoretical reversible, right? If the money is not spent, it can be returned to the rightful owner, not one cent lost. Also in the case of Orange County Bankruptcy, Robert Citron was greedy and reckless, but all his manipulations are on paper only, right? Not a cent was being thrown away. Couldn’t everybody involved, every party implicated, came together to negotiate a deal to reduce the damage?
Several years ago I read about a news concerning a complaint from Malaysian government that currency traders do serious damage to the stability of the Ringgit. Smaller countries are easy targets and their financial markets could collapse because of rogue traders. I didn’t understand how and why this happened, but now these lectures try to explain the underlying stories. I don’t comprehend the whole thing, which reminds me that I probably want to read the Wikipedia page of the case of George Soros taking on Bank of England.
February 19, 2021
There are plenty of talking heads mumbling on TV about crashes and bubbles, but do we truly know what a crash or a bubble is? Do they?
Connel lays out an incredibly detailed roadmap of the last 100 years (and older!) of financial collapses and the reasons for those failures. These crashes include but are not limited to the Dutch's Tulip mania in the 1630s, the South Sea Company's bubble of 1711, the Mississippi Company bubble of 1717, the Panic of 1907, the Crash of 1929, the Great Contraction of 1931-1933, the Savings and Loans Crisis, the Crash of 1987, Japan's Lost Decade, the Dotcom Bubble, and of course the one that many people know already, the Subprime Mortgage Crisis and subsequent recession in 2008.
It is incredibly revealing to see the failures of the Finance industry as a whole be retold over and over through different lenses in different locations. My main takeaway is that standards, guidelines, laws, and other financial seat belts that are put in place to keep the taxpayer, investor, and other "OPM"-providers or financiers are constantly and purposefully eroded by the people who are charged to care for and grow this money as part of an investment or other major purchase or trade. This usually done to further a trader's career or commission, or even cover up a major flaw in accounting that would have otherwise showed a red flag to the rest of the company, or the world.
I think this would be best consumed after an Econ 101 class, but with a little digging and research, I was able to keep up with the pace and follow up on phrases or rehash past lessons with a Google search. An incredibly dense reference that feels more like a series of classes than a traditional book experience.
I think the author could have benefited greatly from including an epilogue to conclude the findings discussed throughout the lectures. Maybe he meant to leave the information open ended and free from personal opinion. This could act as a great jumping-off point to investigate specific key events throughout economic history.
Connel lays out an incredibly detailed roadmap of the last 100 years (and older!) of financial collapses and the reasons for those failures. These crashes include but are not limited to the Dutch's Tulip mania in the 1630s, the South Sea Company's bubble of 1711, the Mississippi Company bubble of 1717, the Panic of 1907, the Crash of 1929, the Great Contraction of 1931-1933, the Savings and Loans Crisis, the Crash of 1987, Japan's Lost Decade, the Dotcom Bubble, and of course the one that many people know already, the Subprime Mortgage Crisis and subsequent recession in 2008.
It is incredibly revealing to see the failures of the Finance industry as a whole be retold over and over through different lenses in different locations. My main takeaway is that standards, guidelines, laws, and other financial seat belts that are put in place to keep the taxpayer, investor, and other "OPM"-providers or financiers are constantly and purposefully eroded by the people who are charged to care for and grow this money as part of an investment or other major purchase or trade. This usually done to further a trader's career or commission, or even cover up a major flaw in accounting that would have otherwise showed a red flag to the rest of the company, or the world.
I think this would be best consumed after an Econ 101 class, but with a little digging and research, I was able to keep up with the pace and follow up on phrases or rehash past lessons with a Google search. An incredibly dense reference that feels more like a series of classes than a traditional book experience.
I think the author could have benefited greatly from including an epilogue to conclude the findings discussed throughout the lectures. Maybe he meant to leave the information open ended and free from personal opinion. This could act as a great jumping-off point to investigate specific key events throughout economic history.
February 25, 2019
Great insight to financial crisis and what causes them and how the governments react to it. If you understand all what this book speaks about then you are proficient in finances.
On the other hand it is quite saddening to see that almost all crashes are, in fact, caused by human greed, stupidity, and fraud.
On the other hand it is quite saddening to see that almost all crashes are, in fact, caused by human greed, stupidity, and fraud.
April 26, 2020
Jeg er ikke skapt for sånne handelshøyskoleforelesninger.
July 14, 2019
A good treatment of various financial disasters and the possible reasons they occurred. I was especially happy with the Tulip Mania financial disaster where people sold their homes in order to buy certain types of tulip bulbs on speculation. While some people lost a lot of money when the market collapsed, the speculators who drove the price sky high did not lose a great deal of money because of the strange way the futures market was managed in those days. While one could offer a lot of money on futures on tulip bulbs, there was no legal way to enforce such a contract. Thus, if you offered a lot of money for the next season's tulip bulbs, but the crop failed or the price collapsed, one lost only 3 Dutch guilders max (if even that). That is a little less than $5 in today's dollars (July 13, 2019).
The history is told with an eye toward how it might apply to today's financial market (or how it would not). Very well done.
I'd listen to this audio course again.
The history is told with an eye toward how it might apply to today's financial market (or how it would not). Very well done.
I'd listen to this audio course again.
February 3, 2023
Lively and appealing, especially for a series of lectures on economics. Every year Professor Fullenkamp teaches material like this at Duke University, and every year students ask him for more information about rogue traders, and every year he says, "Rogue traders are all the same." But he helpfully includes two in this lecture series. My favorite lectures were on . . .
� tulipomania (more of a gambling/partying thing than a society-wide crisis)
� hyperinflation (which has happened about 29 times in recorded history)
� why Long-Term Capital Management failed (ironically, it was a hedge fund that made thousands of bets in the same direction rather than hedging)
� and, of course, Ponzi schemes and how their perpetrators have so much self-confidence that they sometimes end up delivering themselves to authorities
� tulipomania (more of a gambling/partying thing than a society-wide crisis)
� hyperinflation (which has happened about 29 times in recorded history)
� why Long-Term Capital Management failed (ironically, it was a hedge fund that made thousands of bets in the same direction rather than hedging)
� and, of course, Ponzi schemes and how their perpetrators have so much self-confidence that they sometimes end up delivering themselves to authorities
July 1, 2021
Some lessons were pretty interesting. In the discussions on financial catastrophes you might hear of the Tulip Bubble or the hyperinflation of Germany but at least I, as an outsider to the field, wouldn't have heard of the Mississippi Bubble or rogue traders or Japan's lost decade. So having this general overview was pretty decent. At times, though, it felt a bit long and tedious, especially when the financial instruments weren't clear. Since this is an audiobook, it wasn't always easy to imagine something that might be explained easily in a diagram. The subprime mortgage crisis explanation was the most helpful (and most recent) and helped fill some gaps I had on it from more sporadic knowledge on it.
April 29, 2023
From the history courses I have taken, I have learned that we cannot fully understand how the financial policies of a government have actually affected the financial footings of a country until some decades afterward. From this course, I see that looking at the short-term effects of a policy can still be telling and important ways to identify potential shortfalls. Still, I wonder if looking at more historical data could better identify what caused the financial downward spiral. No matter how you look at it though. this book opened up my eyes to some surprising areas of the financial world and helps me to appreciate all that goes on there much greater. There are no easy answers, that's for sure.
January 7, 2021
So basically the only reliable factor in the markets is fear, greed, and manipulation. And stupidity. Maybe it’s because we see all these cases in hindsight, but it’s so painfully obvious each case was bound for failure. Maybe it’s also how you define failure. Since most of the lead perpetrators either get bailed out trouble, sentenced to the minimum time or pay a fine that’s grossly under their profits.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
September 9, 2024
This was a little too arcane for me to follow in many places. The author does his best to explain the economics of each situation but it got too technical. Still, it was interesting to get a little more background on such large events as the Savings and Loan debacle and the Housing Crash of 2007. I feel that the course should have had a prerequisite of some kind to prepare me for the technical stuff.
May 10, 2020
A bit dry, terminology is a bit advanced, but most often I was able to grasp the overall concepts. A reminder that economic disruptions occur from time to time but are generally corrected internally or through various regulatory mechanisms seeking to restore balance to a particular area of the market.
January 17, 2021
This book was boring to get through. It was complicated to follow some of the stories and required a good deal of prerequisite knowledge of finance and various complex financial products. However, all the stories are relevant to help inform societies today of crashes and crises that came before so we can mitigate the risk of it happening again.
February 14, 2022
A relatively informative series of lectures, mostly quite entertaining, on most of the catastrophes that have befallen American, and some international, entities through history. One can only laugh at the number of times technocrats have said they now know how "the economy" works and that such things will not likely happen again.
February 2, 2020
Good background on the genesis for crashes. The common themes are easy to see: new product or investment vehicle+better returns than anything else on the market+complexity+moral hazard=economic crisis. Repeat...
May 27, 2021
The professor describes many famous and less well known financial disasters. The lessons learned are helpful, but many chapters were very complex to listen to and would require a second listen to fully understand the topic.
March 6, 2023
The story of more than 20 different financial crises is told, but there is really not much analysis. So if you want lessons from these you have to get them yourself sadly. The stories were interesting though.
May 31, 2023
Excellent book, both of very old and very recent market crashes. It is cool that the author goes into great technical detail of the financial context in which the crashes happened. I learned a lot about finance.
March 14, 2024
This was amazing! It’s in fact so effective at summarizing all the different types of crises, the major takeaways, as well as lots of unique details that I’m going to re-listen to this in the years to come
December 10, 2024
This is an excellent series of lectures that give you a good understanding of the world of finance through the lens of economic failures and collapses. If you are interested in the topic these will be interesting enough to keep you going. Helpful.
December 18, 2018
Good overview of crashes and crises throughout modern economic history. The audiobook is a great record of case studies and is a great learning tool for financial analysis beginners.
March 9, 2019
very good summary of financial crises across centuries, f perceptive and insightful.
March 10, 2019
interesting.
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