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To Save An Army: The Stalingrad Airlift
Using contemporary photographs and previously unpublished sources, Robert Forsyth analyses the human, strategic, tactical and technical elements of one of the most dramatic operations arranged by the Luftwaffe.
Stalingrad ranks as one of the most infamous, savage and emotive battles of the 20th century. It has consumed military historians since the 1950s and has inspired many books and much debate. This book tells the story of the operation mounted by the Luftwaffe to supply, by airlift, the trapped and exhausted German Sixth Army at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942/43. The weather conditions faced by the flying crews, mechanics, and soldiers on the ground were appalling, but against all odds, and a resurgent and active Soviet air force, the transports maintained a determined presence over the ravaged city on the Volga, even when the last airfields in the Stalingrad pocket had been lost.
Yet, even the daily figure of 300 tons of supplies, needed by Sixth Army just to subsist, proved over-ambitious for the Luftwaffe which battled against a lack of transport capacity, worsening serviceability, and increasing losses in badly needed aircraft.
Using previously unpublished diaries, original Luftwaffe reports and specially commissioned artwork, this gripping battle is told in detail through the eyes of the Luftwaffe commanders and pilots who fought to keep the Sixth Army alive and supplied.
Stalingrad ranks as one of the most infamous, savage and emotive battles of the 20th century. It has consumed military historians since the 1950s and has inspired many books and much debate. This book tells the story of the operation mounted by the Luftwaffe to supply, by airlift, the trapped and exhausted German Sixth Army at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942/43. The weather conditions faced by the flying crews, mechanics, and soldiers on the ground were appalling, but against all odds, and a resurgent and active Soviet air force, the transports maintained a determined presence over the ravaged city on the Volga, even when the last airfields in the Stalingrad pocket had been lost.
Yet, even the daily figure of 300 tons of supplies, needed by Sixth Army just to subsist, proved over-ambitious for the Luftwaffe which battled against a lack of transport capacity, worsening serviceability, and increasing losses in badly needed aircraft.
Using previously unpublished diaries, original Luftwaffe reports and specially commissioned artwork, this gripping battle is told in detail through the eyes of the Luftwaffe commanders and pilots who fought to keep the Sixth Army alive and supplied.
352 pages, Hardcover
First published November 8, 2022
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About the author
Robert Forsyth
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
September 24, 2024
No question the author has done his work, a compelling case against the foolish attempt to supply the 6th Army by air. I would have found it more interesting if I had a background in logistics or cargo aircraft. Unfortunately, I don't so I found all the details less than fascinating. The Luftwaffe had a need for short-term airlift to support their blitzkrieg mode of operations. They also did not foresee a need for a large transport airplane or a significant force structure. The head of the transport arm was low rank. They needed over 1,000 transport aircraft to meet the 6th Army requirements. Their entire force was only 500 aircraft and many were supporting Rommel in North Africa. Never mind the awful winter weather and growing USSR fighter threat. Pretty depressing chronicle, even though it led to a quicker end to WWII with the destruction of the German forces. 3 Stars for excellent research but not a mesmerizing book.
September 1, 2023
There are few Second World War topics that equal the Battle of Stalingrad in terms of drama, scale and impact. For just over five months during the Autumn and Winter of 1942 / 43 Friedrich Paulus's German 6th Army, along with elements of the 4th Panzer Army, fought a life and death struggle to take and retain a city which arguably held marginal strategic importance, but which carried the name of the Soviet Union's leader - Joseph Stalin. The story of the battle is extremely well documented, with numerous books on the subject ranging from weighty academic studies like David Glantz's three volume magnum opus 'Stalingrad' through to more accessible accounts such as Antony Beevor's bestselling book of the same name. The popular narrative coalesces around a number of themes - the over ambitious objectives of Fall Blau, an underestimation of the Red Army by the German Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH), the folly of relying on long and poorly defended flanks, Paulus's unwillingness to attempt a breakout during Eric von Manstein's Unternehmen Wintergewitter relief attempt and the inability of the Luftwaffe to properly supply the surrounded 6th Army after the encirclement. It is the latter aspect that commands the attention of the author, Robert Forsyth. Was it ever feasible to deliver three hundred tons of supplies per day into the Stalingrad Kessel? Where were the key decisions regarding the airlift made, and by whom? How well was the air transport plan implemented and what were the main operational challenges? In answering these questions, the author has brough a refreshingly new perspective to a well-worn subject - providing real insight into an aspect of operations which has not featured as heavily as it should in the historiography - the air transport arm of the Luftwaffe.
Operation Uranus, the encirclement of an entire German Army numbering over 265,000 combatants by the Red Army, was a master stroke in conception and execution. However, it wasn't the first time that a German Army had been encircled and supplied by air. Early in 1942 elements of the 16th Army had been isolated at Demyansk. In this earlier instance, the Kessel was smaller, but the fact that the Luftwaffe was able to satisfactorily supply approximately one hundred thousand service personnel by air for almost three months is sometimes cited as an appropriate precedent for the Stalingrad relief effort. The author quickly dispels this argument by proving that the airlift conducted by Luftflotte 1 at Demjansk was simply not scaleable, and in any case the operational context was fundamentally different to that which prevailed at Stalingrad.
Notwithstanding the obvious point that after-the-fact memoirs should be treated with caution, it is pretty clear that with the noticeable exception of Reichsfuhrer Hermann Wilhelm Göring, virtually all of the senior Luftwaffe commanders involved were highly sceptical that the air supply to the Stalingrad Kessel could succeed. Nevertheless, the effort put into the airlift was phenomenal, involving as it did - a Herculean effort from everyone involved. Flight times for the air crews lengthened as Axis home airfields were overrun by the advancing Red Army, the weather was unforgiving with temperatures dropping to -20 degrees or less, and the logistical challenge of getting the right supplies to the correct railhead became more and more testing. The German aircrew and those who maintained the aircraft in the most difficult of conditions, suffered grievous losses - and the first- hand accounts quoted in the book are not easy to read. Similiarly the reports of what was happening to those who were trapped in the Kessel serve to illustrate the horrors endured by combatants from both sides as the battle unfolded.
The author draws heavily from the memoirs of key Luftwaffe leaders such as Wolfram von Richthofen (the commander of Luftlfotte 4), Erhard Milch (appointed by Adolf Hitler to oversee the airlift in January 1943), Friedrich Wilhelm 'Fritz' Morzik (Luftwaffe airlift operations) and others to show the scale and complexity of the air supply challenge. The post-war Karlsruhe Project, quoted in Appendix 1 of the book, quantifies what was achieved. Over the course of seventy days from the 25th November 1942, 6,591 tons of supplies were airlifted into the Kessel - a daily average of 94.16 tons which was about a third of what 6th Army actually required. Other authoritative sources reveal that just under 25,000 wounded, sick and other personnel were evacuated by air. In achieving these numbers, the variety of aircraft used will come as a surprise to some - for example; the Focke-Wulf Fw 200 (Condor), a four-engine adapted airliner that had seen extensive service in an anti-shipping role over the North Atlantic.
As is clear from the evidence presented, the plan to supply 6th Army by air was never viable. Nevertheless, given that Adolf Hitler had no intention of giving Stalingrad up, it was perhaps inevitable that it would be attempted - particularly if one took the view, as he did, that the encirclement of 6th Army would be short- lived. No effort was spared by the Luftwaffe in the execution of the plan, and it is difficult to identify anything more that could have been done by those who had responsibility for it. Indeed, the author explores every aspect - human, operational, tactical and technical - in reaching this conclusion. The Luftwaffe's effort can be considered doubly impressive when one takes into account the Soviet attempts to frustrate the airlift. A resurgent Soviet air force and highly effective ground operations against the airfields used to support the air-bridge (including the spectacularly successful Tatsinskaya Raid) served to accentuate difficulties caused by the Luftwaffe's lack of transport capacity, worsening serviceability and aircraft losses. Whilst the failure of the airlift was catastrophic, the outcome was entirely predictable. In reading this book, one is drawn to the conclusion that the causes of the decisive defeat of the German Army at Stalingrad lie elsewhere. Indeed, the author does an excellent job in illustrating that the Luftwaffe did all that it could to fulfil an undertaking that should never have been given.
Operation Uranus, the encirclement of an entire German Army numbering over 265,000 combatants by the Red Army, was a master stroke in conception and execution. However, it wasn't the first time that a German Army had been encircled and supplied by air. Early in 1942 elements of the 16th Army had been isolated at Demyansk. In this earlier instance, the Kessel was smaller, but the fact that the Luftwaffe was able to satisfactorily supply approximately one hundred thousand service personnel by air for almost three months is sometimes cited as an appropriate precedent for the Stalingrad relief effort. The author quickly dispels this argument by proving that the airlift conducted by Luftflotte 1 at Demjansk was simply not scaleable, and in any case the operational context was fundamentally different to that which prevailed at Stalingrad.
Notwithstanding the obvious point that after-the-fact memoirs should be treated with caution, it is pretty clear that with the noticeable exception of Reichsfuhrer Hermann Wilhelm Göring, virtually all of the senior Luftwaffe commanders involved were highly sceptical that the air supply to the Stalingrad Kessel could succeed. Nevertheless, the effort put into the airlift was phenomenal, involving as it did - a Herculean effort from everyone involved. Flight times for the air crews lengthened as Axis home airfields were overrun by the advancing Red Army, the weather was unforgiving with temperatures dropping to -20 degrees or less, and the logistical challenge of getting the right supplies to the correct railhead became more and more testing. The German aircrew and those who maintained the aircraft in the most difficult of conditions, suffered grievous losses - and the first- hand accounts quoted in the book are not easy to read. Similiarly the reports of what was happening to those who were trapped in the Kessel serve to illustrate the horrors endured by combatants from both sides as the battle unfolded.
The author draws heavily from the memoirs of key Luftwaffe leaders such as Wolfram von Richthofen (the commander of Luftlfotte 4), Erhard Milch (appointed by Adolf Hitler to oversee the airlift in January 1943), Friedrich Wilhelm 'Fritz' Morzik (Luftwaffe airlift operations) and others to show the scale and complexity of the air supply challenge. The post-war Karlsruhe Project, quoted in Appendix 1 of the book, quantifies what was achieved. Over the course of seventy days from the 25th November 1942, 6,591 tons of supplies were airlifted into the Kessel - a daily average of 94.16 tons which was about a third of what 6th Army actually required. Other authoritative sources reveal that just under 25,000 wounded, sick and other personnel were evacuated by air. In achieving these numbers, the variety of aircraft used will come as a surprise to some - for example; the Focke-Wulf Fw 200 (Condor), a four-engine adapted airliner that had seen extensive service in an anti-shipping role over the North Atlantic.
As is clear from the evidence presented, the plan to supply 6th Army by air was never viable. Nevertheless, given that Adolf Hitler had no intention of giving Stalingrad up, it was perhaps inevitable that it would be attempted - particularly if one took the view, as he did, that the encirclement of 6th Army would be short- lived. No effort was spared by the Luftwaffe in the execution of the plan, and it is difficult to identify anything more that could have been done by those who had responsibility for it. Indeed, the author explores every aspect - human, operational, tactical and technical - in reaching this conclusion. The Luftwaffe's effort can be considered doubly impressive when one takes into account the Soviet attempts to frustrate the airlift. A resurgent Soviet air force and highly effective ground operations against the airfields used to support the air-bridge (including the spectacularly successful Tatsinskaya Raid) served to accentuate difficulties caused by the Luftwaffe's lack of transport capacity, worsening serviceability and aircraft losses. Whilst the failure of the airlift was catastrophic, the outcome was entirely predictable. In reading this book, one is drawn to the conclusion that the causes of the decisive defeat of the German Army at Stalingrad lie elsewhere. Indeed, the author does an excellent job in illustrating that the Luftwaffe did all that it could to fulfil an undertaking that should never have been given.
December 23, 2023
Really well researched, and presented in a chronological series of events that leads to the ultimate tragedy for those involved.
The book contains many stories of individual heroism, interspersed with examples of ruthlessness, sacrifice and at times, terrible decision making.
Probably the best WW2 book I have read
The book contains many stories of individual heroism, interspersed with examples of ruthlessness, sacrifice and at times, terrible decision making.
Probably the best WW2 book I have read
August 26, 2024
Demonstrates the logistical nightmare of trying to supply an army that just sits there. Interesting that Lufthansa airline pilots were shanghaied into flying unappreciated relief sorties. Luftwaffe had a lot of skill and experience on site and did a pretty good job, as this book points out. 6th Army blamed Luftwaffe for their predicament but didn’t retrieve air dropped supplies. Understandable that Paulus wanted to finger point the blame as 6th Army starved to death. I love the book and hope it becomes required reading at military institutions of higher education.
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December 31, 2022Annabelle
May 17, 2023
Terrific book on the struggle to feed an army.
Read
October 3, 2023Listened to the audio book by Audible.
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