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Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure, 1898�2012
Since 1898, the United States and the United Nations have deployed military force more than three dozen times in attempts to rebuild failed states. Currently there are more state-building campaigns in progress than at any time in the past century including Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Sudan, Liberia, Cote d Ivoire, and Lebanon and the number of candidate nations for such campaigns in the future is substantial. Even with a broad definition of success, earlier campaigns failed more than half the time. In this book, Paul D. Miller brings his decade in the U.S. military, intelligence community, and policy worlds to bear on the question of what causes armed, international state-building campaigns by liberal powers to succeed or fail.
The United States successfully rebuilt the West German and Japanese states after World War II but failed to build a functioning state in South Vietnam. After the Cold War the United Nations oversaw relatively successful campaigns to restore order, hold elections, and organize post-conflict reconstruction in Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, and elsewhere, but those successes were overshadowed by catastrophes in Angola, Liberia, and Somalia. The recent effort in Iraq and the ongoing one in Afghanistan where Miller had firsthand military, intelligence, and policymaking experience are yielding mixed results, despite the high levels of resources dedicated and the long duration of the missions there. Miller outlines different types of state failure, analyzes various levels of intervention that liberal states have tried in the state-building process, and distinguishes among the various failures and successes those efforts have provoked.
The United States successfully rebuilt the West German and Japanese states after World War II but failed to build a functioning state in South Vietnam. After the Cold War the United Nations oversaw relatively successful campaigns to restore order, hold elections, and organize post-conflict reconstruction in Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, and elsewhere, but those successes were overshadowed by catastrophes in Angola, Liberia, and Somalia. The recent effort in Iraq and the ongoing one in Afghanistan where Miller had firsthand military, intelligence, and policymaking experience are yielding mixed results, despite the high levels of resources dedicated and the long duration of the missions there. Miller outlines different types of state failure, analyzes various levels of intervention that liberal states have tried in the state-building process, and distinguishes among the various failures and successes those efforts have provoked.
- GenresNonfiction
264 pages, Hardcover
First published July 12, 2013
3 people are currently reading
41 people want to read
About the author
Paul D. Miller
11Ìýbooks93ÌýfollowersPaul D. Miller writes widely on American foreign policy and international affairs, just war, political theory, theology, culture, and film. He is a senior fellow at the at the Atlantic Council. You can also find him on , , , and .
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July 6, 2017
In recent years, we've heard a lot about the enterprise of state-building, most notably in our attempts to do it in Afghanistan and Iraq after the wars in both places. (The author lists forty cases of armed state-building from 1898 through 2012.) But there's also a lot of popular skepticism about the whole enterprise of state-building � can it ever work?
Paul D. Miller argues yes and outlines the conditions. First, he says, we should have a notion of what a functioning government is supposed to do. A state, he argues, is meant to achieve five goals: {1} security through a monopoly on coercive force, {2} legitimacy of its claims to justice, {3} capacity to provide public goods/services, {4} economic prosperity, and {5} respect for human rights. Accordingly, "there are five types of state failure: anarchic, illegitimate, incapable, unproductive, and barbaric" (57).
On any of these, an unhealthy state might be weak, failing, or collapsed. State-building interventions are an attempt to improve these conditions, and Miller's thesis is that they succeed according to how well the strength of the strategy fits the severity of state failure in each of the five areas.
Miller lists three general strategies. The Observe Strategy is suitable for a weak state � it involves deploying a peace-keeping force, monitoring a ceasefire, facilitating DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration), and monitoring local security forces. For a failed or violent state, a more suitable strategy is the Train/Equip Strategy � providing security assistance, training local security forces, and embedding international forces among the local forces. And for a collapsed or anarchic state, the Administer Strategy is needed � deploying a peace enforcement force, executing combat operations, and establishing a military government or transitional authority.
Miller examines five case studies (West Germany, 1945-1955; Nicaragua, 1989-1992; Sierra Leone, 1999-2006; Liberia, 1993-1997; Afghanistan, 2001-2010) to test his thesis, and he recommends that policymakers focus on area expertise, suitable strategy, dialogue between foreign policy generalists and area experts, and making troop decisions based on the security situation rather than availability or political dynamics.
Does Miller have a good case? I know very little about the field other than what I've learned from reading Miller, but to my highly inexpert mind, I saw no leaps in logic or glaring counterexamples. Miller's style struck me as careful and trustworthy, so I defer to my betters on this one. For anyone with an interest in this area, I'd recommend Armed State Building.
Paul D. Miller argues yes and outlines the conditions. First, he says, we should have a notion of what a functioning government is supposed to do. A state, he argues, is meant to achieve five goals: {1} security through a monopoly on coercive force, {2} legitimacy of its claims to justice, {3} capacity to provide public goods/services, {4} economic prosperity, and {5} respect for human rights. Accordingly, "there are five types of state failure: anarchic, illegitimate, incapable, unproductive, and barbaric" (57).
On any of these, an unhealthy state might be weak, failing, or collapsed. State-building interventions are an attempt to improve these conditions, and Miller's thesis is that they succeed according to how well the strength of the strategy fits the severity of state failure in each of the five areas.
Miller lists three general strategies. The Observe Strategy is suitable for a weak state � it involves deploying a peace-keeping force, monitoring a ceasefire, facilitating DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration), and monitoring local security forces. For a failed or violent state, a more suitable strategy is the Train/Equip Strategy � providing security assistance, training local security forces, and embedding international forces among the local forces. And for a collapsed or anarchic state, the Administer Strategy is needed � deploying a peace enforcement force, executing combat operations, and establishing a military government or transitional authority.
Miller examines five case studies (West Germany, 1945-1955; Nicaragua, 1989-1992; Sierra Leone, 1999-2006; Liberia, 1993-1997; Afghanistan, 2001-2010) to test his thesis, and he recommends that policymakers focus on area expertise, suitable strategy, dialogue between foreign policy generalists and area experts, and making troop decisions based on the security situation rather than availability or political dynamics.
Does Miller have a good case? I know very little about the field other than what I've learned from reading Miller, but to my highly inexpert mind, I saw no leaps in logic or glaring counterexamples. Miller's style struck me as careful and trustworthy, so I defer to my betters on this one. For anyone with an interest in this area, I'd recommend Armed State Building.
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