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The Knowledge Machine: How Irrationality Created Modern Science
� Why is science so powerful?
� Why did it take so long—two thousand years after the invention of philosophy and mathematics—for the human race to start using science to learn the secrets of the universe?
In a groundbreaking work that blends science, philosophy, and history, leading philosopher of science Michael Strevens answers these challenging questions, showing how science came about only once thinkers stumbled upon the astonishing idea that scientific breakthroughs could be accomplished by breaking the rules of logical argument.
Like such classic works as Karl Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery and Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The Knowledge Machine grapples with the meaning and origins of science, using a plethora of vivid historical examples to demonstrate that scientists willfully ignore religion, theoretical beauty, and even philosophy to embrace a constricted code of argument whose very narrowness channels unprecedented energy into empirical observation and experimentation. Strevens calls this scientific code the iron rule of explanation, and reveals the way in which the rule, precisely because it is unreasonably close-minded, overcomes individual prejudices to lead humanity inexorably toward the secrets of nature.
“With a mixture of philosophical and historical argument, and written in an engrossing style� (Alan Ryan), The Knowledge Machine provides captivating portraits of some of the greatest luminaries in science’s history, including Isaac Newton, the chief architect of modern science and its foundational theories of motion and gravitation; William Whewell, perhaps the greatest philosopher-scientist of the early nineteenth century; and Murray Gell-Mann, discoverer of the quark. Today, Strevens argues, in the face of threats from a changing climate and global pandemics, the idiosyncratic but highly effective scientific knowledge machine must be protected from politicians, commercial interests, and even scientists themselves who seek to open it up, to make it less narrow and more rational—and thus to undermine its devotedly empirical search for truth.
Rich with illuminating and often delightfully quirky illustrations, The Knowledge Machine, written in a winningly accessible style that belies the import of its revisionist and groundbreaking concepts, radically reframes much of what we thought we knew about the origins of the modern world.
� Why did it take so long—two thousand years after the invention of philosophy and mathematics—for the human race to start using science to learn the secrets of the universe?
In a groundbreaking work that blends science, philosophy, and history, leading philosopher of science Michael Strevens answers these challenging questions, showing how science came about only once thinkers stumbled upon the astonishing idea that scientific breakthroughs could be accomplished by breaking the rules of logical argument.
Like such classic works as Karl Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery and Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The Knowledge Machine grapples with the meaning and origins of science, using a plethora of vivid historical examples to demonstrate that scientists willfully ignore religion, theoretical beauty, and even philosophy to embrace a constricted code of argument whose very narrowness channels unprecedented energy into empirical observation and experimentation. Strevens calls this scientific code the iron rule of explanation, and reveals the way in which the rule, precisely because it is unreasonably close-minded, overcomes individual prejudices to lead humanity inexorably toward the secrets of nature.
“With a mixture of philosophical and historical argument, and written in an engrossing style� (Alan Ryan), The Knowledge Machine provides captivating portraits of some of the greatest luminaries in science’s history, including Isaac Newton, the chief architect of modern science and its foundational theories of motion and gravitation; William Whewell, perhaps the greatest philosopher-scientist of the early nineteenth century; and Murray Gell-Mann, discoverer of the quark. Today, Strevens argues, in the face of threats from a changing climate and global pandemics, the idiosyncratic but highly effective scientific knowledge machine must be protected from politicians, commercial interests, and even scientists themselves who seek to open it up, to make it less narrow and more rational—and thus to undermine its devotedly empirical search for truth.
Rich with illuminating and often delightfully quirky illustrations, The Knowledge Machine, written in a winningly accessible style that belies the import of its revisionist and groundbreaking concepts, radically reframes much of what we thought we knew about the origins of the modern world.
368 pages, Hardcover
First published October 13, 2020
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October 28, 2020
This book is maddingly repetitious, but as a retired research biologist of 45 years, it captures the reality of doing science. Once upon a time, I taught a freshman seminar called “Biological Headlines: the science behind the stories�. One group of seminars was based on the idea that science is an unnatural way of thinking. People often draw some “conclusion� from a chance observation or a case history or a correlation, but for science, that “conclusion� has to be empirically tested by “unnatural� means. Science demands repetition, empirical testing from as many directions as possible, probability and statistical measures, percentages and denominators. As Strevens states, “…science is an alien thought form� (p.4).
The oft-repeated essence of Strevens’s discussion is that in science, “Only empirical testing counts�. There can be no appeal to philosophy, religion, beauty, or other non-empirical source. Scientists are free to use those inputs in formulating or discussing ideas, but the only thing that ultimately matters in science is empirical testing.
I began my scientific training a decade after publication of two influential books on the philosophy of science: Karl Popper’s “The Logic of Scientific Discovery� (1959) and Thomas Kuhn’s “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions� (1962). These are Strevers's straw men. I do not remember ever reading those books, but I knew a soundbite for each. For Popper, a hypothesis had to be falsifiable to be a worthy hypothesis. For Kuhn, great advances in science were when a paradigm shift occurred and the entire scientific activity in an area was reformulated. Looking back on my career, neither of these ideas had any influence, and that agrees with Strevens’s thrust that the nub of science is generating empirical results that best explain observations.
If a scientist thinks something is the case, he or she tries to subject it to as many tests as possible. That is not really Popper’s falsification. It is rather the necessity to make as sure as possible that any empirical result will hold up to future scrutiny. As to Kuhn’s paradigm shifts, I do not know what it is like to experience one. In physics, the move from the ether to Einstein’s relativity and on to quantum mechanics is usually cited. In biology, Darwin’s theory of natural selection is cited. Are those the only ones? Have there been any paradigm shifts beyond quantum mechanics in the last century?
I cannot speak to physics. In biology, there have been major discoveries, but do they qualify as paradigm shifts? Even if they did, what of it? Did it matter to the individual investigator? Two major discoveries were Mendel’s inheritance of discrete traits and recognition of DNA as the genetic material. To be sure, investigators asked different questions, but was that a revolution?
My own specialty was developmental biology � how an embryo develops. Major advances were made in the 1980’s when genetics and molecular biology were used to attack long-standing embryological questions. The unexpected result was that animals as diverse as worms, fruit flies, frogs, mice and humans used the same genes to direct the building of their bodies. Once this idea took hold, it became possible to move freely between organisms. Was that a paradigm shift from an earlier expectation that the diversity of animal forms would be reflected by a diversity of genes important in their construction? The result of a common “molecular toolbox� was exciting, but I would not call it a paradigm shift. It felt more like a logical series of steps made possible by new technologies.
The weakness of Strevens’s book is the repetition. It would be nice to see his “iron rule� of empiricism be discussed with more examples, particularly of the last century. This criticism is far outweighed by the strength of Strevens’s analysis. He captures more than Popper or Kuhn the feeling of doing science.
The oft-repeated essence of Strevens’s discussion is that in science, “Only empirical testing counts�. There can be no appeal to philosophy, religion, beauty, or other non-empirical source. Scientists are free to use those inputs in formulating or discussing ideas, but the only thing that ultimately matters in science is empirical testing.
I began my scientific training a decade after publication of two influential books on the philosophy of science: Karl Popper’s “The Logic of Scientific Discovery� (1959) and Thomas Kuhn’s “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions� (1962). These are Strevers's straw men. I do not remember ever reading those books, but I knew a soundbite for each. For Popper, a hypothesis had to be falsifiable to be a worthy hypothesis. For Kuhn, great advances in science were when a paradigm shift occurred and the entire scientific activity in an area was reformulated. Looking back on my career, neither of these ideas had any influence, and that agrees with Strevens’s thrust that the nub of science is generating empirical results that best explain observations.
If a scientist thinks something is the case, he or she tries to subject it to as many tests as possible. That is not really Popper’s falsification. It is rather the necessity to make as sure as possible that any empirical result will hold up to future scrutiny. As to Kuhn’s paradigm shifts, I do not know what it is like to experience one. In physics, the move from the ether to Einstein’s relativity and on to quantum mechanics is usually cited. In biology, Darwin’s theory of natural selection is cited. Are those the only ones? Have there been any paradigm shifts beyond quantum mechanics in the last century?
I cannot speak to physics. In biology, there have been major discoveries, but do they qualify as paradigm shifts? Even if they did, what of it? Did it matter to the individual investigator? Two major discoveries were Mendel’s inheritance of discrete traits and recognition of DNA as the genetic material. To be sure, investigators asked different questions, but was that a revolution?
My own specialty was developmental biology � how an embryo develops. Major advances were made in the 1980’s when genetics and molecular biology were used to attack long-standing embryological questions. The unexpected result was that animals as diverse as worms, fruit flies, frogs, mice and humans used the same genes to direct the building of their bodies. Once this idea took hold, it became possible to move freely between organisms. Was that a paradigm shift from an earlier expectation that the diversity of animal forms would be reflected by a diversity of genes important in their construction? The result of a common “molecular toolbox� was exciting, but I would not call it a paradigm shift. It felt more like a logical series of steps made possible by new technologies.
The weakness of Strevens’s book is the repetition. It would be nice to see his “iron rule� of empiricism be discussed with more examples, particularly of the last century. This criticism is far outweighed by the strength of Strevens’s analysis. He captures more than Popper or Kuhn the feeling of doing science.
November 1, 2020
Unlike the humanities, including philosophy—where the idea of progress is a controversial topic—it is an essentially indisputable fact that science makes considerable progress over time. Why this is the case—and how science actually works—is what Michael Strevens seeks to explain in The Knowledge Machine.
The basic argument is that scientific knowledge grows through the application of the “iron rule of explanation,� as Strevens calls it, that demands that all scientific argument be settled by empirical testing alone, and that the results of empirical testing are to be recorded in formal scientific journals for future reference and use.
The iron rule is peculiar in the sense that it demands adherence to empirical testing and does not consider the relevance or significance of any non-empirical knowledge, whether philosophical, religious, spiritual, or aesthetic. While individual scientists are free to theorize in whatever manner they like—and are swayed by the same philosophical, moral, and political influences and biases as everyone else—the iron rule of explanation guarantees that formal arguments are presented without reference to any of these ancillary considerations.
The net effect of this “procedural consensus,� over time, is what Strevens refers to as “Baconian convergence,� or the idea that repeated empirical testing over time converges on the one theory that best explains all the accumulated data. This is why physicists, over time, have eventually come to accept the legitimacy of the general theory of relativity, for example, whereas a religion like Christianty schisms permanently into a thousand different parts.
The reason for this is that philosophical and theological reasoning, while attempting to be more ambitious and all-encompassing, has no ultimate method of verification or falsification through testing. If I think, as Isaac Newton did, that Jesus was created by God and subordinate to God, whereas you think that Jesus and God are one and the same, how are we supposed to resolve this philosophical difference? I can provide my logical and coherent reasons and you can provide yours—along with our respective interpretations of the relevant scripture—but without a procedural consensus whereby we can ascertain the truth beyond mere logic, there is no way to settle the argument.
On the other hand, if I believe the Newtonian theory of gravity is correct and you believe the Einsteinian theory is correct, we can (if we were capable) settle the dispute by measuring the angle that light is bent by the sun’s gravity during a total solar eclipse, as Arthur Eddington and others did. Newton’s theory predicts one measure; Einstein’s predicts the other. We can both agree to what the measurements will tell us beforehand; then, after the experiment is conducted and the measurements are verified, we can settle the dispute.
Of course, as Strevens points out, it’s not exactly this simple. An individual scientist must still engage in “plausibility rankings� and determine how to weigh conflicting evidence. There is a strong element of subjectivity in the interpretation of evidence and the process is far from completely objective. But the main reason why science is effective is not due to the unwavering rationality of any individual scientist; rather, it is attributable to the process of several scientists over time abiding to the iron rule of explanation—and publishing detailed empirical findings—that allows the process of convergence to occur over time and the correct theory to materialize. This is why science advances, and why we are now able to launch satellites into space and communicate with each other around the globe electronically at the speed of light.
So far, so good, but why did the iron rule of explanation—which has proven to be so effective—take humanity so long to develop? Why did it develop in 17th-century Europe and not, for example, in ancient Greece or China? The reason is, according to Strevens, that the iron rule is, at bottom, irrational. It asks the practicing scientist to effectively ignore all other forms of human inquiry that is not strictly empirical. This would have seemed absurd, especially in ancient Greece, the birthplace of philosophy, or in Medieval Europe, obsessed with theology as it was. To give up all philosophical and theological reasoning in the attempt to explain how the world works was too radical an idea for most times and places.
This is why science had to wait for the peculiar historical and cultural circumstances of early modern Europe. Only then, and only over time, did it begin to make paradoxical sense that knowledge of the world can only grow by significantly limiting its scope to empirical testing and data alone. Since then, the iron rule of explanation and its procedural consensus has resulted in Baconian convergence and a growing and sophisticated understanding of the workings of the world.
Strevens, I think, has hit on something profound in this book, and his explanation for how science works is ultimately convincing. However, I take some issue with the title of the book and on his calling the process of scientific discovery irrational.
The iron rule is not, in itself, irrational; its tremendous success over the last few hundred years should attest to that. By limiting scientific argument to empirical data alone, our knowledge of the world has increased astronomically in a short period of time.
The irrationality, then, does not lie in the iron rule itself; rather, it lies in the belief that the iron rule applies to problems outside the realm of science. If you believe that philosophical, ethical, and political problems can be solved with empirical argument alone, then yes, your overextension of the iron rule is indeed irrational.
But if you limit the scope of the iron rule to scientific, empirical problems, then there is nothing irrational about the rule because there is nothing in the rule that says you cannot compartmentalize scientific problems. Isaac Newton should have demonstrated this; he abided by the iron rule in his scientific work while simultaneously pursuing other philosophical and mystical pursuits. There is nothing irrational about this. The irrationality, rather, comes from someone like Stephen Hawking, who said that “philosophy is dead� because he couldn’t apply the iron rule to philosophical problems—problems it is not meant to address.
There is no “theory of everything�; reality is complex, like a six-sided cube you cannot view all from the same perspective. Different problem types require different approaches, and science has developed, according to the iron rule, its own successful approach. Philosophical, historical, ethical, legal, and political problems all have their approaches as well, and, while they all influence each other, no single domain has authority over all the others.
Science has simply limited its scope to empirical testing to solve certain kinds of problems. While the scientist that thinks this particular approach can solve all types of problems is certainly irrational, scientific problem solving, led by the iron rule, is not.
The basic argument is that scientific knowledge grows through the application of the “iron rule of explanation,� as Strevens calls it, that demands that all scientific argument be settled by empirical testing alone, and that the results of empirical testing are to be recorded in formal scientific journals for future reference and use.
The iron rule is peculiar in the sense that it demands adherence to empirical testing and does not consider the relevance or significance of any non-empirical knowledge, whether philosophical, religious, spiritual, or aesthetic. While individual scientists are free to theorize in whatever manner they like—and are swayed by the same philosophical, moral, and political influences and biases as everyone else—the iron rule of explanation guarantees that formal arguments are presented without reference to any of these ancillary considerations.
The net effect of this “procedural consensus,� over time, is what Strevens refers to as “Baconian convergence,� or the idea that repeated empirical testing over time converges on the one theory that best explains all the accumulated data. This is why physicists, over time, have eventually come to accept the legitimacy of the general theory of relativity, for example, whereas a religion like Christianty schisms permanently into a thousand different parts.
The reason for this is that philosophical and theological reasoning, while attempting to be more ambitious and all-encompassing, has no ultimate method of verification or falsification through testing. If I think, as Isaac Newton did, that Jesus was created by God and subordinate to God, whereas you think that Jesus and God are one and the same, how are we supposed to resolve this philosophical difference? I can provide my logical and coherent reasons and you can provide yours—along with our respective interpretations of the relevant scripture—but without a procedural consensus whereby we can ascertain the truth beyond mere logic, there is no way to settle the argument.
On the other hand, if I believe the Newtonian theory of gravity is correct and you believe the Einsteinian theory is correct, we can (if we were capable) settle the dispute by measuring the angle that light is bent by the sun’s gravity during a total solar eclipse, as Arthur Eddington and others did. Newton’s theory predicts one measure; Einstein’s predicts the other. We can both agree to what the measurements will tell us beforehand; then, after the experiment is conducted and the measurements are verified, we can settle the dispute.
Of course, as Strevens points out, it’s not exactly this simple. An individual scientist must still engage in “plausibility rankings� and determine how to weigh conflicting evidence. There is a strong element of subjectivity in the interpretation of evidence and the process is far from completely objective. But the main reason why science is effective is not due to the unwavering rationality of any individual scientist; rather, it is attributable to the process of several scientists over time abiding to the iron rule of explanation—and publishing detailed empirical findings—that allows the process of convergence to occur over time and the correct theory to materialize. This is why science advances, and why we are now able to launch satellites into space and communicate with each other around the globe electronically at the speed of light.
So far, so good, but why did the iron rule of explanation—which has proven to be so effective—take humanity so long to develop? Why did it develop in 17th-century Europe and not, for example, in ancient Greece or China? The reason is, according to Strevens, that the iron rule is, at bottom, irrational. It asks the practicing scientist to effectively ignore all other forms of human inquiry that is not strictly empirical. This would have seemed absurd, especially in ancient Greece, the birthplace of philosophy, or in Medieval Europe, obsessed with theology as it was. To give up all philosophical and theological reasoning in the attempt to explain how the world works was too radical an idea for most times and places.
This is why science had to wait for the peculiar historical and cultural circumstances of early modern Europe. Only then, and only over time, did it begin to make paradoxical sense that knowledge of the world can only grow by significantly limiting its scope to empirical testing and data alone. Since then, the iron rule of explanation and its procedural consensus has resulted in Baconian convergence and a growing and sophisticated understanding of the workings of the world.
Strevens, I think, has hit on something profound in this book, and his explanation for how science works is ultimately convincing. However, I take some issue with the title of the book and on his calling the process of scientific discovery irrational.
The iron rule is not, in itself, irrational; its tremendous success over the last few hundred years should attest to that. By limiting scientific argument to empirical data alone, our knowledge of the world has increased astronomically in a short period of time.
The irrationality, then, does not lie in the iron rule itself; rather, it lies in the belief that the iron rule applies to problems outside the realm of science. If you believe that philosophical, ethical, and political problems can be solved with empirical argument alone, then yes, your overextension of the iron rule is indeed irrational.
But if you limit the scope of the iron rule to scientific, empirical problems, then there is nothing irrational about the rule because there is nothing in the rule that says you cannot compartmentalize scientific problems. Isaac Newton should have demonstrated this; he abided by the iron rule in his scientific work while simultaneously pursuing other philosophical and mystical pursuits. There is nothing irrational about this. The irrationality, rather, comes from someone like Stephen Hawking, who said that “philosophy is dead� because he couldn’t apply the iron rule to philosophical problems—problems it is not meant to address.
There is no “theory of everything�; reality is complex, like a six-sided cube you cannot view all from the same perspective. Different problem types require different approaches, and science has developed, according to the iron rule, its own successful approach. Philosophical, historical, ethical, legal, and political problems all have their approaches as well, and, while they all influence each other, no single domain has authority over all the others.
Science has simply limited its scope to empirical testing to solve certain kinds of problems. While the scientist that thinks this particular approach can solve all types of problems is certainly irrational, scientific problem solving, led by the iron rule, is not.
January 25, 2021
Author Strevens is an academic philosopher of science. In this book he takes on Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn as regards our understanding of 'science', as it is actually practiced versus how such as they have conceptualized it. Here one might simplifyingly characterize Popper as tending towards idealization, Kuhn towards criticism. Strevens' own approach is to focus on the scientific practices that have actually increased human understanding and achievement, science that works, and, so doing, to recognize its essential character as narrowly and painstakingly empirical, eschewing ideologies and philosophies, ethics and aesthetics--at least in the domain of professional communications. This is the 'irrationality' of the book's subtitle.
My own take on all of this is to agree that modern science, so conceived, is, like he writes, 'a knowledge machine', just like modern capitalism is a wealth-generating machine--and that both of them are monstrously powerful. Strevens acknowledges this, recognizing that we're on a path to utter destruction while hoping that the 'golem' of modern science may afford the means to preserve civilization. However, he does not much discuss how many of the problems we face are themselves consequences of the sciences we practice.
Other than that I found the book to be very repetitive. Perhaps, not being a philosopher of science, I missed a lot of his subtle references. I've only read one book apiece of Popper and of Kuhn, and those long ago. In any case, his main point might have been handled far more concisely. Still, it was an easy, though somewhat boring after a while, read.
My own take on all of this is to agree that modern science, so conceived, is, like he writes, 'a knowledge machine', just like modern capitalism is a wealth-generating machine--and that both of them are monstrously powerful. Strevens acknowledges this, recognizing that we're on a path to utter destruction while hoping that the 'golem' of modern science may afford the means to preserve civilization. However, he does not much discuss how many of the problems we face are themselves consequences of the sciences we practice.
Other than that I found the book to be very repetitive. Perhaps, not being a philosopher of science, I missed a lot of his subtle references. I've only read one book apiece of Popper and of Kuhn, and those long ago. In any case, his main point might have been handled far more concisely. Still, it was an easy, though somewhat boring after a while, read.
September 8, 2023
The subject of this book is the philosophy of science, and it goes on to try to explain why it took so long for human civilization to develop the “iron rule� that made it possible. The iron rule is the requirement that all scientific arguments be settled by empirical testing. But in addition to the empirical testing it is also required that any discussion of causal reasoning or scientific argument be free of all subjective considerations and non empirical considerations (philosophical, religious, aesthetic).
It is this secondary requirement in addition to the requirement of empirical testing that goes against human nature, and is the irrationality referenced in the book’s subtitle. The human mind naturally wants to use its reasoning to make sense of the world, but science forbids trying to use logic to explain why.
Also part of the scientific process is the sharing of the results of empirical testing for others to check or falsify. Along the way theories and hypotheses may be proposed and will eventually converge to a general consensus. This convergence is referred to in this book as the Baconian convergence. Francis Bacon in his seminal work set out the basis of the .
As this book elaborates on the philosophy of science it covers and describes considerable science history. As far as the philosophy part goes, this author claims to be presenting a new—even revolutionary—philosophy that steers a course somewhere between that of and . The author wraps things up as follows:
It is this secondary requirement in addition to the requirement of empirical testing that goes against human nature, and is the irrationality referenced in the book’s subtitle. The human mind naturally wants to use its reasoning to make sense of the world, but science forbids trying to use logic to explain why.
Also part of the scientific process is the sharing of the results of empirical testing for others to check or falsify. Along the way theories and hypotheses may be proposed and will eventually converge to a general consensus. This convergence is referred to in this book as the Baconian convergence. Francis Bacon in his seminal work set out the basis of the .
As this book elaborates on the philosophy of science it covers and describes considerable science history. As far as the philosophy part goes, this author claims to be presenting a new—even revolutionary—philosophy that steers a course somewhere between that of and . The author wraps things up as follows:
SO MUCH FOR THE old methodists, Popper and Kuhn. The new methodism proposed in “The Knowledge Machine� suggests three essential ingredients for a thriving science.In the following excerpt the author comes close to being poetic in describing the slow adoption by human civilization of science.
The first is fighting spirit. I don't mean Popper's critical spirit, scrutinizing the theoretical landscape from disinterested logical heights. What I have in mind is in far more plentiful supply: partial, self-interested ambition. Such ambition need not be low-minded; its interest in seeking out the truth and advancing human happiness may well be sincere. Nor need it be combative or mean—a great athlete can be full of grace. But it must be ready to play the game to win.
The fighting spirit must then be caged within the iron rule. The nature of the game is thus defined: from its players it will elicit the kind of evidence—arduous and expensive to produce—that hones the knowledge machine's sharp edge, and it will store that evidence securely for thinkers in the centuries ahead. The human race provides fighting spirit in abundance; the iron rule, by contrast, was hard to come by, because its demands are to all appearances contrary to reason. Indeed, as revealed by its war on theoretical beauty, they are in the fullest sense irrational. Nevertheless, the rule's dominion over all forms of inquiry into nature is now well established. "Only empirical tenting count." has come to feel normal, even rather boring.
Perhaps a little too boring. Thus, the third and last of the knowledge machine's needs, which might also be the most difficult, in our day, to satisfy. It is to leave science alone, that is, to resist the urge to tinker, to make science more current, more flexible, or, for that matter, more sensible. (p.283-284)
The Knowledge Machine opened in the darkness of prehistory. Civilization’s sun rose, bringing literature and law, temple domes and proscenium arches, and the more abstract pleasures of mathematics and philosophy. Science's sun, meanwhile, remained deep below the horizon. To one surveying the cultures of the ancient world, there was no glimmer to suggest that anything like modern science would arise. So it continued for centuries, millennia. Empires came and went; each left its enduring aesthetic and intellectual gifts to humankind, but there was no science.
At a stroke, the Scientific Revolution changed everything. Science's sun seemed to have appeared, not on the horizon, but at its zenith, as the fierce genius of Newton and his lieutenants glistered in the heavens. It burned far hotter than had even the sun of civilization. Our sultry, teeming, denatured planet is its consequence—as are our increasingly long, comfortable, amusing lives. (p.289-290)
January 10, 2023
This is a passionate, convincing defense of the scientific method, or more specifically what Strevens calls the “iron rule,� defined operationally as a rule which “directs scientists to resolve their differences of opinion by conducting empirical tests rather than by shouting or fighting or philosophizing or moralizing or marrying or calling on a higher power.� p.88
Stevens provides an examination of the origin and historical development of the “iron rule� as well as explaining its crucial importance to the advancement of knowledge. The double-edged nature of the scientific method (as both the bane as well as the savior of humanity) is acknowledged and discussed.
In sum, this is a well-written book—although Strevens is preaching to the choir. If you are already an advocate of the practice of evidence-based science, you will find little to disagree with here.
Stevens provides an examination of the origin and historical development of the “iron rule� as well as explaining its crucial importance to the advancement of knowledge. The double-edged nature of the scientific method (as both the bane as well as the savior of humanity) is acknowledged and discussed.
In sum, this is a well-written book—although Strevens is preaching to the choir. If you are already an advocate of the practice of evidence-based science, you will find little to disagree with here.
February 25, 2021
Not good. He attempts to talk about the scientific revolution and scientific method with intelligence, but he only talks about it. He starts by talking about the different ideas of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, but he then quickly messes up by trying to apply both of them to the full area of science discovery and explanation rather than admitting it really is two haves.
The working of the scientific method is about looking at a theory, trying to disprove it, and using evidence to show if there's a failure. Evidence is all that matters. Explaining the results is where opinion impacts things, since scientists are also human. The two halves are clearly marked. It's why, in this pandemic time, Astra-Zeneka can make a claim, but they had to provide all the data and other folks found problems with the opinion about the result.
As long as we understand people are people (and that shouldn't be difficult), and as long as the data is always open to review, there's no need to claim the scientific method is a failure because of the second half.
I think it ignorance is best shown when he's muttering about philosophies towards the end. While talking about how scientists mostly think philosophy has no place in science, he types "An inability to think outside the box funnels all of a scientist's mental and physical and emotional energy into the box itself." How moronic.
First, scientists think outside the box. That's how they are able to create specific hypothesis to check to see if a theory is valid. Second, that they only look at empirical evidence during the research doesn't obviate an opportunity to invent reasons, or even excuses, for evidence they like or dislike. Third, that a scientist is rigid during experimentation says nothing about their lives outside the experiment, and "inability" is insulting and ignorant.
Finally, he seems to be stating that it's irrational to ignore the irrationality of religion and non-experimental reasoning of philosophy when experimenting. What a surprise, he has it backwards.
Avoid this book
The working of the scientific method is about looking at a theory, trying to disprove it, and using evidence to show if there's a failure. Evidence is all that matters. Explaining the results is where opinion impacts things, since scientists are also human. The two halves are clearly marked. It's why, in this pandemic time, Astra-Zeneka can make a claim, but they had to provide all the data and other folks found problems with the opinion about the result.
As long as we understand people are people (and that shouldn't be difficult), and as long as the data is always open to review, there's no need to claim the scientific method is a failure because of the second half.
I think it ignorance is best shown when he's muttering about philosophies towards the end. While talking about how scientists mostly think philosophy has no place in science, he types "An inability to think outside the box funnels all of a scientist's mental and physical and emotional energy into the box itself." How moronic.
First, scientists think outside the box. That's how they are able to create specific hypothesis to check to see if a theory is valid. Second, that they only look at empirical evidence during the research doesn't obviate an opportunity to invent reasons, or even excuses, for evidence they like or dislike. Third, that a scientist is rigid during experimentation says nothing about their lives outside the experiment, and "inability" is insulting and ignorant.
Finally, he seems to be stating that it's irrational to ignore the irrationality of religion and non-experimental reasoning of philosophy when experimenting. What a surprise, he has it backwards.
Avoid this book
April 30, 2024
3.5
Chock-full of truly precious insights, but at times Strevens sacrifices clarity for the sake of making bombastic-sounding claims regarding the "irrationality" of the scientific method, the (justified) "unreasonableness" of its rejection of beauty as a sound criterion of investigation, or the fact that the knowledge machine "is not a nigh expression of what is humanly good." With the possible exception of the last (I'm still not quite sure of what that passage is actually meant to express), the other points are in fact perfectly sound, and wouldn't seem controversial at all if Strevens had laid spectacularity aside and stuck to plain argumentation.
All in all, an enlightening but flawed book.
Chock-full of truly precious insights, but at times Strevens sacrifices clarity for the sake of making bombastic-sounding claims regarding the "irrationality" of the scientific method, the (justified) "unreasonableness" of its rejection of beauty as a sound criterion of investigation, or the fact that the knowledge machine "is not a nigh expression of what is humanly good." With the possible exception of the last (I'm still not quite sure of what that passage is actually meant to express), the other points are in fact perfectly sound, and wouldn't seem controversial at all if Strevens had laid spectacularity aside and stuck to plain argumentation.
All in all, an enlightening but flawed book.
December 9, 2022
نویسنده حرفهای نامربوط زیادی زده که البته بر او حرجی نیست. او فلسفهخواندها� است که با علوم طبیعی آشنایی ندارد و تنها چیزکی که از متدولوژی این علوم میداند� از پوپر و کوئن یاد گرفته و خب به سیاق آکادمیسینها� فلسفه� علم در باتلاق مهملبافیها� فایرابند هم زیاد دستوپ� زده. در نهایت تنها حرف درستی که زده هم چیز جدیدی نیست: فرانسوا جیکب، بیولوژیست و نوبلیست فرانسوی، خیلی پیشتر با مفهوم "علم شبانه" و "علم روزانه" کشف کشاف نویسنده را به شکل تمیزتری بیان کرده بود
April 29, 2021
Good explanation of what science *is* and is *not* and speculations about why it developed in Europe 500 years ago and not some other place or time. He talks about Kuhn and Popper, agrees with some of their theories and disputes others. For a book about science it’s pretty flowery and poetic - well done but sometimes I wished he were a little more direct.
February 13, 2022
I have read Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend and thought all of them were brilliant, with each of them having deep insights about the process and development of science but somehow with each of them missing something. Popper's ideas seemed to be too neat and simple. Kuhn was imposing an overall structure that seemed to ignore a lot of messy details, and Feyerabend was so caught up in the messiness of the details that it no longer felt like a good explanation of why science has worked so well for the past few centuries. Mr. Strevens takes us another step forward, though I'm not sure that he has enough of a synthesis to bring us to a complete theory.
I liked his idea of the "Iron Rule" that disagreements are addressed by experimentation designed to show which approach to a problem is correct. And even more I liked the idea that much of the success of science comes from focusing on simple explanations that are considered sufficient if they work without regard to the deep underlying mechanisms or causes. This allows the scientist to put aside religion and philosophy as realms that pose questions that science does not purport to answer, so science can advance based on ever better theories that correspond to observation. As Mr. Strevens points out this is actually a dumbing down of explanatory tools, a conscious decision to reject the methods of analysis that scientists, theologists and philosophers had found to be essential for two thousand years. Another thing I liked was the idea that much of great science comes from people who ignore these "rules," who fudge their data or have interpretive biases that don't correspond to reason or who develop theories based on philosophical or religious ideas that supposedly have been eliminated from the scientific method. The salvation of science comes from repeated testing over time with better and better experiments and in putting theories that have an irrational basis into the meat grinder of experimentation until they are accepted on account of repeated supporting evidence and predictive success or are proved false.
So there is a lot of smart stuff here, but lots left to think about and much more to be revealed in the philosophy and history of science.
I liked his idea of the "Iron Rule" that disagreements are addressed by experimentation designed to show which approach to a problem is correct. And even more I liked the idea that much of the success of science comes from focusing on simple explanations that are considered sufficient if they work without regard to the deep underlying mechanisms or causes. This allows the scientist to put aside religion and philosophy as realms that pose questions that science does not purport to answer, so science can advance based on ever better theories that correspond to observation. As Mr. Strevens points out this is actually a dumbing down of explanatory tools, a conscious decision to reject the methods of analysis that scientists, theologists and philosophers had found to be essential for two thousand years. Another thing I liked was the idea that much of great science comes from people who ignore these "rules," who fudge their data or have interpretive biases that don't correspond to reason or who develop theories based on philosophical or religious ideas that supposedly have been eliminated from the scientific method. The salvation of science comes from repeated testing over time with better and better experiments and in putting theories that have an irrational basis into the meat grinder of experimentation until they are accepted on account of repeated supporting evidence and predictive success or are proved false.
So there is a lot of smart stuff here, but lots left to think about and much more to be revealed in the philosophy and history of science.
November 26, 2020
Not one woman in all of the history of science? 4 stars
April 22, 2024
I won't delve into the content but will say this: his writing is just so beautiful. Only on that merit, it ought to be read, even if you are entirely disinterested on the matter or if a superficial glance indicates your possible disagreement with the author.
P.s: Even if modern science, as we know it, required a war on beauty to be waged, the understanding of its social, political and historical determinants certainly does not.
P.s: Even if modern science, as we know it, required a war on beauty to be waged, the understanding of its social, political and historical determinants certainly does not.
August 5, 2021
Summary: Mostly useful for scientists as a great starting point for thinking explicitly about why we do science the way we do.
This book sets out to answer two questions - why does science work? and why did it take people so long to start using the current scientific method? I wasn't thrilled by this pick from my science nonfiction book club. I love learning new scientific information and this meta approach to the topic didn't appeal to me. Although I still certainly don't agree with everything the author had to say, I ended up enjoying the book a lot. As a scientist, I found it a useful prompt to evaluate how I approach my work.
I thought the most interesting question the author asked was about why science works at all. Theoretically, scientists are supposed to objective. Realistically, it's impossible for people to set aside all subjectivity in their work. He makes explicit that where objectivity is truly required is in professional communication. He makes a great analogy between science and a coral reef. In this analogy, the living, messy surface is the science being done now. The skeleton of the reef is all that objective data we record and leave behind for future generations to build on. Science can then converge on the right answer through this slow accretion of knowledge.
Other parts of the book felt obvious to me, such as the author's definition of science as an evidence-based pursuit. He tried to set this up as a brilliant new idea, but I think this is how most scientists would define what we do. Although he tries to make this book general enough to capture all fields of science, he's clearly focused primarily on physics. In particular, he places a real emphasis on the goal of deriving models and equations that are consistent with existing data. He insists that having an explanation or mechanism for why something happens isn't important. This view doesn't apply as well to biology. For example, Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier are the ones who got the Noble Prize for CIRSPR because they're the ones who showed how it worked. Last but not least, as a scientist, his final section about how scientists these days don't know anything about the humanities was kind of offensive. I took art, philosophy, and literature classes in under grad and I'm one of many scientists I know with a humanities based hobby.
Despite some limitations, this book was really thought provoking. I think the author correctly identifies enough fundamental aspects of how science works that it could be of interest to a general audience. However, I definitely found it most useful as a prompt to consider how I do science, so I'd primarily recommend it to other scientists.
This book sets out to answer two questions - why does science work? and why did it take people so long to start using the current scientific method? I wasn't thrilled by this pick from my science nonfiction book club. I love learning new scientific information and this meta approach to the topic didn't appeal to me. Although I still certainly don't agree with everything the author had to say, I ended up enjoying the book a lot. As a scientist, I found it a useful prompt to evaluate how I approach my work.
I thought the most interesting question the author asked was about why science works at all. Theoretically, scientists are supposed to objective. Realistically, it's impossible for people to set aside all subjectivity in their work. He makes explicit that where objectivity is truly required is in professional communication. He makes a great analogy between science and a coral reef. In this analogy, the living, messy surface is the science being done now. The skeleton of the reef is all that objective data we record and leave behind for future generations to build on. Science can then converge on the right answer through this slow accretion of knowledge.
Other parts of the book felt obvious to me, such as the author's definition of science as an evidence-based pursuit. He tried to set this up as a brilliant new idea, but I think this is how most scientists would define what we do. Although he tries to make this book general enough to capture all fields of science, he's clearly focused primarily on physics. In particular, he places a real emphasis on the goal of deriving models and equations that are consistent with existing data. He insists that having an explanation or mechanism for why something happens isn't important. This view doesn't apply as well to biology. For example, Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier are the ones who got the Noble Prize for CIRSPR because they're the ones who showed how it worked. Last but not least, as a scientist, his final section about how scientists these days don't know anything about the humanities was kind of offensive. I took art, philosophy, and literature classes in under grad and I'm one of many scientists I know with a humanities based hobby.
Despite some limitations, this book was really thought provoking. I think the author correctly identifies enough fundamental aspects of how science works that it could be of interest to a general audience. However, I definitely found it most useful as a prompt to consider how I do science, so I'd primarily recommend it to other scientists.
September 16, 2020
Thanks, NetGalley, authors, and publishers, for the opportunity to review this work of art on science history, philosophy, and, as a matter of fact, knowledge generation principles.
This is a fundamental work on science philosophy & history, providing insights on powers propelling & determining scientific research and scientific idea generation, as well as powers that are challenging and stopping us, human scientists ( with all our human flows and ways of thinking).
In this work, the author presents the main and widely accepted scientific rules that are used for falsification and/or acceptance of the hypothesis, represents two main ways of scientific thinking and roles, that scientists ( and their minds) play in global academia, and does an amazing job equally accepting and rejecting both.
Science, being a "brainchild" of certain people, is certainly influenced by the era when it is conducted, by social, economical, political, intellectual, moral views and ideas of the era, and, certainly, by moral, social, and very personal desires of scientists.
Science is never in the vacuum, it is very much influenced by social and (very) personal factors, and these social and personal powers can greatly propel and at the same time just stop the progress of science, even for millennia...
As scientists, we need to accept and objectify science as much as possible, our personal feelings, hence ideas towards certain outcomes can make us very biased and imagine all scientists just follow one paradigm and be closed to an alternate idea, only because it is not yet giving all the explanation we want. On the other hand, we may waste a huge amount of time and resources researching hypotheses that may answer one question and yet leave all the others open...
Science is very human and follows the same principles, as human behavior.
It is biased, it may be very irrational at times, but it is the only way for us to generate knowledge.
Needless to say, this is a definitely 5-star read for me. The amount of research and accessibility for the researches in all academical fields, language, and logical reasoning and transitions, humor (the proposal image of two scientists ) made this book an exceptional material for both students of academia, who are doing their first steps in the research world, as well as established researches, as a kind reminder to look on their work from above. I am going to use this in my classes of history of psychological research as a mandatory read, as well as my small research group.
If possible, please share a copy of this book upon printing, I'd definitely treasure it in my library.
This is a fundamental work on science philosophy & history, providing insights on powers propelling & determining scientific research and scientific idea generation, as well as powers that are challenging and stopping us, human scientists ( with all our human flows and ways of thinking).
In this work, the author presents the main and widely accepted scientific rules that are used for falsification and/or acceptance of the hypothesis, represents two main ways of scientific thinking and roles, that scientists ( and their minds) play in global academia, and does an amazing job equally accepting and rejecting both.
Science, being a "brainchild" of certain people, is certainly influenced by the era when it is conducted, by social, economical, political, intellectual, moral views and ideas of the era, and, certainly, by moral, social, and very personal desires of scientists.
Science is never in the vacuum, it is very much influenced by social and (very) personal factors, and these social and personal powers can greatly propel and at the same time just stop the progress of science, even for millennia...
As scientists, we need to accept and objectify science as much as possible, our personal feelings, hence ideas towards certain outcomes can make us very biased and imagine all scientists just follow one paradigm and be closed to an alternate idea, only because it is not yet giving all the explanation we want. On the other hand, we may waste a huge amount of time and resources researching hypotheses that may answer one question and yet leave all the others open...
Science is very human and follows the same principles, as human behavior.
It is biased, it may be very irrational at times, but it is the only way for us to generate knowledge.
Needless to say, this is a definitely 5-star read for me. The amount of research and accessibility for the researches in all academical fields, language, and logical reasoning and transitions, humor (the proposal image of two scientists ) made this book an exceptional material for both students of academia, who are doing their first steps in the research world, as well as established researches, as a kind reminder to look on their work from above. I am going to use this in my classes of history of psychological research as a mandatory read, as well as my small research group.
If possible, please share a copy of this book upon printing, I'd definitely treasure it in my library.
November 5, 2020
A fantastic account of the philosophical luminaries in science updated for the 21st century. With Popper and Kuhn as his starting points, Strevens then goes back to Aristotle, Descartes, and Newton to fashion an origin story for the explanatory power and progress made by science. For Strevens, these features arise from an irrational but entirely necessary dedication to empirical observation (referred to as science’s iron rule), and an insistence that explanations, free of philosophical “ultimate causes�, need only accurately describe the observables. While something like beauty can motivate and inspire individual scientists, such subjectivity has no explanatory power and is rightly left out of the public conversations conducted by scientists at meetings and in the pages of niche journals. All told, there may be a poverty within scientific thought if we take Strevens’s analysis seriously. However, this poverty is the source of its effectiveness without which we would not be able to comfortably enjoy the fruits of the fuller, but rather impotent, world of humanistic thought. In Strevens, science has the best kind of advocate - full throated but realistic and not the least bit sycophantic. Easily short listed for best of 2020.
July 25, 2023
3.5/5
Many compelling points and historical anecdotes, however I cannot shake the feeling that A) the radical subjectivists make equally compelling points and B) the best science plays at an intimate, empathetic, and animistic tempo.
Science authors such as Robin Wall-Kimmerer or Merlin Sheldrake do an excellent job exposing the intellectual blindness of “the knowledge machine's� cold detachment. One could say these are not “real scientists� on the cutting edge of rigorous empirical study, nevertheless, they recall a long tradition of mysticism and magic Streven’s asserts is an impossibility in modern science.
Many compelling points and historical anecdotes, however I cannot shake the feeling that A) the radical subjectivists make equally compelling points and B) the best science plays at an intimate, empathetic, and animistic tempo.
Science authors such as Robin Wall-Kimmerer or Merlin Sheldrake do an excellent job exposing the intellectual blindness of “the knowledge machine's� cold detachment. One could say these are not “real scientists� on the cutting edge of rigorous empirical study, nevertheless, they recall a long tradition of mysticism and magic Streven’s asserts is an impossibility in modern science.
March 8, 2022
read this book for a class i’m not crazy about. prob would’ve been better if it weren’t for class but if i’m honest i fell asleep reading this more than once. at first i blamed that on it being hot in the tower room but then i fell asleep in bvac so clearly that wasn’t the issue.
December 12, 2020
An accessible - but occasionally too breezy (it’s irritating when a writer shows that he thinks he’s clever) - interpretation of the rise and triumph of modern science. Strevens wonders why science, as we know it anyway, took so long to arrive (around 1620; 2pm). He does a good job debunking the idea that science is immune from worldly corruptions, from personal differences to interference by governments, religions etc. He locates science’s rise and indeed its coherence as a “thing� in the agreement on a consensus (Baconian Convergence) on the basic rules of the game: science would proceed by continual inquiry regardless of other differences. (The analogy is with games: chess players play chess.) Implicitly this is a celebration of the Enlightenment Project, including its basis in the political economy, now much maligned because it didn’t fulfill all of its transcendent (even utopian) premises and some of its practitioners were not as fastidious as we are. Or as Marx put it, “History sets itself no problems it cannot solve.� It’s not “irrational� at all.
December 31, 2020
I don't know about this one: it's a counter-intuitive history of science that argues that Western science has been successful by being "irrational," that is by narrowly focusing only on evidence, or what he calls the "iron rule of explanation." To call this "irrational," I think, sets up a false expectation (I was thinking about another kind of irrationality that I am familiar with from premodern science). But it's still a interesting account of how the history of science has been told, and what constitutes the nature of science today.
January 14, 2023
“I have dismantled the iron rule, over the last few chapters, to analyze each of its four innovations. Now I need to reassemble the parts, showing how the innovations work together to power and steer the knowledge machine.
The iron rule demands that scientific arguments consider only the explanatory power of contending theories. The positive core of the rule is a shallow, permissive conception of explanatory power, on which a phenomenon is explained by deriving it from a theory’s causal principles. The principles need not pass any philosophical test or even be fully understood—thus, Newton considered himself to have explained the motions of the planets and the tides using his theory of gravity, although he offered no explanation of the causes of gravity itself.
The negative side of the rule forbids scientists, when making their case in official venues such as scientific journals, to assess theories using anything other than explanatory power. Philosophical and religious arguments in particular are out of bounds, no matter how compelling they may seem to scientists and to society at large. Likewise, scientists may not bring personal or cultural or other parochial considerations to bear in making their case; the iron rule requires that everything subjective be removed from scientific argument.
The Scientific Revolution, then, accomplished by way of the iron rule both a shallowing and a narrowing of the old forms of deliberation: post-Revolutionary argument is shallower in its conception of explanatory power, and it is narrower in its range of reasons for accepting and rejecting hypotheses and theories. Although such constrictions have little intuitive appeal, they have turned out to provide the superstructure for an extraordinarily effective engine of inquiry.
We live in a Tychonic world—a world in which great competing stories about the underlying nature of things can be distinguished by, and only by, scrutinizing subtle intricacies and minute differences. Humans in their natural state are not much disposed to attend to such trifles. But they love to win. The procedural consensus imposed by the iron rule creates a dramatic contest within which the trifles acquire an unnatural luster, becoming, for their tactical worth, objects of fierce desire. The rule in this way redirects great quantities of energy that might have gone toward philosophical or other forms of argument into empirical testing. Modern science’s human raw material is molded into a strike force of unnervingly single-minded observers, measurers, and experimenters, generating a vast, detailed, varied, discriminating stock of evidence.
At the same time, the iron rule preserves this evidence, maintaining a craft tradition of “sterilization� that archives observed phenomena in a form that is distorted as little as possible by interpretation and other consequences of plausibility rankings.
The thinking of each generation of scientists is, and is permitted by the iron rule to be, essentially subjective. But that subjectivity does not matter in the long run. As thinkers come and go, observations accrue, revealing in time which theories are better explainers and which are worse. The eventual consequence is Baconian convergence on the truth: informed opinion increasingly favors the one theory, the correct theory, that accounts for every aspect of the accumulated evidence.
Science, then, is built up like a coral reef. Individual scientists are the polyps, secreting a shelly carapace that they bequeath to the reef upon their departure. That carapace is the sterilized public record of their research, a compilation of observation or experimentation and the explanatory derivation, where possible, of the data from known theories and auxiliary assumptions. The scientist, like a polyp, is a complete living thing, all too human in just the ways that the historians and sociologists of science have described. When the organism goes, however, its humanity goes with it. What is left is the evidential exoskeleton of a scientific career. You can see the bare bones laid down by Eddington’s eclipse expedition, for example, in the black-and-white rows of numbers that represent stars� photographed positions and the mathematical calculations that yield the sun’s implied bending of starlight.
The intellectual edifice that is scientific knowledge is composed largely of these exoskeletal remains. It is held together, like a reef, not by living things, but by the evidence and argument that living things produce, assembled according to a strict architectural plan ordained by the iron rule.� (195-7)
The iron rule demands that scientific arguments consider only the explanatory power of contending theories. The positive core of the rule is a shallow, permissive conception of explanatory power, on which a phenomenon is explained by deriving it from a theory’s causal principles. The principles need not pass any philosophical test or even be fully understood—thus, Newton considered himself to have explained the motions of the planets and the tides using his theory of gravity, although he offered no explanation of the causes of gravity itself.
The negative side of the rule forbids scientists, when making their case in official venues such as scientific journals, to assess theories using anything other than explanatory power. Philosophical and religious arguments in particular are out of bounds, no matter how compelling they may seem to scientists and to society at large. Likewise, scientists may not bring personal or cultural or other parochial considerations to bear in making their case; the iron rule requires that everything subjective be removed from scientific argument.
The Scientific Revolution, then, accomplished by way of the iron rule both a shallowing and a narrowing of the old forms of deliberation: post-Revolutionary argument is shallower in its conception of explanatory power, and it is narrower in its range of reasons for accepting and rejecting hypotheses and theories. Although such constrictions have little intuitive appeal, they have turned out to provide the superstructure for an extraordinarily effective engine of inquiry.
We live in a Tychonic world—a world in which great competing stories about the underlying nature of things can be distinguished by, and only by, scrutinizing subtle intricacies and minute differences. Humans in their natural state are not much disposed to attend to such trifles. But they love to win. The procedural consensus imposed by the iron rule creates a dramatic contest within which the trifles acquire an unnatural luster, becoming, for their tactical worth, objects of fierce desire. The rule in this way redirects great quantities of energy that might have gone toward philosophical or other forms of argument into empirical testing. Modern science’s human raw material is molded into a strike force of unnervingly single-minded observers, measurers, and experimenters, generating a vast, detailed, varied, discriminating stock of evidence.
At the same time, the iron rule preserves this evidence, maintaining a craft tradition of “sterilization� that archives observed phenomena in a form that is distorted as little as possible by interpretation and other consequences of plausibility rankings.
The thinking of each generation of scientists is, and is permitted by the iron rule to be, essentially subjective. But that subjectivity does not matter in the long run. As thinkers come and go, observations accrue, revealing in time which theories are better explainers and which are worse. The eventual consequence is Baconian convergence on the truth: informed opinion increasingly favors the one theory, the correct theory, that accounts for every aspect of the accumulated evidence.
Science, then, is built up like a coral reef. Individual scientists are the polyps, secreting a shelly carapace that they bequeath to the reef upon their departure. That carapace is the sterilized public record of their research, a compilation of observation or experimentation and the explanatory derivation, where possible, of the data from known theories and auxiliary assumptions. The scientist, like a polyp, is a complete living thing, all too human in just the ways that the historians and sociologists of science have described. When the organism goes, however, its humanity goes with it. What is left is the evidential exoskeleton of a scientific career. You can see the bare bones laid down by Eddington’s eclipse expedition, for example, in the black-and-white rows of numbers that represent stars� photographed positions and the mathematical calculations that yield the sun’s implied bending of starlight.
The intellectual edifice that is scientific knowledge is composed largely of these exoskeletal remains. It is held together, like a reef, not by living things, but by the evidence and argument that living things produce, assembled according to a strict architectural plan ordained by the iron rule.� (195-7)
August 18, 2021
Science is such a big force in our world, but a lot of people take it for granted. What exactly makes science so special? And if it's so special, why did it take humanity so long to develop it? The latter being particularly important and not a perspective I see often. The emergence of science is often told through the scientific revolution, but few bother to ask what made that revolution happen. Why not before? This is one of the main questions of the book.
It was one of my favourite books this year and I devoured it as quickly as I could. I love both philosophy and science, and this book combines both beautifully in addition to being rich in history. It is the more nuanced and careful investigation I have seen, and what I have always craved when studying the topic. It goes well beyond the basic thesis of Kuhn and Kopper, and more impressively, it doesn't settle for its purely philosophical claims but makes them stand against historical and sociological evidence, which both makes their theories reductionist of how science actually operates.
Strevens' main point is that science took so long because it is an unnatural way of looking at the world. Not unnatural doesn't quite capture it, it is almost irrational. It is a rich point that isn't easy to explain in a couple of sentences but he builds his argument well, especially by putting on the lenses of specific historical periods and making thought experiments of how one ought to think. Even with our current knowledge, it would be incredibly hard to convince someone in the past why the scientific method is superior.
The rich history was what really made the book powerful for me. Countless examples are given which strengthen his point. This what also something that made Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions very strong, but it's even better made here. And some of the history I was honestly appealed at how I never encountered it before. Most mind-blowing is how often science was badly done. This isn't too surprising if we think of individual studies in modernity, but I am talking about the very foundations of the most important scientific discoveries ever made, from Einstein's relativity and its confirmation with the 1919 eclipse to Mendel's statistics on inheritance and Newton's experiments. I honestly cannot comprehend how much I have studied philosophy and science and I never once heard about this.
These historical cases really highlight the messy nature of science, and many more are given. How it can be flawed, and how its roots go well beyond pure data or even rationality. Yet, how why it still works besides all of that. What he argues is that what makes science special is that it creates a game where everyone knows the rules and has to play by the rules. And the rule is that empirical evidence is what counts, and nothing else. What he calls “iron rule of explanation".
Scientists never actually work like this. It is impossible to work with evidence alone because it always requires auxiliary assumptions. Yet by playing the game nevertheless, the truth eventually emerges. Or it is the game that has the highest likelihood of that happening. The science itself never says which theory to believe. It is only a process, a shared game. It is also an open-ended game, one side can always come up with a new interpretation and a new experiment to try to support it.
What people fail to appreciate is that observation isn't new. Even Aristotle relied on observation, and there are examples of him using it to completely disprove a hypothesis even if counter-intuitive. What is unique to modern science, however, is that only observation counts, even at the expense of any philosophical, religious, spiritual, or aesthetic considerations. Philosophers before the scientific revolution used observation, but they also used everything else at their disposal. If you have many different tools in your toolbox, it is incredibly odd to think that you're better off throwing all of them except one and use it for everything. It's not so much that the main idea of science didn't occur to previous generations, but more so that that idea seemed preposterous and dumb.
What is curious is that while science works like that, scientists don't. In their private lives, they are still motivated by beauty, harmony, and reason, like every other human being and just like Aristotle was. The difference is a split between what motivates the scientist and what counts as proof for his claims. And without these motivations, modern science would not exist since almost all major discoveries were made because of them.
The whole book was beautifully written. It seemed to nail every aspect I ever wondered about, and explore paths that I never thought possible. I feel bad for my review because it seems overly abstract, and perhaps not so different from the idea of science you may have. But I believe it is fairly different, but hard to explain in a few words. The countless historical examples are needed to truly encapsulate the vision of science that Strevens shines forth. The ending of the book also contains a fair criticism of science and how it is conducted. The details of which I shall omit in order to give you the pleasure of reading it unspoiled.
If you have any interest in science, read this. The only criticism I have is that it is at times repetitive. And with some historical examples, perhaps too many technical details were given. Yet, it is well worth it. If you have experience with philosophy of science, I believe that you will find some extra depth and insight compared to what you have read. And if you're interested in science but never even touched philosophy of science, you will expand your worldview manyfold.
It was one of my favourite books this year and I devoured it as quickly as I could. I love both philosophy and science, and this book combines both beautifully in addition to being rich in history. It is the more nuanced and careful investigation I have seen, and what I have always craved when studying the topic. It goes well beyond the basic thesis of Kuhn and Kopper, and more impressively, it doesn't settle for its purely philosophical claims but makes them stand against historical and sociological evidence, which both makes their theories reductionist of how science actually operates.
Strevens' main point is that science took so long because it is an unnatural way of looking at the world. Not unnatural doesn't quite capture it, it is almost irrational. It is a rich point that isn't easy to explain in a couple of sentences but he builds his argument well, especially by putting on the lenses of specific historical periods and making thought experiments of how one ought to think. Even with our current knowledge, it would be incredibly hard to convince someone in the past why the scientific method is superior.
The rich history was what really made the book powerful for me. Countless examples are given which strengthen his point. This what also something that made Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions very strong, but it's even better made here. And some of the history I was honestly appealed at how I never encountered it before. Most mind-blowing is how often science was badly done. This isn't too surprising if we think of individual studies in modernity, but I am talking about the very foundations of the most important scientific discoveries ever made, from Einstein's relativity and its confirmation with the 1919 eclipse to Mendel's statistics on inheritance and Newton's experiments. I honestly cannot comprehend how much I have studied philosophy and science and I never once heard about this.
These historical cases really highlight the messy nature of science, and many more are given. How it can be flawed, and how its roots go well beyond pure data or even rationality. Yet, how why it still works besides all of that. What he argues is that what makes science special is that it creates a game where everyone knows the rules and has to play by the rules. And the rule is that empirical evidence is what counts, and nothing else. What he calls “iron rule of explanation".
Scientists never actually work like this. It is impossible to work with evidence alone because it always requires auxiliary assumptions. Yet by playing the game nevertheless, the truth eventually emerges. Or it is the game that has the highest likelihood of that happening. The science itself never says which theory to believe. It is only a process, a shared game. It is also an open-ended game, one side can always come up with a new interpretation and a new experiment to try to support it.
What people fail to appreciate is that observation isn't new. Even Aristotle relied on observation, and there are examples of him using it to completely disprove a hypothesis even if counter-intuitive. What is unique to modern science, however, is that only observation counts, even at the expense of any philosophical, religious, spiritual, or aesthetic considerations. Philosophers before the scientific revolution used observation, but they also used everything else at their disposal. If you have many different tools in your toolbox, it is incredibly odd to think that you're better off throwing all of them except one and use it for everything. It's not so much that the main idea of science didn't occur to previous generations, but more so that that idea seemed preposterous and dumb.
What is curious is that while science works like that, scientists don't. In their private lives, they are still motivated by beauty, harmony, and reason, like every other human being and just like Aristotle was. The difference is a split between what motivates the scientist and what counts as proof for his claims. And without these motivations, modern science would not exist since almost all major discoveries were made because of them.
The whole book was beautifully written. It seemed to nail every aspect I ever wondered about, and explore paths that I never thought possible. I feel bad for my review because it seems overly abstract, and perhaps not so different from the idea of science you may have. But I believe it is fairly different, but hard to explain in a few words. The countless historical examples are needed to truly encapsulate the vision of science that Strevens shines forth. The ending of the book also contains a fair criticism of science and how it is conducted. The details of which I shall omit in order to give you the pleasure of reading it unspoiled.
If you have any interest in science, read this. The only criticism I have is that it is at times repetitive. And with some historical examples, perhaps too many technical details were given. Yet, it is well worth it. If you have experience with philosophy of science, I believe that you will find some extra depth and insight compared to what you have read. And if you're interested in science but never even touched philosophy of science, you will expand your worldview manyfold.
October 1, 2023
Show your work. Especially your data. That's basically the author's "iron rule" of science. Facts count (in the form of empirical data), nothing else does.
He then goes on to qualify the rule, noting that facts have to be processed by human minds, so subjectivity is never far away. But that subjectivity usually just leads to further research, until more facts pile up, eventually settling the question (and leaving little room for further subjectivity). Then scientists move on to the next problem.
So what about the subtitle to the book? Did "irrationality" really create modern science? Um, no. Substitute "unnatural" for "irrational" and you'll get closer to the case. Pre-modern thinkers tended to assume that their scientific findings should slot easily into their overall views -- that philosophy, theology, even politics should mesh with what they discovered about the natural world. That's not how it turned out, of course.
When modern science began in the 17th century, many of its practitioners (including Isaac Newton) were alchemists on the side. Which made sense because, at the time, who knew? Maybe the world was 6000 years old, as the Bible suggested. Maybe you really could turn lead into gold with mysterious formulas. It took long years (centuries in fact) of hard, slogging research to discover otherwise.
There's a thread of anxiety (even anger) running through the book, especially when the author describes what he imagines to be the narrowness of science education. Why the angst? Probably because science has become so important. As the author notes, it really is a knowledge machine, one that can engulf everything in its path.
So it's a bit surprising that, at the end of the book, the author advises that we "Point science in the right direction and let it go." Which is probably good advice. Especially the part about pointing it in the right direction (we don't need more nuclear weapons, but could really use better ways to combat climate change and pandemics).
He then goes on to qualify the rule, noting that facts have to be processed by human minds, so subjectivity is never far away. But that subjectivity usually just leads to further research, until more facts pile up, eventually settling the question (and leaving little room for further subjectivity). Then scientists move on to the next problem.
So what about the subtitle to the book? Did "irrationality" really create modern science? Um, no. Substitute "unnatural" for "irrational" and you'll get closer to the case. Pre-modern thinkers tended to assume that their scientific findings should slot easily into their overall views -- that philosophy, theology, even politics should mesh with what they discovered about the natural world. That's not how it turned out, of course.
When modern science began in the 17th century, many of its practitioners (including Isaac Newton) were alchemists on the side. Which made sense because, at the time, who knew? Maybe the world was 6000 years old, as the Bible suggested. Maybe you really could turn lead into gold with mysterious formulas. It took long years (centuries in fact) of hard, slogging research to discover otherwise.
There's a thread of anxiety (even anger) running through the book, especially when the author describes what he imagines to be the narrowness of science education. Why the angst? Probably because science has become so important. As the author notes, it really is a knowledge machine, one that can engulf everything in its path.
So it's a bit surprising that, at the end of the book, the author advises that we "Point science in the right direction and let it go." Which is probably good advice. Especially the part about pointing it in the right direction (we don't need more nuclear weapons, but could really use better ways to combat climate change and pandemics).
Shelved as 'lv-0-чух-основите-няма-да-чета'
June 25, 2022Страхотно заглавие. Грабва. Но всъщност дори заглавието е зле, щото науката не дава знание, знанието идва от личен опит, науката ни дава карти за реалността, които да обяснят знания които имаме.
Най-вероятно няма да я прочета. Бих прегледал първите глави за Аристотел.
Бях се надъхал, заради подвеждащо то заглавие и особено подзаглавието, но един час и 30 Мин подкаст на автора с Майкъл Шурмър ме отказа.
Авторът е клише материалист.
При все, че за същото време мога да прочета с уши Структура на научните революции на Кун, или Против метода на Файеребанд, или дори за втори път ХУБАВАТА книга въведение във философия на науката Теория и Реалност на не му запомних името
Опортюнити костът просто не си струва.
За същото време мога и да прочета два пъти набързо или един път бавно с разбиране най-интересните научна книга, на която съм попадал от Паралелни светове на Мичио Каку (или Какво е живота на Шрьодингер - до сега) - а именно книгата Аргументът против реалността - как еволюцията скри реалността от нашите очи (the case against reality) на Доналд Хофман.
Страхувам се, че американския елит страда от хронична посредственост изглежда във всякое едно отношение, което е тъжно.
Ще ме принудят да почна да чета европейски автори накрая.
Най-вероятно няма да я прочета. Бих прегледал първите глави за Аристотел.
Бях се надъхал, заради подвеждащо то заглавие и особено подзаглавието, но един час и 30 Мин подкаст на автора с Майкъл Шурмър ме отказа.
Авторът е клише материалист.
При все, че за същото време мога да прочета с уши Структура на научните революции на Кун, или Против метода на Файеребанд, или дори за втори път ХУБАВАТА книга въведение във философия на науката Теория и Реалност на не му запомних името
Опортюнити костът просто не си струва.
За същото време мога и да прочета два пъти набързо или един път бавно с разбиране най-интересните научна книга, на която съм попадал от Паралелни светове на Мичио Каку (или Какво е живота на Шрьодингер - до сега) - а именно книгата Аргументът против реалността - как еволюцията скри реалността от нашите очи (the case against reality) на Доналд Хофман.
Страхувам се, че американския елит страда от хронична посредственост изглежда във всякое едно отношение, което е тъжно.
Ще ме принудят да почна да чета европейски автори накрая.
February 2, 2021
The Knowledge Machine: How Irrationality Created Modern Science by Michael Strevens covers the development of the scientific method through the lens of philosophy. Strevens frames his analysis between the pillars of Thomas Kuhn, scientists establish and follow a paradigm or common method, and Karl Popper, theories can never be proved but only disproved, or "falsified." The best part about the book is Strevens treatment of scientists as human: petty, fame-seeking and hubristic. Anyone questioning Strevens viewpoint will find their doubts removed after attending a university department meeting. The Knowledge Machine also points out interesting questions. It is a surprise that the scientific method too so long to develop? Or is it a surprise that the scientific method developed at all? The weakness of The Knowledge Machine is that it constrains its analysis to philosophical matters. There are a number of practical developments, namely Universities giving scientists employment dedicated to scientific research, that lead to the scientific method as we know it today. The Knowledge Machine is a solid addition to the philosophical discourse on the scientific method.
December 12, 2022
How does science really work? Strevens surveys the evolution of science as a machine that generates, (in)validates, and systematizes knowledge claims. He explores the question of how the iron rule (all disputes are to be settled by empirical data) achieved universal acceptance in a population comprised largely or entirely of magical thinkers, such as Isaac Newton, who compartmentalized his mind and time between empirical (scientific) and magical (alchemy) pursuits. Strevens also explores the dynamic relationship between imaginative and evidence-based thinking. How to they oppose and complement each other? It's a very rich exploration. I will have to re-read more closely. After a first read, I feel I've sprinted past a stadium-long table of delicacies. Now I want to trawl the table more deliberatively, savoring more fully.
January 25, 2024
I understand his point that science has been so incredibly productive because it has been kept separate from other areas of inquiry, but this has also enabled some of the most horrific ethical atrocities of the past few centuries. I think we need to include humanism in scientific training and scientific research to ensure that science is actually serving the communities it claims to benefit. That being said, I appreciated the opportunity this book provided to think about how and why science is conducted.
However, Strevens repeatedly discusses how excruciating it is to devote your life to the daily tasks of scientific research, and this seems like a pessimistic generalization. Scientific experimentation, while exhausting, can be incredibly soothing and meditative. It is frustrating, but I think science is enduring in part because many of us actually like being in a lab and doing experiments.
However, Strevens repeatedly discusses how excruciating it is to devote your life to the daily tasks of scientific research, and this seems like a pessimistic generalization. Scientific experimentation, while exhausting, can be incredibly soothing and meditative. It is frustrating, but I think science is enduring in part because many of us actually like being in a lab and doing experiments.
March 13, 2021
What is science? And why did it take so long to emerge? These are super interesting questions and Strevens presents them in a clear and captivating way. Science is a method of arguing on the basis of empirical observations but is observed by individual scientists in all their idiosyncrasies. Science took so long because “who in their right mind would abandon philosophy, religion and aesthetic, these profound sources of knowledge, and focus on observation alone?� Only three stars because Strevens went a bit overboard on the metaphors and I wanted him to explain more about what was so seductive about science’s method to its founders, such as Newton? Was it a kind of challenge to explain as much as they could with as little as they could?
Want to read
December 24, 2020I watched the author summarize this book here:
Then I realized... I don't care enough to read this book. TECHNICALLY, if you are an analytic philosopher using a narrow definition of rationality, the definition of rationality includes considering EVERYTHING in your argument, not just the narrow focus of evidence in science. Ok... Do I need a really really long book about that? I'll pass! What difference does this actually make for our lives? Science is important for understanding the world, making decisions and understanding ourselves. Is it everything in itself? No. However, if we act like, say, religion is just about exploring different aspects of life, that is ridiculous. It isn't THAT separate (religion is also hard to define... probably harder to define than science). To be fair, I could see how part of his thesis could be useful for defending science from people like critical race theorists who want to somehow claim we can/should have "black physics" or some BS like that. But only if it was a way shorter book would it be at all useful for such a purpose. Maybe more of a pamphlet or article. That could make it maybe useful in such a case.
Then I realized... I don't care enough to read this book. TECHNICALLY, if you are an analytic philosopher using a narrow definition of rationality, the definition of rationality includes considering EVERYTHING in your argument, not just the narrow focus of evidence in science. Ok... Do I need a really really long book about that? I'll pass! What difference does this actually make for our lives? Science is important for understanding the world, making decisions and understanding ourselves. Is it everything in itself? No. However, if we act like, say, religion is just about exploring different aspects of life, that is ridiculous. It isn't THAT separate (religion is also hard to define... probably harder to define than science). To be fair, I could see how part of his thesis could be useful for defending science from people like critical race theorists who want to somehow claim we can/should have "black physics" or some BS like that. But only if it was a way shorter book would it be at all useful for such a purpose. Maybe more of a pamphlet or article. That could make it maybe useful in such a case.
April 27, 2025
Given that I am not exposed to this field apart from some mentions in the night science podcast, I really enjoyed this new perspective on scientific work. It is nicely written making the ideas accessible to a broader audience. I would probably recommend it to all PhD students in science.
April 25, 2024
3.5 // 19a24
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