Christopher Hibbert, MC, FRSL, FRGS (5 March 1924 - 21 December 2008) was an English writer, historian and biographer. He was a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature and the author of many books, including Disraeli, Edward VII, George IV, The Rise and Fall of the House of Medici, and Cavaliers and Roundheads.
Described by Professor Sir John Plumb as "a writer of the highest ability and in the New Statesman as "a pearl of biographers," he established himself as a leading popular historian/biographer whose works reflected meticulous scholarship.
What an excellent book!!!!! Hibbert, who is one of the best historians of the British military experience has done it again. In this learned and beautifully written book, he provides an in-depth study of the military life of Lord Raglan and how the Crimean War in which he was the supreme commander of the troops, affected him, both professionally and personally. Raglan, who fought beside and was a close personal friend and ADC of the great Duke of Wellington, learned the Duke's methods of warfare which were successful in defeating Napoleon. But those tactics were outdated when, 40 years later, Britain entered into the ill-advised Crimean War. Raglan was a good man, a brave man, but not a good General and his shyness and hesitancy coupled with his outmoded strategy brought controversy and government scorn upon him. According to Hibbert, this broke his heart and as a result, he died in the Crimea of that affliction. The battle scenes of the various battles, especially Inkerman and Balaclava are described in their horrifying detail and the reader can only be amazed at the unbelievable courage of the troops as they fought against an army that numbered twice it's size. As scholars of that war know, it accomplished nothing in relation to military conquest but did cause the government to modernize their battle tactics,reorganize their methods of materiel supply, and ensure the availability of medical care to the troops. Highly recommended to anyone who loves the history of the British military or just enjoy a thumping good read.
This is the second historical biography I have read from Christopher Hibbert and it was a great one. Lord Raglan was the unfortunate one-armed Commander-in-Chief for the British Army in the little known conflict between, on one side the Brits, the French and the Ottomans and on the other side, Russia. As with WWI, this war was primarily fought over control of the access to the Dardanelles and the Mediterranean for the Russians and was full of senseless slaughter. The Brits and French were ill-prepared for the war and seriously outmanned (nearly 3:1!) by the Russians. Not only that, but there was a series of stupid strategic errors that made the war drag on interminably to an incredibly unsatisfying stalemate. Also interesting to me was the fact that 3-5x more soldiers died from disease (primarily outbreaks of cholera and dysentery) than from combat itself. As for our protagonist Lord Raglan, he became a scapegoat to the armchair generals back in London for why the war dragged on for two years and he was unfairly blamed for errors committed by the French and some of his own incompetent staff (which the Empire imposed on him rather than letting him choose). It is also at the could-have-been-crucial-had-opportunities-not-been-squandered Battle of Balaclava where the infamous Charge of the Light Brigade occurred where one of the most beautiful calvary units ever assembled was annihilated by superior artillery in an absolutely insanely stupid charge by the British in which 75% of the Light Brigade were killed. This was also the context of the siege of Sebastopol in which countless people were slaughtered and the city ultimately not taken - primarily due to a poorly organized attack by the French. At the end of the day, Lord Raglan fell sick and died - primarily from depression both from the military setbacks and the domestic rumor mongering against him. This explains, of course, the title "The Destruction of Lord Raglan." Overall, the book is extremely readable if quite depressing, and I really appreciated getting the broader historical perspective on this, the last European war before WW1 which engaged tens of thousands of troops and was the final use of horse cavalry in warfare of the 19th C. Highly recommended.
Christopher Hibbert's The Destruction of Lord Raglan is a gripping, graphic narrative account of the Crimean War, that ever fascinating, excruciatingly pointless conflict that doomed a British Army to miserable, inglorious death in mismanaged battles, outbreaks of disease and brutal weather. Hibbert, a writer whose work I've found hit or miss, finds a topic well-suited to his style: the book bristles with detailed accounts of the Crimea's famous battles (Alma, Balaclava, Inkerman), alternating between the officers' bumbling tactics and the suffering of front line soldiers. The casual history buff will marvel at the incompetence on display; poor coordination at the Alma forced the British to take and retake the same Russian positions; the Light Cavalry Brigade is sent to its death due to poorly communicated orders; a vicious Russian assault at Inkerman flounders in a rainstorm that rendered the combat like "fighting in a nightmare." Between such horrific combats, soldiers suffered from inadequate provisions, poor medical supplies, weather alternating between extremes and endless outbreaks of cholera and malnutrition. This is not the book to read for a detailed overview of the Crimean War's diplomatic or political background; the Russians and Turks are bit players, although Hibbert pays due homage to the gallant, if occasionally frustrating French forces who served alongside Raglan's British army. Hibbert's attempts to rehabilitate the British commander, Lord Raglan, as something more than an amiable incompetent are wholly unconvincing, though he does make a half-persuasive argument that Raglan was often blamed for mistakes and oversights he had little control over. But the book is an extremely compelling as a chronicle of how British troops experienced one of the most miserable, pointless conflicts in history.
Crimea has been in the news over the past four years, as Putin's Russia seized the peninsula from the Ukraine in 2014. Of course, in the time of the Soviet Union and before, it was vital as it was the location of the important Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol. When Britain and France went to war with Russia in 1854 ( in order to save the declining Ottoman Empire), their objective was to capture Sevastopol. Today, if the Crimean War is remembered at all, it's remembered for the disastrous charge of the Light Brigade and the nursing of Florence Nightingale. It was one of the most terrible wars Britain was ever involved with, although Sevastopol was captured in the end. Hibbert gives us a good history of this war, but it is from the British POV His main point is that the commander, Lord Raglan, was blamed by the British government for the bad conditions that the soldiers suffered under. Her Majesty's government should bear the blame for not properly supporting the army with supplies and an adequate medical service. But the mismanagement was such that I don't think Raglan can escape entirely. As the author concludes, the Crimean War did lead to reforms of the British Army and a more humane treatment of the men.
Christopher Hibbert’s The Destruction of Lord Ragland is written well enough. The events are hard to read because the amount of bad work performed by so many leaders. This is a good book to quench your interest in what was a bad war. Among the problems in the books are that the book is mainly a defense of Lord Ragland and secondarily a condemnation of the military bureaucracy the British Army was stuck with during the post Wellington years. And it is also a history. The book is short, mostly a good thing but it is also too short. It is highly focused which helps it to achieve its first and second goal, but this reduces its value as history. I recommend this book to those with an interest in military history, but the recommendation is conflicted.
IF you only need the essential facts of the Crimean War, Wiki does it nicely in 1 paragraph: The Crimean War was a military conflict fought between October 1853 � March 1856 in which Russia lost to an alliance of France, the United Kingdom, the Ottoman Empire, and Sardinia. The immediate cause involved the rights of Christian minorities in the Holy Land, which was controlled by the Ottoman Empire. The French promoted the rights of Catholics, while Russia promoted those of the Eastern Orthodox Christians. The longer-term causes involved the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the unwillingness of the United Kingdom and France to allow Russia to gain territory and power at Ottoman expense. It has widely been noted that the causes, in one case involving an argument over a key, have never revealed a "greater confusion of purpose", yet led to a war noted for its "notoriously incompetent international butchery.
At the head of what was a notoriously incompetent British Army was a good man and a much wronged one, Field Marshal FitzRoy James Henry Somerset, 1st Baron Raglan, GCB, PC. The Lord Ragland of the title. He had been Chief of staff under Lord Wellington at Waterloo (Where he had lost an arm) and continued in this role until his commander retired. Denied overall command of the British Army, he was place at the head of a 40,000 man army who in combination with the above 3 allies sailed into the Black Sea to invade Russia.
A quick look at the map will tell you that European logistics even with solid Turkish support had to have been at its extremes, while the Russians would have every advantage defending its homeland. Some discussion of the problems of re supply as experienced by each of the Armies would have helped except that this is not primarily a history.
Total Allied strength is hard to estimate from the book, and throughout the text the impression is that the allies were everywhere severely out numbered. This may not be the case and points to a weakness in the book.
Because The Destruction of Lord Ragland is primarily about the problems he faced we quickly understand that: As a life time Chief of Staff, Lord Ragland never assumed the full authoritative voice of command. The System of officers buying rank was, outmoded and should have been ended. Almost every aspect of the British logistics system was in the hands of civilian departments all charged with lines of authority and obedience to procedures separate from military command or war time needs.
The war that brought us the poem The Charge of the Light Brigade gave us both the heroic image of brave men sent to die because they would follow orders, but also gave us the statement, “someone had blundered�. What makes so much of this book a hard read is that the British Soldier is everywhere the hero. Routinely performing at levels better than the quality of its leadership. Brave men died and someone routinely blunders.
This asks more questions. Lord Ragland seemed to be good enough as a commanding general to plan winning battles and respond to loosing situations. His order are routinely ignored, misunderstood or delayed. And yet his troops usually end the battle having driven off, defeated or stale mated superior numbers of Russian troops. How does this happen? What do we learn about the Russian soldier, and his leadership? What details of allied, especially French participation mattered? Mostly these topics are ignored.
In the final chapters we have copies of the mostly unfair charges levied against Lord Ragland. Unfair they seem to be, but His Lordship seems to be unable to record the ineffectiveness of the Crown’s system for supporting troops in war. Chief of Staff, rather than Commander in Chief, he is the loyal underling no matter the cost.
Especially frustrating was the end of this book. The British Army goes from be on the verge of collapse in the depths of Russian Winter, and then playing sports and selling extra provision on almost the next page. Was it really that easy?
Once His Lordship departs this history, Hibbert writes a very brief wrap-up. Perhaps because the Crimean War did not achieve much or perhaps because the Author loses interest.
I began The Destruction of Lord Ragland knowing almost nothing about the Crimean War. I finished it with more questions than answers. This history of the Crimean War leaves one with a sense that that this was an embarrassing example of that inhuman human failing, war
A reviewer friend of mine had good things to say about author Christopher Hibbert, so I started looking for some of his titles, especially since Hibbert published during the middle of the last century--a period of historiography that I tend to gravitate toward anyway. Hibbert's titles aren't scarce, but they aren't always easy to find without resorting to online sellers--eventually I ran across The Destruction of Lord Raglan, and eagerly snatched it up; not only was it the author I'd been looking for, but also about an event of which I had very little knowledge.
For those wondering what all that verbiage has to do with the review, the point is that while reading, I was evaluating this author as much as the information he presented. I'm often looking for comprehensive, general surveys of different periods and events, but am also well aware that there has been a growing trend in recent years toward revisionism, written for the sole purpose of justifying contemporary attitudes and opinions. One of the reasons I'm drawn toward accounts written in the middle of the last century is because there seemed to be less of that trend then; that, and recent controversies surrounding previously-acclaimed historians such as Stephen Ambrose, Orlando Figes, and even journalists such as Ryszard Kapuaeciñski make me wary of accepting any author immediately. Since my reading is broad and not deep, it may be years before I read anything else about the Crimean War, and I want the greatest value for the time spent--value being measured by a lucid narrative and impartiality.
The title of this book alone suggests that it's a rehabilitation project--and this, I think, can be entirely separate from revisionism as it's currently meant. As the commander of the English Army in the Crimea, Lord Raglan was severely criticized for the appalling conditions that the army had to face; and, as the war was one of the first widely reported on (most notably by The Times correspondent William Russell), it was from these indefensible (in all senses of the word) attacks in the media from which Lord Raglan suffered most. Borrowing a quote from Prince Metternich of Vienna, written at the occasion of Lord Raglan's death, Hibbert makes clear his intent; to "establish amply the historical truth concerning the character and conduct of Lord Raglan."
As such, The Destruction of Lord Raglan is both biography and military history. Events on the ground are described in detail, but always in relation to the central figure of Lord Raglan--thus, the geopolitical situation that propelled the conflict is given short shrift, as well as events outside of Lord Raglan's sphere. In other words, although Hibbert's book covers the most well-known battles, it is not, nor is it intended to be, a complete account of the war. Nor is it intended to be a complete biography of Lord Raglan's life--it is an examination of his actions as commander in the Crimea. And although it is a very good account, there is a supplemental feel to it, as if it should be read after a more comprehensive narrative (and perhaps, as another reviewer has suggested, along with Tolstoy's Sebastopol Sketches.)
In the end, I was impressed with Hibbert's account, even though I was a bit disappointed that it wasn't more comprehensive. Many military histories suffer from a large cast of characters--with the inherent problems of distinguishing one colonel from another, so to speak--and I found this to be true of Lord Raglan as well. But most importantly, Hibbert's depiction of his subject appears even-handed--the thoughts of Florence Nightingale, upon hearing of Lord Raglan's death, might very well sum up the author's assessment: "He was not a very great general, she thought, but he was a very good man." Although another commander may well have prevented the worst calamities of the war, the structure of the army, the incompetence of his officers, the problems with logistics and of dealing with his allies, and the unfair stings of the newspapers proved too much for a very good man to rise above.
A typical high calibre book by Hibbert. This was only his third book, but reads as well as any of his later works. What I enjoy about Hibbert above anything else is his writing, it's just such a delight to read. Emphatic, smooth, oftentimes cheeky. Despite the misery of the Crimean War, the moments of joy between the soldiers make the atrocities bearable. Hibbert brings their little in-jokes and anecdotes to life while constantly putting us in the boots (or often- the ragtag assortments of materials they could find to cover their feet) of the soldiers and the horrific conditions they faced.
The focus of the book is a little strange as the title suggests this is a biography first and foremost, but the attention is not really wholly on Lord Raglan, or not so much as other comparable biographies. The introduction to his life, all 60+ years of it before his appointment as CinC, is a brief whistle at the start and then we watch the details of the Crimean War play out, Lord Raglan as a character behind it all, until his demise in 1855. The book ends with his death, but as Raglan dies partway through the war, we do not observe the end of the Crimean War in this book. So in one way, it is neither a deep biography of its central character nor a comprehensive telling of the Crimean War. But, as someone unfamiliar to the topic, this was perfect. Again, just the effusiveness of Hibbert's prose makes his topic so interesting, so imminently readable. I'm inspired to read more which is always a positive feeling for a book to leave you with, though we learn as much about the war as you could expect in a span of only 300 pages. I would perhaps roughly describe this as an 'introduction to' the topic, but it depends how deep you would want to go. Certainly the major important elements seem to have been covered off here. There were a few things I found particularly interesting, which this book talks about in some depth:
* the relationship between Lord Raglan and the Great Man, Wellington. They are - in looks and perspective - very similar and I can see how Raglan's approach at times was extremely Wellington-esque. As a lover of Wellington it was fascinating therefore, to see how this approach ultimately failed in the context of a 'modern' army. Already the time of men of his like was over, & the procedures of war were no longer those that Wellington had mastered. As the book concludes, the Crimean War signalled the end of the archaic British way of doing things and ushered in a time for reformation of the army and perhaps, a distancing from Wellington as the archetypal British hero.
* the origins of the war. This is not something touched on in much depth here, I think because the causes are so woolly, which ultimately shows the bitter cruelty of this pointless war. Like so many others. The whole situation reminded me of the Battle of Gallipoli, both in geography and in the pointless wastage of life in both cases. I was surprised Hibbert didn't mention the Great Game and the wider context of British-Russian relations at this time, as essentially it appears this war was a release of pressure during the butting of heads between the two major powers at the time. Also, the involvement of France , within the living memory of Lord Raglan himself and many others as Britain's enemies, leading to such jealousy but, gentle comradery too, makes for fascinating reading.
* is this the first war where the press is such a major player? It certainly seems so, I suppose since the invention of the telegram 20 years prior - and no major wars took place before this one - suddenly the ease of communication leads to topical newspapers. The influence of the Times in particular is discussed in depth here. I found it humorous to see a review by the Times on the front, given the elbowing it gets in this book for its role in revealing British intel to the Russians and marring Raglan's image.
Interestingly Hibbert expresses the view that Lord Raglan is a victim of his circumstances and that players such as the press unfairly criticised him. Despite a narrative that is very sympathetic to the man, I struggle to agree. While Lord Raglan is not responsible for all the events of the War, such as the pre-existing flaws in the Army already - and indeed some of his misfortune is just plain bad luck - ultimately a fish rots from the head down. We are told of the numerous problems leading to the failure of the British in the Crimean War, and Lord Raglan's individual flaws, but each time are told how nice a man he is, how hard he worked, how moved he was by the army's suffering, as if this absolves him of blame. He was ultimately the wrong man for the job (perhaps there was no right man) which is a tragedy because as we learn in this book, for all his faults Lord Raglan was a British gent of the highest order, a dutiful servant to the state (of Wellington's stature, if not his success). The final paragraph in this book, a quote from Raglan on the fundamental goodness of the British soldier is a touching reflection of his fundamental goodness. Only a shame that it had to be exposed to such horrific circumstances, dying ultimately - I could believe - of a broken heart. it's a complicated situation, with so many individuals shouldering the blame.
A wonderful book edited to within an inch of its life. Hibbert is a unique author who writes in a style that I have not come across before. A concise and to the point account of the Crimean War and all its political and military fall out. I’ve read numerous books on this conflict and this would be a great starter for someone new to the topic. Loved it.
The Crimean War brought the armies of Britain, France, Turkey, Russia, and eventually Sardinia (Italy) to fight on the shores of the Black Sea’s Crimean Peninsula. One product of this conflict was the creation of tens of thousands of letters, personal memoirs, official histories, and modern accounts of the battles and the related war that today fill the shelves of the world’s libraries, archives, and perhaps even today its attics. This resulted in great part not only from the efforts of Mr. Russell of The London Times, probably the first modern war correspondent, and his colleagues, but also from the many literate veterans of this conflict, especially from England. The Crimean War was probably the first war to produce so many accounts from the soldiers in the ranks instead of just the army commanders and senior officers. With such raw material to work with it is little wonder that the library on the Crimean War has continued to grow as historians continued to work through it. Over his career, historian Christopher Hibbert has written many excellent works recounting the history and/or biography of places, events, and individuals both British and non-British. He presented his contribution on the Crimean war in 1961 in the form of this biography/military history centered upon the role the of the British Army’s Commander, Lord Raglan, before and during the war in the Crimea. Curiously, Hibbert’s book appeared at about the time that I first read Cecil Woodham-Smith’s “The Reason Why� and discovered the body of scholarship on this conflict that was relatively forgotten and unknown in the United States at that time. Woodham-Smith’s work was an important contribution to scholarship and popular literature on the war, first published in 1953, and telling the story of the Charge of the Light Brigade at the Battle of Balaclava (immortalized in Longfellow’s poem, The Charge of the Light Brigade). I really regret that it took me this long to discover Hibbert’s book because having finally read it I consider “The Destruction of Lord Raglan� to be one of the best English-language histories of the Crimean War. If you want to study this conflict, you have to include ‘Lord Raglan� in your readings. Published almost 50 years ago, Hibbert’s work obviously does not reflect the scholarship of recent years. However, he was the first author to make extensive use of Lord Raglan’s own correspondence and papers in both the Royal Archives at Windsor Castle, but also those held at the Royal United Services Institute. In his acknowledgements, the author makes further note of the many other sources upon which he drew in researching Lord Raglan and the Crimean War. The Sources listed in the published work extend for almost eight pages and include English, French, and Russian language sources. Christopher Hibbert writes that no one interested in learning and writing about the Crimean War can avoid W.A. Kinglake’s masterful nine volume history, “The Invasion of the Crimea,� published 1877-1888. Having discovered “The Destruction of Lord Raglan,� I would dare to amend his advice to add, “nor can the serious student of this conflict ignore Christopher Hibbert’s “The Destruction of Lord Raglan.�
An excellent narrative history--readable, and informative.
In our world of embedded reporters and ubiquitous news it was interesting to read about the Times' campaign against the slightly hapless Lord Raglan. As was written in the book, "not a great general, but undoubtedly a good man." The descriptions of the battles, and the privations suffered by the army were very vivid. Overall a very good book on Lord Raglan and the Crimean War.
Really interesting military history of the Crimean war & Victorian life. I love stuff like this. Well written too. I found an old Pelican paperback version in a charity shop.