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An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
A splendid edition. Schneewind's illuminating introduction succinctly situates the Enquiry in its historical context, clarifying its relationship to Calvinism, to Newtonian science, and to earlier moral philosophers, and providing a persuasive account of Hume's ethical naturalism. --Martha C. Nussbaum, Brown University
128 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1751
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About the author
David Hume
2,932books1,603followersDavid Hume was a Scottish historian, philosopher, economist, diplomat and essayist known today especially for his radical philosophical empiricism and scepticism.
In light of Hume's central role in the Scottish Enlightenment, and in the history of Western philosophy, Bryan Magee judged him as a philosopher "widely regarded as the greatest who has ever written in the English language." While Hume failed in his attempts to start a university career, he took part in various diplomatic and military missions of the time. He wrote The History of England which became a bestseller, and it became the standard history of England in its day.
His empirical approach places him with John Locke, George Berkeley, and a handful of others at the time as a British Empiricist.
Beginning with his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Hume strove to create a total naturalistic "science of man" that examined the psychological basis of human nature. In opposition to the rationalists who preceded him, most notably René Descartes, he concluded that desire rather than reason governed human behaviour. He also argued against the existence of innate ideas, concluding that humans have knowledge only of things they directly experience. He argued that inductive reasoning and therefore causality cannot be justified rationally. Our assumptions in favour of these result from custom and constant conjunction rather than logic. He concluded that humans have no actual conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with the self.
Hume's compatibilist theory of free will proved extremely influential on subsequent moral philosophy. He was also a sentimentalist who held that ethics are based on feelings rather than abstract moral principles, and expounded the is–ought problem.
Hume has proved extremely influential on subsequent western philosophy, especially on utilitarianism, logical positivism, William James, the philosophy of science, early analytic philosophy, cognitive philosophy, theology and other movements and thinkers. In addition, according to philosopher Jerry Fodor, Hume's Treatise is "the founding document of cognitive science". Hume engaged with contemporary intellectual luminaries such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, James Boswell, and Adam Smith (who acknowledged Hume's influence on his economics and political philosophy). Immanuel Kant credited Hume with awakening him from "dogmatic slumbers".
In light of Hume's central role in the Scottish Enlightenment, and in the history of Western philosophy, Bryan Magee judged him as a philosopher "widely regarded as the greatest who has ever written in the English language." While Hume failed in his attempts to start a university career, he took part in various diplomatic and military missions of the time. He wrote The History of England which became a bestseller, and it became the standard history of England in its day.
His empirical approach places him with John Locke, George Berkeley, and a handful of others at the time as a British Empiricist.
Beginning with his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), Hume strove to create a total naturalistic "science of man" that examined the psychological basis of human nature. In opposition to the rationalists who preceded him, most notably René Descartes, he concluded that desire rather than reason governed human behaviour. He also argued against the existence of innate ideas, concluding that humans have knowledge only of things they directly experience. He argued that inductive reasoning and therefore causality cannot be justified rationally. Our assumptions in favour of these result from custom and constant conjunction rather than logic. He concluded that humans have no actual conception of the self, only of a bundle of sensations associated with the self.
Hume's compatibilist theory of free will proved extremely influential on subsequent moral philosophy. He was also a sentimentalist who held that ethics are based on feelings rather than abstract moral principles, and expounded the is–ought problem.
Hume has proved extremely influential on subsequent western philosophy, especially on utilitarianism, logical positivism, William James, the philosophy of science, early analytic philosophy, cognitive philosophy, theology and other movements and thinkers. In addition, according to philosopher Jerry Fodor, Hume's Treatise is "the founding document of cognitive science". Hume engaged with contemporary intellectual luminaries such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, James Boswell, and Adam Smith (who acknowledged Hume's influence on his economics and political philosophy). Immanuel Kant credited Hume with awakening him from "dogmatic slumbers".
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April 24, 2025
I run hot and cold when it comes to David Hume...
An eighteenth century philosopher who antedated postmodern deconstructionism by several centuries, with this one massive blow of his critical axe he shook the ethical foundation of inherited tradition into the first tremors of its ruin.
Ethics would never be the same again - until, some say, that Teutonic quibbler Immanuel Kant.
I am one of those who agree, for Kant re-established ethics on its firm Christian foundation.
But Hume?
Like me he was prone to novel nervous conditions, which in his case grew steadily worse and worse. My contention is you can NEVER - as is, alas, the case nowadays - graft Christian charity onto a trunk of a sceptical humanism.
It just won’t flourish. So the Void leered into his innocent face from the depths of his enthusiasm.
Just like the paucity of traditional Christians nowadays - their faith just withers in the howling wind of Nothingness and dies.
No, Christian charity needs a strong source of nutrients. And scepticism can never give that, being rootless.
If you see life holistically and in sharp focus, scepticism will drown that vision unthinkingly, as a destructive cretin might do.
You can’t “see life steadily and see it whole� if you desert traditional faith and its concomitant artistic culture.
So said Matthew Arnold a century later.
But - enter Kant to the rescue...
He says that WILLING THAT MORAL GOODNESS BECOME UNIVERSAL (by your little and ordinary good deeds) is the only firm foundation for ethical behaviour.
Read his lips: if you discard all religious behaviour out of hand, you’re lost.
And will sink.
So next time you grow weary of religious cant and hypocrisy -
Don’t throw out the Baby of sincere Moral Behaviour -
With the Bathwater of sceptical Appearances!
An eighteenth century philosopher who antedated postmodern deconstructionism by several centuries, with this one massive blow of his critical axe he shook the ethical foundation of inherited tradition into the first tremors of its ruin.
Ethics would never be the same again - until, some say, that Teutonic quibbler Immanuel Kant.
I am one of those who agree, for Kant re-established ethics on its firm Christian foundation.
But Hume?
Like me he was prone to novel nervous conditions, which in his case grew steadily worse and worse. My contention is you can NEVER - as is, alas, the case nowadays - graft Christian charity onto a trunk of a sceptical humanism.
It just won’t flourish. So the Void leered into his innocent face from the depths of his enthusiasm.
Just like the paucity of traditional Christians nowadays - their faith just withers in the howling wind of Nothingness and dies.
No, Christian charity needs a strong source of nutrients. And scepticism can never give that, being rootless.
If you see life holistically and in sharp focus, scepticism will drown that vision unthinkingly, as a destructive cretin might do.
You can’t “see life steadily and see it whole� if you desert traditional faith and its concomitant artistic culture.
So said Matthew Arnold a century later.
But - enter Kant to the rescue...
He says that WILLING THAT MORAL GOODNESS BECOME UNIVERSAL (by your little and ordinary good deeds) is the only firm foundation for ethical behaviour.
Read his lips: if you discard all religious behaviour out of hand, you’re lost.
And will sink.
So next time you grow weary of religious cant and hypocrisy -
Don’t throw out the Baby of sincere Moral Behaviour -
With the Bathwater of sceptical Appearances!
June 7, 2022
دوستان� گرانقدر، این کتابِ ارزشمند، از ۹ فصل تشکیل شده است و زنده یاد «دیوید هیوم» خردمند، در این کتاب، به مسائلی همچون: اصولِ کلیِ اخلاق- خیرخواهی، عدالت، جامعهٔ سیاسی- فایده رسانی- خصایل مفید برای ما و دیگران - خوددوستی و احساسِ اخلاقی، پرداخته است
ای� مردِ بزرگ و فیلسوفِ خردگرا و تجربه گرا، به هیچ عنوان اخلاقیات، کردار، گفتار و پندارِ نیک را به موهوماتِ دینی و مذهبی ارتباط نداده و مسائلِ اخلاقی را همچون هر انسانِ خردگرایِ دیگر، خارج از دایرهٔ دینی و الاهیات، موردِ بررسی قرار داده است
د� زیر، به انتخاب جملاتی از این کتاب را برایِ شما دوستانِ گرامی، مینویسم
-------------------------------------
تنه� حقِ ویژه و امتیازِ انحصاریِ انسان که او را بالاتر از سایرِ موجودات مینشاند، حمایت کردن از فرودستانی است که خود را در پناهِ او قرار میدهند
د� ستایشِ یک انسانِ خیرخواه و مردمدار، عاملی وجود دارد که به عنوانِ ستونِ اصلیِ هر تحسینِ اخلاقی، به وفور بر آن تأکید میرود، و آن شادی و رضایتی است که از برکتِ معاشرت و حسنِ رفتارِ او برایِ جامعه حاصل میشود
د� تمامیِ تصمیم گیری هایِ اخلاقی، معیارِ فایده مندیِ عمومی، همواره مهمترین معیارِ موردِ نظر است
فضیل� هایِ اخلاقی و حقیقتِ فلسفیِ آن ، همان متانت، راستگویی، انسانیت، سودمند بودن برایِ جامعه، گشاده رویی و تفریح و شادی میباشد و دیگر خبری از آموزه هایِ موهوم و دلتنگی آورِ الهی دانان و دینداران نیست.. در بینِ فضیلت هایِ اخلاقی و انسانی، دیگر از پارسایی و پرهیزکاری و سخت گیری بر نفس و عذاب کشیدن و خودستیزیِ بیهوده و عبادتِ موهومات، هیچ سخنی به میان نمی آید .. انسانِ خردمندی که بر مسیرِ این اصولِ اخلاقی و انسانی حرکت میکند، در هر لحظه از زندگی، شادی و خوشبختیِ خود و تمامیِ بشریت را آرزو دارد
ی� دیندارِ متعصب و شوم و خرگوش مغز که وی را قدیس و مردِ خدا مینامند، شاید پس از مرگش جایی در تقویمِ دینداران و موهوم پرستان پیدا کند، ولی به ندرت در هنگامِ حیات در روابطِ صمیمی و در اجتماع پذیرفته میشود، البته به جز از سویِ کسانی که مثلِ خودش هذیان گو، موهوم پرست و بیخرد هستند
انسان� با خرد و عقلِ سلیم و بدونِ پیش داوری و بدونِ جلوه و جلایِ اغواگرِ خرافات و دین و مذهب، میتواند به بزرگترین خصائلِ اخلاقی دست یابد که هم برای خویش و هم برایِ دیگران مفید باشد... دینداری، عبادت، تجرد، سخت گیری، توبه نزدِ پرودگار، ریاضت، خود انکاری، سرافکندگی، سکوت، تنهایی و دیگر رفتار و گفتاری که نزدِ دینداران و دینفروشان به عنوانِ فضیلت هایِ اخلاقی شناخته میشود، از سویِ هر انسانِ فهیم و خردمندی طرد میشود، چراکه چنین مسائلِ دینی، به هیچ دردِ شخص و جامعه نمیخورد.. نه جهازِ خوشبختیِ خودِ شخص را میگستراند و نه او را به عضوی مفید برای جامعه تبدیل میکند و نه او را به پذیرایی و سرگرمیِ یاران تواناتر میکند و نه نیرویِ او را برایِ حظ و سعادتِ فردی افزایش میدهد.. این اوصاف و به اصطلاح موهوماتِ دینی و مذهبی که به اشتباه فضیلت خوانده میشود، بر تمامیِ مقاصد و اخلاقیاتِ مطلوب، قلم میکشد.. این مسائلِ دینی عقل و فهم را ضایع، تخیل را کور و خلق و خویِ انسان را عبوس میکند.. بنابراین ما خردگرایان، این موارد و موضوعاتِ دینی را به جایِ قرار دادن در ستونِ فضیلتها، در ستونِ رذیلتها قرار میدهیم.. هیچ نیرویِ خرافی در میانِ مردمِ جهان چندان زورآمد نیست که این احساساتِ طبیعی را به کلی تباه کند
م� به فضائلِ اخلاقیِ دیگران احترام میگذاریم و آن را میستاییم، تا مطمئن شویم که فضائلِ متناظری که در خودمان وجود دارد و نهایتاً شخصیتمان، در نگاهِ دیگران قابلِ احترام و ستایش است
ا� اعمال و اطوارِ آدمی برخی تصوراتِ عامِ اخلاقی ساخته میشود و فلان رفتار در فلان موقعیت از آنان انتظار میرود، مثلاً گفته میشود که این عملِ خاص، مطابقِ قانونِ انتزاعیِ اخلاقی ما است و آن عملِ دیگر ناقضِ آن و به یُمنِ این اصولِ عمومیِ همه گیر است که احساساتِ خاص و موردیِ حبِ نفس، کنترل و محدود میشود و میتوان گفت این چنین است که فضیلت و رذیلت شناخته میشود و اخلاقیات تشخیص داده میشوند
م� متقاعد شده ام که وقتی کسی خیلی به خود مطمئن و افاده باز باشد، عموماً بیشتر هم در معرضِ خطا میباشد و افسارِ خویش را بدونِ تعمق و تعلیق که تنها محافظِ او از بدخیم ترین یاوه بافی ها است، به تمایلات میسپرد
-------------------------------------
امیدوار� این ریویو در جهتِ آشنایی با این کتاب، کافی و مفید بوده باشه
«پیرو� باشید و ایرانی»
ای� مردِ بزرگ و فیلسوفِ خردگرا و تجربه گرا، به هیچ عنوان اخلاقیات، کردار، گفتار و پندارِ نیک را به موهوماتِ دینی و مذهبی ارتباط نداده و مسائلِ اخلاقی را همچون هر انسانِ خردگرایِ دیگر، خارج از دایرهٔ دینی و الاهیات، موردِ بررسی قرار داده است
د� زیر، به انتخاب جملاتی از این کتاب را برایِ شما دوستانِ گرامی، مینویسم
-------------------------------------
تنه� حقِ ویژه و امتیازِ انحصاریِ انسان که او را بالاتر از سایرِ موجودات مینشاند، حمایت کردن از فرودستانی است که خود را در پناهِ او قرار میدهند
د� ستایشِ یک انسانِ خیرخواه و مردمدار، عاملی وجود دارد که به عنوانِ ستونِ اصلیِ هر تحسینِ اخلاقی، به وفور بر آن تأکید میرود، و آن شادی و رضایتی است که از برکتِ معاشرت و حسنِ رفتارِ او برایِ جامعه حاصل میشود
د� تمامیِ تصمیم گیری هایِ اخلاقی، معیارِ فایده مندیِ عمومی، همواره مهمترین معیارِ موردِ نظر است
فضیل� هایِ اخلاقی و حقیقتِ فلسفیِ آن ، همان متانت، راستگویی، انسانیت، سودمند بودن برایِ جامعه، گشاده رویی و تفریح و شادی میباشد و دیگر خبری از آموزه هایِ موهوم و دلتنگی آورِ الهی دانان و دینداران نیست.. در بینِ فضیلت هایِ اخلاقی و انسانی، دیگر از پارسایی و پرهیزکاری و سخت گیری بر نفس و عذاب کشیدن و خودستیزیِ بیهوده و عبادتِ موهومات، هیچ سخنی به میان نمی آید .. انسانِ خردمندی که بر مسیرِ این اصولِ اخلاقی و انسانی حرکت میکند، در هر لحظه از زندگی، شادی و خوشبختیِ خود و تمامیِ بشریت را آرزو دارد
ی� دیندارِ متعصب و شوم و خرگوش مغز که وی را قدیس و مردِ خدا مینامند، شاید پس از مرگش جایی در تقویمِ دینداران و موهوم پرستان پیدا کند، ولی به ندرت در هنگامِ حیات در روابطِ صمیمی و در اجتماع پذیرفته میشود، البته به جز از سویِ کسانی که مثلِ خودش هذیان گو، موهوم پرست و بیخرد هستند
انسان� با خرد و عقلِ سلیم و بدونِ پیش داوری و بدونِ جلوه و جلایِ اغواگرِ خرافات و دین و مذهب، میتواند به بزرگترین خصائلِ اخلاقی دست یابد که هم برای خویش و هم برایِ دیگران مفید باشد... دینداری، عبادت، تجرد، سخت گیری، توبه نزدِ پرودگار، ریاضت، خود انکاری، سرافکندگی، سکوت، تنهایی و دیگر رفتار و گفتاری که نزدِ دینداران و دینفروشان به عنوانِ فضیلت هایِ اخلاقی شناخته میشود، از سویِ هر انسانِ فهیم و خردمندی طرد میشود، چراکه چنین مسائلِ دینی، به هیچ دردِ شخص و جامعه نمیخورد.. نه جهازِ خوشبختیِ خودِ شخص را میگستراند و نه او را به عضوی مفید برای جامعه تبدیل میکند و نه او را به پذیرایی و سرگرمیِ یاران تواناتر میکند و نه نیرویِ او را برایِ حظ و سعادتِ فردی افزایش میدهد.. این اوصاف و به اصطلاح موهوماتِ دینی و مذهبی که به اشتباه فضیلت خوانده میشود، بر تمامیِ مقاصد و اخلاقیاتِ مطلوب، قلم میکشد.. این مسائلِ دینی عقل و فهم را ضایع، تخیل را کور و خلق و خویِ انسان را عبوس میکند.. بنابراین ما خردگرایان، این موارد و موضوعاتِ دینی را به جایِ قرار دادن در ستونِ فضیلتها، در ستونِ رذیلتها قرار میدهیم.. هیچ نیرویِ خرافی در میانِ مردمِ جهان چندان زورآمد نیست که این احساساتِ طبیعی را به کلی تباه کند
م� به فضائلِ اخلاقیِ دیگران احترام میگذاریم و آن را میستاییم، تا مطمئن شویم که فضائلِ متناظری که در خودمان وجود دارد و نهایتاً شخصیتمان، در نگاهِ دیگران قابلِ احترام و ستایش است
ا� اعمال و اطوارِ آدمی برخی تصوراتِ عامِ اخلاقی ساخته میشود و فلان رفتار در فلان موقعیت از آنان انتظار میرود، مثلاً گفته میشود که این عملِ خاص، مطابقِ قانونِ انتزاعیِ اخلاقی ما است و آن عملِ دیگر ناقضِ آن و به یُمنِ این اصولِ عمومیِ همه گیر است که احساساتِ خاص و موردیِ حبِ نفس، کنترل و محدود میشود و میتوان گفت این چنین است که فضیلت و رذیلت شناخته میشود و اخلاقیات تشخیص داده میشوند
م� متقاعد شده ام که وقتی کسی خیلی به خود مطمئن و افاده باز باشد، عموماً بیشتر هم در معرضِ خطا میباشد و افسارِ خویش را بدونِ تعمق و تعلیق که تنها محافظِ او از بدخیم ترین یاوه بافی ها است، به تمایلات میسپرد
-------------------------------------
امیدوار� این ریویو در جهتِ آشنایی با این کتاب، کافی و مفید بوده باشه
«پیرو� باشید و ایرانی»
November 19, 2014
It had been some time since I had last visited 221B Baker Street, and when I entered I found my friend engrossed in the study of a slim volume. "Watson!" he said, without lifting his eyes from the text. "Pray tell me, are you by any chance familiar with Mr. Hume's Enquiry into the Principles of Morals?"
I could not hide a smile of modest self-congratulation. "Indeed, Holmes," I said, "I know the book very well. I wrote an essay on it during my final year at Oxford, and was fortunate enough to be rewarded for my efforts by winning a minor prize."
"Excellent, excellent!" said Holmes. "Then you will no doubt have little difficulty in summarizing the content?"
"I think, even at this remove in time, that I would be equal to the task," I replied. "Mr. Hume regarded the book as his greatest and most important achievement in the field of philosophy. He endeavors to explain the origins of our moral sense, and considers three main explanations: that moral principles are due to custom, that they are due to self-interest, and that they are due to the general benefit they bring to society as a whole. Although he does not by any means discount the relevance of the first two causes, the author nonetheless maintains, throughout his book, that the third is by far the most important. This notion he argues for at length, supplying a wealth of examples in its support; though despite the fact that I generally found myself in agreement with him, and to no small extent influenced by the ideas he propounds, I am forced to admit that the prolixity of his explanations and the inordinate length of his sentences on occasion caused me to wish that he had found a more succinct manner to present his thoughts."
"It is indeed evident," said Holmes, "that Mr. Hume has had a considerably influence on you. But I must confess that, speaking for myself, there was another aspect of the work that more immediately engaged my attention."
"And what may that be?" I asked.
"Why," said Holmes, "it is perhaps of little account; but were you not struck by the curious nature of the author's remarks concerning the possibility that moral principles are divinely ordained, and follow from the precepts of Holy Scripture?"
"I am not sure I grasp your meaning," I replied. "To the best of my recollection, Mr. Hume says little or nothing about this matter."
"Quite so!" said Holmes with satisfaction. "You have put it in a nutshell. That is exactly the curious circumstance to which I was referring."
I could not hide a smile of modest self-congratulation. "Indeed, Holmes," I said, "I know the book very well. I wrote an essay on it during my final year at Oxford, and was fortunate enough to be rewarded for my efforts by winning a minor prize."
"Excellent, excellent!" said Holmes. "Then you will no doubt have little difficulty in summarizing the content?"
"I think, even at this remove in time, that I would be equal to the task," I replied. "Mr. Hume regarded the book as his greatest and most important achievement in the field of philosophy. He endeavors to explain the origins of our moral sense, and considers three main explanations: that moral principles are due to custom, that they are due to self-interest, and that they are due to the general benefit they bring to society as a whole. Although he does not by any means discount the relevance of the first two causes, the author nonetheless maintains, throughout his book, that the third is by far the most important. This notion he argues for at length, supplying a wealth of examples in its support; though despite the fact that I generally found myself in agreement with him, and to no small extent influenced by the ideas he propounds, I am forced to admit that the prolixity of his explanations and the inordinate length of his sentences on occasion caused me to wish that he had found a more succinct manner to present his thoughts."
"It is indeed evident," said Holmes, "that Mr. Hume has had a considerably influence on you. But I must confess that, speaking for myself, there was another aspect of the work that more immediately engaged my attention."
"And what may that be?" I asked.
"Why," said Holmes, "it is perhaps of little account; but were you not struck by the curious nature of the author's remarks concerning the possibility that moral principles are divinely ordained, and follow from the precepts of Holy Scripture?"
"I am not sure I grasp your meaning," I replied. "To the best of my recollection, Mr. Hume says little or nothing about this matter."
"Quite so!" said Holmes with satisfaction. "You have put it in a nutshell. That is exactly the curious circumstance to which I was referring."
June 2, 2016
Well, this was disappointing.
I say this because Hume’s first Enquiry was brilliant, unforgettably so. There, we see Hume as one of the most subtle, most penetrating, and most profound thinkers in Western history. Here we see him don the hat of a common moralist:
“Instance, briefly; come, instance� (As You Like It)
Hume apparently shared the English love for instances. He fills up entire chapters with example after example of moral and immoral acts. He drones away like a pontificating prefect. It’s almost embarrassing.
This would have been more excusable if he was making a sufficiently complicated point, but he is arguing that humans have a special moral sense and naturally feel pleasure when doing moral acts. If this is true, then we certainly don’t need an entire book to demonstrate it.
I would rate this book lower, but Hume can’t help letting his brilliance occasionally shine through.
I say this because Hume’s first Enquiry was brilliant, unforgettably so. There, we see Hume as one of the most subtle, most penetrating, and most profound thinkers in Western history. Here we see him don the hat of a common moralist:
“Instance, briefly; come, instance� (As You Like It)
Hume apparently shared the English love for instances. He fills up entire chapters with example after example of moral and immoral acts. He drones away like a pontificating prefect. It’s almost embarrassing.
This would have been more excusable if he was making a sufficiently complicated point, but he is arguing that humans have a special moral sense and naturally feel pleasure when doing moral acts. If this is true, then we certainly don’t need an entire book to demonstrate it.
I would rate this book lower, but Hume can’t help letting his brilliance occasionally shine through.
April 1, 2022
يبحث هيوم في الكتاب عن مفهومي العدالة والاحسان ودورهما في تشكيل المبادئ الأخلاقية لدى أفراد المجتمع، بين الضرورة و الاختيار، ودورهما في سعادة البشرية ( إذ تمكّن الإنسان من التعقل والتحكم والسيطرة والأخذ والعطاء مع الآخر والأشياء في هذا العالم.)
مع الأخذ بعين الاعتبار بعلاقتهما بالوعي والمشاعر وأثرهما في التعامل بين الأفراد، أو العامة، وذلك بطرح عدد من النماذج والدروس والتجارب الإنسانية المختلفة بتحليلات تفصيلية لعدد من الحالات؛ أي تشخيص الواقع وتجريده، بما يكتنه من معطيات عقلية ودلالات فكرية لمقاربة ما يعتمل بعقله بعقل الوعي الجمعي. مع اهتمامه بموضوع القوانين ودورها في ضبط السلوك الاجتماعي للأفراد، وعن الفارق بين الأخلاق والقانون . وما يثيره عامةً "مفهوم الأخلاق " من إشكاليات فلسفية ( بين فلسفة أخلاق وعلم أخلاق.) ك التناقضات والصراعات الأيديولوجية وما خلفته في السياق المفاهيمي والدلالي للأخلاق عبر التاريخ.
مع الأخذ بعين الاعتبار بعلاقتهما بالوعي والمشاعر وأثرهما في التعامل بين الأفراد، أو العامة، وذلك بطرح عدد من النماذج والدروس والتجارب الإنسانية المختلفة بتحليلات تفصيلية لعدد من الحالات؛ أي تشخيص الواقع وتجريده، بما يكتنه من معطيات عقلية ودلالات فكرية لمقاربة ما يعتمل بعقله بعقل الوعي الجمعي. مع اهتمامه بموضوع القوانين ودورها في ضبط السلوك الاجتماعي للأفراد، وعن الفارق بين الأخلاق والقانون . وما يثيره عامةً "مفهوم الأخلاق " من إشكاليات فلسفية ( بين فلسفة أخلاق وعلم أخلاق.) ك التناقضات والصراعات الأيديولوجية وما خلفته في السياق المفاهيمي والدلالي للأخلاق عبر التاريخ.
August 2, 2007
Hume is the moral philosopher who is most recognizable as a fellow modern human being. In his short autobiographical "My Own Life", he says that the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals is "incomparably the best" of all his writings (though he admits that he isn't the one to judge that).
Reading this for the first time, I was surprised at how little "philosophy" is in it--by that, I mean how little complicated argumentation there is. Most of the arguments are short and direct: against someone who thinks that all of morality can be constructed out of self interest, Hume says that such a view is intuitively implausible, and gives some examples of difficult cases for such a theory to handle: admiring the moral qualities of an adversary, assigning moral praise or blame to historically different acts whose relation to present self interest is not at all clear, and so on. Of course there are responses that can be made on behalf of the views that Hume criticizes, but they look needlessly complex, sophistical and increasingly implausible when compared with his straightforward approach, which is to find the traits that we find agreeable and the traits we find disagreeable and see if they have anything in common. If they do, then that's likely to be the foundation of morals. There is no search for absolute certainty.
Not to give away the ending, but the foundation of morals turns out to be shared sentiment. One worry is that it's not as universal as he makes it out to be, but overall, this is about as enjoyable a work of moral philosophy as I've ever read (it's not as much fun as the Republic, but the view is saner).
Reading this for the first time, I was surprised at how little "philosophy" is in it--by that, I mean how little complicated argumentation there is. Most of the arguments are short and direct: against someone who thinks that all of morality can be constructed out of self interest, Hume says that such a view is intuitively implausible, and gives some examples of difficult cases for such a theory to handle: admiring the moral qualities of an adversary, assigning moral praise or blame to historically different acts whose relation to present self interest is not at all clear, and so on. Of course there are responses that can be made on behalf of the views that Hume criticizes, but they look needlessly complex, sophistical and increasingly implausible when compared with his straightforward approach, which is to find the traits that we find agreeable and the traits we find disagreeable and see if they have anything in common. If they do, then that's likely to be the foundation of morals. There is no search for absolute certainty.
Not to give away the ending, but the foundation of morals turns out to be shared sentiment. One worry is that it's not as universal as he makes it out to be, but overall, this is about as enjoyable a work of moral philosophy as I've ever read (it's not as much fun as the Republic, but the view is saner).
April 28, 2019
در ابتدای کار هیوم سوالی رو مطرح میکنه که خواننده حس میکنه فقط متا اثیک در این کتاب دنبال میشه و خب مسلما مباحث خشکی پیش رو داره.اما زبان ساده و بی پیراییه ی هیوم چنین مباحثی رو هم آسان میکنند.
حقیقتا آنچنان با نظریات اخلاقی هیوم بر سر مهر نیستم.حتی اون حجم قابل ملاحظه ای که هیوم در رد خودگرایی روانشناختی و خودگرایی فلسفی اختصاص داده.
این عبارات توضیحی جناب آقای مردیها هم اذیت بود. واقعا اکثرجاها زائد بود.هرچند برخی جاها واقعا مفید بود.
ترجمه هم که خیلی خوب بود.
حقیقتا آنچنان با نظریات اخلاقی هیوم بر سر مهر نیستم.حتی اون حجم قابل ملاحظه ای که هیوم در رد خودگرایی روانشناختی و خودگرایی فلسفی اختصاص داده.
این عبارات توضیحی جناب آقای مردیها هم اذیت بود. واقعا اکثرجاها زائد بود.هرچند برخی جاها واقعا مفید بود.
ترجمه هم که خیلی خوب بود.
September 20, 2014
کتاب خیلی خوب بود، اما امان از مرتضی مردیها. نه اینک� ترجمها� بد باشد، اما بدون اغراق یک سومِ کتاب توضیحات اضافیا� است که درون قلاب و وسط متن اصلی آورده است. خیلی زیاد و سطحی هستند. حسابی روی اعصابان�
March 15, 2012
It would be one thing if all Hume did was ask the question, instead, he gives some quite pathetic answers that professors still cram down student's throats.
April 6, 2018
A contemporary reader might think his conclusions to be truisms, but the philosophical climate in Hume's lifetime ensured that his work would be consistently controversial and original.
November 4, 2023
Hume argues for a naturalist view of moral sentiments against Hobbesian self-interest as well as the rationalism he rejects in the Treatise.
October 27, 2023
There is no such thing as justice that resides in the soul, only justice as it resides in the community. As a public virtue, justice draws its praiseworthiness and merit-endowing powers from the services it renders for the community, the most significant of which is the maintenance of private property. As Hume's thought experiment goes, in a hypothetical post-scarcity society inhabited by supremely benevolent rational creatures, justice has no place, or if it does, it would not be glorified as a virtue. On the other extreme, in a Hobbesian state of war of all against all, justice also ceases to be a virtue. Hume, of course, is quick to acknowledge that not all behavior and actions that are praised (or blamed) are so praised because they contribute to public good or even individual self-interest. We can cite countless examples of praise bestowed on individuals for their courage, brilliance magnanimity, etc. who lived a long time ago in some faraway place and whose existence has no conceivable effect on present observers. Their actions simply excite pleasure in us, and that is why we praise them. In general, Hume is quite convinced that the passions associated with our care for others originate from that fundamental aspect of human nature we know as benevolence. In firm opposition to those who claim that benevolence is either a sham or a surface appearance assumed by narrow and abstract self-interest, Hume defends benevolence ("a particle of the dove") as a naturalistically irreducible part of the constitution of our species-being.
July 30, 2022
هرچند هیوم را در زمرۀ فلاسفۀ اخلاق به حساب نمیآورن� اما این کتاب از مهمتری� فلسفورزیها� نظری در حوزه اخلاق است که از رویکرد طبیعتباوران� و تجربهگرای� وی نشات میگیر�. اصول اخلاق برای وی ریشه در نظم و مجموعها� ازمصادیق خرد جمعی دارد که در پی کسب بیشترین میزان شادکامی و بهروزی و کاهش حداکثری رنج و ناکامی است. این اخلاقِ مبتنیب� اصالتِ «سودمندی» از دل آنچه «طبیعت در ذات بشر نهادینه کرد» شروع و به تجویز«آنچه خواستنیست� منتهی میشو�. مواضع اخلاقی هیوم با وجود تفاوتها� جزئی با آنچه بعدهه� توسط بنتام و استوارتمی� بسط مییابد� همپوشان� گستردها� با آنچه امروزه بعنوان تفکر «فایدهگرا� میشناسی� دارد.
September 10, 2021
This is one giant of a book, not for its length nor heaviness of subject, but the themes it touches and its argument. If Hume's first enquiry about human understanding (the book) is about the limit and nature of factual knowledge, this second enquiry is about the origin of morality.
Encountering its arguments feels like getting hit by a brick. I never thought some of these things seriously. All this time I thought morality originated in reason. All of us have some sort of innate capacity to judge whether something is right or wrong, which is based on reason. Just like mathematics and geometry, they can be deduced by reason. Being kind to others is good, and murder is wrong, surely every society agrees on that, right? The ideal morality exists regardless of differences in custom between cultures, and they can be deduced by reason. Maybe God played a role, maybe not, but there you go.
This as it turns out was more or less Kant's position. Hume had something different in mind. Here he argued that the origin of morality are feelings and utility. Throughout its history, different cultures have different experience about which actions generate the most utility for individuals and society. It is these, argued Hume, that form the basis of morality. Furthermore, our feelings reinforced this tendency, resulting in almost knee-jerk moral reaction with regards to moral judgments. For instance, there has been a taboo against incest in many societies. This is not due to some normative understanding based on reason but due to the bad consequences that such acts will result e.g. abnormality of the child. Hence, the law against incest was then codified into 'morality' where the sinfulness of the act implied something far more transcendental. Another example that Hume provided is the origin of justice. He argued that justice originates precisely in those places where there is scarcity of goods. If it weren't for scarcity, people would not need to distribute resources fairly, since they can just simply get other things without the need to divide them. This shows in the fact that ancient humans never divided virtually limitless natural resources such as oxygen and sea (that is until we got greedy). Hence, the law is codified into principles and so on.
As it turns out, Hume wasn't exactly a dogmatist about this, in fact he was rather lenient. He acknowledged that reason also played a large role in classifying and analysing moral acts, but it is clueless about right and wrong.
It was a more Darwinian approach, building morality from the bottom up. As it turns out this is a huge debate in morality, whether morality is based on feelings or reason, one that has massive consequences for many fields of study.
Hume was clear and pragmatic. He was surprised that he needed to write this book, because his approach was such a commonsensical one. If it were not for some obtuse philosophers and theologians arguing for some vague terms about the origins of morality, he wouldn't need to write this book.
The reason I read this book is mainly that I realize old books are important. Okay, new books are way easier to get through and way more entertaining, but I start to notice that certain themes keep on showing up. These books are like the foundation of the knowledge that subsequent books use to build up. And reading these books is not the same as reading book summaries! I think it was the economist writer Nassim Taleb who said that books that last older means that they pass the test of importance. He argued that you have to read books that are at least 300 years old. They age like fine wine, and they naturally select themselves. Only the best of the best remain relevant after hundreds of years. This book by Hume is no exception. Goes without saying that new books are fresher. This book is pretty tough that I have to read online summary to keep up at times.
Encountering its arguments feels like getting hit by a brick. I never thought some of these things seriously. All this time I thought morality originated in reason. All of us have some sort of innate capacity to judge whether something is right or wrong, which is based on reason. Just like mathematics and geometry, they can be deduced by reason. Being kind to others is good, and murder is wrong, surely every society agrees on that, right? The ideal morality exists regardless of differences in custom between cultures, and they can be deduced by reason. Maybe God played a role, maybe not, but there you go.
This as it turns out was more or less Kant's position. Hume had something different in mind. Here he argued that the origin of morality are feelings and utility. Throughout its history, different cultures have different experience about which actions generate the most utility for individuals and society. It is these, argued Hume, that form the basis of morality. Furthermore, our feelings reinforced this tendency, resulting in almost knee-jerk moral reaction with regards to moral judgments. For instance, there has been a taboo against incest in many societies. This is not due to some normative understanding based on reason but due to the bad consequences that such acts will result e.g. abnormality of the child. Hence, the law against incest was then codified into 'morality' where the sinfulness of the act implied something far more transcendental. Another example that Hume provided is the origin of justice. He argued that justice originates precisely in those places where there is scarcity of goods. If it weren't for scarcity, people would not need to distribute resources fairly, since they can just simply get other things without the need to divide them. This shows in the fact that ancient humans never divided virtually limitless natural resources such as oxygen and sea (that is until we got greedy). Hence, the law is codified into principles and so on.
As it turns out, Hume wasn't exactly a dogmatist about this, in fact he was rather lenient. He acknowledged that reason also played a large role in classifying and analysing moral acts, but it is clueless about right and wrong.
It was a more Darwinian approach, building morality from the bottom up. As it turns out this is a huge debate in morality, whether morality is based on feelings or reason, one that has massive consequences for many fields of study.
Hume was clear and pragmatic. He was surprised that he needed to write this book, because his approach was such a commonsensical one. If it were not for some obtuse philosophers and theologians arguing for some vague terms about the origins of morality, he wouldn't need to write this book.
The reason I read this book is mainly that I realize old books are important. Okay, new books are way easier to get through and way more entertaining, but I start to notice that certain themes keep on showing up. These books are like the foundation of the knowledge that subsequent books use to build up. And reading these books is not the same as reading book summaries! I think it was the economist writer Nassim Taleb who said that books that last older means that they pass the test of importance. He argued that you have to read books that are at least 300 years old. They age like fine wine, and they naturally select themselves. Only the best of the best remain relevant after hundreds of years. This book by Hume is no exception. Goes without saying that new books are fresher. This book is pretty tough that I have to read online summary to keep up at times.
October 17, 2019
After A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), according to David Hume himself, "fell dead-bron from the press" he decided to lay out the two main themes of this huge work - epistemology and morality - in two new works. In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), Hume gives an overview on his epistemology, while in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) he sets out his theory of human emotions.
Hume's main thoughts on ethics are easy to summarize. He thinks human nature is the origin of morality: passions guide our behaviour, while reason cannot motivate us to act ("reason is a slave of the passions"). Therefore, we need to study mankind in order to understand (and prescribe) morality.
How does this work? Well, first of all, we have feelings of empathy for others - we feel with them. Second, when dealing with others, we notice their character traits and behaviours and these acts provoke feelings of approval or disapproval. In other words, we form (mental) associations between feelings of approval or disapproval and particular acts. This leads to our feelings of good and bad (i.e. ethics): good acts are acts that are accompanied by our feelings of approval; bad acts are acts that are accompanied by our feelings of disapproval.
This is an emotivistic theory of morality - morality is based on human emotions/passions. In approaching ethics this way, Hume breaks with the tradition of 17th and 18th cenutry contract theorists (like Hobbes and Locke), who saw mankind as a brutal animal in a state of nature, in need of hard rulers to enforce peace, safety and liberty. Hume acknowledges human beings as not only selfish, but also cooperative. Man, in the state of nature, lives in groups and cooperates regularly with his fellow beings.
Why is it necessary to live in states and coerce people to follow the laws? Well, this is because - according to Hume - there are two types of virtues. Natural virtues are the virtues that mankind already possesses in his original state; cultural virtues are virtues that only exist in states. These cultural virtues require the existence of institutions. This is the only reason for the existence of a state. This is a very important, historical lesson: human beings don't need to be forced into cooperation or into sympathy, they only need to be 'kept in check'.
But apart from being an emotivist, Hume also was a determinist. He subscribed to scientific knowledge as the only source of human knowledge - Newton's mechanics were the source of Hume's original philosophical work - but this inevitably leads to the conclusion that Nature is determined by natural laws. So where's the room for human freedom? Aren't we determined by Nature? Well, this is a thorny question (it still is) and Hume is not able to resolve it.
He decides to define freedom as 'not being shackled or in prison' (i.e. your own volition not limited by externally restrictions), but this leaves open the question of internal restrictions. What if we want to quit smoking but simply can't? And freedom might not even be a question of dichotomoty (you either have it or you don't), but be a gradual concept - something that contemporary philosopher Daniel Dennett has written about at large (and has convinced me of its truth).
(I decided to write down all of my notes on Hume's approach of morality, politics and freedom, collected from his other books as well, so not all of the topics in this review are treated in the book that's being reviewed).
Hume's main thoughts on ethics are easy to summarize. He thinks human nature is the origin of morality: passions guide our behaviour, while reason cannot motivate us to act ("reason is a slave of the passions"). Therefore, we need to study mankind in order to understand (and prescribe) morality.
How does this work? Well, first of all, we have feelings of empathy for others - we feel with them. Second, when dealing with others, we notice their character traits and behaviours and these acts provoke feelings of approval or disapproval. In other words, we form (mental) associations between feelings of approval or disapproval and particular acts. This leads to our feelings of good and bad (i.e. ethics): good acts are acts that are accompanied by our feelings of approval; bad acts are acts that are accompanied by our feelings of disapproval.
This is an emotivistic theory of morality - morality is based on human emotions/passions. In approaching ethics this way, Hume breaks with the tradition of 17th and 18th cenutry contract theorists (like Hobbes and Locke), who saw mankind as a brutal animal in a state of nature, in need of hard rulers to enforce peace, safety and liberty. Hume acknowledges human beings as not only selfish, but also cooperative. Man, in the state of nature, lives in groups and cooperates regularly with his fellow beings.
Why is it necessary to live in states and coerce people to follow the laws? Well, this is because - according to Hume - there are two types of virtues. Natural virtues are the virtues that mankind already possesses in his original state; cultural virtues are virtues that only exist in states. These cultural virtues require the existence of institutions. This is the only reason for the existence of a state. This is a very important, historical lesson: human beings don't need to be forced into cooperation or into sympathy, they only need to be 'kept in check'.
But apart from being an emotivist, Hume also was a determinist. He subscribed to scientific knowledge as the only source of human knowledge - Newton's mechanics were the source of Hume's original philosophical work - but this inevitably leads to the conclusion that Nature is determined by natural laws. So where's the room for human freedom? Aren't we determined by Nature? Well, this is a thorny question (it still is) and Hume is not able to resolve it.
He decides to define freedom as 'not being shackled or in prison' (i.e. your own volition not limited by externally restrictions), but this leaves open the question of internal restrictions. What if we want to quit smoking but simply can't? And freedom might not even be a question of dichotomoty (you either have it or you don't), but be a gradual concept - something that contemporary philosopher Daniel Dennett has written about at large (and has convinced me of its truth).
(I decided to write down all of my notes on Hume's approach of morality, politics and freedom, collected from his other books as well, so not all of the topics in this review are treated in the book that's being reviewed).
August 4, 2019
Though this was the shortest of the books I've owned of Hume, it took me longest to read it. Though the argument is debated in typical Hume's fashion, its hard to ignore Plato's dialogues echoing every few pages. Its interesting to say the least but Hume's attention is more on acts of morality than the actual principles of it.
September 22, 2022
La utilidad o beneficio obtenido por la sociedad como cimientos de aquello que puede ser aplaudido o censurado. Entre más útil, más loable�
Interesante la parte sobre el dogmatismo, que aunque aparece brevemente en la introducción y en las conclusiones, resulta importante: “me doy cuenta de que nada puede ser más antifilosófico que el estar seguro o ser dogmático acerca de asunto alguno�.
Interesante la parte sobre el dogmatismo, que aunque aparece brevemente en la introducción y en las conclusiones, resulta importante: “me doy cuenta de que nada puede ser más antifilosófico que el estar seguro o ser dogmático acerca de asunto alguno�.
November 14, 2023
A good fuck but an empiricist cuck
June 5, 2021
In his second great enquiry, Hume sets out to discuss his ideas on human morality, which in essence amount to sentimentalism, the idea that we can never make moral judgments based on reason alone. Reason deals with facts and draws conclusions from them, but, all else being equal, it could not lead us to choose one option over the other; only our sentiments can do this. I agree with many scholars who claim that Hume is merely writing a description of
human moral psychology here, rather than laying out true philosophical arguments, but I agree with most of his assessments and he writes with such joy that I will forgive him this issue. The most poignant ideas for me, come in the latter part of the text, when Hume rejects many qualities deemed by religious doctrine to be virtuous, while also signaling that qualities deemed to be bad by religion may in fact be virtuous. Hume makes important distinctions in his classifications of virtues as being either "artificial" or "natural". The key difference between these virtue classes is their origin. Artificial virtues originate from and depend on social structures such as governments or religious doctrine. This category of virtues include fidelity, justice, chastity and obedience. Natural virtues are not created but are automatically present in humans since birth. It is ideas such as these that lead Hume to be referred to as the “awful atheist Hume,� and his proddings of religious thought paved the way for legions of free thinkers to come.
human moral psychology here, rather than laying out true philosophical arguments, but I agree with most of his assessments and he writes with such joy that I will forgive him this issue. The most poignant ideas for me, come in the latter part of the text, when Hume rejects many qualities deemed by religious doctrine to be virtuous, while also signaling that qualities deemed to be bad by religion may in fact be virtuous. Hume makes important distinctions in his classifications of virtues as being either "artificial" or "natural". The key difference between these virtue classes is their origin. Artificial virtues originate from and depend on social structures such as governments or religious doctrine. This category of virtues include fidelity, justice, chastity and obedience. Natural virtues are not created but are automatically present in humans since birth. It is ideas such as these that lead Hume to be referred to as the “awful atheist Hume,� and his proddings of religious thought paved the way for legions of free thinkers to come.
October 16, 2021
As usual, I appreciated Hume’s insights, yet it doesn’t stand up to his Treatise. I enjoyed the conclusion, appendices I and II, and the ending dialogue, but the meat of the book was tough to get through. His general method was to present a quality we generally agree is good, maybe give an example from history, and say it really is good because it’s agreeable and/or useful. Needless to say I didn’t find it very convincing. The arguments in the rest of the book were more solid.
I agree that passions are necessary for moral preferences, and that ethics can’t be derived from pure reason. I agree that self-interest is not sufficient to explain why we care about others.
I loved the daoist/epicurean sentiment at the very end: “And in a view to pleasure, what comparison between unbought satisfaction of conversation, society, study, even health and the common beauties of nature, but above all the peaceful reflection on one’s own conduct: What comparison, I say, between these, and the feverish, empty amusements of luxury and expence? These natural pleasures, indeed, are really without price; both because they are below all price in their attainment, and above it in their enjoyment.�
I agree that passions are necessary for moral preferences, and that ethics can’t be derived from pure reason. I agree that self-interest is not sufficient to explain why we care about others.
I loved the daoist/epicurean sentiment at the very end: “And in a view to pleasure, what comparison between unbought satisfaction of conversation, society, study, even health and the common beauties of nature, but above all the peaceful reflection on one’s own conduct: What comparison, I say, between these, and the feverish, empty amusements of luxury and expence? These natural pleasures, indeed, are really without price; both because they are below all price in their attainment, and above it in their enjoyment.�
April 7, 2020
Quizá hoy este libro no nos diga mucho porque estemos más de acuerdo con él en ciertos juicios que sus contemporáneos y tuviera su cierto impacto en el momento. Verdaderamente no lo sé. Empecé este libro por capricho del momento sin recabar información previamente.
Si no estás estudiando la obra de Hume, no creo que haga mucho daño a la lectura dirigirse directamente a la Conclusión y a los 4 apéndices.
Si no estás estudiando la obra de Hume, no creo que haga mucho daño a la lectura dirigirse directamente a la Conclusión y a los 4 apéndices.
September 24, 2017
Hume investigates how moral judgments are made...
July 16, 2018
David Hume could have saved himself a lot of time if he had just admitted right away that the only true foundation for morals is GOD> any other answer is a waste of time,
January 19, 2022
Yeah a solid read, cheers David 👍
February 7, 2016
Hume utilizes an empirical method to explain the basis of moral understanding, and his analysis mirrors scientific study through the observation of human traits, and the corresponding public reception of those traits. In this sense, unlike his contemporaries, Hume believes in a sort of “projectivism," in that his theory of morality does not presuppose the conditions of the world, but rather, suggests that morality exists as a product of human values, and is thus exhibited through individual preference. Hume interprets that there are two ways to view morality—motivated by either reason or by sentiment. However, despite his empirical approach when questioning the basis of morality, Hume argues that moral judgments themselves are not fundamentally rational, but are largely driven by sentiment. Whereas rationality allows individuals to have clarity, such knowledge alone is not enough to compel moral judgment, as individual action is catalyzed by impulses of the will. In conjunction, Hume proposes that individuals value certain traits or values, including those often deemed “moral,� on the basis of their utility. However, Hume does not take an egoist approach, as he does not argue that human actions are inherently self-interested, but rather, argues that actions or values are chosen based on their utility to a common good. In this sense, our sentiments are inclined to prefer traits and behaviors that satisfy the needs of humanity, and thus, those traits are ascribed as virtuous. Reflexively, traits or behaviors that contribute negatively to public interest are libeled “immoral,� or as “vice.� Hume’s preference for sentiment is noted again, as Hume argues that all actions or preferences have an ultimate end—to maximize pleasure, or to minimize suffering. Yet, Hume also contends that although some moral values are natural, others are artificial—justice a key example. Hume argues that this is once again to promote overall utility, particularly in the distribution of material goods and property.
In many ways, Hume's theory strikes a note with me--his preference for sentiment over reason lays the foundation for many modern non-cognitivist theories, particularly those expressivist or emotivist in nature. Further, Hume's long--possibly too much so--and determined argument against the principle of psychological egoism so common in utilitarian theories seemed effective, or at the least, very thought provoking. However, there appear to be several flaws within the argument, both those in connotation and those in form. First, structurally, Hume tends to beg the question, and dismiss any potential counterexamples to his theory. Notably, Hume argues that *all* individuals are motivated to promote overall social utility, but does not necessarily specify that *all* individuals have the same perception of social welfare, nor explains how the existence of individuals without sentimentality--the hypothetical sociopath as an example--would make decisions, particularly those of a "moral" nature. On that note, Hume presents the troubling notion that "moral" decisions bare no distinction from any other, leaving one to wonder why he sought to explain the foundations of moral decisions at all, if they truly were indistinguishable from other decisions. Lastly, Hume's argument that certain virtues are "artificial" seems equally troubling; For example, Hume argues that justice is only deemed virtuous due to its "usefulness," or fundamental role in distributing material goods and property.
Not only does this proposition grossly underestimate what justice seems to be, it presents the potentially harmful utilitarian notion that what is 'just' is simply what is 'useful.' Clearly, this notion has many negative implications, particularly given Hume's relatively comfortable socio-economic perspective.
March 6, 2021
Ideas con los pies en la tierra y muy aclaradoras. De lo mejor que he leído sobre moral. Quizás un poco repetitivo, pero no es un libro pensado para el entretenimiento.
January 11, 2022
In the Enquiry, commonly referred to as David Hume’s “second treatise,� Hume seeks to identify which qualities of mind are praiseworthy and blameworthy to discern “those universal principles, from which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived� (16). His method is thereby empirical: like a kind of moral scientist, he acquires data from a set of observations on the moral life, based on which he makes inferences about the supreme principle of morality. Based on these observations, Hume concludes that the foundation of morality lies in sentiment and not reason. While reason may be “sufficient to instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and actions,� he insists that “it is not alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation�; rather, we praise and blame qualities in ourselves and others based on a natural affection for human happiness and a revulsion toward human misery (83). Reason, then, is merely instrumental and does not implicate our choice of ends in moral action. Sentiment, rather, provides us with the end of virtue, which is to maximize public happiness.
If sentiment provides the basis on which we make moral evaluations, it also serves an important epistemic function. For Hume, we know moral truths not via the mediation of reason, but directly via our sentiments—i.e. by whether we approve or disapprove of certain actions or attitudes. We take pleasure in what is virtuous because it is socially beneficial, and we are repulsed by what is vicious because it is harmful to the common interest. Likewise, sentiment—and not reason—provides us with the motivation for moral action: we desire to live virtuously either because it offers immediate pleasure or because it promotes public utility, in which we also take pleasure on account of our natural sociability.
The relationship between sentiment, or the pleasure we take in the estimable qualities associated with virtue, and public utility is critically important for Hume. He claims that we denominate those qualities of mind associated with virtue as virtuous on account of their usefulness to society, and that we have a natural, and not merely customary affection for what promotes social utility and thereby human happiness. Here, Hume introduces a central premise to his moral theory. We take pleasure in human happiness, he claims, because humans have, on account of their universal nature, a social sympathy toward other humans; we are, in other words, naturally responsive to the passions of others. This “social sympathy in human nature� explains why we deem virtuous that which promotes human happiness and vicious that which impedes it; at the same time, it also accounts for why social utility is the standard in view of which we evaluate moral actions and attitudes. As Hume explains, “in all determinations of morality, this circumstance of public utility is ever principally in view.� In circumstances in which “the bounds of duty� are unclear, we must discern which course of action promotes “the true interests of mankind� (19). As a rule, then, Hume claims that moral responsibility—i.e. what we owe one another—is proportionate with public utility that notably extends to all of humanity. This idea, of course, would soon become the basis for what we now know as utilitarianism.
Hume therefore offers a naturalistic account of morality insofar as he claims humans have natural sympathy vis-a-vis the pleasures and pains of other humans. To esteem what is socially beneficial and disapprove of what is socially harmful is an essential and universal element of human nature. Importantly, for Hume, our natural social sympathy is not ultimately rooted in self-love or self-interest. He rejects the thesis that we have this sympathy because we realize that we cannot live without human society, and so we feel affection toward that which promotes it in the hope that we may enjoy its benefits ourselves. Like a scientist, he points to specific instances in which this explanation does not hold: we frequently act in accordance with the common interest yet contrary to our individual interests or desires. Moreover, there are several dispositions like benevolence, friendship, and compassion whose “causes, effects, objects, and operations� are plainly differentiated “from those of the selfish passions.� To assert that benevolent actions toward others are most basically motivated by self-love would require needless philosophical contortions “to establish so extraordinary a paradox� (90). Hume claims that while our natural sympathy does not always and everywhere overpower our equally natural self-concern, it does exert its influence over our attitudes and behaviors and, on account of our social nature, likewise inflects commonly shared assumptions about what constitutes virtue and vice. In fact, “the intercourse of sentiments . . . in society and conversation� helps form an “unalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of characters and manners”—a standard which, he insists, sufficiently serves “all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools� (49).
The Enquiry, despite its amiable tone and endorsement of what amounts to a fairly conventional set of moral norms, was a revolutionary text in its time. God, for example, is entirely absent from Hume’s moral theory, and Hume’s claim about our natural sociability effectively denies the Fall. For Hume, we are in some sense still in the Garden of Eden, naturally sympathetic toward other humans whose happiness we take pleasure in and whose misery causes us pain. Yet however attractive this common sense portrait of morality may be, it does fail to address several desiderata. For instance, Hume seems unconcerned with the interrelation between sentiment, which motivates us to moral action, and reason, which serves sentiment; he offers no concept, like the will, which connects the two. The concept of public utility or the common interest, upon which so much of Hume’s moral theory rests, is likewise underdeveloped: how do we know whether some action or attitude promotes public utility without a more robust explanation of what it is? On the same token, Hume’s claim that “the true interests of mankind� should be the standard to adjudicate conflicts of duties implausibly presumes that we know what the true interests of humanity are and that we can understand the relation between any action or attitude and these interests. Finally, we may also call into question Hume’s universalistic claims: should we really be so certain that social sympathy is an essential and inextricable element of human nature as Hume insists? This last concern points to a broader, more fundamental worry about Hume’s empirical method: one counter-example would undermine the conclusions arrived at by his inductive approach.
If sentiment provides the basis on which we make moral evaluations, it also serves an important epistemic function. For Hume, we know moral truths not via the mediation of reason, but directly via our sentiments—i.e. by whether we approve or disapprove of certain actions or attitudes. We take pleasure in what is virtuous because it is socially beneficial, and we are repulsed by what is vicious because it is harmful to the common interest. Likewise, sentiment—and not reason—provides us with the motivation for moral action: we desire to live virtuously either because it offers immediate pleasure or because it promotes public utility, in which we also take pleasure on account of our natural sociability.
The relationship between sentiment, or the pleasure we take in the estimable qualities associated with virtue, and public utility is critically important for Hume. He claims that we denominate those qualities of mind associated with virtue as virtuous on account of their usefulness to society, and that we have a natural, and not merely customary affection for what promotes social utility and thereby human happiness. Here, Hume introduces a central premise to his moral theory. We take pleasure in human happiness, he claims, because humans have, on account of their universal nature, a social sympathy toward other humans; we are, in other words, naturally responsive to the passions of others. This “social sympathy in human nature� explains why we deem virtuous that which promotes human happiness and vicious that which impedes it; at the same time, it also accounts for why social utility is the standard in view of which we evaluate moral actions and attitudes. As Hume explains, “in all determinations of morality, this circumstance of public utility is ever principally in view.� In circumstances in which “the bounds of duty� are unclear, we must discern which course of action promotes “the true interests of mankind� (19). As a rule, then, Hume claims that moral responsibility—i.e. what we owe one another—is proportionate with public utility that notably extends to all of humanity. This idea, of course, would soon become the basis for what we now know as utilitarianism.
Hume therefore offers a naturalistic account of morality insofar as he claims humans have natural sympathy vis-a-vis the pleasures and pains of other humans. To esteem what is socially beneficial and disapprove of what is socially harmful is an essential and universal element of human nature. Importantly, for Hume, our natural social sympathy is not ultimately rooted in self-love or self-interest. He rejects the thesis that we have this sympathy because we realize that we cannot live without human society, and so we feel affection toward that which promotes it in the hope that we may enjoy its benefits ourselves. Like a scientist, he points to specific instances in which this explanation does not hold: we frequently act in accordance with the common interest yet contrary to our individual interests or desires. Moreover, there are several dispositions like benevolence, friendship, and compassion whose “causes, effects, objects, and operations� are plainly differentiated “from those of the selfish passions.� To assert that benevolent actions toward others are most basically motivated by self-love would require needless philosophical contortions “to establish so extraordinary a paradox� (90). Hume claims that while our natural sympathy does not always and everywhere overpower our equally natural self-concern, it does exert its influence over our attitudes and behaviors and, on account of our social nature, likewise inflects commonly shared assumptions about what constitutes virtue and vice. In fact, “the intercourse of sentiments . . . in society and conversation� helps form an “unalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of characters and manners”—a standard which, he insists, sufficiently serves “all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools� (49).
The Enquiry, despite its amiable tone and endorsement of what amounts to a fairly conventional set of moral norms, was a revolutionary text in its time. God, for example, is entirely absent from Hume’s moral theory, and Hume’s claim about our natural sociability effectively denies the Fall. For Hume, we are in some sense still in the Garden of Eden, naturally sympathetic toward other humans whose happiness we take pleasure in and whose misery causes us pain. Yet however attractive this common sense portrait of morality may be, it does fail to address several desiderata. For instance, Hume seems unconcerned with the interrelation between sentiment, which motivates us to moral action, and reason, which serves sentiment; he offers no concept, like the will, which connects the two. The concept of public utility or the common interest, upon which so much of Hume’s moral theory rests, is likewise underdeveloped: how do we know whether some action or attitude promotes public utility without a more robust explanation of what it is? On the same token, Hume’s claim that “the true interests of mankind� should be the standard to adjudicate conflicts of duties implausibly presumes that we know what the true interests of humanity are and that we can understand the relation between any action or attitude and these interests. Finally, we may also call into question Hume’s universalistic claims: should we really be so certain that social sympathy is an essential and inextricable element of human nature as Hume insists? This last concern points to a broader, more fundamental worry about Hume’s empirical method: one counter-example would undermine the conclusions arrived at by his inductive approach.
November 9, 2016
Good God. David Hume is amazing. I think he must be the sanest, most reasonable, engaging, penetrating writer I have ever read. Reading him is like reading to flashes of lightning. With each flash, an idea is revealed and you are left wondering why someone hadn't see it before: it is all so clear and obvious.
In this book Hume lays the foundations for what Bentham would later turn into Utilitarianism, but that doesn't really capture the heart of it: Hume recognizes that the bedrock of our behavior is human sentiment, and that sentiments, when attached to reason, serve to enforce our communal moral nature. Put another way, our reason is grounded in our sentiments, and that combination of reason grounded in sentiment is the basis of morality. And that's that!
In this book Hume lays the foundations for what Bentham would later turn into Utilitarianism, but that doesn't really capture the heart of it: Hume recognizes that the bedrock of our behavior is human sentiment, and that sentiments, when attached to reason, serve to enforce our communal moral nature. Put another way, our reason is grounded in our sentiments, and that combination of reason grounded in sentiment is the basis of morality. And that's that!
February 22, 2016
Hume applies the scientific method to morality, looking at a case-by-case basis. Nietzsche and future moral thinkers certainly resonated with Hume's theory that it is emotion which determines moral judgment. A contemporary reader might think his conclusions to be truisms, but the philosophical climate in Hume's lifetime ensured that his work would be consistently controversial and original.
September 28, 2016
Ridiculous. How convenient that the best customs and habits are exactly those Hume finds most pleasing. The arch skeptic in his works on metaphysics and science, becomes the arch conservative in a book devoid of even an iota of cultural skepticism.
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