Marcel H. Van Herpen
Å·±¦ÓéÀÖ Author
Member Since
October 2015
More books by Marcel H. Van Herpen…
“There are two opposing conceptions concerning lies. The first is attributed to Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, who is reputed to have said, “A lie told often enough becomes the truth.â€� There is another one, attributed to US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who said: “Repetition does not transform a lie into a truth.â€�
It is clear that the Russian leadership has a preference for Lenin’s approach. Even faced with unequivocal evidence it continues to deny the facts. Apart from unfounded accusations against Georgia of genocide and the denial of its own use of cluster bombs, the war in Georgia was preceded and accompanied by open lies, misinformation (for instance, about “uncontrollable� South Ossetian militias), and active disinformation, all reminiscent of the old Soviet style.
In this way Russia almost succeeded in hiding the most important fact: that this was not a “Russian-Georgian war,â€� but a Russian war against Georgia in Georgia. There was not a single Georgian soldier that crossed the Russian frontier at any point. The Georgian troops that went into South Ossetia did not cross international frontiers, but intervened in their own country, no different from Russian troops intervening in Chechnya. It was Russian and not Georgian troops that crossed the border of another, sovereign country, in breach of the principles of international law [230â€�31].”
― Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism
It is clear that the Russian leadership has a preference for Lenin’s approach. Even faced with unequivocal evidence it continues to deny the facts. Apart from unfounded accusations against Georgia of genocide and the denial of its own use of cluster bombs, the war in Georgia was preceded and accompanied by open lies, misinformation (for instance, about “uncontrollable� South Ossetian militias), and active disinformation, all reminiscent of the old Soviet style.
In this way Russia almost succeeded in hiding the most important fact: that this was not a “Russian-Georgian war,â€� but a Russian war against Georgia in Georgia. There was not a single Georgian soldier that crossed the Russian frontier at any point. The Georgian troops that went into South Ossetia did not cross international frontiers, but intervened in their own country, no different from Russian troops intervening in Chechnya. It was Russian and not Georgian troops that crossed the border of another, sovereign country, in breach of the principles of international law [230â€�31].”
― Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism
“On September 11, 2008, during a meeting of the Valdai Club with Vladimir Putin in Sochi, Carrère d’Encausse asked Putin if he would respond positively to Kokoity’s demand for integration of South Ossetia into the Russian Federation. She wrote: “Vladimir Putin answered with the greatest firmness that such a hypothesis was excluded. He explained that if Russia in this specific case was unable to ignore the will of the Ossetian people to be independent, it was firm regarding the principles of respecting the inviolability of existing frontiers. This principle, according to him, applied without exception to the Russian Federation which could not, therefore, welcome into its midst a nation or territory that so desired.â€�
Putin’s double-talk (he is speaking about the “inviolability of existing frontiersâ€� just after having changed the frontiers of Georgia by brutal force) brings her to the â€� naive â€� conclusion that “the blunt refusal that was opposed to the Ossetian demand for integration into Russia makes the Russian position clear: the August intervention in Georgia... could lead to a settlement of a conflict between Georgia and its separatist minorities, [but] in no case to a dossier that was of interest to Russia.â€� [237]”
― Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism
Putin’s double-talk (he is speaking about the “inviolability of existing frontiersâ€� just after having changed the frontiers of Georgia by brutal force) brings her to the â€� naive â€� conclusion that “the blunt refusal that was opposed to the Ossetian demand for integration into Russia makes the Russian position clear: the August intervention in Georgia... could lead to a settlement of a conflict between Georgia and its separatist minorities, [but] in no case to a dossier that was of interest to Russia.â€� [237]”
― Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism
“The Russians have a tradition in which every war is a 'total war'. ... When the decision has been taken to start a war, there is no feeling for the fact that there can be limits and should be limits how this war is conducted." The Russians call this situation bespredel, which literally means "without limits". It implies torture, cruelty, and gratuitous acts of violence which remain, as a rule, unpunished.”
― Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism
― Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism