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The Metaphysics of Morals
The Metaphysics of Morals is Kant's major work in applied moral philosophy in which he deals with the basic principles of rights and of virtues. It comprises two parts: the "Doctrine of Right," which deals with the rights that people have or can acquire, and the "Doctrine of Virtue," which deals with the virtues they ought to acquire. Mary Gregor's translation, revised for publication in Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, is the only complete translation of the whole text. It includes extensive annotation on Kant's difficult and sometimes unfamiliar vocabulary. A new introduction by Roger Sullivan sets the work in its historical and philosophical context.
280 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1797
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About the author
Immanuel Kant
2,566books4,097followersImmanuel Kant was an 18th-century philosopher from Königsberg, Prussia (now Kaliningrad, Russia). He's regarded as one of the most influential thinkers of modern Europe & of the late Enlightenment. His most important work is The Critique of Pure Reason, an investigation of reason itself. It encompasses an attack on traditional metaphysics & epistemology, & highlights his own contribution to these areas. Other main works of his maturity are The Critique of Practical Reason, which is about ethics, & The Critique of Judgment, about esthetics & teleology.
Pursuing metaphysics involves asking questions about the ultimate nature of reality. Kant suggested that metaphysics can be reformed thru epistemology. He suggested that by understanding the sources & limits of human knowledge we can ask fruitful metaphysical questions. He asked if an object can be known to have certain properties prior to the experience of that object. He concluded that all objects that the mind can think about must conform to its manner of thought. Therefore if the mind can think only in terms of causality–which he concluded that it does–then we can know prior to experiencing them that all objects we experience must either be a cause or an effect. However, it follows from this that it's possible that there are objects of such a nature that the mind cannot think of them, & so the principle of causality, for instance, cannot be applied outside experience: hence we cannot know, for example, whether the world always existed or if it had a cause. So the grand questions of speculative metaphysics are off limits, but the sciences are firmly grounded in laws of the mind. Kant believed himself to be creating a compromise between the empiricists & the rationalists. The empiricists believed that knowledge is acquired thru experience alone, but the rationalists maintained that such knowledge is open to Cartesian doubt and that reason alone provides us with knowledge. Kant argues, however, that using reason without applying it to experience will only lead to illusions, while experience will be purely subjective without first being subsumed under pure reason. Kant’s thought was very influential in Germany during his lifetime, moving philosophy beyond the debate between the rationalists & empiricists. The philosophers Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer saw themselves as correcting and expanding Kant's system, thus bringing about various forms of German Idealism. Kant continues to be a major influence on philosophy to this day, influencing both Analytic and Continental philosophy.
Pursuing metaphysics involves asking questions about the ultimate nature of reality. Kant suggested that metaphysics can be reformed thru epistemology. He suggested that by understanding the sources & limits of human knowledge we can ask fruitful metaphysical questions. He asked if an object can be known to have certain properties prior to the experience of that object. He concluded that all objects that the mind can think about must conform to its manner of thought. Therefore if the mind can think only in terms of causality–which he concluded that it does–then we can know prior to experiencing them that all objects we experience must either be a cause or an effect. However, it follows from this that it's possible that there are objects of such a nature that the mind cannot think of them, & so the principle of causality, for instance, cannot be applied outside experience: hence we cannot know, for example, whether the world always existed or if it had a cause. So the grand questions of speculative metaphysics are off limits, but the sciences are firmly grounded in laws of the mind. Kant believed himself to be creating a compromise between the empiricists & the rationalists. The empiricists believed that knowledge is acquired thru experience alone, but the rationalists maintained that such knowledge is open to Cartesian doubt and that reason alone provides us with knowledge. Kant argues, however, that using reason without applying it to experience will only lead to illusions, while experience will be purely subjective without first being subsumed under pure reason. Kant’s thought was very influential in Germany during his lifetime, moving philosophy beyond the debate between the rationalists & empiricists. The philosophers Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer saw themselves as correcting and expanding Kant's system, thus bringing about various forms of German Idealism. Kant continues to be a major influence on philosophy to this day, influencing both Analytic and Continental philosophy.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 72 reviews
April 6, 2024
Kant's existence was dedicated to the Sovereign Good, and his philosophy was: "There is nowhere anything in the world, nor even in general outside it, that it is possible to think and which could without restriction be taken for good, except for goodwill. "
However, I should not approach the question of Good in a way that does not suit it. For example, defending the Good through aesthetic or religious arguments, or worse, employing a manipulative and deceitful argumentation, is inappropriate. You must do it honestly and research yourself before presenting it as a free possibility to others.
That said, on a metaphysical question of this kind, even the most honest research risks irresistibly leading the human being who makes it towards dogmatism or skepticism, places where morality disappears because skepticism does not believe in it and because dogmatism believes in illusion. Therefore, to avoid sinking into one of these moral impasses, it is necessary first to establish the openings and limits of human reason to develop a critical position where one can pursue morality safely. To do this, Kant will write his Critique of Pure Reason.
Subsequently, without fear of sinking into metaphysical ratiocination, he should finally be able to afford to tackle the question most important to him: morality.
However, in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, he seems content to tackle only a few preliminary questions by exposing the analog of feeling that is "respect" and by presenting various formulations of the categorical imperative before attempting a deduction of freedom in part 3. And it is undoubtedly the failure of his hypothesis of independence that kept him from writing his Metaphysics of Morals for some time. Morality is indeed impossible if freedom is not present.
But since morality's content will be presented to us through the categorical imperative, how can the freedom that should accompany it not be deduced from it? This morality is because all deduction belongs to the amoral world of logic and necessity, while freedom implies a leap in reflection or existence. It escapes, in its very essence, all needs and all causalities.
Kant is not yet ready to assume this leap in his writing when he produces his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. But, if we have an eye for it, we can observe the emergence of this leap in the first part of his Critique of Practical Reason, which he wrote three years later.
However, I do not want to abuse the patience of people who are kind enough to read this little reflection to explain this essential piece of Kantian philosophy.
The set is a must-read for anyone interested in morality or philosophy, their own life, or simple curiosity. For others, it reads very well (for Kant) and constitutes a beautiful (and profitable) exercise in reflection.
However, I should not approach the question of Good in a way that does not suit it. For example, defending the Good through aesthetic or religious arguments, or worse, employing a manipulative and deceitful argumentation, is inappropriate. You must do it honestly and research yourself before presenting it as a free possibility to others.
That said, on a metaphysical question of this kind, even the most honest research risks irresistibly leading the human being who makes it towards dogmatism or skepticism, places where morality disappears because skepticism does not believe in it and because dogmatism believes in illusion. Therefore, to avoid sinking into one of these moral impasses, it is necessary first to establish the openings and limits of human reason to develop a critical position where one can pursue morality safely. To do this, Kant will write his Critique of Pure Reason.
Subsequently, without fear of sinking into metaphysical ratiocination, he should finally be able to afford to tackle the question most important to him: morality.
However, in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, he seems content to tackle only a few preliminary questions by exposing the analog of feeling that is "respect" and by presenting various formulations of the categorical imperative before attempting a deduction of freedom in part 3. And it is undoubtedly the failure of his hypothesis of independence that kept him from writing his Metaphysics of Morals for some time. Morality is indeed impossible if freedom is not present.
But since morality's content will be presented to us through the categorical imperative, how can the freedom that should accompany it not be deduced from it? This morality is because all deduction belongs to the amoral world of logic and necessity, while freedom implies a leap in reflection or existence. It escapes, in its very essence, all needs and all causalities.
Kant is not yet ready to assume this leap in his writing when he produces his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. But, if we have an eye for it, we can observe the emergence of this leap in the first part of his Critique of Practical Reason, which he wrote three years later.
However, I do not want to abuse the patience of people who are kind enough to read this little reflection to explain this essential piece of Kantian philosophy.
The set is a must-read for anyone interested in morality or philosophy, their own life, or simple curiosity. For others, it reads very well (for Kant) and constitutes a beautiful (and profitable) exercise in reflection.
July 2, 2018
i think kant was way too fixated on moral laws, anyone who followed everything he said (some of which is very prudish and not at all fun) would have a very boring life ,,, maybe if kant had read more nietzsche he would have realized that
January 25, 2021
3,5/5
Sinto como se tivesse stalkeado o feed do twitter dele.
Sinto como se tivesse stalkeado o feed do twitter dele.
October 30, 2023
Three stars for Kant is not three stars for a less divine thinker
December 30, 2024
Hate him but he ate w this
January 29, 2023
The question is not, as is desperately asked in every applied ethics seminar across the world: 'was Kant right?'. The question is, do we deserve to claim Kant is right in the eyes of God.
Kant claims that reason and faith are not only compatible, but interdependent, terming this reasoned demand ‘rational belief or faith� . The following statement provides a summary of what this entails for his ethics and especially philosophy of history, ‘a human being who has common but (morally) healthy reason can mark out his path, in both a theoretical and a practical respect, in a way which is fully in accord with the whole end of his vocation� , addressing here ‘friends of the human race� who ‘use their freedom lawfully and hence in a way which is conducive to what is best for the world!� . What Jacobi will later term a ‘salto mortale� is thus for Kant conducive and indeed already integrated in the necessity of reason if we are not to ‘become unworthy of freedom� .
So, to fulfil man’s moral vocation as intellectus ectypus, reason must have a ‘rational faith� in the possibility of approximating itself to an intellectus archetypus, thereby orienting itself in history. This interpretation recognizes the merely regulative role played by the Idea of God, and provides humanity a moral vocation on both the individual and collective level to bridge the domains of nature and freedom. This simultaneously moral and scientific task assumes its highest conceptual expression in the pragmatic anthropology under the question ‘what is man?�, and thus invites humanity to partake in an endless self-critique that accords with the critical demands Kant has made emblematic of the Enlightenment.
Kant claims that reason and faith are not only compatible, but interdependent, terming this reasoned demand ‘rational belief or faith� . The following statement provides a summary of what this entails for his ethics and especially philosophy of history, ‘a human being who has common but (morally) healthy reason can mark out his path, in both a theoretical and a practical respect, in a way which is fully in accord with the whole end of his vocation� , addressing here ‘friends of the human race� who ‘use their freedom lawfully and hence in a way which is conducive to what is best for the world!� . What Jacobi will later term a ‘salto mortale� is thus for Kant conducive and indeed already integrated in the necessity of reason if we are not to ‘become unworthy of freedom� .
So, to fulfil man’s moral vocation as intellectus ectypus, reason must have a ‘rational faith� in the possibility of approximating itself to an intellectus archetypus, thereby orienting itself in history. This interpretation recognizes the merely regulative role played by the Idea of God, and provides humanity a moral vocation on both the individual and collective level to bridge the domains of nature and freedom. This simultaneously moral and scientific task assumes its highest conceptual expression in the pragmatic anthropology under the question ‘what is man?�, and thus invites humanity to partake in an endless self-critique that accords with the critical demands Kant has made emblematic of the Enlightenment.
May 26, 2011
I had to read this twice so I could at least start to absorb everything. I will likely have to read it a few more times to get what's going on here. It seems most readers through the years don't immediately have a clue what Kant was talking about. The content is something that one needs to meditate on and mentally digest so I'm afraid it would be a bit premature to write a proper review at this time. However, I would reccomend this to anyone with an interest in philosophy, sociology or psychology. It's most certainly food for thought.
September 28, 2008
I cannot imagine thinking as deeply as Kant and other philosophers did. I am glad though to have their works and to be able to challenge myself in not only reading but also in analyzing my own ethics. I like Kant's categorical imperative which suggests we do things for the good within the good itself. My husband is much better at this than I am. I can see the flaw in human nature for doing things because of the outcome - - what Kant refers to as the hypothetical imperative. I do, however, disagree with Kant in that you do need to look at the outcome if a greater good is a stake.
January 7, 2023
This is what our youth should be reading and not the nihilist Nietzsche. If more people aspired to live by the Categorical Imperative and to live in a Kingdom of Ends our society would be in a much better place and true progress could be achieved.
Please read this book and encourage others to do so.
Please read this book and encourage others to do so.
March 25, 2024
Not to be confused with his much earlier 1785 work Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals in which he attempts to build a metaphysical foundation for absolute morality, Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals focuses on the application of virtue in the real world. In keeping with the grounded, practical themes of his later works, the metaphysician of Prussia’s Die Metaphysik der Sitten focuses on law, government regulation and virtue. Law is the inevitable end of Reason, and as such, is rooted in a priori principles native to the soul but not external experience, in other words, metaphysical. The imperative of virtue relies on internal compulsion, while the imperative of legality relies on an external compulsion. In his lifelong rage against the Empiricism of David Hume, Kant here builds a positive framework devoid of polemics.
The ethical and legal principle to behave in a civil, cosmopolitan manner of mutual respect is an imperative command of Reason, and we are merely acknowledging a theory of law that is intuitive to all rational agents. Kant does not posit that his ideas are new, just clearer than his predecessors. These are the dull, functional manifestations of an Intellectus Arrchytypus native to the whole of humanity. This is the telos of Reason and not merely the Techne- the internal ordering of the soul, the a priori postulates of Reason, tell one not merely how to do something, but what ought to be done. The will is the source of both Morality and Evil. In Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, he writes:
Kant’s “Doctrine of Rights� explained here would inspire Hegel’s 1820 Philosophy of Rights, where he would develop a more robust legal theory and a more restrictive social contract. Kant’s legal theory is deeply rooted in his Deontological moral theory which emphasizes duty, what one ought to do, regardless of desire or any other factor. Hegel’s theory of governance likewise emphasizes duty, but understands societal advancement more teleologically, creating an entire Eschatology not quite seen in Kant. To Kant, a peaceful world is the telos of Reason, while Hegel sees even beyond world peace. Both see virtue as an elemental choice of the intellectual archetypes of the will.
Kant's entire body of work can be understood as a resurrection of the debates between Hellenistic Skepticism and Platonism, the Stoics and the Epicureans, particularly in his attempt to address the limits of human knowledge and understanding. His critical philosophy questioning the ability to know things-in-themselves, aligns with skeptical concerns about the certainty of knowledge gained through the Empiricist methodology, filtered through Cartesian methodology. Kant's ideas about innate knowledge and the existence of non-empirical concepts are an innovation on the Platonic theory of Forms, particularly the concept of noumena (things-in-themselves), is reminiscent of Plato's metaphysics where truest reality, or that which is most meaningful, is not sensory or empirical, but Noetic-Mind-Spirit. This is a return to the Judeo-Platonic continuum where "the fear of the lord is the beginning of all knowledge" (i.e. the material world is unknowable potentiality without the Representative world), and a repudiation of the influence of Aristotle in the middle ages which laid the foundation of Materialistic Protestantism & Atheism. Still, Kant built bridges between his neo-platonic apologetics (aimed against the English Empiricists) and Aristotelian logic, despite his critiques. He is still deeply in debt to Protestantism’s adoption of Medieval-Aristotelian metaphysics. His categorical imperative has parallels with Aristotle's focus on virtue ethics and the importance of rationality in determining ethical behavior, while simultaneously resurrect Platonic Stoicism's unyielding demand of absolute ethical behavior aligned to a transcendental reality- "even in a palace one can be moral".
Kantian Roots of Jungian Archetypes
In several of his works, Kant muses about Christ being the apotheosis of a primordial Archetype, what the founder of Analytic Psychology, Carl Jung, would call the “Archetype of Self-Consciousness� which resides in the Collective Unconscious. He does not consider the biological or genetic factors in the creation of the “supersensous substrate� but gets close:
…the Son of God, if we imagine that divinely minded man, as the archetype for us.. in the appearance of the God-man there is not what comes to mind or can be known through experience, but the archetype lying in our reason, which we subordinate to the latter (because so much can be perceived from his example, being found according to that), actually the object of saving faith, and such faith is one with the principle of a life pleasing to God.
Hegel would go on to call this apotheosis of the Hero Myth archetypically manifest in Christ as a “Uniform Plurality� (Gleichförmige Pluralität�). Kant’s Moral Teleological apologetic model, which Hegel developed further into a line of thought called Kanto-Hegelian Ontotheology, relies on these intrinsic rational archetypes:
Moral teleology, on the other hand, which is no less firmly founded than physical teleology, but rather deserves preference because it is based a priori on principles inseparable from our reason, leads to what is required for the possibility of a theology, namely, to a definite concept of the supreme cause, as a world cause according to moral laws, consequently to such a cause as satisfies our moral final purpose: for which nothing less than omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, etc.
His apologetic model has limits, Kant admits. The Immortality of the Soul, free will and the existence (Dasein) of God are all empirically unprovable but are postulates of Rationality itself. These a priori realities of “pure philosophy, i.e. Metaphysics, are necessary for Reason and the application of Reason to the material work, i.e. science, to exist at all. Heidegger noted as much in his 1915 Thesis on Duns Scotus:
Philosophy cannot do without its actual optics, metaphysics, in the long run. For the theory of truth this means the abandonment of a final metaphysical-philosophical interpretation of consciousness. In this, the value actually already lives, insofar as it is a meaningful and meaning-realizing living act, which is not remotely understood if it is neutralized into the concept of a biological blind factuality.
Kant is arguing against Secular and Protestant tendencies to commit Futurism- that is, seeing beliefs as independent and formless from it’s predecessors. Jung argues the same thing- that the Hero myth which the Christian claim is rooted in originates from an elemental Psychic state, genetically universal to all humans. Hegel recognized this same fact in his Lectures on Religion: "The idea of the Incarnation, for example, runs through all religions. Such general concepts also assert themselves in other spheres of the Geist." Because it is biological, it is universal and has manifested in many forms across human history and in virtually all cultures. It is the ideological manifestation of human physiology; the dramatized representation of the emergence of human consciousness itself. The ancient archetypical death-and-resurrection Hero Archetype (the 'good dream' as St. Lewis put it)- is rooted in emergent biology and expresses itself in the deepest levels of unconscious psychology.
Specifically, the conceptualization of Christ is rooted in the Egyptian Sun-god Horus, which was a reworking of the Mesopotamian deity Marduk (who could 'speak magic words') which made it’s way through the Roman iteration of Zoroastrianism, Mithraism, into Christianity. Conversely- the word 'Satan' evolved from the word Seth, the Egyptian god of Chaos. Yet the assumption that this makes the Christian claim of the Incarnation of the Theanthropos 'not true' or simply a myth like any other is itself rooted in the Nominalistic assumptions within the Western Rationalist Religion, particularly Modernism and it’s current successor. Ironically, this Modernist and post-modernist argument is itself religious dogma, a dogma which was adopted from the Futuristic nature of Fundamentalist Apologists.
Jung makes the case that the emergent biological roots of the Hero-Myth make the story of Christ more than merely factually or historically true; it is super-rational, truer than true: the highest form of truth possible. Newman phrased this as "Conscience is the aboriginal Vicar of Christ, a prophet in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness". In other words, Consciousness contains both objective and subjective truth; the biologically ingrained Hero Myth is not an illusion of the mind, but a precept of the truest true. This primordial story only incarnated fully one time in human history across all cultures and religions. The Universal only Particularized, the Multiplicity met the Singularity, the All became the One, the unknowable became knowable and the Infinite was made manifest through Finite form only once. And nothing could be more meaningful than the Divine becoming Human because Meaning itself exists at the intersection of the Particular and the Universal. He is the discrimination of composite natures; unitemporal and eternal, unique and universal, supernatural and natural simultaneously.
Kant’s apologetics follow a similar track as Jung, only along metaphysical lines instead of merely Psychological. Kant argues that the moral Atheist is incongruent to his own worship, for the very recognition of a Transcendental Good is also de facto a belief in God: "how will he [the atheist] judge his own inner purpose by the moral law which he actively worships?" For we do not hold ideas, Kant and Jung say, rather, we are held by ideas; they possess us, we do not possess them.
His aim here is to keep both natural science and theology within their respective dialectal parameters, and reconcile the antinomies of Newtonian Rationalism and Moral Teleology, as Jung says “The puddle reflecting the galaxies of the night sky� or the reconciliation of the material and the immaterial:
Two things fill my mind with new and ever-increasing admiration and awe, the more frequently and persistently my mind is occupied with them: The starry sky above me and the moral law within me.
I must not look for either of them, nor merely suppose them to be veiled in darkness or exuberance, outside my range of vision; I see them before me and connect them directly with the consciousness of my existence.
The first starts from the place I occupy in the outer world of the senses, and extends the connection in which I stand into the immeasurable greatness of worlds upon worlds and systems of systems, and beyond that into the boundless times of their periodic movement, their beginning and continuation.
The second starts from my invisible self, my personality, and represents me in a world that has true infinity, but is only perceptible to the mind, and with which (but also at the same time with all those visible worlds) I recognize myself, not as being there, in merely accidental, but general and necessary connection. The first sight of an innumerable number of worlds destroys, as it were, my importance, like that of an animal creature which, after having been supplied for a short time with life-force (one does not know how), has to return the matter from which it has become to the planet (a mere point in the universe).
The second, on the other hand, increases my value as an intelligence infinitely, through my personality, in which the moral law reveals to me a life independent of animality and even of the whole world of the senses, at least as much as can be deduced from the purposeful determination of my existence by this law, which is not limited to the conditions and limits of this life, but goes into infinity.
…The contemplation of the world began with the most marvelous sight that human senses can only ever present, and our intellect, in its wide scope, can only ever tolerate to pursue, and ended - with the interpretation of the stars.
Morality began with the noblest quality in human nature, the development and culture of which is aimed at infinite benefit, and ended - with enthusiasm, or superstition. So it goes with all still crude experiments, in which the noblest part of the business depends on the use of reason, which, like the use of the feet, does not find itself by means of frequent exercise, especially when it concerns qualities that cannot be so directly represented in common experience.
The Metaphysician of Konigsburg
1755 General Natural History and Theory of Heaven:
1764 Observations on the feeling of the beautiful:
1766 Dreams of a Ghost-Seer:
1783 Prolegomena to any future metaphysics:
1785 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals:
1786 Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science:
1787 Critique of Pure Reason:
1788 Critique of Practical Reason:
1790 Critique of Judgment:
1793 Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason:
1795 Toward Eternal Peace:
1797 Metaphysics of Morals:
1798 The Dispute of the Faculties:
The ethical and legal principle to behave in a civil, cosmopolitan manner of mutual respect is an imperative command of Reason, and we are merely acknowledging a theory of law that is intuitive to all rational agents. Kant does not posit that his ideas are new, just clearer than his predecessors. These are the dull, functional manifestations of an Intellectus Arrchytypus native to the whole of humanity. This is the telos of Reason and not merely the Techne- the internal ordering of the soul, the a priori postulates of Reason, tell one not merely how to do something, but what ought to be done. The will is the source of both Morality and Evil. In Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, he writes:
There is nothing in the world, or even outside of it, that can be considered good without restriction, but only a good will. Understanding, wit, power of judgment, and whatever else the talents of the spirit may be called, or courage, determination, perseverance in resolution as qualities of temperament are undoubtedly good and desirable in some intentions; but they can also become extremely evil and harmful if the will…is not good�. For without principles of good will they can become most evil� The good will is good not by what it brings about or accomplishes, not by its suitability for the attainment of some predetermined end, but solely by the will
Kant’s “Doctrine of Rights� explained here would inspire Hegel’s 1820 Philosophy of Rights, where he would develop a more robust legal theory and a more restrictive social contract. Kant’s legal theory is deeply rooted in his Deontological moral theory which emphasizes duty, what one ought to do, regardless of desire or any other factor. Hegel’s theory of governance likewise emphasizes duty, but understands societal advancement more teleologically, creating an entire Eschatology not quite seen in Kant. To Kant, a peaceful world is the telos of Reason, while Hegel sees even beyond world peace. Both see virtue as an elemental choice of the intellectual archetypes of the will.
Kant's entire body of work can be understood as a resurrection of the debates between Hellenistic Skepticism and Platonism, the Stoics and the Epicureans, particularly in his attempt to address the limits of human knowledge and understanding. His critical philosophy questioning the ability to know things-in-themselves, aligns with skeptical concerns about the certainty of knowledge gained through the Empiricist methodology, filtered through Cartesian methodology. Kant's ideas about innate knowledge and the existence of non-empirical concepts are an innovation on the Platonic theory of Forms, particularly the concept of noumena (things-in-themselves), is reminiscent of Plato's metaphysics where truest reality, or that which is most meaningful, is not sensory or empirical, but Noetic-Mind-Spirit. This is a return to the Judeo-Platonic continuum where "the fear of the lord is the beginning of all knowledge" (i.e. the material world is unknowable potentiality without the Representative world), and a repudiation of the influence of Aristotle in the middle ages which laid the foundation of Materialistic Protestantism & Atheism. Still, Kant built bridges between his neo-platonic apologetics (aimed against the English Empiricists) and Aristotelian logic, despite his critiques. He is still deeply in debt to Protestantism’s adoption of Medieval-Aristotelian metaphysics. His categorical imperative has parallels with Aristotle's focus on virtue ethics and the importance of rationality in determining ethical behavior, while simultaneously resurrect Platonic Stoicism's unyielding demand of absolute ethical behavior aligned to a transcendental reality- "even in a palace one can be moral".
Kantian Roots of Jungian Archetypes
In several of his works, Kant muses about Christ being the apotheosis of a primordial Archetype, what the founder of Analytic Psychology, Carl Jung, would call the “Archetype of Self-Consciousness� which resides in the Collective Unconscious. He does not consider the biological or genetic factors in the creation of the “supersensous substrate� but gets close:
…the Son of God, if we imagine that divinely minded man, as the archetype for us.. in the appearance of the God-man there is not what comes to mind or can be known through experience, but the archetype lying in our reason, which we subordinate to the latter (because so much can be perceived from his example, being found according to that), actually the object of saving faith, and such faith is one with the principle of a life pleasing to God.
Hegel would go on to call this apotheosis of the Hero Myth archetypically manifest in Christ as a “Uniform Plurality� (Gleichförmige Pluralität�). Kant’s Moral Teleological apologetic model, which Hegel developed further into a line of thought called Kanto-Hegelian Ontotheology, relies on these intrinsic rational archetypes:
Moral teleology, on the other hand, which is no less firmly founded than physical teleology, but rather deserves preference because it is based a priori on principles inseparable from our reason, leads to what is required for the possibility of a theology, namely, to a definite concept of the supreme cause, as a world cause according to moral laws, consequently to such a cause as satisfies our moral final purpose: for which nothing less than omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, etc.
His apologetic model has limits, Kant admits. The Immortality of the Soul, free will and the existence (Dasein) of God are all empirically unprovable but are postulates of Rationality itself. These a priori realities of “pure philosophy, i.e. Metaphysics, are necessary for Reason and the application of Reason to the material work, i.e. science, to exist at all. Heidegger noted as much in his 1915 Thesis on Duns Scotus:
Philosophy cannot do without its actual optics, metaphysics, in the long run. For the theory of truth this means the abandonment of a final metaphysical-philosophical interpretation of consciousness. In this, the value actually already lives, insofar as it is a meaningful and meaning-realizing living act, which is not remotely understood if it is neutralized into the concept of a biological blind factuality.
Kant is arguing against Secular and Protestant tendencies to commit Futurism- that is, seeing beliefs as independent and formless from it’s predecessors. Jung argues the same thing- that the Hero myth which the Christian claim is rooted in originates from an elemental Psychic state, genetically universal to all humans. Hegel recognized this same fact in his Lectures on Religion: "The idea of the Incarnation, for example, runs through all religions. Such general concepts also assert themselves in other spheres of the Geist." Because it is biological, it is universal and has manifested in many forms across human history and in virtually all cultures. It is the ideological manifestation of human physiology; the dramatized representation of the emergence of human consciousness itself. The ancient archetypical death-and-resurrection Hero Archetype (the 'good dream' as St. Lewis put it)- is rooted in emergent biology and expresses itself in the deepest levels of unconscious psychology.
Specifically, the conceptualization of Christ is rooted in the Egyptian Sun-god Horus, which was a reworking of the Mesopotamian deity Marduk (who could 'speak magic words') which made it’s way through the Roman iteration of Zoroastrianism, Mithraism, into Christianity. Conversely- the word 'Satan' evolved from the word Seth, the Egyptian god of Chaos. Yet the assumption that this makes the Christian claim of the Incarnation of the Theanthropos 'not true' or simply a myth like any other is itself rooted in the Nominalistic assumptions within the Western Rationalist Religion, particularly Modernism and it’s current successor. Ironically, this Modernist and post-modernist argument is itself religious dogma, a dogma which was adopted from the Futuristic nature of Fundamentalist Apologists.
Jung makes the case that the emergent biological roots of the Hero-Myth make the story of Christ more than merely factually or historically true; it is super-rational, truer than true: the highest form of truth possible. Newman phrased this as "Conscience is the aboriginal Vicar of Christ, a prophet in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness". In other words, Consciousness contains both objective and subjective truth; the biologically ingrained Hero Myth is not an illusion of the mind, but a precept of the truest true. This primordial story only incarnated fully one time in human history across all cultures and religions. The Universal only Particularized, the Multiplicity met the Singularity, the All became the One, the unknowable became knowable and the Infinite was made manifest through Finite form only once. And nothing could be more meaningful than the Divine becoming Human because Meaning itself exists at the intersection of the Particular and the Universal. He is the discrimination of composite natures; unitemporal and eternal, unique and universal, supernatural and natural simultaneously.
Kant’s apologetics follow a similar track as Jung, only along metaphysical lines instead of merely Psychological. Kant argues that the moral Atheist is incongruent to his own worship, for the very recognition of a Transcendental Good is also de facto a belief in God: "how will he [the atheist] judge his own inner purpose by the moral law which he actively worships?" For we do not hold ideas, Kant and Jung say, rather, we are held by ideas; they possess us, we do not possess them.
His aim here is to keep both natural science and theology within their respective dialectal parameters, and reconcile the antinomies of Newtonian Rationalism and Moral Teleology, as Jung says “The puddle reflecting the galaxies of the night sky� or the reconciliation of the material and the immaterial:
Two things fill my mind with new and ever-increasing admiration and awe, the more frequently and persistently my mind is occupied with them: The starry sky above me and the moral law within me.
I must not look for either of them, nor merely suppose them to be veiled in darkness or exuberance, outside my range of vision; I see them before me and connect them directly with the consciousness of my existence.
The first starts from the place I occupy in the outer world of the senses, and extends the connection in which I stand into the immeasurable greatness of worlds upon worlds and systems of systems, and beyond that into the boundless times of their periodic movement, their beginning and continuation.
The second starts from my invisible self, my personality, and represents me in a world that has true infinity, but is only perceptible to the mind, and with which (but also at the same time with all those visible worlds) I recognize myself, not as being there, in merely accidental, but general and necessary connection. The first sight of an innumerable number of worlds destroys, as it were, my importance, like that of an animal creature which, after having been supplied for a short time with life-force (one does not know how), has to return the matter from which it has become to the planet (a mere point in the universe).
The second, on the other hand, increases my value as an intelligence infinitely, through my personality, in which the moral law reveals to me a life independent of animality and even of the whole world of the senses, at least as much as can be deduced from the purposeful determination of my existence by this law, which is not limited to the conditions and limits of this life, but goes into infinity.
…The contemplation of the world began with the most marvelous sight that human senses can only ever present, and our intellect, in its wide scope, can only ever tolerate to pursue, and ended - with the interpretation of the stars.
Morality began with the noblest quality in human nature, the development and culture of which is aimed at infinite benefit, and ended - with enthusiasm, or superstition. So it goes with all still crude experiments, in which the noblest part of the business depends on the use of reason, which, like the use of the feet, does not find itself by means of frequent exercise, especially when it concerns qualities that cannot be so directly represented in common experience.
The Metaphysician of Konigsburg
1755 General Natural History and Theory of Heaven:
1764 Observations on the feeling of the beautiful:
1766 Dreams of a Ghost-Seer:
1783 Prolegomena to any future metaphysics:
1785 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals:
1786 Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science:
1787 Critique of Pure Reason:
1788 Critique of Practical Reason:
1790 Critique of Judgment:
1793 Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason:
1795 Toward Eternal Peace:
1797 Metaphysics of Morals:
1798 The Dispute of the Faculties:
May 26, 2021
Perhaps this is one of the most interesting subjects that I found myself spending a decent amount of time pondering on, for the domain of ethics, whether we like it or not, is of the utmost importance in our lives. Accordingly, and in an attempt of establishing the ultimate ideological construction, it becomes imperative to question my choices within given hypothetical (and quite possible) situations. Generally speaking, and being influenced from the very beginning by the vast sea of idealism (rather lost, as some would argue), I have been constantly inclined towards establishing a general formula that could be modeled and utilized. Somehow, this is what Kant has been trying to do, and his title "Father of German Idealism" did not come out of the blue; he rightfully earned it. Accordingly, and to grasp the main idea behind the book, one is bound to understand the context from which Kant constructs his philosophical framework. The core of his morality from where I see it is attempting to formulate a general law that depends in essence on human reason. Such maxims are metaphysical because they are independent of any condition of intuition; they float, and they are independent of our perception.
Once a specific situation that does not fit the law is provided, the idealist retires, and that is the main point I attempt to carefully ponder on while partially rejecting Kant's approach. In my understanding, the aim is to adopt an ideal construction that accounts by definition to the specific context that debunks the general law. In other words: a practical implementation of the ideal which does not compromise one of its metaphysical elements. Currently, it appears to be an almost impossible task, but I have persistence, and I'll keep on it until I find some adequate answers. If I find none, then that's fine, for I shall die eventually, and it won't make that much of a difference then. I suppose it's all a matter of a sport of some sort.
If I am honest, I would say that Kant's language and choice of words, although iconic, pose as a hindrance for the reader sometimes. It gets quite annoying at one stage. For that, the solution would be to download an existent glossary that clarifies some frequent terminology he utilizes.
All in all, it was a fun read.
Once a specific situation that does not fit the law is provided, the idealist retires, and that is the main point I attempt to carefully ponder on while partially rejecting Kant's approach. In my understanding, the aim is to adopt an ideal construction that accounts by definition to the specific context that debunks the general law. In other words: a practical implementation of the ideal which does not compromise one of its metaphysical elements. Currently, it appears to be an almost impossible task, but I have persistence, and I'll keep on it until I find some adequate answers. If I find none, then that's fine, for I shall die eventually, and it won't make that much of a difference then. I suppose it's all a matter of a sport of some sort.
If I am honest, I would say that Kant's language and choice of words, although iconic, pose as a hindrance for the reader sometimes. It gets quite annoying at one stage. For that, the solution would be to download an existent glossary that clarifies some frequent terminology he utilizes.
All in all, it was a fun read.
May 20, 2022
Även denna bok höll omläsning. Kants moralens metafysik hanterar först moral såsom vi förstår dem, och därefter hans syn på staters rätt och plikt och medborgares d:o, i freds och krigstid. Just denna version avslutades med två intressanta appendix, inklusive en där Kant konstaterar att precis som det bara kan finnas en kemi och en moral, så kan det bara finnas en korrekt filosofi. Jag tycker nog att det är så tydligt det kan bli kring hur man skall förstå Kants syn på uppfattning.
Read
February 16, 2021More interesting than his 'Critique of Pure Reason' for sure, as the Categorical Imperative idea is a worthwhile theory to consider or at the very least entertain.
April 29, 2023
Philosophers write like they are getting paid by the word.
March 28, 2020
Life is too short to read a book this poorly written, even if it contains new insight on important topics. I want to finish this, but it's just so badly present that Kant can't get out of his own way. I get that he originally gave these essays as lectures, but they are not only written in that stream-of-consciousness, conversational style, the amount of repetition and verbal diarrhea overwhelms the actual content with all of the "so you see" and "as I have shown" and repetitions of previous points, interjections and asides. The translator certainly bears a certain amount of the burden of guilt in literally having literally propagated Kant's literary sins, and god only knows what he was thinking about being 100% faithful in his reproduction of Kant's argumentative style, or perhaps how overly-enamored he was of Kant, his ideas, or both that he could not bear to lose a single word of the text, no matter how often it was over-used.
There are other translations of these essays, particularly those of Mary J. Gregor, that are considered definitive and I strongly recommend those be looked to instead.
There are other translations of these essays, particularly those of Mary J. Gregor, that are considered definitive and I strongly recommend those be looked to instead.
July 11, 2021
I tell you what, when I started my philosophy journey I really did think philosophy books were going to be closer to mystical self-help guides than they really are. The average polymath white dude Thinker TM of the last few centuries produced a work that’s a combination of apologetic letter to the sponsors for the gap in content, grammatical lexicon (what are words?), and legal statement. There’s a whole swathe of this book that’s all about wills, are they legal? It felt like a chapter of a lawyer’s textbook had been printed by mistake. But that’s OG text philosophy for ya! The ‘good life� involves listening to God pronounce the judgements of your conscience court, not being happy about colonialism but finding the extermination of illegitimate kids tolerable, and wondering if haircuts are self-mutilation. Fun times.
Here be my notes.
Preface
There’s only one human reason, and so only one philosophy, one virtue, and one doctrine of virtue.
A doctrine’s ability to withstand ridicule signals its truth.
Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals
Science has a priori principles.
Morals hold if they are SEEN to be based on a priori morality, not experience.
Only experience teaches us what brings joy; it cannot be reasoned beforehand.
Reason commands how to act without examples; its authority is based on purported advantages.
Moral anthropology deals with conditions that hinter or help in fulfilling the metaphysics of morals. It should not be confused with them.
Pleasure is a subjective feeling; it is only in relation to the subject.
Pleasure that precedes desire is inclination. Desire that precedes pleasure is intellectual pleasure.
Choice is the ability to fulfil a desire. A wish is an inability to fulfil a desire.
The will is the faculty of desire that lies within reason.
Choice isn’t pure but can be determined by the will.
Freedom is a purely rational concept; it cannot come from any possible experience.
Moral laws are imperatives; actions are either permitted or forbidden.
A fault is an unintentional transgression, while a crime is an intentional transgression.
Justice dictates right according to external laws.
Natural laws exist a priori and are obligatory without external lawgiving.
The categorical imperative says that you must act upon a maxim that can also hold as a universal law.
Legality is the conformity of an action with the law of duty.
Morality is the conformity of the maxim of an action with a law.
A maxim is a subjective principle of action and a principle of duty. Reason prescribes how you ought to act.
A law has a proposition that contains a command.
A priori binding laws come from a supreme lawgiver.
There is more merit if great natural obstacles and less moral obstacles block your actions.
Keeping promises is a duty of right not virtue, as this can be coerced.
Introduction to the Doctrine of Right
The doctrine of right are laws for which external lawgiving is possible.
A positive right exists if there has been actual lawgiving about it.
Right has to do with people’s relations to each other: choices not wishes.
Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law.
Everyone must pay debts: this is a coercion that coexists with the freedom of all.
The doctrine of right wants to be sure what belongs to all has been determined, while the doctrine of virtue has space for exceptions.
Thread of an uncertain ill (capital punishment) isn’t outweighed by a certain ill (drowning).
The duties of right are: be a means and an end for others; do not wrong anyone; let others keep their stuff.
Rights are: natural and a priori; positive/statutory if legislated; innate if belonging to everyone; acquired if it requires an external action.
Freedom is an innate equality which is beyond reproach.
The duties of right can have lawgiving while the duties of virtue cannot.
We know our own freedom through the moral imperative.
The moral imperative commands duty, from which you can then derive the capacity to put others under obligation.
Our relations to other humans involve rights and duties; to animals no rights or duties; to god, only duties, no rights.
The state of nature is not opposed to social but to civil conditions.
Private Right
If something is rightfully mine, I would be harmed if it used without my consent. This is called possession.
Rational possession is of an object external to me.
Empirical possession is of an object in another location.
Intelligible possession: I’m not holding it, but it’s still mine.
Do I possess Դdzٳ’s choice? Is his promise included in my belongings, independent of temporality or empirical possession?
Rights are a priori propositions sine they are laws of reason.
Permissive law is where others cannot have my stuff because I got there first.
Intuition re: empirical possession must be removed in order to extend the concept to: ‘it’s mine if I control it�.
Empirical holding v the concept of possession.
That is mine which I bring under my control, can use, and will to be mine.
Property Right
You don’t own things; otherwise you’d be their guardian spirit and have an obligation to objects.
The right to a thing is actually the right to the private use of a thing that’s originally owned in common, against others who also possess it in common.
The original possession in common precedes any acts of establishing rights.
Acquisition of an object is by unilateral will. However the capacity of the common will to bind recognition of possession is valid even if unilateral.
The condition in which the will of all is united for law is the civil condition.
Coercion is necessary to leave the state of nature for the civil condition, which makes acquisition provisional not conclusive. Provisional acquisition needs law to determine its limits. Leaving the state of nature is based on duty.
Kant is against colonialism!
If I am wronged, I can demand what is mine but not more.
Under a promise, you are enriched by an obligation on the freedom of another person.
Rights of Persons
Sexual union is the reciprocal use of sex organs. It can be natural or unnatural (!!).
Marriage is in accordance with law.
Sex work is making yourself a thing.
Husbands are the natural superiors in promoting the household’s interest � lol.
Children have an innate right to care. They are made without their consent, on their parents� initiative. Thus the parents have an obligation to make the child content. You cannot destroy a child like a piece of property.
Division of Rights acquired by Contract
Division according to a priori principles is dogmatic
Money represents all goods. It is only indirect.
The nation’s wealth is the sum of the industry humans pay each other.
On Acquisition
A contract to make a gift should not be coerced.
If you loan something and its damaged, you are liable unless you specifically said not to do that beforehand.
You can never prove who first owned a thing, thus there’s no such thing as a ‘secure� acquisition.
How do you know oaths are real? By presuming religion is real and relying on spiritual coercion.
Public Right
Individuals living in a civil condition is a state.
The difference between this and the state of nature is that laws for distributive justice can be put into effect.
The legislative authority of the state only belongs to the united will of the people.
A legislator cannot be a rule because the ruler is subject to the law.
There cannot be an authority to resist a supreme leader because that would make resistance stronger than the supreme leader so he isn’t supreme any more. Thus a state has no right to rebel. Reform can only be introduced by a sovereign. If a king is overthrown you can’t blame him for any acts he did as a supreme leader because he was the supreme law at the time.
By killing a king the state commits suicide, a truly unforgiveable act.
The government is authorized to constraint the wealthy to help maintain those who aren’t.
He suggests taxing childless people to support orphans! Thank you next.
Churches cannot hinder progress as this is anti-humanity.
You cannot bequeath merit to your descendants (anti-hereditary nobility yay).
Laws of punishment should not teach lessons or cause reparations: just punish the crime. Nor should punishment involve experiments. Justice isn’t justice if it can be bought.
Apparently an honourable man would prefer to be hung for murder than do hard labour � it would be more punishing to live and do hard labour.
Illegitimate children are like contraband that’s smuggled into the country! You can ignore their ‘annihilation�!!!
The overthrow of a civil constitution by revolution is a dissolution of democracy, because the united people are the sovereign.
The Right of Nations
The rights of states are all about war.
All states are in a condition of war with others at all times.
Apparently wars can’t be punitive, or carried out for extermination or subjugation. Er, what?
Cannot use in your state’s defense: spies, snipers, assassins, fake news, or plunder.
States have no right to seek compensation or make colonies after a war, because that suggests the war was unjust.
You can take any measures against an unjust enemy � but what is an unjust enemy?
Perpetual peace is unachievable. However, even so, we should act like it is and work towards it.
Cosmopolitan Right
Marriage is a way of preventing sex from being dehumanizing.
Children incur obligations from their parents.
Power should belong to laws and not humans; this is what metaphysics is.
Doctrine of Virtue
Ethics are duties that don’t come under external laws.
Duty is a constraint, either external or self imposed.
Virtue is the capacity and resolve to withstand an unjust opponent.
Ends that are also duties: one’s own perfection and the happiness of others.
Adversity, pain, and want are temptations to violate duty.
The greatest perfection is to do your duty from duty.
Benevolence is unlimited; it is harder to do good.
Self love can’t be separated from our need for love, hence we make ourselves an end for others.
There are no limits to what we should do for others; we definitely shouldn’t tempt them to do things that will later pain them.
Strength of virtue is measured by the obstacles overcome.
Obstacles include our natural inclinations, so constraint is self imposed.
The unconditional end of virtue is to be its own end and its own reward (versus holiness, because a holy person is never tempted).
We can enhance the moral incentive by contemplation.
Moral feeling is an awareness that our actions are constrained by duty; it isn’t created but cultivated.
Conscience is an unavoidable fact, but it is possible to ignore its verdict. We can work to enlighten ourselves as to what is our duty.
Through doing good to others you may learn to love your neighbour ‘as yourself�.
Respect for your own being forms the basis of your duty to yourself.
Duties to Oneself
Suicide goes against the duty of self preservation and violation of one’s duty to others.
Self mutilation is also undutiful. (Depends if you’re ill though, and he’s unsure about haircuts. Also vaccines.)
‘Unnatural� sex is worse though because suicide requires courage and some self-respect, but bad sex deprives you of ALL RESPECT.
Is having sex with an infertile woman morally wrong, Kant wonders.
Sexual pleasure is not moral pleasure.
Gluttony and drunkenness basically make you an animal (weirdly I am on board with this hot take).
Perfect Duties to Oneself
Regarding lies: the doctrine of right says they’re only harmful if they hurt others. Ethics says no authorization is derived from harmlessness.
An external lie is contemptible to others, an internal lie is contemptible to oneself.
Conscience is an internal court. You can refuse to heed it but not to hear its verdict. God is the judge.
God doesn’t provide an empirical experience and we should act as if he exists.
Imperfect Duties to Oneself
Duty to cultivate natural powers. The powers of the spirit are exercised through reason not experience eg maths. The powers of the soul are memory and imagination. The powers of the body is looking after the body’s matter.
Duties of Virtue to Others
Love is a benevolence that results in beneficience.
Respect is limiting our self esteem by the dignity of others.
Sympathy is pleasure at Դdzٳ’s joy.
Envy is greeting Դdzٳ’s wellbeing with distress.
We have a duty to respect every human being and that is why torture is bad.
Failure to do so is vice.
The Methods of Ethics
A good example isn’t a model; it shows us what we ought to be.
A Stoic puts up with misfortune and learns how to do without superfluous pleasure.
An Epicurean has a cheerful heart.
Doing duty is meritorious only if done cheerfully.
Ethics cannot extend beyond the limits of humans� duties to each other; God is too complicated to count.
Here be my notes.
Preface
There’s only one human reason, and so only one philosophy, one virtue, and one doctrine of virtue.
A doctrine’s ability to withstand ridicule signals its truth.
Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals
Science has a priori principles.
Morals hold if they are SEEN to be based on a priori morality, not experience.
Only experience teaches us what brings joy; it cannot be reasoned beforehand.
Reason commands how to act without examples; its authority is based on purported advantages.
Moral anthropology deals with conditions that hinter or help in fulfilling the metaphysics of morals. It should not be confused with them.
Pleasure is a subjective feeling; it is only in relation to the subject.
Pleasure that precedes desire is inclination. Desire that precedes pleasure is intellectual pleasure.
Choice is the ability to fulfil a desire. A wish is an inability to fulfil a desire.
The will is the faculty of desire that lies within reason.
Choice isn’t pure but can be determined by the will.
Freedom is a purely rational concept; it cannot come from any possible experience.
Moral laws are imperatives; actions are either permitted or forbidden.
A fault is an unintentional transgression, while a crime is an intentional transgression.
Justice dictates right according to external laws.
Natural laws exist a priori and are obligatory without external lawgiving.
The categorical imperative says that you must act upon a maxim that can also hold as a universal law.
Legality is the conformity of an action with the law of duty.
Morality is the conformity of the maxim of an action with a law.
A maxim is a subjective principle of action and a principle of duty. Reason prescribes how you ought to act.
A law has a proposition that contains a command.
A priori binding laws come from a supreme lawgiver.
There is more merit if great natural obstacles and less moral obstacles block your actions.
Keeping promises is a duty of right not virtue, as this can be coerced.
Introduction to the Doctrine of Right
The doctrine of right are laws for which external lawgiving is possible.
A positive right exists if there has been actual lawgiving about it.
Right has to do with people’s relations to each other: choices not wishes.
Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law.
Everyone must pay debts: this is a coercion that coexists with the freedom of all.
The doctrine of right wants to be sure what belongs to all has been determined, while the doctrine of virtue has space for exceptions.
Thread of an uncertain ill (capital punishment) isn’t outweighed by a certain ill (drowning).
The duties of right are: be a means and an end for others; do not wrong anyone; let others keep their stuff.
Rights are: natural and a priori; positive/statutory if legislated; innate if belonging to everyone; acquired if it requires an external action.
Freedom is an innate equality which is beyond reproach.
The duties of right can have lawgiving while the duties of virtue cannot.
We know our own freedom through the moral imperative.
The moral imperative commands duty, from which you can then derive the capacity to put others under obligation.
Our relations to other humans involve rights and duties; to animals no rights or duties; to god, only duties, no rights.
The state of nature is not opposed to social but to civil conditions.
Private Right
If something is rightfully mine, I would be harmed if it used without my consent. This is called possession.
Rational possession is of an object external to me.
Empirical possession is of an object in another location.
Intelligible possession: I’m not holding it, but it’s still mine.
Do I possess Դdzٳ’s choice? Is his promise included in my belongings, independent of temporality or empirical possession?
Rights are a priori propositions sine they are laws of reason.
Permissive law is where others cannot have my stuff because I got there first.
Intuition re: empirical possession must be removed in order to extend the concept to: ‘it’s mine if I control it�.
Empirical holding v the concept of possession.
That is mine which I bring under my control, can use, and will to be mine.
Property Right
You don’t own things; otherwise you’d be their guardian spirit and have an obligation to objects.
The right to a thing is actually the right to the private use of a thing that’s originally owned in common, against others who also possess it in common.
The original possession in common precedes any acts of establishing rights.
Acquisition of an object is by unilateral will. However the capacity of the common will to bind recognition of possession is valid even if unilateral.
The condition in which the will of all is united for law is the civil condition.
Coercion is necessary to leave the state of nature for the civil condition, which makes acquisition provisional not conclusive. Provisional acquisition needs law to determine its limits. Leaving the state of nature is based on duty.
Kant is against colonialism!
If I am wronged, I can demand what is mine but not more.
Under a promise, you are enriched by an obligation on the freedom of another person.
Rights of Persons
Sexual union is the reciprocal use of sex organs. It can be natural or unnatural (!!).
Marriage is in accordance with law.
Sex work is making yourself a thing.
Husbands are the natural superiors in promoting the household’s interest � lol.
Children have an innate right to care. They are made without their consent, on their parents� initiative. Thus the parents have an obligation to make the child content. You cannot destroy a child like a piece of property.
Division of Rights acquired by Contract
Division according to a priori principles is dogmatic
Money represents all goods. It is only indirect.
The nation’s wealth is the sum of the industry humans pay each other.
On Acquisition
A contract to make a gift should not be coerced.
If you loan something and its damaged, you are liable unless you specifically said not to do that beforehand.
You can never prove who first owned a thing, thus there’s no such thing as a ‘secure� acquisition.
How do you know oaths are real? By presuming religion is real and relying on spiritual coercion.
Public Right
Individuals living in a civil condition is a state.
The difference between this and the state of nature is that laws for distributive justice can be put into effect.
The legislative authority of the state only belongs to the united will of the people.
A legislator cannot be a rule because the ruler is subject to the law.
There cannot be an authority to resist a supreme leader because that would make resistance stronger than the supreme leader so he isn’t supreme any more. Thus a state has no right to rebel. Reform can only be introduced by a sovereign. If a king is overthrown you can’t blame him for any acts he did as a supreme leader because he was the supreme law at the time.
By killing a king the state commits suicide, a truly unforgiveable act.
The government is authorized to constraint the wealthy to help maintain those who aren’t.
He suggests taxing childless people to support orphans! Thank you next.
Churches cannot hinder progress as this is anti-humanity.
You cannot bequeath merit to your descendants (anti-hereditary nobility yay).
Laws of punishment should not teach lessons or cause reparations: just punish the crime. Nor should punishment involve experiments. Justice isn’t justice if it can be bought.
Apparently an honourable man would prefer to be hung for murder than do hard labour � it would be more punishing to live and do hard labour.
Illegitimate children are like contraband that’s smuggled into the country! You can ignore their ‘annihilation�!!!
The overthrow of a civil constitution by revolution is a dissolution of democracy, because the united people are the sovereign.
The Right of Nations
The rights of states are all about war.
All states are in a condition of war with others at all times.
Apparently wars can’t be punitive, or carried out for extermination or subjugation. Er, what?
Cannot use in your state’s defense: spies, snipers, assassins, fake news, or plunder.
States have no right to seek compensation or make colonies after a war, because that suggests the war was unjust.
You can take any measures against an unjust enemy � but what is an unjust enemy?
Perpetual peace is unachievable. However, even so, we should act like it is and work towards it.
Cosmopolitan Right
Marriage is a way of preventing sex from being dehumanizing.
Children incur obligations from their parents.
Power should belong to laws and not humans; this is what metaphysics is.
Doctrine of Virtue
Ethics are duties that don’t come under external laws.
Duty is a constraint, either external or self imposed.
Virtue is the capacity and resolve to withstand an unjust opponent.
Ends that are also duties: one’s own perfection and the happiness of others.
Adversity, pain, and want are temptations to violate duty.
The greatest perfection is to do your duty from duty.
Benevolence is unlimited; it is harder to do good.
Self love can’t be separated from our need for love, hence we make ourselves an end for others.
There are no limits to what we should do for others; we definitely shouldn’t tempt them to do things that will later pain them.
Strength of virtue is measured by the obstacles overcome.
Obstacles include our natural inclinations, so constraint is self imposed.
The unconditional end of virtue is to be its own end and its own reward (versus holiness, because a holy person is never tempted).
We can enhance the moral incentive by contemplation.
Moral feeling is an awareness that our actions are constrained by duty; it isn’t created but cultivated.
Conscience is an unavoidable fact, but it is possible to ignore its verdict. We can work to enlighten ourselves as to what is our duty.
Through doing good to others you may learn to love your neighbour ‘as yourself�.
Respect for your own being forms the basis of your duty to yourself.
Duties to Oneself
Suicide goes against the duty of self preservation and violation of one’s duty to others.
Self mutilation is also undutiful. (Depends if you’re ill though, and he’s unsure about haircuts. Also vaccines.)
‘Unnatural� sex is worse though because suicide requires courage and some self-respect, but bad sex deprives you of ALL RESPECT.
Is having sex with an infertile woman morally wrong, Kant wonders.
Sexual pleasure is not moral pleasure.
Gluttony and drunkenness basically make you an animal (weirdly I am on board with this hot take).
Perfect Duties to Oneself
Regarding lies: the doctrine of right says they’re only harmful if they hurt others. Ethics says no authorization is derived from harmlessness.
An external lie is contemptible to others, an internal lie is contemptible to oneself.
Conscience is an internal court. You can refuse to heed it but not to hear its verdict. God is the judge.
God doesn’t provide an empirical experience and we should act as if he exists.
Imperfect Duties to Oneself
Duty to cultivate natural powers. The powers of the spirit are exercised through reason not experience eg maths. The powers of the soul are memory and imagination. The powers of the body is looking after the body’s matter.
Duties of Virtue to Others
Love is a benevolence that results in beneficience.
Respect is limiting our self esteem by the dignity of others.
Sympathy is pleasure at Դdzٳ’s joy.
Envy is greeting Դdzٳ’s wellbeing with distress.
We have a duty to respect every human being and that is why torture is bad.
Failure to do so is vice.
The Methods of Ethics
A good example isn’t a model; it shows us what we ought to be.
A Stoic puts up with misfortune and learns how to do without superfluous pleasure.
An Epicurean has a cheerful heart.
Doing duty is meritorious only if done cheerfully.
Ethics cannot extend beyond the limits of humans� duties to each other; God is too complicated to count.
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November 30, 2022 Virtue as an Intellectus Archetypus
Not to be confused with his much earlier 1785 work Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals in which he attempts to build a metaphysical foundation for absolute morality, Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals focuses on the application of virtue in the real world. In keeping with the grounded, practical themes of his later works, the metaphysician of Prussia’s Die Metaphysik der Sitten focuses on law, government regulation and virtue. Law is the inevitable end of Reason, and as such, is rooted in a priori principles native to the soul but not external experience, in other words, metaphysical. The imperative of virtue relies on internal compulsion, while the imperative of legality relies on an external compulsion. In his lifelong rage against the Empiricism of David Hume, Kant here builds a positive framework devoid of polemics.
The ethical and legal principle to behave in a civil, cosmopolitan manner of mutual respect is an imperative command of Reason, and we are merely acknowledging a theory of law that is intuitive to all rational agents. Kant does not posit that his ideas are new, just clearer than his predecessors. These are the dull, functional manifestations of an Intellectus Arrchytypus native to the whole of humanity. This is the telos of Reason and not merely the Techne- the internal ordering of the soul, the a priori postulates of Reason, tell one not merely how to do something, but what ought to be done. The will is the source of both Morality and Evil. In Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, he writes:
Kant’s “Doctrine of Rights� explained here would inspire Hegel’s 1820 Philosophy of Rights, where he would develop a more robust legal theory and a more restrictive social contract. Kant’s legal theory is deeply rooted in his Deontological moral theory which emphasizes duty, what one ought to do, regardless of desire or any other factor. Hegel’s theory of governance likewise emphasizes duty, but understands societal advancement more teleologically, creating an entire Eschatology not quite seen in Kant. To Kant, a peaceful world is the telos of Reason, while Hegel sees even beyond world peace. Both see virtue as an elemental choice of the intellectual archetypes of the will.
The Metaphysician of Konigsburg
1755 General Natural History and Theory of Heaven:
1764 Observations on the feeling of the beautiful:
1766 Dreams of a Ghost-Seer:
1783 Prolegomena to any future metaphysics:
1785 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals:
1786 Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science:
1787 Critique of Pure Reason:
1788 Critique of Practical Reason:
1790 Critique of Judgment:
1793 Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason:
1795 Toward Eternal Peace:
1797 Metaphysics of Morals:
1798 The Dispute of the Faculties:
Not to be confused with his much earlier 1785 work Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals in which he attempts to build a metaphysical foundation for absolute morality, Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals focuses on the application of virtue in the real world. In keeping with the grounded, practical themes of his later works, the metaphysician of Prussia’s Die Metaphysik der Sitten focuses on law, government regulation and virtue. Law is the inevitable end of Reason, and as such, is rooted in a priori principles native to the soul but not external experience, in other words, metaphysical. The imperative of virtue relies on internal compulsion, while the imperative of legality relies on an external compulsion. In his lifelong rage against the Empiricism of David Hume, Kant here builds a positive framework devoid of polemics.
The ethical and legal principle to behave in a civil, cosmopolitan manner of mutual respect is an imperative command of Reason, and we are merely acknowledging a theory of law that is intuitive to all rational agents. Kant does not posit that his ideas are new, just clearer than his predecessors. These are the dull, functional manifestations of an Intellectus Arrchytypus native to the whole of humanity. This is the telos of Reason and not merely the Techne- the internal ordering of the soul, the a priori postulates of Reason, tell one not merely how to do something, but what ought to be done. The will is the source of both Morality and Evil. In Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, he writes:
There is nothing in the world, or even outside of it, that can be considered good without restriction, but only a good will. Understanding, wit, power of judgment, and whatever else the talents of the spirit may be called, or courage, determination, perseverance in resolution as qualities of temperament are undoubtedly good and desirable in some intentions; but they can also become extremely evil and harmful if the will…is not good�. For without principles of good will they can become most evil� The good will is good not by what it brings about or accomplishes, not by its suitability for the attainment of some predetermined end, but solely by the will
Kant’s “Doctrine of Rights� explained here would inspire Hegel’s 1820 Philosophy of Rights, where he would develop a more robust legal theory and a more restrictive social contract. Kant’s legal theory is deeply rooted in his Deontological moral theory which emphasizes duty, what one ought to do, regardless of desire or any other factor. Hegel’s theory of governance likewise emphasizes duty, but understands societal advancement more teleologically, creating an entire Eschatology not quite seen in Kant. To Kant, a peaceful world is the telos of Reason, while Hegel sees even beyond world peace. Both see virtue as an elemental choice of the intellectual archetypes of the will.
The Metaphysician of Konigsburg
1755 General Natural History and Theory of Heaven:
1764 Observations on the feeling of the beautiful:
1766 Dreams of a Ghost-Seer:
1783 Prolegomena to any future metaphysics:
1785 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals:
1786 Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science:
1787 Critique of Pure Reason:
1788 Critique of Practical Reason:
1790 Critique of Judgment:
1793 Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason:
1795 Toward Eternal Peace:
1797 Metaphysics of Morals:
1798 The Dispute of the Faculties:
January 6, 2016
Morality and law are always a questionable mix. But Kant is not deterred. Emboldened by his firm categorical imperative, he examines basic legal principles through this hefty lens. The first half of the The Metaphysics of Morals seems to be the 18th Century’s version of Plato’s Laws. An analysis of what is law, what types of laws are there and what law should strive to be. Except, for Kant, it lacks the joyful meanderings of Plato.
After the first half (titled the Doctrine of Right), Kant moves into the Doctrine of Virtue. Even he concedes in his Preface that:
After the first half (titled the Doctrine of Right), Kant moves into the Doctrine of Virtue. Even he concedes in his Preface that:
[t]oward the end of the book I have worked less thoroughly over certain sections than might be expected in comparison with the earlier ones, partly because it seems to me that they can be inferred from the earlier ones and partly, too, because the later sections (dealing with the public right) are currently subject to so much discussion, and still so important, that they can justify postponing a decisive judgment for some time. Pg. 6Not a real strong foundation for what attempts to be a foundational work. Nevertheless, people who get into Kant surely appreciate the details he gets into regarding the difference between “wide� and “indeterminate� duties and his examination of specific duties. However, as I suspect he himself realized, it becomes somewhat absurd to spend too much time hashing out the details. If you can deduce the categorical imperative for an action, then it has the force of law. That’s because, at the core of Kant’s belief, God is at the core. As he concludes his Doctrine of Virtue, he finally reveals this key component:
That is to say, we cannot very well make obligation (moral constraint) intuitive for ourselves without thereby thinking of Դdzٳ’s will, namely God’s (of which reason in giving universal laws is the only spokesman). Pg. 229Couching belief in logic can only go so far.
December 5, 2011
This book certainly has some interesting ideas and from time to time it does appeal to my own social/political ideas but all in all I feel the categorical imperative, and with it the entire theory, is not practical.
For an ethical theory to be practical I feel it is essential that it is based on the real man and not the ideal man. The categorical imperative does this in part by accepting that people have certain desires they tend to follow but Kant seems to step over this issue rather easily without giving it a proper place in his theory. We are simply expected not to follow these desires and to let our reason lead us instead.
Of course, in a way Kant does give this inclination a place in the Metaphysics of Morals by introducing obligation and punishment - with which he accepts the fact that people will not always obey the law voluntarily. But this is not part of the moral law. The moral law, The categorical imperative, asks us to do things that will often feel incompatible with our moral sense (giving a murderer directions to your children by his request).
For an ethical theory to be practical I feel it is essential that it is based on the real man and not the ideal man. The categorical imperative does this in part by accepting that people have certain desires they tend to follow but Kant seems to step over this issue rather easily without giving it a proper place in his theory. We are simply expected not to follow these desires and to let our reason lead us instead.
Of course, in a way Kant does give this inclination a place in the Metaphysics of Morals by introducing obligation and punishment - with which he accepts the fact that people will not always obey the law voluntarily. But this is not part of the moral law. The moral law, The categorical imperative, asks us to do things that will often feel incompatible with our moral sense (giving a murderer directions to your children by his request).
December 26, 2018
Where I think Kant falls short is in his classifying the promotion of moral well- being of others under the happiness of others. He seems curiously and inexplicably and intentionally vague with its bounds. Which makes me wonder- at what point did the church invert his main point- that our duty is to perfect self and to make others happy rather than to make self happy and to perfect others? In some ways he contradicted himself here. A worthwhile read.
December 18, 2020
All moral relations of rational beings, which involve a principle of the harmony of the will of one with that of another, can be reduced to love and respect; and, insofar as this principle is practical, in the case of love the basis for determining one's will can be reduced to another's end, and in the case of respect, to another's right.
July 26, 2009
Kant is a genius. I am not sure I agree with his ideas but that does not change the fact they are well-built and creative.
November 22, 2020
The Doctrine of Right is the main reason why I read the book. It is really good. For those of you who think Kant is unreadable, you should read it. It is very clearly put. The most interesting points Kant raises, apart from his long-winded albeit interesting anti-Lockean theory of property, are imho the distinction between right and morals (1), his unrestrained attack on the right of rebellion (2), and his criticism of Beccaria's points against death penalty (3). Of course there is more to it than just these, but these really are what I considered to be the key takeaways of the book. If you want a systematic perspective of how the book is wrought, you might as well just read it, it isn't that long.
(1) Rights and laws are enforceable and you should abide by them whatever the reason you give yourself for doing so. It doesn't matter. All that matters is that you abide by it. Duties and morals, on the contrary, have to do with how you think about what you do: it is an inner obligation or constraint, not an outer one. So it has to do with what you can force people to do: you can't force me to have a definite intention (that is only up to me, which is why you have to distinguish between morals and politics) but you can force me to adopt a definite behavior. The behavior that you can legitimately force me to adopt is one that doesn't violate anyone else's own freedom. Therefore, you have very libertarian-leaning pages where Kant defends the right to prostitution although that doesn't mean that these legitimate activities are morally defensible. Actually when it comes to morals, Kant is pretty much in line with very conservative Victorian-like ethics (as in "let's castrate the homos").
(2) The right of rebellion Kant regards as self-contradictory. If you think the king violated the Constitution, how can you know that you are right in believing so? Who will settle the debate between the people and the king (let alone the fact that it is rather seldom to have a people rebelling all at once against the king)? Similarly, the "people" is only constituted as such by the king and the emergence of the State, which is why having the people proceeding to rebel against it seems logically impossible in the eyes of Kant, as what the people sets itself to abolish is the primary reason if its existence. At this point, I think it is actually quite funny to see how the notion of "contract" evolved from Locke to Kant (you could argue that Kant's politics are just the total opposite of Locke's) from a seemingly revolutionary idea that tries and limit the scope of the State's power to a conservative notion in Kant's political philosophy that essentially makes any revolution impossible/self-contradictory. To be honest, Kant's understanding of the notion is quite different from Locke's, as the "contract" only exists as far as Kant goes in the form of a regulatory idea, something like a benchmark the ruler uses to make decisions (some sort of gold-standard of political decision-making if you will). This hypothetical original "contract" is also the notion Kant resorts to when discussing Locke's theory of property (though he doesn't directly mention Locke as he does for Beccaria for instance): unlike Locke who justifies property through the act of adding value to what you own through work, Kant essentially states that work is but a trace you leave signalling that you own the land you work on, i.e. it assumes that you already own it, through a contract. In the beginning, you have to assume that there was some sort of original contract that gave the Earth to all mankind in order to legitimate all subsequent interindividual contracts. This, by the way, is typical Kantian reasoning in a nutshell: in order to make some stuff legit, you have to make up/posit some other stuff that doesn't exist to ground the stuff that exists in reality. In this line of thinking, the State itself doesn't own anything, though it be the sole instance that has the power to decide what goes to whom.
(3) This notion of contract is also key to Kant's rebuttal of Beccaria. Beccaria essentially argued that the reason why you can't have death penalty is no one would want to sign a contract in which he agrees to be killed. But 'tis but nonsense, Kant says: it most certainly is not the same person that agrees to the contract and that kills! Either that person was a killer right from the start and then he or she is deprived of any legislative power and the contract they signed is worth nothing, or that person was not a killer right from the start and then, well, it is not the same person anymore and therefore what they previously agreed to or didn't agree to is irrelevant. Besides, when signing the hypothetical contract, you do not agree to being sentenced to death you personally: you agree to have any random person who commits a murder sentenced to death penalty.
By and large, The Doctrine of Right is insightful and clever. It made me want to read the Doctrine of Virtue but the Introduction was so repetitive and boring that I dropped it. I more or less intend to read Byrd's Commentary and Arendt's Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy now.
(1) Rights and laws are enforceable and you should abide by them whatever the reason you give yourself for doing so. It doesn't matter. All that matters is that you abide by it. Duties and morals, on the contrary, have to do with how you think about what you do: it is an inner obligation or constraint, not an outer one. So it has to do with what you can force people to do: you can't force me to have a definite intention (that is only up to me, which is why you have to distinguish between morals and politics) but you can force me to adopt a definite behavior. The behavior that you can legitimately force me to adopt is one that doesn't violate anyone else's own freedom. Therefore, you have very libertarian-leaning pages where Kant defends the right to prostitution although that doesn't mean that these legitimate activities are morally defensible. Actually when it comes to morals, Kant is pretty much in line with very conservative Victorian-like ethics (as in "let's castrate the homos").
(2) The right of rebellion Kant regards as self-contradictory. If you think the king violated the Constitution, how can you know that you are right in believing so? Who will settle the debate between the people and the king (let alone the fact that it is rather seldom to have a people rebelling all at once against the king)? Similarly, the "people" is only constituted as such by the king and the emergence of the State, which is why having the people proceeding to rebel against it seems logically impossible in the eyes of Kant, as what the people sets itself to abolish is the primary reason if its existence. At this point, I think it is actually quite funny to see how the notion of "contract" evolved from Locke to Kant (you could argue that Kant's politics are just the total opposite of Locke's) from a seemingly revolutionary idea that tries and limit the scope of the State's power to a conservative notion in Kant's political philosophy that essentially makes any revolution impossible/self-contradictory. To be honest, Kant's understanding of the notion is quite different from Locke's, as the "contract" only exists as far as Kant goes in the form of a regulatory idea, something like a benchmark the ruler uses to make decisions (some sort of gold-standard of political decision-making if you will). This hypothetical original "contract" is also the notion Kant resorts to when discussing Locke's theory of property (though he doesn't directly mention Locke as he does for Beccaria for instance): unlike Locke who justifies property through the act of adding value to what you own through work, Kant essentially states that work is but a trace you leave signalling that you own the land you work on, i.e. it assumes that you already own it, through a contract. In the beginning, you have to assume that there was some sort of original contract that gave the Earth to all mankind in order to legitimate all subsequent interindividual contracts. This, by the way, is typical Kantian reasoning in a nutshell: in order to make some stuff legit, you have to make up/posit some other stuff that doesn't exist to ground the stuff that exists in reality. In this line of thinking, the State itself doesn't own anything, though it be the sole instance that has the power to decide what goes to whom.
(3) This notion of contract is also key to Kant's rebuttal of Beccaria. Beccaria essentially argued that the reason why you can't have death penalty is no one would want to sign a contract in which he agrees to be killed. But 'tis but nonsense, Kant says: it most certainly is not the same person that agrees to the contract and that kills! Either that person was a killer right from the start and then he or she is deprived of any legislative power and the contract they signed is worth nothing, or that person was not a killer right from the start and then, well, it is not the same person anymore and therefore what they previously agreed to or didn't agree to is irrelevant. Besides, when signing the hypothetical contract, you do not agree to being sentenced to death you personally: you agree to have any random person who commits a murder sentenced to death penalty.
By and large, The Doctrine of Right is insightful and clever. It made me want to read the Doctrine of Virtue but the Introduction was so repetitive and boring that I dropped it. I more or less intend to read Byrd's Commentary and Arendt's Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy now.
August 13, 2022
This was a tough one and some of the arguments were so convoluted that it requires a trained philosophical mind to properly digest them. However, I did note some points of interests in the discourse. One can feel his general distaste for empiricism as ideas according to him predate experiences and hence one cannot make conclusions on such ideas based on experience. The value of will is intrinsic and independent on the result or fact of execution of such will. Thus, our value as rational beings with a will are independent on anything external, even God. And as for reason, it was given to us by nature even with the uncertainties that come with it. Couldn’t nature have left us with simple instincts that optimise life functions? Was nature gambling or reason was a necessity for each individual rational being to optimise their life functions by their own will? So how do you measure the value of your decisions while exercising your free will? Any maxim that supports your decision must have the ability to apply as a universal law without contradicting itself!
June 8, 2024
É um bom livro. Há um trabalho inegável do autor para construir e fundamentar bem as suas ideias e isso deve ser sempre valorizado tendo em conta a época. Contudo, não deixa de ter os vários defeitos da filosofia branca e idealista, dentre eles o peso do viés cognitivo da religião.
Li o livro a partir de um prisma também enviesado, o de um estudante de direito e sem dúvida isto ajuda a concluir a leitura e a compreender melhor a origem e a finalidade de certas ideias.
De todo o modo, há que reconhecer que estamos diante de uma leitura incontornável no ramo da metafísica.
Li o livro a partir de um prisma também enviesado, o de um estudante de direito e sem dúvida isto ajuda a concluir a leitura e a compreender melhor a origem e a finalidade de certas ideias.
De todo o modo, há que reconhecer que estamos diante de uma leitura incontornável no ramo da metafísica.
March 5, 2024
The beginning of Doctrine of Right, explicating ‘property right� in the abstract is arguably the only good part of this book. The rest is weak philosophical justifications for already existing institutions, which Kant’s previous critique of Religion/The Church got him censored in the first place.
The doctrine of virtue seems more of a rehash of things that have appeared in CPrR, CoJ, and RWBBR.
This took me so long because I didn’t enjoy it very much, it is what it is.
The doctrine of virtue seems more of a rehash of things that have appeared in CPrR, CoJ, and RWBBR.
This took me so long because I didn’t enjoy it very much, it is what it is.
June 21, 2024
Nietzsche must have been thinking about this when he wrote, "Kant wanted to prove, in a way that would dumbfound the common man, that the common man was right: that was the secret joke of his soul. He wrote against the scholars in support of popular prejudice, but for scholars and not for the people."
June 15, 2017
Não acho que caiba escrever sobre as obras kantianas no ŷ, pelo menos não em meu perfil. Portanto, deixarei a nota máxima para expressar o quão imperativo é a leitura do texto para quem se interessa em ética, moral e razão.
March 4, 2018
عالم الأخلاقيات الخاص بكانت مألوف ليا بنسبة كبيرة جداز الفيلسوف العظيم متأثر بسعيه وراء احترام النفس البشرية في نطاق التعامل الانساني. و أسس الاخلاقيات التي اصردها بعا انعكاس لتاثير البيئة المسيحية المتدينة في القرن الثامن عشر. كتاب رائع و أسلوب شيق و رأي محترم للنفس البشرية في كل صورها.
December 11, 2020
Some of the ‘morals� in here are quite weird and dated (e.g., you can kill your illegitimate children, but you can’t sell your own hair), but as a whole, it’s a neat little insight into the applied form of Kant’s ethics.
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