What do you think?
Rate this book
The Empirical Stance (The Terry Lectures) by Bas Fraassen
What is empiricism and what could it be? Bas C. van Fraassen, one of the world's foremost contributors to philosophical logic and the philosophy of science, here undertakes a fresh consideration of these questions and offers a program for renewal of the empiricist tradition. The empiricist tradition is not and could not be defined by common doctrines but embodies a certain stance in philosophy, van Fraassen says. This stance is displayed first of all in a searing recurrent critique of metaphysics, and second in a focus on experience that requires a voluntarist view of belief and opinion.
Hardcover
First published January 1, 2002
16 people are currently reading
226 people want to read
About the author
Bas C. Van Fraassen
21books35followersBastiaan Cornelis van Fraassen is a Dutch-American philosopher noted for his seminal contributions to philosophy of science. He is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at San Francisco State University and the McCosh Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Princeton University.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
August 10, 2015
This is an important work in the philosophy of science, one that most scientists and philosophers should read.
Science, itself built on various uncritically adopted empiricist assumptions, is a human enterprise consisting of people with various interests and dispositions. Van Fraassen suggests that empiricism, if it can be of any use at all, cannot be a clearly-defined doctrine, and should instead be understood as a stance that involves attitudes, beliefs, emotions, etc. Van Fraassen's offers numerous, persuasive reasons for his conclusions: classical empiricism is false (empiricism cannot provide a dogmatic position regarding knowledge), materialism is incoherent (the term lacks definite content) and naturalized epistemology is flawed (it fails to account for conceptual revolutions). Van Fraassen also offers a devastating critique of contemporary analytic metaphysics, and it is fairly obvious that it's his antirealism and his critique of abductive inferences which largely shape his, mostly correct, conclusions.
Science, itself built on various uncritically adopted empiricist assumptions, is a human enterprise consisting of people with various interests and dispositions. Van Fraassen suggests that empiricism, if it can be of any use at all, cannot be a clearly-defined doctrine, and should instead be understood as a stance that involves attitudes, beliefs, emotions, etc. Van Fraassen's offers numerous, persuasive reasons for his conclusions: classical empiricism is false (empiricism cannot provide a dogmatic position regarding knowledge), materialism is incoherent (the term lacks definite content) and naturalized epistemology is flawed (it fails to account for conceptual revolutions). Van Fraassen also offers a devastating critique of contemporary analytic metaphysics, and it is fairly obvious that it's his antirealism and his critique of abductive inferences which largely shape his, mostly correct, conclusions.
August 7, 2023
This is actually 3.5 stars, but I rounded up because the book is worth reading.
Some editions have a rather terrible description, but here's what it actually includes:
A powerful criticism of analytic metaphysics, which, even if one disagrees with it (as I do), should be considered by anyone interested in the topic.
An analysis and history of empiricism.
An analysis of what holding a philosophical position actually consists of (van Fraassen concludes that philosophical positions can be "stances" instead of explicit doctrines)
A critique of physicalism and materialism as an example.
A superb criticism (I think it's a refutation) of Quine's program of naturalizing epistemology.
An existentialist analysis of the psychology of theory change in scientific revolutions (this book is a work of analytic philosophy, but it includes some Continental themes)
Quite a bit about van Fraassen's "voluntarist epistemology", which is extremely pragmatic. These parts discuss Pascal's Wager.
An interesting criticism of epistemological theories that try to construct all knowledge from a few basic principles (he calls such theories "foundationalist", but that's a bit misleading)
A somewhat mediocre analysis of the nature of science.
A truly regrettable section on religion, which can easily be skipped over.
It's been asserted that this book uses the questionable strategy of questioning naturalism to make the reader more receptive to religion, but that's probably inaccurate. When van Fraassen argues against metaphysical naturalism, he's specifically arguing against the Quinean strategy of analyzing the ontological commitments of scientific theories. He does so because he's criticizing contemporary metaphysics, which he does because he's against metaphysics in general. Those parts never argue for metaphysical non-naturalism, though I believe there is a cliched little argument in the religious section. His refutation of epistemological naturalism specifically refutes Quine's idea that epistemology ought to become cognitive science, and one could argue that his pragmatist picture of epistemology is definitely more naturalistic than, say, Cartesian epistemology.
That being said, the parts on religion are definitely awful and seem to be more or less incoherent with the rest of the book. However, van Fraassen is preaching to the converted and thankfully ignores popular debates about science and religion.
There are also some problems with his criticisms of metaphysics. When he criticizes metaphysical naturalism, his case study does not use a regimented theory, which means that his argument doesn't apply to Quine's specific position. Furthermore, he considers his arguments to have accomplished a refutation of metaphysics in general. However, they make use of metaphysical theses like "scientific theories do not contain clear ontological commitments" or "the word "world" never refers to actual entities and instead specifies domains of discourse". Consequently, his arguments would be self-refuting if they refuted all metaphysics, since they include negative and therapeutic metaphysical assertions.
However, it's not clear that he would have refuted all of metaphysics anyway, since some of his main arguments use case studies. If they are not considered to do such a thing, they still say interesting things about metaphysical methodology. For example, van Fraassen notes that abductive methods in metaphysics suffer from a lack of clearly defined or agreed-upon explanatory virtues, suggesting that a proper epistemology of explanation is needed prior to any such metaphysical theorizing.
Nonetheless, I still found this book extremely thought-provoking. Van Fraassen has many good arguments, and even when I disagreed with them, coming up with criticisms was a fascinating intellectual exercise.
The argument against Quinean naturalistic epistemology essentially notes that if such epistemologies contained descriptions of how we rationally draw conclusions (and they would have to), then they would have to label us irrational if we rationally rejected those descriptions because they were refuted during a scientific revolution.
Although this book isn't particularly difficult, to understand it one definitely has to have read Quine, understood current trends in epistemology and metaphysics, and understood Kuhn's philosophy of scientific revolutions and the resulting historicist turn.
Some editions have a rather terrible description, but here's what it actually includes:
A powerful criticism of analytic metaphysics, which, even if one disagrees with it (as I do), should be considered by anyone interested in the topic.
An analysis and history of empiricism.
An analysis of what holding a philosophical position actually consists of (van Fraassen concludes that philosophical positions can be "stances" instead of explicit doctrines)
A critique of physicalism and materialism as an example.
A superb criticism (I think it's a refutation) of Quine's program of naturalizing epistemology.
An existentialist analysis of the psychology of theory change in scientific revolutions (this book is a work of analytic philosophy, but it includes some Continental themes)
Quite a bit about van Fraassen's "voluntarist epistemology", which is extremely pragmatic. These parts discuss Pascal's Wager.
An interesting criticism of epistemological theories that try to construct all knowledge from a few basic principles (he calls such theories "foundationalist", but that's a bit misleading)
A somewhat mediocre analysis of the nature of science.
A truly regrettable section on religion, which can easily be skipped over.
It's been asserted that this book uses the questionable strategy of questioning naturalism to make the reader more receptive to religion, but that's probably inaccurate. When van Fraassen argues against metaphysical naturalism, he's specifically arguing against the Quinean strategy of analyzing the ontological commitments of scientific theories. He does so because he's criticizing contemporary metaphysics, which he does because he's against metaphysics in general. Those parts never argue for metaphysical non-naturalism, though I believe there is a cliched little argument in the religious section. His refutation of epistemological naturalism specifically refutes Quine's idea that epistemology ought to become cognitive science, and one could argue that his pragmatist picture of epistemology is definitely more naturalistic than, say, Cartesian epistemology.
That being said, the parts on religion are definitely awful and seem to be more or less incoherent with the rest of the book. However, van Fraassen is preaching to the converted and thankfully ignores popular debates about science and religion.
There are also some problems with his criticisms of metaphysics. When he criticizes metaphysical naturalism, his case study does not use a regimented theory, which means that his argument doesn't apply to Quine's specific position. Furthermore, he considers his arguments to have accomplished a refutation of metaphysics in general. However, they make use of metaphysical theses like "scientific theories do not contain clear ontological commitments" or "the word "world" never refers to actual entities and instead specifies domains of discourse". Consequently, his arguments would be self-refuting if they refuted all metaphysics, since they include negative and therapeutic metaphysical assertions.
However, it's not clear that he would have refuted all of metaphysics anyway, since some of his main arguments use case studies. If they are not considered to do such a thing, they still say interesting things about metaphysical methodology. For example, van Fraassen notes that abductive methods in metaphysics suffer from a lack of clearly defined or agreed-upon explanatory virtues, suggesting that a proper epistemology of explanation is needed prior to any such metaphysical theorizing.
Nonetheless, I still found this book extremely thought-provoking. Van Fraassen has many good arguments, and even when I disagreed with them, coming up with criticisms was a fascinating intellectual exercise.
The argument against Quinean naturalistic epistemology essentially notes that if such epistemologies contained descriptions of how we rationally draw conclusions (and they would have to), then they would have to label us irrational if we rationally rejected those descriptions because they were refuted during a scientific revolution.
Although this book isn't particularly difficult, to understand it one definitely has to have read Quine, understood current trends in epistemology and metaphysics, and understood Kuhn's philosophy of scientific revolutions and the resulting historicist turn.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
March 16, 2022
This is the published form of van Fraassen's Terry Lectures given at Yale, the Terry Lectures being a series on Religion in the Light of Science and Philosophy. In it van Fraassen gives his account of the sort of empiricism he favours and how it allows us to put science in a perspective that he considers proper at once respecting its boundaries and at the same time not giving it too much credit or control of our lives. In this he mostly targets not scientists or their views of things but more philosophers he feels have too totalizing a perspective often enforcing science as the only model and basis for knowledge or action. The key claim is that the empiricist position he finds defensible is not a doctrine of definite statements, but a set of attitudes.
In principle this book is focused on a more general audience. However I think some of the arguments and disputes in academic philosophy invoked here will remain opaque to that audience. However van Fraassen does engage with a broader audience in various ways. Linking his technical epistemological disputes to issues in more direct religious thought and experience. I am not that familiar with van Fraassen's writing but as I recall he rarely invokes his personal religious commitments in his academic writing and even here they are in some ways rather peripheral to much of his arguments.
The limited skeptical view of empiricism he sketches here which avoids treating any scientific claim as more than provisional and necessarily limited in scope is in conclusion not much different from many other positions of van Fraassen in early works or other empiricists. There are certainly salient points about the limits of general epistemic doctrines to be definite in light of shifting particulars. However n key questions I often found his arguments unconvincing perhaps the inference he seemed to draw as an inevitable consequence of process of elimination I viewed as dubitable, another time I might think he failed to consider various alternatives and so on. Still it is an interesting exposition of his position and has some interesting perspective on certain key debates in philosophy and empiricism in particular.
In principle this book is focused on a more general audience. However I think some of the arguments and disputes in academic philosophy invoked here will remain opaque to that audience. However van Fraassen does engage with a broader audience in various ways. Linking his technical epistemological disputes to issues in more direct religious thought and experience. I am not that familiar with van Fraassen's writing but as I recall he rarely invokes his personal religious commitments in his academic writing and even here they are in some ways rather peripheral to much of his arguments.
The limited skeptical view of empiricism he sketches here which avoids treating any scientific claim as more than provisional and necessarily limited in scope is in conclusion not much different from many other positions of van Fraassen in early works or other empiricists. There are certainly salient points about the limits of general epistemic doctrines to be definite in light of shifting particulars. However n key questions I often found his arguments unconvincing perhaps the inference he seemed to draw as an inevitable consequence of process of elimination I viewed as dubitable, another time I might think he failed to consider various alternatives and so on. Still it is an interesting exposition of his position and has some interesting perspective on certain key debates in philosophy and empiricism in particular.
March 19, 2025
The book aims to construct a more defensible definition of empiricism as a basis for scientific rationality.
Naive empiricism states that what is true is what can be observed. But then it cannot rule out far fetched claims for which evidence is not available and therefore loses much traction against even absurd claims (that one might associate with religion, for example).
Naive materialism posits that the material concerns things that have object value in space, but then as physics advances the premises that define such object value become untenable. It has no stable footing and therefore any empiricism based on such definitions is unstable.
Van Fraassen proposes that a more robust normative framework proposes empiricism as a “stance”—that is, an orientation toward using empirics and rational inquiry as a way to probe the implications of claims—rather than a grounding belief like naive empiricism or materialism. Empiricism is taking science to be the way that we learn to question and even abandon certain beliefs. This is how empiricism can operate when all beliefs and theories are potentially false.
After developing the idea of the empirical stance, the book covers issues like rationalizing scientific revolutions (as a constructive alternative to Kuhn) and establishing standards for objective inquiry (which is how one operates from the empirical stance).
Naive empiricism states that what is true is what can be observed. But then it cannot rule out far fetched claims for which evidence is not available and therefore loses much traction against even absurd claims (that one might associate with religion, for example).
Naive materialism posits that the material concerns things that have object value in space, but then as physics advances the premises that define such object value become untenable. It has no stable footing and therefore any empiricism based on such definitions is unstable.
Van Fraassen proposes that a more robust normative framework proposes empiricism as a “stance”—that is, an orientation toward using empirics and rational inquiry as a way to probe the implications of claims—rather than a grounding belief like naive empiricism or materialism. Empiricism is taking science to be the way that we learn to question and even abandon certain beliefs. This is how empiricism can operate when all beliefs and theories are potentially false.
After developing the idea of the empirical stance, the book covers issues like rationalizing scientific revolutions (as a constructive alternative to Kuhn) and establishing standards for objective inquiry (which is how one operates from the empirical stance).
Read
March 20, 2024cursory reading
April 28, 2018
Basically, Van Fraassen is extremely skeptical of science and research results. However, he is not nearly as skeptical of Christianity. His arguments in favor of "empiricism" as he calls it would seem to, if genuinely applied to Christianity, make it utterly pointless to believe in such a religion. The book honestly reminded me of Christian books like The Reason for God where they try to loosen your confidence in science's importance and naturalism so that they can get you to try to believe in Christianity in the second part of the book. He doesn't offer any decent arguments for why someone would believe in, say, a god. In my opinion, the book is jumbled and self-contradictory. It also doesn't come across as intellectually honest.
July 16, 2013
I don't agree with some of his ideas but he has some good insight into empiricism and a very helpful analysis of the fuzziness of the concept of material.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
Can't find what you're looking for?
Get help and learn more about the design.