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Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror
An unprecedented high-level master narrative of America's intelligence wars, demonstrating in a time of new threats that espionage and the search for factsare essential to our democracy For General Michael Hayden, playing to the edge means playing so close to the line that you get chalk dust on your cleats. Otherwise, by playing back, you may protect yourself, but you will be less successful in protecting America. "Play to the edge" was Hayden's guiding principle when he ran the National Security Agency, and it remained so when he ran CIA. In his view, many shortsighted and uninformed people are quick to criticize, and this book will give them much to chew on but little easy comfort; it is an unapologetic insider's look told from the perspective of the people who faced awesome responsibilities head on, in the moment. How did American intelligence respond to terrorism, a major war and the most sweeping technological revolution in the last 500 years? What was NSA before 9/11 and how did it change in its aftermath? Why did NSA begin the controversial terrorist surveillance program that included the acquisition of domestic phone records? What else was set in motion during this period that formed the backdrop for the infamous Snowden revelations in 2013? As Director of CIA in the last three years of the Bush administration, Hayden had to deal with the rendition, detention and interrogation program as bequeathed to him by his predecessors. He also had to ramp up the agency to support its role in the targeted killing program that began to dramatically increase in July 2008. This was a time of great crisis at CIA, and some agency veterans have credited Hayden with actually saving the agency. He himself won't go that far, but he freely acknowledges that CIA helped turn the American security establishment into the most effective killing machine in the history of armed conflict. For 10 years, then, General Michael Hayden was a participant in some of the most telling events in the annals of American national security. General Hayden's goals are in writing this book are simple and No apologies. No excuses. Just what happened. And why. As he writes, "There is a story here that deserves to be told, without varnish and without spin. My view is my view, and others will certainly have different perspectives, but this view deserves to be told to create as complete a history as possible of these turbulent times. I bear no grudges, or at least not many, but I do want this to be a straightforward and readable history for that slice of the American population who depend on and appreciate intelligence, but who do not have the time to master its many obscure characteristics."
452 pages, Kindle Edition
First published February 23, 2016
431 people are currently reading
2556 people want to read
About the author
Michael V. Hayden
8books79followersMichael Hayden is a retired United States Air Force four-star general and former Director of the National Security Agency, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He is currently a principal at the Chertoff Group, a security consultancy founded by former Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff. Hayden also serves as a Distinguished Visiting Professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government and is the founder of the Hayden Center for Intelligence, Policy, and International Security there. He is the author of the New York Times bestseller Playing to the Edge.
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March 26, 2016
There was a time when I thought Michael V. Hayden and his ilk were scum, but, as Hayden himself acknowledges: “You can only dehumanize an enemy from a distance� (238). Once I let Hayden into my head, he gave my liberal, civilian ass a serious reality check. Despite its nonlinear format and a bevy of technical jargon that I struggled to properly parse, Playing to the Edge challenged me to consider new perspectives about how and why Americans need––and should even celebrate––our practitioners of espionage.
This book’s title is a carefully chosen sports metaphor; it functions at multiple levels throughout Hayden’s memoir of heading up both the NSA and CIA during the late 1990s and early 2000s. “The reference,� Hayden explains, “is to using all the tools and all the authorities available, much like how a good athlete takes advantage of the entire playing field right up to the sideline markers and endlines� (xiv). In Hayden’s view, it is the job of intelligence services to take every inch allowed by the law in order to keep Americans safe.
Whether or not Americans agree with Hayden’s viewpoint is less important than our ability to learn from his experience. That’s why Playing to the Edge is a valuable text, even if it is also confounding, sad, and occasionally infuriating. Hayden prompts us to look deeply at our ambivalent relationship with national security, and suggests how we might shed some light on it while still preserving the elements of secrecy on which all intelligence is founded. This is a monumental task––one that nobody could expect Hayden to accomplish alone. But his experiences have given him a singular view of the security landscape, and from this vantage point he makes a worthy contribution to our national dialogue.
From the start, Hayden works very hard to dissuade readers who think the “freedom vs. security� trade-off is a sham. For Hayden and his colleagues, the tension between freedom and security is much more than an abstraction; it is the protean global wound from which their job derives its meaning. Hayden repeatedly points out that maintaining freedom and security concurrently is a grueling and thankless charge. Instead of understanding the deadly nuances that intelligence officials deal with every day, people prefer to “criticize intelligence agencies for not doing enough when they feel in danger, while reserving the right to criticize those agencies for doing too much when they feel safe again� (34-5). I happen to think our spies should be forced to live with this pickle (as they do), but Hayden is right to point out that, even on the best days, it’s a damned difficult position to be in.
Hayden thinks the Americans who take up this burden on behalf of the rest of us are under-appreciated; after reading this book, I’m inclined to agree. Hayden goes to great lengths to demonstrate how hard people at the NSA and CIA work to ensure that their actions are safe and lawful––even when they fail. Though part of me balked at the suggestion, it was more of a relief than anything else to learn that “CIA is composed of ordinary Americans. Ordinary Americans placed in extraordinary circumstances and expected to do extraordinary things� (272-3).
Even when our intelligence personnel fail or disgrace us, what do we accomplish by vilifying them? Hayden provides a disquieting but wise answer: “They get to say, and say publicly, ‘See. This wasn’t about us. It was never about us. We’re not like that. Those people, those people over there. The ones who lied. It’s about them’� (400). If we, the public, continually exculpate ourselves from the moral transgressions of those we send to guard the walls of our republic, for how long will we deserve that protection? This question should not be used to silence all criticism of intelligence agencies, nor should it lead us to believe everything we’re told about how they operate. But it should make us stop and think about what we are really willing to give (or to tolerate) to preserve our illusions of safety in an inherently dangerous world.
If Hayden is an expert at needling the conflict between freedom and security, he is equally adept at framing the role of intelligence in the modern world. Even though there are plenty of sections in this book that merely catalog “one damned thing after another,� Playing to the Edge is also peppered with telling insights about what intelligence is and how it operates. The most delightful aspect of these moments is that they sometimes apply not only to intelligence in the narrow context of national security, but also in the broad context of what it means to act intelligently in general (something that is notoriously difficult to define).
My favorite of these characterizations is also the most vexing. Hayden contrasts intelligence with traditional justice:
"[Traditional justice] is a process of assigning guilt and meting out punishment after an evil has been done, with time not a factor, and with the appropriate standard of proof being beyond a reasonable doubt.
None of that applies to intelligence, where the evil is pending, time is always critical, and where the objective is to enable action even in the face of continued doubt.� (280)
The sticky truth is that we ask our intelligence agencies to do an impossible job, which is to protect us from the future. No reasonable person would deny that bad things can be prevented with proper foresight and preparation, but neither would that same person deny that the future is always uncertain until it becomes the present. So we toss our intelligence people into the middle of that paradox and let them sweat it out. Then we go get a cheeseburger and think about who’s going to win March Madness.
Lest you should think I’ve downed Hayden’s Kool-Aid without a fight, I’ve got a few serious bones to pick with him. The first is that, throughout the book, he is far too defensive about the claims of his critics. Hayden is happy to lionize those who “play to the edge� in the name of security, but doesn’t extend the same magnanimity to those who take up the arduous task of scrutinizing whether or not the receiver was actually in-bounds when the catch was made. Too often, Hayden comes off as a football coach who prefers it when the opposing team and referees just don't show up for the big game. He seems to find the idea that there are multiple interpretations of the law distasteful, especially when those interpretations might render some of his or his colleagues� actions unlawful.
Hayden haughtily dismisses the work of journalists like Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras as “hopelessly agenda-driven� (124). This is a myopic and unfair characterization of people many Americans see as heroes––myself included. Hayden’s appraisal of Edward Snowden is even worse; he calls Snowden an “incredibly naive, hopelessly narcissistic, and insufferably self-important defector� (421). Even if those labels rightly apply to Snowden, they are certainly not the only ones that do. Hayden credits Snowden for shedding light on the need to improve the “relationship between the intelligence community and the public it serves,� but gives him no recognition for bravely standing up for his core beliefs, for doing something he knew would make him a global target, or for sacrificing his personal achievement of the American Dream in order to promote his vision of a better America (422). By assuming a view so devoid of nuance, Hayden belies many of his other insights about the importance of grey areas when assessing security situations; he also risks looking like precisely the villain that indignant liberals accuse him of being.
This problem is compounded by sections in Playing to the Edge that read like something straight out of Heller or Orwell. Take this example:
"Enhanced interrogation techniques had been used on about a third of the hundred or so HVDs [High-Value Detainees] that had been held. The techniques were not used to elicit information, but rather to move a detainee from defiance to cooperation by imposing on him a state of helplessness. When he got to the latter state (the duration varied, but on average a week or so), interrogations resembled debriefings or conversations." (223, emphasis his)
This is the insidious logic of a teenage psychopath caught abusing a dog: “I wasn’t hitting him to make him do what I wanted! I was just trying to show him what would happen if he didn’t!�
Similarly disturbing are Hayden’s calculations about how to weaken Iran:
"What kind of internal tensions would distract Iranians from the nuclear program, cause them to divert resources from it, or convince them it wasn’t worth the candle or at least make their behavior more costly?
Iran has fault lines; it is far from a homogenous society…Would it be possible to exploit or deepen the unhappiness that these groups already had with the government?…What kind of messaging could mobilize these groups and energize these disputes? What kind of actions could inspire or appear to reflect heightened dissidence?" (303-4).
Reading passages like this made me feel like a more appropriate title for the book might have been Playing with Lives. I find it sickening that some of our best and brightest spend their time trying to weaken foreign nations in such a fashion––even in the name of preventing nuclear proliferation. Nebulous phrases like “divert resources� and “deepen the unhappiness� and “energize these disputes� obfuscate the larger goal here, which is to sacrifice the stability of a nation––to compromise thousands upon thousands of innocent lives––because we are terrified of what might happen if they acquire one nuclear bomb. Perhaps this is evidence that I’m simply not grokking what’s really at stake, but I’ve never accepted the logic that America should go to such lengths to ensure nonproliferation. If Iran gets one bomb, we still have thousands––the deterrent against initiating a nuclear strike still seems perfectly robust. And in an era when cyber attacks and biological warfare can be just as damaging as nukes (if not moreso), why is nonproliferation still an acceptable justification for undermining a foreign nation?
There is a systemic trend here: By asking individuals to serve in our intelligence agencies, we foist on them a kind of selective empathy. We train them to be highly perspicacious and flexible when detecting threats, mimicking the thought processes of enemies, and designing security solutions, while also dulling their sensitivity to the plight of perceived enemies. We require their perspective-taking habits to conform to the standards of treaties, laws, and global conflicts, while simultaneously resisting many of the intuitive mechanisms of mutual understanding that pervade social life. I believe this is a necessary but tragic predicament that enables our intelligence apparatus to function properly; but it doesn’t come without a personal cost to those on the ground.
The influence of the “us-versus-them� mentality is powerful, as demonstrated by Hayden’s reflections on a conversation with Branco Krga, a Serbian intelligence officer:
"At one point Branco leaned into me over lunch and lamented the deaths of so many young men. He talked especially about Serb grief, with one- and two-child families now the norm, and then it happened. 'But these Muslim families,' he continued with a wave of his hand, 'they are so large, what does it matter to them?'
There is little point in arguing. Just don’t agree or even seem to agree. Sit there, expressionless, not allowing yourself the almost instinctive head nod signaling 'transmission acknowledged,' hoping that the episode passes quickly and you can get back to useful dialogue.
It took a while, but one night as I was preparing for an overnight hop to another destination on a foreign trip, the thought struck me. What of my side of these dialogues did our partners dismiss as American mythology? When I talked about self-determination? Cultural pluralism? The curative effect of elections? And when were my partners patiently waiting while I finished before we got back to 'serious' talk?" (317)
Rather than blaming Branco for his harshness and praising Hayden for his trenchant revelation, my first impulse is to lament the need for such discussions and interactions between people and nations. I picture Hayden sitting there, blank-faced, not showing an inkling of the disgust he must have felt. And seeing that in my mind’s eye, I conclude that something in the world is profoundly broken. But, to my surprise, I also conclude that something in the world is pressing on, despite setbacks and sins, despite cruelty and callousness, despite disease and death.
Where does this leave me? Well, I agree with Hayden when he asserts that “Rather than just being compatible with a democracy, espionage is essential to it. Frightened people don’t make good democrats. No spies. Less security. Less freedom� (427). I also think he is right to conclude that intelligence agencies need better and more frequent communication with the American public:
"The American intelligence community owes the public it serves enough data so that people can make out the broad shapes and broad movements of what intelligence is doing, but they do not need specific operational details. The former should suffice to build trust, while the latter would be destructive of espionage’s inherent purposes." (424)
This balance is currently skewed far too much in favor of secrecy, and it’s good to see Hayden pushing for transparency where appropriate. Only time can reveal if the sacrifices we make for freedom and security are worth it, in the end. But right now, caught in the dizzy unfolding of events, there is some comfort in knowing that good people of all sorts are pushing for their respective ends. Though some of his views and actions repulse me, I’m glad Hayden served my country, and fortunate for the chance to encounter this book.
This review was originally published on my blog, .
This book’s title is a carefully chosen sports metaphor; it functions at multiple levels throughout Hayden’s memoir of heading up both the NSA and CIA during the late 1990s and early 2000s. “The reference,� Hayden explains, “is to using all the tools and all the authorities available, much like how a good athlete takes advantage of the entire playing field right up to the sideline markers and endlines� (xiv). In Hayden’s view, it is the job of intelligence services to take every inch allowed by the law in order to keep Americans safe.
Whether or not Americans agree with Hayden’s viewpoint is less important than our ability to learn from his experience. That’s why Playing to the Edge is a valuable text, even if it is also confounding, sad, and occasionally infuriating. Hayden prompts us to look deeply at our ambivalent relationship with national security, and suggests how we might shed some light on it while still preserving the elements of secrecy on which all intelligence is founded. This is a monumental task––one that nobody could expect Hayden to accomplish alone. But his experiences have given him a singular view of the security landscape, and from this vantage point he makes a worthy contribution to our national dialogue.
From the start, Hayden works very hard to dissuade readers who think the “freedom vs. security� trade-off is a sham. For Hayden and his colleagues, the tension between freedom and security is much more than an abstraction; it is the protean global wound from which their job derives its meaning. Hayden repeatedly points out that maintaining freedom and security concurrently is a grueling and thankless charge. Instead of understanding the deadly nuances that intelligence officials deal with every day, people prefer to “criticize intelligence agencies for not doing enough when they feel in danger, while reserving the right to criticize those agencies for doing too much when they feel safe again� (34-5). I happen to think our spies should be forced to live with this pickle (as they do), but Hayden is right to point out that, even on the best days, it’s a damned difficult position to be in.
Hayden thinks the Americans who take up this burden on behalf of the rest of us are under-appreciated; after reading this book, I’m inclined to agree. Hayden goes to great lengths to demonstrate how hard people at the NSA and CIA work to ensure that their actions are safe and lawful––even when they fail. Though part of me balked at the suggestion, it was more of a relief than anything else to learn that “CIA is composed of ordinary Americans. Ordinary Americans placed in extraordinary circumstances and expected to do extraordinary things� (272-3).
Even when our intelligence personnel fail or disgrace us, what do we accomplish by vilifying them? Hayden provides a disquieting but wise answer: “They get to say, and say publicly, ‘See. This wasn’t about us. It was never about us. We’re not like that. Those people, those people over there. The ones who lied. It’s about them’� (400). If we, the public, continually exculpate ourselves from the moral transgressions of those we send to guard the walls of our republic, for how long will we deserve that protection? This question should not be used to silence all criticism of intelligence agencies, nor should it lead us to believe everything we’re told about how they operate. But it should make us stop and think about what we are really willing to give (or to tolerate) to preserve our illusions of safety in an inherently dangerous world.
If Hayden is an expert at needling the conflict between freedom and security, he is equally adept at framing the role of intelligence in the modern world. Even though there are plenty of sections in this book that merely catalog “one damned thing after another,� Playing to the Edge is also peppered with telling insights about what intelligence is and how it operates. The most delightful aspect of these moments is that they sometimes apply not only to intelligence in the narrow context of national security, but also in the broad context of what it means to act intelligently in general (something that is notoriously difficult to define).
My favorite of these characterizations is also the most vexing. Hayden contrasts intelligence with traditional justice:
"[Traditional justice] is a process of assigning guilt and meting out punishment after an evil has been done, with time not a factor, and with the appropriate standard of proof being beyond a reasonable doubt.
None of that applies to intelligence, where the evil is pending, time is always critical, and where the objective is to enable action even in the face of continued doubt.� (280)
The sticky truth is that we ask our intelligence agencies to do an impossible job, which is to protect us from the future. No reasonable person would deny that bad things can be prevented with proper foresight and preparation, but neither would that same person deny that the future is always uncertain until it becomes the present. So we toss our intelligence people into the middle of that paradox and let them sweat it out. Then we go get a cheeseburger and think about who’s going to win March Madness.
Lest you should think I’ve downed Hayden’s Kool-Aid without a fight, I’ve got a few serious bones to pick with him. The first is that, throughout the book, he is far too defensive about the claims of his critics. Hayden is happy to lionize those who “play to the edge� in the name of security, but doesn’t extend the same magnanimity to those who take up the arduous task of scrutinizing whether or not the receiver was actually in-bounds when the catch was made. Too often, Hayden comes off as a football coach who prefers it when the opposing team and referees just don't show up for the big game. He seems to find the idea that there are multiple interpretations of the law distasteful, especially when those interpretations might render some of his or his colleagues� actions unlawful.
Hayden haughtily dismisses the work of journalists like Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras as “hopelessly agenda-driven� (124). This is a myopic and unfair characterization of people many Americans see as heroes––myself included. Hayden’s appraisal of Edward Snowden is even worse; he calls Snowden an “incredibly naive, hopelessly narcissistic, and insufferably self-important defector� (421). Even if those labels rightly apply to Snowden, they are certainly not the only ones that do. Hayden credits Snowden for shedding light on the need to improve the “relationship between the intelligence community and the public it serves,� but gives him no recognition for bravely standing up for his core beliefs, for doing something he knew would make him a global target, or for sacrificing his personal achievement of the American Dream in order to promote his vision of a better America (422). By assuming a view so devoid of nuance, Hayden belies many of his other insights about the importance of grey areas when assessing security situations; he also risks looking like precisely the villain that indignant liberals accuse him of being.
This problem is compounded by sections in Playing to the Edge that read like something straight out of Heller or Orwell. Take this example:
"Enhanced interrogation techniques had been used on about a third of the hundred or so HVDs [High-Value Detainees] that had been held. The techniques were not used to elicit information, but rather to move a detainee from defiance to cooperation by imposing on him a state of helplessness. When he got to the latter state (the duration varied, but on average a week or so), interrogations resembled debriefings or conversations." (223, emphasis his)
This is the insidious logic of a teenage psychopath caught abusing a dog: “I wasn’t hitting him to make him do what I wanted! I was just trying to show him what would happen if he didn’t!�
Similarly disturbing are Hayden’s calculations about how to weaken Iran:
"What kind of internal tensions would distract Iranians from the nuclear program, cause them to divert resources from it, or convince them it wasn’t worth the candle or at least make their behavior more costly?
Iran has fault lines; it is far from a homogenous society…Would it be possible to exploit or deepen the unhappiness that these groups already had with the government?…What kind of messaging could mobilize these groups and energize these disputes? What kind of actions could inspire or appear to reflect heightened dissidence?" (303-4).
Reading passages like this made me feel like a more appropriate title for the book might have been Playing with Lives. I find it sickening that some of our best and brightest spend their time trying to weaken foreign nations in such a fashion––even in the name of preventing nuclear proliferation. Nebulous phrases like “divert resources� and “deepen the unhappiness� and “energize these disputes� obfuscate the larger goal here, which is to sacrifice the stability of a nation––to compromise thousands upon thousands of innocent lives––because we are terrified of what might happen if they acquire one nuclear bomb. Perhaps this is evidence that I’m simply not grokking what’s really at stake, but I’ve never accepted the logic that America should go to such lengths to ensure nonproliferation. If Iran gets one bomb, we still have thousands––the deterrent against initiating a nuclear strike still seems perfectly robust. And in an era when cyber attacks and biological warfare can be just as damaging as nukes (if not moreso), why is nonproliferation still an acceptable justification for undermining a foreign nation?
There is a systemic trend here: By asking individuals to serve in our intelligence agencies, we foist on them a kind of selective empathy. We train them to be highly perspicacious and flexible when detecting threats, mimicking the thought processes of enemies, and designing security solutions, while also dulling their sensitivity to the plight of perceived enemies. We require their perspective-taking habits to conform to the standards of treaties, laws, and global conflicts, while simultaneously resisting many of the intuitive mechanisms of mutual understanding that pervade social life. I believe this is a necessary but tragic predicament that enables our intelligence apparatus to function properly; but it doesn’t come without a personal cost to those on the ground.
The influence of the “us-versus-them� mentality is powerful, as demonstrated by Hayden’s reflections on a conversation with Branco Krga, a Serbian intelligence officer:
"At one point Branco leaned into me over lunch and lamented the deaths of so many young men. He talked especially about Serb grief, with one- and two-child families now the norm, and then it happened. 'But these Muslim families,' he continued with a wave of his hand, 'they are so large, what does it matter to them?'
There is little point in arguing. Just don’t agree or even seem to agree. Sit there, expressionless, not allowing yourself the almost instinctive head nod signaling 'transmission acknowledged,' hoping that the episode passes quickly and you can get back to useful dialogue.
It took a while, but one night as I was preparing for an overnight hop to another destination on a foreign trip, the thought struck me. What of my side of these dialogues did our partners dismiss as American mythology? When I talked about self-determination? Cultural pluralism? The curative effect of elections? And when were my partners patiently waiting while I finished before we got back to 'serious' talk?" (317)
Rather than blaming Branco for his harshness and praising Hayden for his trenchant revelation, my first impulse is to lament the need for such discussions and interactions between people and nations. I picture Hayden sitting there, blank-faced, not showing an inkling of the disgust he must have felt. And seeing that in my mind’s eye, I conclude that something in the world is profoundly broken. But, to my surprise, I also conclude that something in the world is pressing on, despite setbacks and sins, despite cruelty and callousness, despite disease and death.
Where does this leave me? Well, I agree with Hayden when he asserts that “Rather than just being compatible with a democracy, espionage is essential to it. Frightened people don’t make good democrats. No spies. Less security. Less freedom� (427). I also think he is right to conclude that intelligence agencies need better and more frequent communication with the American public:
"The American intelligence community owes the public it serves enough data so that people can make out the broad shapes and broad movements of what intelligence is doing, but they do not need specific operational details. The former should suffice to build trust, while the latter would be destructive of espionage’s inherent purposes." (424)
This balance is currently skewed far too much in favor of secrecy, and it’s good to see Hayden pushing for transparency where appropriate. Only time can reveal if the sacrifices we make for freedom and security are worth it, in the end. But right now, caught in the dizzy unfolding of events, there is some comfort in knowing that good people of all sorts are pushing for their respective ends. Though some of his views and actions repulse me, I’m glad Hayden served my country, and fortunate for the chance to encounter this book.
This review was originally published on my blog, .
May 4, 2016
This is a superb book. It will give you incredible insight into NSA and CIA. Okay before I say more let me note that I know the author. He was stationed at Osan AB, Korea in a job very similar to the one I had on Okinawa in the early 1980s. We were both Air Force Majors then and had briefly met in Hawaii. When he heard I was up at Osan, he caught up with me and said, "c'mon over to my place tonight Janine will fix dinner." I went, had a good time because he and Janine just two very down to earth, genuine people. At that time they were home schooling their kids. They are every bit as Catholic as they claim to be and it is no surprise that they took the chaplain on a family vacation.
Fast forward to 1991 or so. Mike and I are both Colonels. He is still on his way up and I am surprised that I have gotten as far as I did. I am the Air Attache in Warsaw, Poland. Mikey is the executive assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force, then Donald B. Rice. Mikey and I are working out details for a visit Dr. Rice is about to make to Poland. Things are pretty well set and Mikey says to me, "okay Joe, let me ask you this. If i were able to do one thing for you, what would it be? " I said, "easy stuff, have the Secretary bring the Polish Air Force Commander an invitation to visit the US as General McPeak's guest." General Merrill McPeak was then the Chief of Staff of the USAF. To make a long story short, Dr. Rice came with that invitation and General Jerzy Gotowala, Commander Polish Air Force, became the first senior military officer from the former Warsaw Pact to visit the US.
I told you that story to show you what kind of guy Mikey Hayden is. He delivers.
But he is much more than that, he is a remarkable man who held some of the toughest jobs a military officer can hold. This is his story and he tells it well and in a conversational tone. This is a very readable book and it explains why both NSA and CIA have done the things they have done. It is also the story of a remarkable career in the Air Force. Is there a tiny bit of self promotion? Perhaps, but if there is it does not come close to that done by Stan McCrystal or David Petraeus. And, when Mikey quotes Plato or whoever you know that unlike the other two, he has actually read the relevant writing.
I basically can see everything Mikey talks about happening. Even though he is a tiny bit embarrassed about saying this, I 110% agree with his description of Edward Snowden. It is on page 421. "I am no doubt betraying my own background when I say that I think Snowden is an incredibly naive, hopelessly narcissistic, and insufferably self-important defector. In early October 2013 at a Washington panel, moderator David Ignatius began by pointing out that Snowden had been nominated and was on the short list for the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. (It eventually went to Pakistani teenager Malala Yousafzai.) I couldn’t help commenting that “I must admit in my darker moments over the past several months, I’d also thought of nominating Mr. Snowden, but it was for a different list.�
Fast forward to 1991 or so. Mike and I are both Colonels. He is still on his way up and I am surprised that I have gotten as far as I did. I am the Air Attache in Warsaw, Poland. Mikey is the executive assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force, then Donald B. Rice. Mikey and I are working out details for a visit Dr. Rice is about to make to Poland. Things are pretty well set and Mikey says to me, "okay Joe, let me ask you this. If i were able to do one thing for you, what would it be? " I said, "easy stuff, have the Secretary bring the Polish Air Force Commander an invitation to visit the US as General McPeak's guest." General Merrill McPeak was then the Chief of Staff of the USAF. To make a long story short, Dr. Rice came with that invitation and General Jerzy Gotowala, Commander Polish Air Force, became the first senior military officer from the former Warsaw Pact to visit the US.
I told you that story to show you what kind of guy Mikey Hayden is. He delivers.
But he is much more than that, he is a remarkable man who held some of the toughest jobs a military officer can hold. This is his story and he tells it well and in a conversational tone. This is a very readable book and it explains why both NSA and CIA have done the things they have done. It is also the story of a remarkable career in the Air Force. Is there a tiny bit of self promotion? Perhaps, but if there is it does not come close to that done by Stan McCrystal or David Petraeus. And, when Mikey quotes Plato or whoever you know that unlike the other two, he has actually read the relevant writing.
I basically can see everything Mikey talks about happening. Even though he is a tiny bit embarrassed about saying this, I 110% agree with his description of Edward Snowden. It is on page 421. "I am no doubt betraying my own background when I say that I think Snowden is an incredibly naive, hopelessly narcissistic, and insufferably self-important defector. In early October 2013 at a Washington panel, moderator David Ignatius began by pointing out that Snowden had been nominated and was on the short list for the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. (It eventually went to Pakistani teenager Malala Yousafzai.) I couldn’t help commenting that “I must admit in my darker moments over the past several months, I’d also thought of nominating Mr. Snowden, but it was for a different list.�
June 19, 2016
A broad and engaging if not always well-written memoir of Hayden’s military, NSA, and CIA career that covers a lot of territory in a calm, deadpan style (and often comes off as pessimistic) Most of the book deals with such topics as bureaucratic turf wars and the tension between privacy and security, or between a free press and an intelligence organization. Of course, Hayden does defend STELLAR WIND, advocates a modified version of the CIA’s terrorist detention and interrogation practices, and does describe the 2008 expansion of drone strikes, but, in all, he does not add much to what is already known about these programs.
The title refers to Hayden’s involvement in covert programs that pushed the envelope of legality. Throughout the narrative Hayden advocates for these, especially if their main target is foreign terrorist networks. Hayden comes off as more concerned with resolving legal issues and maintaining good relations with Congress and the White House than in the day-to-day affairs of the intelligence community. The book often reads like a legal brief as Hayden describes the programs and the review process by the White House, the Justice Department, and the intelligence community’s own lawyers. He does succeed in describing the challenges of fighting al-Qaeda, which he describes as easy to kill but hard to find, as well as the often frustrating experience of heading an intelligence agency in the face of a hostile media (Hayden recalls one ironic episode where a paper uncovered a program to track terrorist finances, then published an article three years later criticizing the intelligence community’s inability to do so) “Most American intelligence professions are well acquainted with the broad cultural rhythm connecting American espionage practitioners and American political elites: the latter group gets to criticize the former for not doing enough when it feels in danger,� Hayden writes, “while reserving the right to criticize it for doing too much as soon as it has been made to feel safe again.”Hayden is critical of purists that “act as if we in the intelligence community somehow think less of American liberty than they do.� He writes that the NSA’s success stories related to surveillance was mostly all current operations, active investigations, or related to open court cases, and that this was why the American people and media were so hard to convince.
In covering STELLAR WIND Hayden details the program’s origins and its controversial bypassing of FISA court oversight, which Hayden asserts involved only about 20% of the program’s operations and met no opposition from Justice. Controversially, Hayden disputes the assertion that the program was illegal, citing the program’s approval by other lawyers. Hayden also writes that those members of Congress that were in the know had no objection to the program, and argues that the initial press reports about STELLAR WIND were overly sensationalized (elsewhere Hayden expresses disdain for the media’s frenzy over “espionage porn") Disappointingly, Hayden only addresses the controversy over the program’s legality, and never the question of whether it actually succeeded in collecting valuable or actionable intelligence; there is no evidence that it did, and the program’s secrecy made it very obscure even within the intelligence community; apparently only a small group of CIA analysts were aware of the program, and the FBI couldn’t even use it. Hayden also describes how he attempted to convince the press not to run with the STELLAR WIND stories, claiming that at the time there was no disagreement about it within the Bush administration (even though some Justice officials threatened to resign) Hayden writes that his statement to the press was “true as far as it went� and that legal issues were later settled, even though the incidents were about two different aspects of STELLAR WIND. Hayden asserts that STELLAR WIND intel resulted in “hundreds� of reports on terrorist-related intelligence, that most of these reports came from foreign-to-foreign calls merely transiting the US, and that few members of Congress had any serious objection (and that some took steps to make a record of both their approval and “reservations,� in case of either a scandal or a terrorist attack). Hayden regrets not being permitted to brief the entire membership of the oversight committees, which would have effectively dared them “to take action to stop any of it. This would have turned their natural political caution to our advantage.� Although STELLAR WIND was criticized as unconstitutional, “the arguments backstopping the program had strong history and precedent behind them,� although for some reason Hayden frustratingly does not elaborate further. He also covers the controversy over the ThinThread vs. Trailblazer debate, describing the disappointments of both programs and stressing that the debate at the time was purely technical, that ThinThread wasn’t as powerful, and that either way, the NSA would still be collecting and retaining metadata and that ThinThread did not meet US legal standards. Hayden also discusses the media coverage of the 215 metadata program and PRISM, stressing that NSA was requesting only e-mail accounts of specific foreign targets using US-based Internet services, where the only thing “American� about the intercepts was their US location and their hosting by a US-based Internet company. Hayden writes that the program collected the metadata of American calls, with access limited only to select counterterrorism analysts. "Others made claims that, if true, had NSA not only violating the laws of the United States but the laws of physics as well.� Hayden describes how the revelations created unlikely coalitions of Republicans, Democrats, conservatives and liberals both in favor of and against these programs, and Snowden’s various disclosures to the Chinese and Russians of intelligence that had nothing to do with privacy, and asserts that Ron Wyden’s famous question to Clapper about NSA collection of American data was one that Wyden knew the answer to in advance.
Hayden also covers his interaction with President Bush, who comes off as intelligent and engaged, and whose decisions often reflected his own convictions regardless of whose advice he valued. Hayden also argues that NSA and CIA have a strong institutional culture of respecting constitutional law and of strict subordination to the President’s authority (of course, not every reader will be convinced). Hayden vividly describes the atmosphere at the CIA when he became director, with the Agency’s failures to disrupt the 9/11 plot, to find bin Laden, and to accurately assess the issue of Iraqi WMDs virtually defining the Agency’s reputation, along with the blunders of Porter Goss, the office of Kyle Foggo becoming a crime scene due to bribery charges, and hearings before the congressional oversight committees turning into shouting matches: “In one session I was asked if I would waterboard my daughter." Hayden writes that no “serious discussion� ever happened because “members were too busy yelling at us and one another. He recalls accusations of Hayden “looking bored," lectures on the American political system, stated opposition to all covert action, legislators excusing themselves from briefings on the RDI program, legislators accusing Keith Alexander of “weaponizing space� and claims that “racial and gender diversity would markedly improve American intelligence." He also writes of some congressional officials expressing one position on the CIA’s rendition, detention and interrogation program in a closed hearing and the opposite position in media appearances. Regarding the RDI program, Hayden asserts that “Congress lacked the courage or the consensus to stop it, endorse it, or amend it� (in apparent contradiction Hayden also writes that Congress made it “so legally difficult and politically dangerous to grab and hold someone that we would simply default to the kill switch to take terrorists off the battlefield�) Elsewhere Hayden writes that he had more productive conversations about the RDI program with the Red Cross than with Congress. He does assert that the program succeeded in gathering useful intelligence, a conclusion some will not be convinced by (“There were occasional mistakes,� he writes) Hayden doesn’t seem to care much for investigative journalists or Democratic members of Congress.
While discussing the RDI program Hayden writes that KSM’s interrogation “resembled more an interview� that the information he revealed was “extremely valuable,� that “no one with any knowledge of this program doubted that it had provided unique, actionable intelligence,� that there were “fewer than a hundred� detainees, that a serious discussion with Congress “never happened,� that the interrogators were properly vetted, that Congress had “no impact� on the program, that the tapes of the interrogations were consistent with the reporting cables, and that the tapes were destroyed because they were useless. Of course, all of this is contradicted by the Senate report. Hayden writes that the report has “errors of fact� but doesn’t actually cite any. Elsewhere Hayden blasts the Democrats for criticizing the program in 2014 but not in 2002, although even back then questions over the EITs� legality were raised, and the Senate report documents various instances of CIA stonewalling.
Hayden also describes the pitfalls of the post-9/11 intelligence reforms, such as John Kerry’s endorsement of the 9/11 Commission Report’s findings within hours of their release (i.e. before he could have read them all) and of Congress devoting “rare energy� to reform. “It seemed that the Hill had sprouted 535 intelligence experts practically overnight...It’s hard for Congress to legislate better analysis or more aggressive collection or more foolproof covert operations.� Criticism of the intelligence community’s “Cold War mentality,� “stovepiping,� or “turf wars,� Hayden writes, is mostly just “empty and emotionally charged.�
Hayden comes off as a bit detached when discussing his directorships, both in the writing and in describing his history there, and there isn’t too much in the way of new revelations. The style also comes off as poorly organized or breezy at times. Still, a very readable memoir, and the best parts of the book tend to be those where Hayden describes the challenges the intelligence community faces. The book is poorly written at times, and much of the prose comes off as a mix of tough rhetoric and insider lingo. His discussion of the post-9/11 reforms is dense and somewhat unorganized. And the conclusion is as weak as the introduction.
The title refers to Hayden’s involvement in covert programs that pushed the envelope of legality. Throughout the narrative Hayden advocates for these, especially if their main target is foreign terrorist networks. Hayden comes off as more concerned with resolving legal issues and maintaining good relations with Congress and the White House than in the day-to-day affairs of the intelligence community. The book often reads like a legal brief as Hayden describes the programs and the review process by the White House, the Justice Department, and the intelligence community’s own lawyers. He does succeed in describing the challenges of fighting al-Qaeda, which he describes as easy to kill but hard to find, as well as the often frustrating experience of heading an intelligence agency in the face of a hostile media (Hayden recalls one ironic episode where a paper uncovered a program to track terrorist finances, then published an article three years later criticizing the intelligence community’s inability to do so) “Most American intelligence professions are well acquainted with the broad cultural rhythm connecting American espionage practitioners and American political elites: the latter group gets to criticize the former for not doing enough when it feels in danger,� Hayden writes, “while reserving the right to criticize it for doing too much as soon as it has been made to feel safe again.”Hayden is critical of purists that “act as if we in the intelligence community somehow think less of American liberty than they do.� He writes that the NSA’s success stories related to surveillance was mostly all current operations, active investigations, or related to open court cases, and that this was why the American people and media were so hard to convince.
In covering STELLAR WIND Hayden details the program’s origins and its controversial bypassing of FISA court oversight, which Hayden asserts involved only about 20% of the program’s operations and met no opposition from Justice. Controversially, Hayden disputes the assertion that the program was illegal, citing the program’s approval by other lawyers. Hayden also writes that those members of Congress that were in the know had no objection to the program, and argues that the initial press reports about STELLAR WIND were overly sensationalized (elsewhere Hayden expresses disdain for the media’s frenzy over “espionage porn") Disappointingly, Hayden only addresses the controversy over the program’s legality, and never the question of whether it actually succeeded in collecting valuable or actionable intelligence; there is no evidence that it did, and the program’s secrecy made it very obscure even within the intelligence community; apparently only a small group of CIA analysts were aware of the program, and the FBI couldn’t even use it. Hayden also describes how he attempted to convince the press not to run with the STELLAR WIND stories, claiming that at the time there was no disagreement about it within the Bush administration (even though some Justice officials threatened to resign) Hayden writes that his statement to the press was “true as far as it went� and that legal issues were later settled, even though the incidents were about two different aspects of STELLAR WIND. Hayden asserts that STELLAR WIND intel resulted in “hundreds� of reports on terrorist-related intelligence, that most of these reports came from foreign-to-foreign calls merely transiting the US, and that few members of Congress had any serious objection (and that some took steps to make a record of both their approval and “reservations,� in case of either a scandal or a terrorist attack). Hayden regrets not being permitted to brief the entire membership of the oversight committees, which would have effectively dared them “to take action to stop any of it. This would have turned their natural political caution to our advantage.� Although STELLAR WIND was criticized as unconstitutional, “the arguments backstopping the program had strong history and precedent behind them,� although for some reason Hayden frustratingly does not elaborate further. He also covers the controversy over the ThinThread vs. Trailblazer debate, describing the disappointments of both programs and stressing that the debate at the time was purely technical, that ThinThread wasn’t as powerful, and that either way, the NSA would still be collecting and retaining metadata and that ThinThread did not meet US legal standards. Hayden also discusses the media coverage of the 215 metadata program and PRISM, stressing that NSA was requesting only e-mail accounts of specific foreign targets using US-based Internet services, where the only thing “American� about the intercepts was their US location and their hosting by a US-based Internet company. Hayden writes that the program collected the metadata of American calls, with access limited only to select counterterrorism analysts. "Others made claims that, if true, had NSA not only violating the laws of the United States but the laws of physics as well.� Hayden describes how the revelations created unlikely coalitions of Republicans, Democrats, conservatives and liberals both in favor of and against these programs, and Snowden’s various disclosures to the Chinese and Russians of intelligence that had nothing to do with privacy, and asserts that Ron Wyden’s famous question to Clapper about NSA collection of American data was one that Wyden knew the answer to in advance.
Hayden also covers his interaction with President Bush, who comes off as intelligent and engaged, and whose decisions often reflected his own convictions regardless of whose advice he valued. Hayden also argues that NSA and CIA have a strong institutional culture of respecting constitutional law and of strict subordination to the President’s authority (of course, not every reader will be convinced). Hayden vividly describes the atmosphere at the CIA when he became director, with the Agency’s failures to disrupt the 9/11 plot, to find bin Laden, and to accurately assess the issue of Iraqi WMDs virtually defining the Agency’s reputation, along with the blunders of Porter Goss, the office of Kyle Foggo becoming a crime scene due to bribery charges, and hearings before the congressional oversight committees turning into shouting matches: “In one session I was asked if I would waterboard my daughter." Hayden writes that no “serious discussion� ever happened because “members were too busy yelling at us and one another. He recalls accusations of Hayden “looking bored," lectures on the American political system, stated opposition to all covert action, legislators excusing themselves from briefings on the RDI program, legislators accusing Keith Alexander of “weaponizing space� and claims that “racial and gender diversity would markedly improve American intelligence." He also writes of some congressional officials expressing one position on the CIA’s rendition, detention and interrogation program in a closed hearing and the opposite position in media appearances. Regarding the RDI program, Hayden asserts that “Congress lacked the courage or the consensus to stop it, endorse it, or amend it� (in apparent contradiction Hayden also writes that Congress made it “so legally difficult and politically dangerous to grab and hold someone that we would simply default to the kill switch to take terrorists off the battlefield�) Elsewhere Hayden writes that he had more productive conversations about the RDI program with the Red Cross than with Congress. He does assert that the program succeeded in gathering useful intelligence, a conclusion some will not be convinced by (“There were occasional mistakes,� he writes) Hayden doesn’t seem to care much for investigative journalists or Democratic members of Congress.
While discussing the RDI program Hayden writes that KSM’s interrogation “resembled more an interview� that the information he revealed was “extremely valuable,� that “no one with any knowledge of this program doubted that it had provided unique, actionable intelligence,� that there were “fewer than a hundred� detainees, that a serious discussion with Congress “never happened,� that the interrogators were properly vetted, that Congress had “no impact� on the program, that the tapes of the interrogations were consistent with the reporting cables, and that the tapes were destroyed because they were useless. Of course, all of this is contradicted by the Senate report. Hayden writes that the report has “errors of fact� but doesn’t actually cite any. Elsewhere Hayden blasts the Democrats for criticizing the program in 2014 but not in 2002, although even back then questions over the EITs� legality were raised, and the Senate report documents various instances of CIA stonewalling.
Hayden also describes the pitfalls of the post-9/11 intelligence reforms, such as John Kerry’s endorsement of the 9/11 Commission Report’s findings within hours of their release (i.e. before he could have read them all) and of Congress devoting “rare energy� to reform. “It seemed that the Hill had sprouted 535 intelligence experts practically overnight...It’s hard for Congress to legislate better analysis or more aggressive collection or more foolproof covert operations.� Criticism of the intelligence community’s “Cold War mentality,� “stovepiping,� or “turf wars,� Hayden writes, is mostly just “empty and emotionally charged.�
Hayden comes off as a bit detached when discussing his directorships, both in the writing and in describing his history there, and there isn’t too much in the way of new revelations. The style also comes off as poorly organized or breezy at times. Still, a very readable memoir, and the best parts of the book tend to be those where Hayden describes the challenges the intelligence community faces. The book is poorly written at times, and much of the prose comes off as a mix of tough rhetoric and insider lingo. His discussion of the post-9/11 reforms is dense and somewhat unorganized. And the conclusion is as weak as the introduction.
January 4, 2017
This is the personal memoir of perhaps the most visible top manager in the US intelligence community following the 9/11 attacks who served as the leader of the NSA and the CIA in Bush 43's two terms. He has a formidable media presence and is a powerful advocate for the value of US intelligence agencies during the post-9/11 era.
While General Hayden is easily recognized from his TV appearances, I was unsure whether I would like the book. Memoirs by those recently in controversial offices have inherent issues of agenda pursuit and rear covering. Besides, while Hayden is a powerful advocate, he had seem to me to come across as a bit of a scold and I was unsure how much nuance the major intelligence issues since 2001 would receive from a career officer and four star general, who also seems to be a republican.
I was wrong in my presumptions about Hayden and I found the book to be informative and interesting, but for reasons I did not anticipate. To start with, the book provides an exceptional account of top administration of an elite public bureaucracy in difficult times. How does one build a management team? Interact with government and administration oversight? Coordinate with peer agencies (or peer wannabes) to get good results? Deal with the bad actors you encounter? This is a very interesting and fairly persuasive account of a fascinating set of agencies and their workforces during a period of exceptional conflict and risk, exceptional innovative challenges, and the political pressures of a highly divided nation at war. Hayden's account is generally sympathetic to the agencies and people he led. What kind of a background trains one to run such an agency? What constitutes success in the domain of counter-terrorism and Middle East conflict? Hayden appears in the book as a skilled leader, an extraordinary judge of talent, a good networker, and a practical manager with good HR skills. This side of Hayden's memoirs was one of the strongest aspects of the book and of Hayden himself - who writes well (not a surprise given his prior articles).
National intelligence and counter-terrorism, however, are not areas awash with moral clarity and the inherent tensions in this work are also present in the book. Hayden is never unclear about where he stands, but that does not mean that his solutions to ethical dilemmas will work for others even while they work for him. Civil liberties versus homeland security dilemmas are clearly there and Hayden does not accept holding espionage work, whether active or passive, to the standard of being strictly legal issues. Indeed, he sees the forward looking need for security and the basis for a more pragmatic logic to guide behaviors oriented towards avoiding attacks. The chapter on drones and targeted killings is exceptional in this regard. My issue is that that while I may accept the need to recognize national security concerns, the assertions of the primacy of national security needs is not an argument but rather an assertion. Of course one can recognize the need to do what must be done, but readers will be even more served by trying to articulate an argument.
The conclusion of the book provides a nice discussion on the role of policy guidance for an agency based on the fact driven dynamics of good intelligence tradecraft. Senior national leadership is inherently political and concerned with visions, values, and the like. Intelligence professionals are charged with providing their best analyses of how the world works, both broadly and in detail. The task facing the administrator is how to balance a policy world of "ought" with the fact based "isness" of the world. How to mesh policy and the production of good intelligence is the critical task for agency administrators in the intelligence community. This argument has implications well beyond the intelligence community as well.
This is a really good book to read as a new administration - one that actively derides the intelligence community -- takes office. I can only hope that relations with the intelligence community will improve as the administration starts to figure out its new surroundings.
While General Hayden is easily recognized from his TV appearances, I was unsure whether I would like the book. Memoirs by those recently in controversial offices have inherent issues of agenda pursuit and rear covering. Besides, while Hayden is a powerful advocate, he had seem to me to come across as a bit of a scold and I was unsure how much nuance the major intelligence issues since 2001 would receive from a career officer and four star general, who also seems to be a republican.
I was wrong in my presumptions about Hayden and I found the book to be informative and interesting, but for reasons I did not anticipate. To start with, the book provides an exceptional account of top administration of an elite public bureaucracy in difficult times. How does one build a management team? Interact with government and administration oversight? Coordinate with peer agencies (or peer wannabes) to get good results? Deal with the bad actors you encounter? This is a very interesting and fairly persuasive account of a fascinating set of agencies and their workforces during a period of exceptional conflict and risk, exceptional innovative challenges, and the political pressures of a highly divided nation at war. Hayden's account is generally sympathetic to the agencies and people he led. What kind of a background trains one to run such an agency? What constitutes success in the domain of counter-terrorism and Middle East conflict? Hayden appears in the book as a skilled leader, an extraordinary judge of talent, a good networker, and a practical manager with good HR skills. This side of Hayden's memoirs was one of the strongest aspects of the book and of Hayden himself - who writes well (not a surprise given his prior articles).
National intelligence and counter-terrorism, however, are not areas awash with moral clarity and the inherent tensions in this work are also present in the book. Hayden is never unclear about where he stands, but that does not mean that his solutions to ethical dilemmas will work for others even while they work for him. Civil liberties versus homeland security dilemmas are clearly there and Hayden does not accept holding espionage work, whether active or passive, to the standard of being strictly legal issues. Indeed, he sees the forward looking need for security and the basis for a more pragmatic logic to guide behaviors oriented towards avoiding attacks. The chapter on drones and targeted killings is exceptional in this regard. My issue is that that while I may accept the need to recognize national security concerns, the assertions of the primacy of national security needs is not an argument but rather an assertion. Of course one can recognize the need to do what must be done, but readers will be even more served by trying to articulate an argument.
The conclusion of the book provides a nice discussion on the role of policy guidance for an agency based on the fact driven dynamics of good intelligence tradecraft. Senior national leadership is inherently political and concerned with visions, values, and the like. Intelligence professionals are charged with providing their best analyses of how the world works, both broadly and in detail. The task facing the administrator is how to balance a policy world of "ought" with the fact based "isness" of the world. How to mesh policy and the production of good intelligence is the critical task for agency administrators in the intelligence community. This argument has implications well beyond the intelligence community as well.
This is a really good book to read as a new administration - one that actively derides the intelligence community -- takes office. I can only hope that relations with the intelligence community will improve as the administration starts to figure out its new surroundings.
December 23, 2021
Another book about the author’s ‘intelligence� career defending the choices made during his tenure at various government jobs. At some point all those who enter a certain level of government feel compelled to write about their experiences. Whether it is to explain their actions/reactions or absolve themselves of the decisions they made, it all goes back to their selflessness and dedication to their country. General Hayden was involved in many areas of America’s spy agencies. It gets old having him write about his work and how he and the agencies he worked for made the ‘right� decisions for Americans and America. The general public may be misinformed, lacking knowledge, and at times just plain stupid. Nonetheless, it doesn’t negate the fact that Americans treasure their privacy and should therefore expect their government to maintain it. Really dry book. Not recommended.
September 30, 2016
SILENCE DOESN'T EQUAL GUILT!! Especially in the Intelligence Community. It is blatantly wrong and unjust to level accusations against organizations that can't even properly defend themselves and so are always presumed guilty of whatever hair-brained conspiracy is leveled against them!
Reality is so much more nuanced and messier than the catchy one-liners of our modern hash-tag world. Our Government, specifically Congress, is full of Moral and Intellectual cowards who abuse the Intelligence community by wanting them to both prevent all Terrorism and equally angered if they fail at it, all the while tying their hands and waffling back and forth on giving them the tools and security to do their jobs.
We ask the Intelligence Community to do the impossible and then turn our backs on them and falsely accuse them of things they haven't even done knowing that the truth will never be completely revealed. It has become a favorite Political Pastime to beat up on the Intel Community and this has damaging repercussions beyond what those short-sighted politicians can predict. It demoralizes and chases off desperately needed talent in those agencies and makes them timid and hesitant when they need to be quick and decisive. All of your best players, your varsity team, leave and then your JV team, and the agencies end up with your 3 string players, the ones who are most likely to make more mistakes. This isn't unique to the Intel Community this is across all Government Agencies, how can we keep bad mouthing the Government, de-funding it, under-paying Government Employees and still expect them to perform at a standard of Excellence?? Our own Government leaders have created a Toxic climate for those working within Government and its effects will be felt for generations as we now have a culture of Government-Hating in America.
I'm glad Michael Hayden wrote this book in defense of the IC because someone needed to. Someone needed to come to the defense of the IC and make it clear to the American people that even though we have a right to be suspicious of the Government we can also be proud of the Americans who do serve and try hard to do the right thing.
Reality is so much more nuanced and messier than the catchy one-liners of our modern hash-tag world. Our Government, specifically Congress, is full of Moral and Intellectual cowards who abuse the Intelligence community by wanting them to both prevent all Terrorism and equally angered if they fail at it, all the while tying their hands and waffling back and forth on giving them the tools and security to do their jobs.
We ask the Intelligence Community to do the impossible and then turn our backs on them and falsely accuse them of things they haven't even done knowing that the truth will never be completely revealed. It has become a favorite Political Pastime to beat up on the Intel Community and this has damaging repercussions beyond what those short-sighted politicians can predict. It demoralizes and chases off desperately needed talent in those agencies and makes them timid and hesitant when they need to be quick and decisive. All of your best players, your varsity team, leave and then your JV team, and the agencies end up with your 3 string players, the ones who are most likely to make more mistakes. This isn't unique to the Intel Community this is across all Government Agencies, how can we keep bad mouthing the Government, de-funding it, under-paying Government Employees and still expect them to perform at a standard of Excellence?? Our own Government leaders have created a Toxic climate for those working within Government and its effects will be felt for generations as we now have a culture of Government-Hating in America.
I'm glad Michael Hayden wrote this book in defense of the IC because someone needed to. Someone needed to come to the defense of the IC and make it clear to the American people that even though we have a right to be suspicious of the Government we can also be proud of the Americans who do serve and try hard to do the right thing.
April 22, 2020
I really enjoyed seeing the General's perspective on exploiting and disseminating intelligence in the United States especially since his tenure in government was before and after 9/11. It was enlightening to see how different things were before and how society was launched into a more pronounced battle between American liberties and safety while trying to change the intelligence apparatus. General Hayden chose a somewhat chronological format dating from his tenure as the NSA Director, to the Deputy DNI, to finally the Director of the CIA. He does jump around somewhat so it's easy to get lost sometimes, and he will just name drop some people like the audience is supposed to know who he is talking about (especially during the Stellarwind part). I had to stop and Google these people (most of the time they're not well known) because I was a kid during many of the time periods. I feel that he overshared A LOT- things on his background, or short biographies of people he met, or just superfluous information in general. Literally it was hard to read for me at some points- because I was waiting for him to get to the POINT. I'm not really sure what his purpose was in writing this book, maybe to just defend the position he and a lot of officers were in?In order to do so he felt he had to give extra content I guess. So JUST for how this book was written, it's a 3 star for me. Thank you for your service General. I understand things always get a little political when it comes to Intelligence Community, but I believe you chose options that were always in the best interest when it came to saving American and our allies lives.
May 6, 2016
Contrary to my initial trepidation, Michael Hayden's memoir exceeded expectations insofar as it challenged my deeply held assumptions and convictions about where to draw the line when it comes security and freedom. As a liberal who repudiates the use of RDI for moral reasons, always in the FOIA-forever camp, Hayden's no bullshit account of HUMINT collection proves that often reality is much more complex than theory and that sometimes one must "play to the edge" in order to establish boundaries. While I still find the use of torture morally repugnant, I also feel the need to defend the intelligence community who have often been made to play the villainous aggressor of political theater. Regardless of your stance on RDI techniques, retroactively punishing intelligence operates for the sake of political expediency will have lasting and devastating effects on our ability to defend against future attacks on American targets at home and abroad. An interesting read leaving me with a lot to chew on....
October 5, 2017
In writing Playing to the Edge, General Michael V. Hayden, a man who has held some of the most important positions in the American intelligence community, wished to fulfill two tasks. First, he wanted to help fill the gap that most Americans possess in their understanding of what American intelligence bodies may do, can do, and how effectively they are doing it. Second, he wanted his voice to be heard about some of the weightiest and most controversial intelligence and policy issues of our time. In both of these goals he succeeds magnificently.
Hayden is, unlike what some of his harshest critics may suppose, a genuine patriot, a lawful practitioner of espionage, and man who during his time at the pinnacle of American intelligence (from 1999 to 2009 he was in succession the Director of the NSA, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, and Director of the CIA) was faced with an outstanding brief to execute missions on America’s behalf, missions that would never see the light of day. The title of this book, effectively his memoirs but mostly focused on this ten year span, lends some insight to how he saw his role and the intelligence communities role in being the first lie of defense of the nation. Playing to the edge emotes using all the available space within the limit of a brief, mandate, or legal authority to fulfill the task of espionage and intelligence gathering. The simple reality is Americans don’t like this. They don’t like secrecy and they don’t like powerful government entities, both of which the intelligence community and its largest constituent parts by necessity must be. These organizations don’t have to play by the same rules as a police force or a prosecutor. If a crime has already been committed they’ve failed. They’re in a position where if they stop an attack but do it in a way people don’t like (but which is legal and appropriate) they get torched in the Washington Post, or by Glenn Greenwald, and get hauled before the Senate Select Committee to get asked questions in open sessions that they can’t possible answer in that forum. On the other hand if they restrain their abilities and techniques and an attack occurs, they are accused of having been soft on terror and not doing enough. They’re placed in an impossible position made even more difficult by the incorrect information (read: lies) spread by their harshest critics about their surveillance programs and interrogation techniques and their covert actions.
Hayden is fully cognizant of tension. He was DirNSA when the PATRIOT ACT was passed and when the Stellar Wind program was initiated. He was DCIA when restrictions on interrogation techniques were begrudgingly but willingly given up by CIA. He briefed intelligence committee members and staffers on these operations, and then was excoriated by them for a lack of transparency years later. This tension makes the intelligence practitioner’s job a little harder, but as Hayden admiringly points out, that practitioner still goes out and goes an incredible job protecting American lives. Hayden explicitly welcomes restraints and oversight, but he insists that this occur on an even playing field. He insists that oversight occurs with people in full possession of the facts, not half-truths and lies. He understands and appreciates that people of different ideological positions have different interpretations of civil liberties. That debate, in his mind, makes the intelligence community better. Hayden is grieved at the idea that those at NSA and CIA are painted as power-hungry, unlawful, authority-shrugging buccaneers. They are nothing of the sort. They are everyday Americans who are carefully restricted by laws, norms, and internal divisions to create environments where intelligence can successfully be gathered and analyzed without people constantly looking over their shoulders for a DOJ subpoena. He admits they have made mistakes and that he has made mistakes, but these mistakes are errors in the execution, and not in the overlying policy or techniques. Americans have been improperly swept up in signals intelligence collection, but the Stellar Wind and PRISM programs at NSA were lawful and necessary. Detainees have been abused, but the CIA’s rendition, detention, and interrogation program was effective, lawful, and necessary.
The intelligence community is in a hard spot, and will always be in that position. They are at times untrusted, and indeed at times have earned that distrust, but it is a community that learns, is regulated, and is staffed and led by people that have sacrificed a great deal. They really are America’s first line of defense. Hayden’s writing is full of admiration for these people, many of whom are not fully known to their own families. It’s hard to not have the same admiration.
Hayden is, unlike what some of his harshest critics may suppose, a genuine patriot, a lawful practitioner of espionage, and man who during his time at the pinnacle of American intelligence (from 1999 to 2009 he was in succession the Director of the NSA, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, and Director of the CIA) was faced with an outstanding brief to execute missions on America’s behalf, missions that would never see the light of day. The title of this book, effectively his memoirs but mostly focused on this ten year span, lends some insight to how he saw his role and the intelligence communities role in being the first lie of defense of the nation. Playing to the edge emotes using all the available space within the limit of a brief, mandate, or legal authority to fulfill the task of espionage and intelligence gathering. The simple reality is Americans don’t like this. They don’t like secrecy and they don’t like powerful government entities, both of which the intelligence community and its largest constituent parts by necessity must be. These organizations don’t have to play by the same rules as a police force or a prosecutor. If a crime has already been committed they’ve failed. They’re in a position where if they stop an attack but do it in a way people don’t like (but which is legal and appropriate) they get torched in the Washington Post, or by Glenn Greenwald, and get hauled before the Senate Select Committee to get asked questions in open sessions that they can’t possible answer in that forum. On the other hand if they restrain their abilities and techniques and an attack occurs, they are accused of having been soft on terror and not doing enough. They’re placed in an impossible position made even more difficult by the incorrect information (read: lies) spread by their harshest critics about their surveillance programs and interrogation techniques and their covert actions.
Hayden is fully cognizant of tension. He was DirNSA when the PATRIOT ACT was passed and when the Stellar Wind program was initiated. He was DCIA when restrictions on interrogation techniques were begrudgingly but willingly given up by CIA. He briefed intelligence committee members and staffers on these operations, and then was excoriated by them for a lack of transparency years later. This tension makes the intelligence practitioner’s job a little harder, but as Hayden admiringly points out, that practitioner still goes out and goes an incredible job protecting American lives. Hayden explicitly welcomes restraints and oversight, but he insists that this occur on an even playing field. He insists that oversight occurs with people in full possession of the facts, not half-truths and lies. He understands and appreciates that people of different ideological positions have different interpretations of civil liberties. That debate, in his mind, makes the intelligence community better. Hayden is grieved at the idea that those at NSA and CIA are painted as power-hungry, unlawful, authority-shrugging buccaneers. They are nothing of the sort. They are everyday Americans who are carefully restricted by laws, norms, and internal divisions to create environments where intelligence can successfully be gathered and analyzed without people constantly looking over their shoulders for a DOJ subpoena. He admits they have made mistakes and that he has made mistakes, but these mistakes are errors in the execution, and not in the overlying policy or techniques. Americans have been improperly swept up in signals intelligence collection, but the Stellar Wind and PRISM programs at NSA were lawful and necessary. Detainees have been abused, but the CIA’s rendition, detention, and interrogation program was effective, lawful, and necessary.
The intelligence community is in a hard spot, and will always be in that position. They are at times untrusted, and indeed at times have earned that distrust, but it is a community that learns, is regulated, and is staffed and led by people that have sacrificed a great deal. They really are America’s first line of defense. Hayden’s writing is full of admiration for these people, many of whom are not fully known to their own families. It’s hard to not have the same admiration.
July 10, 2019
This book is definitely a 5 star book (deep insights into how NSA, CIA, the US IC, and intelligence overall worked in the late 90s/00s, including the immediate response to 9/11).
(I wouldn’t rate the author’s career as 5 stars. Hayden is complex, and I’m honestly not sure if he was a horrible NSA Director or merely a middling one at a challenging time, but he did seem to be a good CIA Director. Partially at NSA he seemed to have been dealt a basically broken organization that had failed to keep up with the world in the 1990s (as the threat evolved from the military and central government of the USSR on dedicated systems to a much more diverse threat using commercial systems), but he managed to both under-react before 9/11 and overreact afterward, turning NSA into an effective battlefield support organization but also realizing the formerly abstract threat of an NSA which could basically ignore the constitution when it felt like it. Fortunately there were enough people within NSA and government (including Hayden) that they didn’t choose to use their power for evil, but they absolutely created tools which could be flipped secretly and unilaterally to suppress all civil dissent. However, he certainly wasn’t the only one responsible for this shift within the government, and probably wasn’t even one of the primary forces pushing in that direction � he was just one of the primary implementors who possibly could have stopped it.)
(I wouldn’t rate the author’s career as 5 stars. Hayden is complex, and I’m honestly not sure if he was a horrible NSA Director or merely a middling one at a challenging time, but he did seem to be a good CIA Director. Partially at NSA he seemed to have been dealt a basically broken organization that had failed to keep up with the world in the 1990s (as the threat evolved from the military and central government of the USSR on dedicated systems to a much more diverse threat using commercial systems), but he managed to both under-react before 9/11 and overreact afterward, turning NSA into an effective battlefield support organization but also realizing the formerly abstract threat of an NSA which could basically ignore the constitution when it felt like it. Fortunately there were enough people within NSA and government (including Hayden) that they didn’t choose to use their power for evil, but they absolutely created tools which could be flipped secretly and unilaterally to suppress all civil dissent. However, he certainly wasn’t the only one responsible for this shift within the government, and probably wasn’t even one of the primary forces pushing in that direction � he was just one of the primary implementors who possibly could have stopped it.)
June 4, 2018
A behind the scenes glimpse into the government agencies created to provide America with the information to protect us from foreign infiltration among other things. Technology was meant to benefit and allow more free time to pursue other interests but it has become a red herring as well with all the hackers working to disrupt civilizations. There is a great deal of information to process in this work and just reading the guidelines fried my gray cells. I did think it was a worth while read and the author went to great lengths in explaining and giving examples.
June 14, 2017
I recommend this book to everyone. While there may be a certain amount of jargon or acronyms used, there is a table of them and he does an excellent job of delineating the data collection process and the data analysis leading to covert and not-so-covert actions. He also explores in depth the tension between personal liberties and our country's need for security. It is particularly topical given the current rounds of Congressional hearings and recent international events. Dig in and enlarge your view of the IC (Intelligence Community).
January 6, 2025
Just Fine
It was a fine book. I don't like how much I felt like it jumped around chronologically, though I understand. Many parts got repetitive, especially the defensive vibe the entire narrative imparts.
It was a fine book. I don't like how much I felt like it jumped around chronologically, though I understand. Many parts got repetitive, especially the defensive vibe the entire narrative imparts.
October 20, 2017
I enjoyed General Hayden's perspective and experience during the War on Terror. His leadership and passion are respectable and honorable.
July 15, 2016
(Audiobook). When I first heard of this work, I was quite curious to read it. Given all that has happened, especially since 9/11, to get the perspective from a man who was in the thick of the intelligence side of things, between his stints running NSA, the 1st Deputy Director of National Intelligence and the head of the CIA, there were quite a lot of highly visible and highly controversial topics that Hayden could provide insight for many in the public. He certainly tries to do that, jumping right into his time as the DIRNSA (Director of NSA) and then moving into his role in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and all the subsequent events that followed. The book does not follow a strict chronological order, as might be expected of an autobiography. The main focus of this work centers on his time at NSA and CIA, which also proved to be the most headline-worthy (and controversial). With his perspective, a view that few could or should ever have, he attempts to explain and justify his actions. There is certainly much to gleam from his insight and for many, it is very informative. However, as a first person narrative, Hayden does not attempt to remain an impartial observer. In some ways, it is good to get the personal accounts, the views from such a unique career and perspective. Unfortunately, and perhaps as a result of all the negative attacks, he does come across defensive and sarcastic, as I am sure a main objective of this work was to have a medium in which he could fire back at the critics that he could not counter while in his official capacity. I can certainly understand that, and yet, there is a sense that the weakest part of this work is when he is providing insight into actions and policies that he did not have a direct role in (i.e. the actions of the US government after he left the CIA in 2009). His political leanings are quite transparent, but again, in a first person narrative such as this work, it does provide a more complete image of the man. Unfortunately for him and the readers, there is certain much more to the story, but the nature of intelligence is that is can, does and must live in the shadows. Perhaps in later years, a more complete picture will emerge. Ultimately, I don't think that this work will change your view of the man. He is neither saint or demon. Just a man who did what he had to do in very trying and difficult circumstances. The audiobook is nice in that Hayden himself narrates. Thus, you get to hear him narrate as though he was talking to you directly (accent and all). The defensive snipping and sarcastic commentary in the later part of the book I think detracts from his message, but to get the insight of a man like him in the mix and to get such an account written so recent, this is worth the time.
September 27, 2016
This review is of the audio version.
When reading a memoir, it is important for me to remember that memoirs are the memories, biases, and experiences of the author. All authors are biased in their selection of material in accordance with the purpose of the story but memoirs, as first person descriptions are meant to be biased. When the purpose of a memoir is to set the record straight, one can naturally expect the writer to be telling a difficult story in a manner that defends his decisions and behavior and tells the worth of his work. This book is no exception.
When a book is placed in an audio format, a decision is made to hire a reader or have the author read the work. When an author reads a memoir, tone and emotion are added that tell another story. I found the tone of this book painful to hear and wanted to quit reading it several times, especially near the end when he defends his actions. The words were tough when he castigated those who disagreed with him and opposed his actions. While his emotion is understandable, it did nothing for his case. Since I frequently did not approve of his actions but was trying to understand his logic and experience, his manner was self-defeating to his case.
Hayden is a principled and patriotic man but he also appears to be somewhat arrogant, defensive, and prickly. He held top level positions, especially as head of the Central Intelligence Administration (CIA) during the George W Bush administration. He tells of his work and defends his more difficult tasks and decisions. It was his words "a roomful of evidence" that were important to the decision for the United States to invade Iraq.
Hayden attempted to be fair in the telling of his story. When things did not go well, his explanation was often "We could have done better," but he rarely told what those words meant. How could he have done better? How would someone learn from his experience? As he moved through the book, his tone became more acerbic. He had detractors within both parties but primarily within the Democratic ranks. He seemed to be angry with all of them and considered them unfair, duplicitous, dangerous, and lacking in understanding of the problem.
I found the book very interesting as it explained a painful period in our history. He described much about foreign policy and government interaction during the Bush administration. It is a worthy read if one keeps in mind the need of the author to defend his positions.
When reading a memoir, it is important for me to remember that memoirs are the memories, biases, and experiences of the author. All authors are biased in their selection of material in accordance with the purpose of the story but memoirs, as first person descriptions are meant to be biased. When the purpose of a memoir is to set the record straight, one can naturally expect the writer to be telling a difficult story in a manner that defends his decisions and behavior and tells the worth of his work. This book is no exception.
When a book is placed in an audio format, a decision is made to hire a reader or have the author read the work. When an author reads a memoir, tone and emotion are added that tell another story. I found the tone of this book painful to hear and wanted to quit reading it several times, especially near the end when he defends his actions. The words were tough when he castigated those who disagreed with him and opposed his actions. While his emotion is understandable, it did nothing for his case. Since I frequently did not approve of his actions but was trying to understand his logic and experience, his manner was self-defeating to his case.
Hayden is a principled and patriotic man but he also appears to be somewhat arrogant, defensive, and prickly. He held top level positions, especially as head of the Central Intelligence Administration (CIA) during the George W Bush administration. He tells of his work and defends his more difficult tasks and decisions. It was his words "a roomful of evidence" that were important to the decision for the United States to invade Iraq.
Hayden attempted to be fair in the telling of his story. When things did not go well, his explanation was often "We could have done better," but he rarely told what those words meant. How could he have done better? How would someone learn from his experience? As he moved through the book, his tone became more acerbic. He had detractors within both parties but primarily within the Democratic ranks. He seemed to be angry with all of them and considered them unfair, duplicitous, dangerous, and lacking in understanding of the problem.
I found the book very interesting as it explained a painful period in our history. He described much about foreign policy and government interaction during the Bush administration. It is a worthy read if one keeps in mind the need of the author to defend his positions.
August 11, 2016
As someone who became a civil libertarian in response to the sweeping powers of the surveilliance state during the Bush administration, I began reading this as a hostile audience, more or less. I was chiefly interested in the chapter on cybersecurity, although he says very little about it. The book is part memoir-biography, part defense of the privileged powers given to the United States' intelligence-security programs. While I am still not nor never will be comfortable with the amount of information being collected by these agencies, even if they are staffed by the heroic characters who populate this book under Hayden's pen, recent books on cybersecurity have made me realize that that agencies like these have actual national-security priorities, with a focus on malevolent organizations outside the U.S.
Hayden is very good at making the enormous amount of data-collecting sound completely mundane, even benign, and is very cagey with details when a plant is bombed or infrastructure sabotaged via computer viruses. Sometimes interesting and sometimes plodding are his comments on CIA-NSA organization, and the organization of the intelligence community (sixteen agencies, including the intelligence depts of other organizations). There's the usual attraction in a political memoir in that formidable media personalities are suddenly reduced to ordinary people: Secretary of State Condeleeza Rice becomes "Condie", the attorney general is "Al", Hayden himself is "Mikey"...it's a little touch of intimacy that a vast bureacracy, far-removed from the concerns of the people as a whole, is usually without. All that said, I still like having Greewalds and Snowdens to keep the government on its toes.
Hayden is very good at making the enormous amount of data-collecting sound completely mundane, even benign, and is very cagey with details when a plant is bombed or infrastructure sabotaged via computer viruses. Sometimes interesting and sometimes plodding are his comments on CIA-NSA organization, and the organization of the intelligence community (sixteen agencies, including the intelligence depts of other organizations). There's the usual attraction in a political memoir in that formidable media personalities are suddenly reduced to ordinary people: Secretary of State Condeleeza Rice becomes "Condie", the attorney general is "Al", Hayden himself is "Mikey"...it's a little touch of intimacy that a vast bureacracy, far-removed from the concerns of the people as a whole, is usually without. All that said, I still like having Greewalds and Snowdens to keep the government on its toes.
January 12, 2019
I'm not sure who this book is written for. The message is an apology in the older sense that it is a defense of the actions that Hayden himself and others in the intelligence community undertook. But these actions were tried in the court of public opinion years ago. It seems unlikely that this book will change minds.
This book is not an apology that Hayden is admitting to being wrong. He certainly isn't. Or rather Hayden only admits to being wrong on minor issues that only serve to highlight the fact that his being wrong is the exception that proves the rule.
So I suppose that this book exists solely to give Hayden the last word. He certainly has a number of political scores to settle. I take issue with his characterizations of some persons. Comey was a wet blanket. Cheney was great. Those namby pamby Europeans are hand wringers. Et cetera.
The last few pages do offer some interesting insight into how espionage and politics interface in a modern nation-state. Everything up to this point were very concrete examples like, "Renditions helped because..." or, "Targeted killings were effective because..." But only in the last ten pages or so does he tie these things to an abstract, unifying conception of the system as a whole.
This book is not an apology that Hayden is admitting to being wrong. He certainly isn't. Or rather Hayden only admits to being wrong on minor issues that only serve to highlight the fact that his being wrong is the exception that proves the rule.
So I suppose that this book exists solely to give Hayden the last word. He certainly has a number of political scores to settle. I take issue with his characterizations of some persons. Comey was a wet blanket. Cheney was great. Those namby pamby Europeans are hand wringers. Et cetera.
The last few pages do offer some interesting insight into how espionage and politics interface in a modern nation-state. Everything up to this point were very concrete examples like, "Renditions helped because..." or, "Targeted killings were effective because..." But only in the last ten pages or so does he tie these things to an abstract, unifying conception of the system as a whole.
July 8, 2016
I experienced this book in the audible format. The fact that it was read by the author was a very positive addition to the experience. I am however very conflicted about how many stars to give this effort to document the career of this four-star general who spent a good deal of his work career as a spy and sees it as a noble and essential part of what keeps America free. He seems especially pleased with the time he worked with President George W. Bush and Vice President Cheney two politicians that I mostly have pretty negative opinions of. He thinks pretty highly of them.
Author Hayden covers a lot of ground with his years in the leadership of both the NSA and the CIA. He was mixed up with a lot of very controversial stuff over the years. He also covers the movement of the intelligence community into the computer and cyber age. Even though he is now retired from government service he is still stirring the pot with occasional op ed pieces and plenty of speaking engagements. His use of alphabet soup in talking about all the agencies with their lettered shorthand names is both impressive and offputting.
Author Hayden covers a lot of ground with his years in the leadership of both the NSA and the CIA. He was mixed up with a lot of very controversial stuff over the years. He also covers the movement of the intelligence community into the computer and cyber age. Even though he is now retired from government service he is still stirring the pot with occasional op ed pieces and plenty of speaking engagements. His use of alphabet soup in talking about all the agencies with their lettered shorthand names is both impressive and offputting.
January 26, 2018
For the past few years I have been reading in an effort to understand our political system as well as the rest of the world and the US’s interaction with them. I was hoping this book would be more straightforward but I couldn’t get passed the author constantly stating over and over that he and the employees he was in charge of never broke the law and his self aggrandizement. I understand that there have been multiple allegations/investigations into the interrogations of the terrorists that were caught as well as the collection of information such as phone call data of US citizens, and I was hoping to be persuaded and have more of an informed opinion after reading a book like this however I feel more uncertain then I did before reading this book.
March 9, 2016
Someone who has served as the head of both the NSA and the CIA likely has some very interesting stories and Michael Hayden imparts a great number in this wonderful memoir. You may, and will likely, disagree with his latter discussion of the Snowden revelations but his clear-headed analysis of his time in the public-eye and the work he did outside of the public-eye makes for extremely interesting reading. Highly Recommended
July 10, 2016
I didn't realize that this was an autobiography, since my interest in choosing it was purely about learning more of the U.S. counter intelligence efforts.
But there was enough on my subject of interest to stretch a little and give it 3 stars.
The author is to be commended for a career spent in the service of his country in the military and then as CIA director.
The book makes clear how difficult it is for a democratic country to conduct intelligence operations and keep them secret.
But there was enough on my subject of interest to stretch a little and give it 3 stars.
The author is to be commended for a career spent in the service of his country in the military and then as CIA director.
The book makes clear how difficult it is for a democratic country to conduct intelligence operations and keep them secret.
April 8, 2018
Fascinating experiences hampered by clunky prose and heaps of self-justification. Good story. Horrible writing.
July 31, 2018
Dry and tedious
January 26, 2018
As boss of the National Security Agency during 9/11 and later boss of the CIA, Hayden managed two intelligence bureaucracies.
At NSA, Hayden’s work was expected to be in the first two steps of the Data-Analysis-Decision-Action sequence. Hayden’s job was to collect as much data as possible, maybe more than anyone else in the world. Then, the job was to analyze it. To translate and filter it down and package it into something decision-makers can use. Which means into something that fits inside a decision-maker’s head.
That’s a hard job. It requires knowing the questions decision-makers have. Knowing what decision-makers need. Knowing what they can understand. And filtering that enormous amount of data into something that fits inside a decision-maker’s head.
That’s why Hayden talks a lot about politics and leaders. He talks about what they knew and wanted to know. He talks a lot about answering their questions.
But he takes one part of the DADA process a step further.
Hayden knows that the DADA process isn’t static. It’s a dynamic loop. After you get to action, you collect data on what just happened. Then you go through the process again.
Sometimes, you take action in order to generate more data.
In the early days of the Iraq War, NSA wasn’t collecting the right data, so Hayden asked CENTCOM to target Iraq’s fiber optic cables. “The idea was to herd signals into the air, where we could intercept them� (p. 60).
When he became boss of the CIA, Hayden took over the hunt for Bin Laden, civil war in Iraq and the detainees at Guantanamo. A lot of the book is Hayden maneuvering through the politics and quoting himself about those issues. He says, “There are days when a director of the CIA is inclined to think that he is running a large public affairs, legal, and legislative liaison enterprise attached to small operational and analytic elements. Of course, it is (or should be) the other way around� (p. 232).
Of course, the “public affairs, legal and legislative liaison enterprise� are necessary because that’s how you talk to the end user. It’s through those tools that you reach decision-makers.
When you’re boss of an intelligence agency, your primary job is to manage and improve the DADA process. You’re making sure data collectors are collecting the right data. You’re making sure analysts are analyzing the right things. You’re making sure your agency “products� answer the questions decision-makers have.
But you don’t stop there. You also look forward to the actions that follow decisions. And you’re looking forward to the results of those actions. Sometimes, others take those actions. Sometimes, you do.
When you’re boss of an intelligence agency, your job is to make sure the whole DADA process works. You can’t silo data collection. You can’t separate analysis. You can’t keep decision-makers and the people taking action away from the others. You do as much sharing and cross-pollination as possible. You make sure everyone appreciates the other parts. You make sure there’s generosity between the parts.
When you’re boss of an intelligence agency, your job is to make sure the whole thing works.
But not every boss sees it that way. Some bosses want to right past wrongs. Some bosses want to make one part ascendant over the others. Some bosses care more about the parts than the whole.
Michael Hayden made sure the whole thing worked.
------------
For Hayden, the big change in moving from NSA to the CIA was the focus on taking action. Not just collecting data. Not just analyzing it. Not just informing decision-makers. The CIA was expected to do all that plus take action under certain circumstances.
For “action,� Hayden worked closely with former case officer Steve Kappes, his Deputy Director. Hayden says, “Steve Kappes ran something called the CARG, the Covert Action Review Group, to keep us on the right side of issues. Monthly he deconstructed proposed and ongoing operations with a skeptic’s, even a cynic’s, eye. Tough sessions. No autopilots� (p. 283). For an inkling of what was happening behind the scenes, go to the index and read the pages under “Steve Kappes.�
At NSA, Hayden’s work was expected to be in the first two steps of the Data-Analysis-Decision-Action sequence. Hayden’s job was to collect as much data as possible, maybe more than anyone else in the world. Then, the job was to analyze it. To translate and filter it down and package it into something decision-makers can use. Which means into something that fits inside a decision-maker’s head.
That’s a hard job. It requires knowing the questions decision-makers have. Knowing what decision-makers need. Knowing what they can understand. And filtering that enormous amount of data into something that fits inside a decision-maker’s head.
That’s why Hayden talks a lot about politics and leaders. He talks about what they knew and wanted to know. He talks a lot about answering their questions.
But he takes one part of the DADA process a step further.
Hayden knows that the DADA process isn’t static. It’s a dynamic loop. After you get to action, you collect data on what just happened. Then you go through the process again.
Sometimes, you take action in order to generate more data.
In the early days of the Iraq War, NSA wasn’t collecting the right data, so Hayden asked CENTCOM to target Iraq’s fiber optic cables. “The idea was to herd signals into the air, where we could intercept them� (p. 60).
When he became boss of the CIA, Hayden took over the hunt for Bin Laden, civil war in Iraq and the detainees at Guantanamo. A lot of the book is Hayden maneuvering through the politics and quoting himself about those issues. He says, “There are days when a director of the CIA is inclined to think that he is running a large public affairs, legal, and legislative liaison enterprise attached to small operational and analytic elements. Of course, it is (or should be) the other way around� (p. 232).
Of course, the “public affairs, legal and legislative liaison enterprise� are necessary because that’s how you talk to the end user. It’s through those tools that you reach decision-makers.
When you’re boss of an intelligence agency, your primary job is to manage and improve the DADA process. You’re making sure data collectors are collecting the right data. You’re making sure analysts are analyzing the right things. You’re making sure your agency “products� answer the questions decision-makers have.
But you don’t stop there. You also look forward to the actions that follow decisions. And you’re looking forward to the results of those actions. Sometimes, others take those actions. Sometimes, you do.
When you’re boss of an intelligence agency, your job is to make sure the whole DADA process works. You can’t silo data collection. You can’t separate analysis. You can’t keep decision-makers and the people taking action away from the others. You do as much sharing and cross-pollination as possible. You make sure everyone appreciates the other parts. You make sure there’s generosity between the parts.
When you’re boss of an intelligence agency, your job is to make sure the whole thing works.
But not every boss sees it that way. Some bosses want to right past wrongs. Some bosses want to make one part ascendant over the others. Some bosses care more about the parts than the whole.
Michael Hayden made sure the whole thing worked.
------------
For Hayden, the big change in moving from NSA to the CIA was the focus on taking action. Not just collecting data. Not just analyzing it. Not just informing decision-makers. The CIA was expected to do all that plus take action under certain circumstances.
For “action,� Hayden worked closely with former case officer Steve Kappes, his Deputy Director. Hayden says, “Steve Kappes ran something called the CARG, the Covert Action Review Group, to keep us on the right side of issues. Monthly he deconstructed proposed and ongoing operations with a skeptic’s, even a cynic’s, eye. Tough sessions. No autopilots� (p. 283). For an inkling of what was happening behind the scenes, go to the index and read the pages under “Steve Kappes.�
February 22, 2017
General Michael Hayden recounts his storied and controversial career in the National Intelligence Agency, as head of the National Security Agency and the CIA, in Playing to the Edge. The book is deeply informative, but accessible to the layperson unfamiliar with modern security methods and tradecraft. Unsurprisingly Hayden is a firm believer in the cause and necessity of espionage, and as such, the book is important, especially for those who tend to be skeptical of state secrets and security agencies.
It is a lengthy book but Hayden rarely gets lost in the weeds. He walks through different episodes of his career and offers a rationale for the choices he and the agencies made. Given the popular hostility to security agencies in the modern climate, and to Hayden in particular, the book sometimes has a defensive tone, as if Hayden anticipated readers recriminations. He explains the complexity of situations and methods used and acknowledges drawbacks.
Whatever one thinks of security agencies in general and Bush-era policies, in particular, Hayden makes it clear that agency policy was well thought through by agents struggling to balance their duty to protect the Republic and people's rights and privacy. And successful efforts at trade-craft help keep people safe and vulnerable to the false notion that tradecraft is unnecessary. Reading Hayden makes one aware that the ideological jabs directed at security agencies from certain figures in the press are at best one-sided, and at worst egregious character attacks against people desperately trying to balance their duty to protect and their love of freedom against very real threats.
Hayden is balanced, but he is not reluctant to express his opinions. His take on the liberal Democrats who took the senate and the house in the mid-2000s is particularly scathing. It is clear, even to a liberal, that the pandering to certain elements of the democratic base was not in the America public interest. Senate and House meetings became ideological lecturing sessions as Hayden and colleagues were routinely excoriated by leading Democrats. Hayden does not seem particularly bothered by this, but he notes that by asking agents whether they would like their families waterboarded, instead of trying to work on agency standards for interrogation, left decisions entirely to the executive. Using meetings with intelligence officials to score points, left a vacuum of power that had to be taken by the president. Effectively they ensured that Congress had virtually no influence on developing agency standards. Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid come in for particularly scathing criticism. The often criticised centrist Democrats seem more responsible in Hayden's telling of events.
As a fan of President Obama, I have to acknowledge that Hayden makes some intelligent critiques of his choices in regards to agency policies. In particular, Hayden was dismayed by Obama's choice to allow his Attorney General to press charges against former agency officials. if an administration felt so strongly about culpability, shouldn't legislators be held to account instead of agents who acted upon the direction of the Congress and the personal support of the President? If agents cannot be sure of their security they will not take risks and will rarely do anything that might be publicly controversial. That may seem to be a good thing, but in an era when the public is divided, there are few security issues that do not provoke controversy. If agencies are the prisoners of political whims, the intelligence community will be neutered at a time it needs to be bold. Hayden argues a similar case when the decision was made by Obama to release details of certain interrogation techniques. Transparency is desirable in a democracy, but intelligence agencies need to have aces up their sleeves in order to outmanoeuvre terrorists and others who mean Americans and westerners harm.
If you are a liberal you need to think about the role of security. Hayden reminds us that we still live in a dangerous world, despite our progress and prosperity. Should American intelligence agencies be stripped of the ability to engage in espionage activities that virtually every other major power on earth (most of them undemocratic) does with reckless abandon? I cannot help but think that at a time when Russian tradecraft has jeopardized the entire post-war era that liberals may want to rethink leftist orthodoxy on these issues. One of the consequences of closing down the enhanced interrogation program was a massive increase in targeted killings. Is that really a desirable outcome?
What emerges from the book is a nuanced look at running an intelligence agency. Hayden explains several controversial policies, such as the collection of metadata. It is clear that there is a vast difference between how this intelligence was described by pseudo-journalists, and what the program actually entailed. It is hard not to reassess your view of certain icons of the anti-American left after reading Hayden's articulate and emphatic defence of the program and explanation of the dangers entailed in leaking the information.
The book is not perfect. Hayden's military background is obvious. As one who grew up in the military he sometimes displays little regard for dissent and his dismissal of a "citizen of the world" who leaked some information in the early 2000s echoes the sometimes inept way he tried to defend the agency from scurrilous, agenda-driven journalists, and some legitimate reporters asking honest questions. I cannot help but wonder whether those with military backgrounds are best suited to lead security agencies. Maybe people from other industries would be better suited to helm agencies in an era when people on both sides of the political spectrum mistrust their leaders and institutions. Hayden places most of the blame for the fallout from Bush-era policies on those who followed Bush. But does the Bush administration deserve more blame for failing to maintain the confidence of a broad majority of the American public? And in the future how difficult will it be to mobilize public support for major international efforts? If every administration simply cancels guarantees and agreements made by previous ones, how will any government agencies and employees function? Hayden feels that we may be less safe in the future as a consequence of tying the hands of security agencies. It is hard to discount that fear after reading this book.
It is a lengthy book but Hayden rarely gets lost in the weeds. He walks through different episodes of his career and offers a rationale for the choices he and the agencies made. Given the popular hostility to security agencies in the modern climate, and to Hayden in particular, the book sometimes has a defensive tone, as if Hayden anticipated readers recriminations. He explains the complexity of situations and methods used and acknowledges drawbacks.
Whatever one thinks of security agencies in general and Bush-era policies, in particular, Hayden makes it clear that agency policy was well thought through by agents struggling to balance their duty to protect the Republic and people's rights and privacy. And successful efforts at trade-craft help keep people safe and vulnerable to the false notion that tradecraft is unnecessary. Reading Hayden makes one aware that the ideological jabs directed at security agencies from certain figures in the press are at best one-sided, and at worst egregious character attacks against people desperately trying to balance their duty to protect and their love of freedom against very real threats.
Hayden is balanced, but he is not reluctant to express his opinions. His take on the liberal Democrats who took the senate and the house in the mid-2000s is particularly scathing. It is clear, even to a liberal, that the pandering to certain elements of the democratic base was not in the America public interest. Senate and House meetings became ideological lecturing sessions as Hayden and colleagues were routinely excoriated by leading Democrats. Hayden does not seem particularly bothered by this, but he notes that by asking agents whether they would like their families waterboarded, instead of trying to work on agency standards for interrogation, left decisions entirely to the executive. Using meetings with intelligence officials to score points, left a vacuum of power that had to be taken by the president. Effectively they ensured that Congress had virtually no influence on developing agency standards. Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid come in for particularly scathing criticism. The often criticised centrist Democrats seem more responsible in Hayden's telling of events.
As a fan of President Obama, I have to acknowledge that Hayden makes some intelligent critiques of his choices in regards to agency policies. In particular, Hayden was dismayed by Obama's choice to allow his Attorney General to press charges against former agency officials. if an administration felt so strongly about culpability, shouldn't legislators be held to account instead of agents who acted upon the direction of the Congress and the personal support of the President? If agents cannot be sure of their security they will not take risks and will rarely do anything that might be publicly controversial. That may seem to be a good thing, but in an era when the public is divided, there are few security issues that do not provoke controversy. If agencies are the prisoners of political whims, the intelligence community will be neutered at a time it needs to be bold. Hayden argues a similar case when the decision was made by Obama to release details of certain interrogation techniques. Transparency is desirable in a democracy, but intelligence agencies need to have aces up their sleeves in order to outmanoeuvre terrorists and others who mean Americans and westerners harm.
If you are a liberal you need to think about the role of security. Hayden reminds us that we still live in a dangerous world, despite our progress and prosperity. Should American intelligence agencies be stripped of the ability to engage in espionage activities that virtually every other major power on earth (most of them undemocratic) does with reckless abandon? I cannot help but think that at a time when Russian tradecraft has jeopardized the entire post-war era that liberals may want to rethink leftist orthodoxy on these issues. One of the consequences of closing down the enhanced interrogation program was a massive increase in targeted killings. Is that really a desirable outcome?
What emerges from the book is a nuanced look at running an intelligence agency. Hayden explains several controversial policies, such as the collection of metadata. It is clear that there is a vast difference between how this intelligence was described by pseudo-journalists, and what the program actually entailed. It is hard not to reassess your view of certain icons of the anti-American left after reading Hayden's articulate and emphatic defence of the program and explanation of the dangers entailed in leaking the information.
The book is not perfect. Hayden's military background is obvious. As one who grew up in the military he sometimes displays little regard for dissent and his dismissal of a "citizen of the world" who leaked some information in the early 2000s echoes the sometimes inept way he tried to defend the agency from scurrilous, agenda-driven journalists, and some legitimate reporters asking honest questions. I cannot help but wonder whether those with military backgrounds are best suited to lead security agencies. Maybe people from other industries would be better suited to helm agencies in an era when people on both sides of the political spectrum mistrust their leaders and institutions. Hayden places most of the blame for the fallout from Bush-era policies on those who followed Bush. But does the Bush administration deserve more blame for failing to maintain the confidence of a broad majority of the American public? And in the future how difficult will it be to mobilize public support for major international efforts? If every administration simply cancels guarantees and agreements made by previous ones, how will any government agencies and employees function? Hayden feels that we may be less safe in the future as a consequence of tying the hands of security agencies. It is hard to discount that fear after reading this book.
July 31, 2024
I remember watching Michael Hayden's interview with Trevor Noah a long time ago, which initially piqued my interest in his perspectives, leading me to buy his book. It had been sitting on my shelf for almost six years. Hayden’s memoir has given me a lot to think about and raised questions about my own thinking.
Hayden's book is meticulously factual. I checked several facts, and they all held up. The chapter on Stellar Wind was particularly eye-opening, providing new respect for President Bush’s decisions. Hayden candidly discusses the intelligence failures regarding Saddam Hussein’s WMD program, offering a transparent look into the complexities and pressures faced by the intelligence community.
When discussing the RDI program, Hayden provides a detailed account of the legal framework and the guidelines that interrogators were supposed to follow by law. Although I have always been repulsed by the RDI program and still am, Hayden's explanation highlights the legal and procedural aspects that shaped the actions of those involved. This perspective, while not changing my fundamental opposition, has added a layer of understanding to the complexities of the situation.
One of the most challenging aspects of the book is Hayden’s defense of drone attacks and targeted killings. Initially, I was enraged by the drone attacks, viewing them as morally indefensible. However, Hayden's reasoning has made me reconsider my stance. While I still find these actions troubling, I now understand the perceived necessity behind them.
Hayden also devotes a chapter to criticizing Eric Holder, President Obama’s Attorney General. At the time, I believed Holder’s actions represented a much-needed step towards transparency. Yet, Hayden’s arguments have made me question my earlier views, suggesting that perhaps I was naive about the complexities involved.
"Playing to the Edge" is a thought-provoking read that challenges deeply held beliefs and offers a nuanced view of the intelligence community’s actions post-9/11. Hayden’s no-nonsense approach and willingness to discuss controversial topics openly make this book a compelling and informative read, leaving me with much to ponder about the delicate balance between security and freedom.
Hayden's book is meticulously factual. I checked several facts, and they all held up. The chapter on Stellar Wind was particularly eye-opening, providing new respect for President Bush’s decisions. Hayden candidly discusses the intelligence failures regarding Saddam Hussein’s WMD program, offering a transparent look into the complexities and pressures faced by the intelligence community.
When discussing the RDI program, Hayden provides a detailed account of the legal framework and the guidelines that interrogators were supposed to follow by law. Although I have always been repulsed by the RDI program and still am, Hayden's explanation highlights the legal and procedural aspects that shaped the actions of those involved. This perspective, while not changing my fundamental opposition, has added a layer of understanding to the complexities of the situation.
One of the most challenging aspects of the book is Hayden’s defense of drone attacks and targeted killings. Initially, I was enraged by the drone attacks, viewing them as morally indefensible. However, Hayden's reasoning has made me reconsider my stance. While I still find these actions troubling, I now understand the perceived necessity behind them.
Hayden also devotes a chapter to criticizing Eric Holder, President Obama’s Attorney General. At the time, I believed Holder’s actions represented a much-needed step towards transparency. Yet, Hayden’s arguments have made me question my earlier views, suggesting that perhaps I was naive about the complexities involved.
"Playing to the Edge" is a thought-provoking read that challenges deeply held beliefs and offers a nuanced view of the intelligence community’s actions post-9/11. Hayden’s no-nonsense approach and willingness to discuss controversial topics openly make this book a compelling and informative read, leaving me with much to ponder about the delicate balance between security and freedom.
October 12, 2019
I listened to the audio book and it's just okay. While I can recommend this book it is mostly a memoir by Michael V. Hayden and a recounting of his military career and his time as the head of the NSA and the head of the CIA.
Hayden does seem to share some inside information about the inner workings of the NSA and Operation Prism and Stellar Wind. For those of you who do not know Prism is what Edward Snowden exposed by leaking his NSA documents to a reporter. Hayden shares his belief and his opinion of Snowden in this book which I will not repeat here as to not give it away. I have my own opinion about Snowden that has vacillated after listening to this book and listening to a book about Snowden by another author. Hayden has his reasons and presents compelling arguments and others have their own, opposite beliefs, and equally present compelling arguments. The arguments center around Benjamin Franklin's quote, "Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty or Safety." For more about the historical context of this quote please research it yourself in the historical context. I will not dare to share my opinion here only to ask the reader to read my previous sentence and follow through on the research in the historical context.
There are three things that I noted about this book: 1) by reading or listening to this book you will get a sense of what the current President Trump means when he says "fake news" and let it be known that I have been saying since 2004 or 2005 that there is a reason why television is called television programming (because our brains have been programmed by 24-hours news media and television in general, think 1984 and Big Brother) 2) this book is a perfect example of the Military Industrial Complex in action, e.g. the tail is wagging the dog and 3) a quote I saw on a bumper sticker in Hawaii "1984 was supposed to be a warning not a road map or blueprint." Please think about these things and how they relate and are interconnected in today's 21st century content consuming culture. Also, I ask the question, "How does one really know what is true?" and I ask the reader to consider this question.
With my commentary above this book is dense and long and I found it be mostly boring and Hayden just telling about his career and more recent career (since 9/11) in the military and moving from a military post to becoming the director of the NSA and CIA while still being a military officer and some of the legal and political ramifications and debates about the subjects which are interesting.
Hayden does seem to share some inside information about the inner workings of the NSA and Operation Prism and Stellar Wind. For those of you who do not know Prism is what Edward Snowden exposed by leaking his NSA documents to a reporter. Hayden shares his belief and his opinion of Snowden in this book which I will not repeat here as to not give it away. I have my own opinion about Snowden that has vacillated after listening to this book and listening to a book about Snowden by another author. Hayden has his reasons and presents compelling arguments and others have their own, opposite beliefs, and equally present compelling arguments. The arguments center around Benjamin Franklin's quote, "Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty or Safety." For more about the historical context of this quote please research it yourself in the historical context. I will not dare to share my opinion here only to ask the reader to read my previous sentence and follow through on the research in the historical context.
There are three things that I noted about this book: 1) by reading or listening to this book you will get a sense of what the current President Trump means when he says "fake news" and let it be known that I have been saying since 2004 or 2005 that there is a reason why television is called television programming (because our brains have been programmed by 24-hours news media and television in general, think 1984 and Big Brother) 2) this book is a perfect example of the Military Industrial Complex in action, e.g. the tail is wagging the dog and 3) a quote I saw on a bumper sticker in Hawaii "1984 was supposed to be a warning not a road map or blueprint." Please think about these things and how they relate and are interconnected in today's 21st century content consuming culture. Also, I ask the question, "How does one really know what is true?" and I ask the reader to consider this question.
With my commentary above this book is dense and long and I found it be mostly boring and Hayden just telling about his career and more recent career (since 9/11) in the military and moving from a military post to becoming the director of the NSA and CIA while still being a military officer and some of the legal and political ramifications and debates about the subjects which are interesting.
December 10, 2021
Hayden is definitely a company man. I enjoyed the General's memoir and his retelling of events of his life in intelligence. I did not like the non-linear aspect of it, but perhaps that helped divide it up by subject so those could be fully retold. My other criticism is his complete dismissal of criticism of the company by the likes of Tim Weiner's book . As the old adage goes, those who fail to learn from the past are doomed to repeat it (or something like that). I'd have loved to see him point out the flaws in the critiques and how the current day IC is prepared to prevent the mistakes of the past. This would have led to a more complete rendition of the capabilities of the IC and how they help us sleep at night.
Enough of the bad stuff. I really enjoyed several of the chapters, especially those that had detailed discussions in the White House about policy or the decisions to hit Abu Musab al-zarqawi. Fascinating stuff. I love how apolitical he is/was.
I'd also like to know his thoughts on the best methods to get HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT and MASINT. How does the IC use those to make the world a little safer? Lastly, give us more details about the major operations of the IC during his tenure and some of the major successes? I have long stated that we are "behind" other countries in espionage because we are unwilling (unable?) to be ruthless. I'd love to know his thoughts on that. Russia, and it's predecessor the Soviet Union didn't play by "the rules" and this led to them being able to put moles in our IC at will. The punishment they mete out is far greater than ours - just look at what happens to their people that get caught vs ours. Overall, this is a great addition to an espionage library and gives a very good understanding of the current day IC and the realities they face in the real world. I thank the General for his service and I'm glad there are people like him on our side.
Enough of the bad stuff. I really enjoyed several of the chapters, especially those that had detailed discussions in the White House about policy or the decisions to hit Abu Musab al-zarqawi. Fascinating stuff. I love how apolitical he is/was.
I'd also like to know his thoughts on the best methods to get HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT and MASINT. How does the IC use those to make the world a little safer? Lastly, give us more details about the major operations of the IC during his tenure and some of the major successes? I have long stated that we are "behind" other countries in espionage because we are unwilling (unable?) to be ruthless. I'd love to know his thoughts on that. Russia, and it's predecessor the Soviet Union didn't play by "the rules" and this led to them being able to put moles in our IC at will. The punishment they mete out is far greater than ours - just look at what happens to their people that get caught vs ours. Overall, this is a great addition to an espionage library and gives a very good understanding of the current day IC and the realities they face in the real world. I thank the General for his service and I'm glad there are people like him on our side.
August 31, 2020
My approach to reading is generally organized as a web; I try to not only follow up on interesting bits and citations in works but also try to find pieces which counter the thesis from which an author draws. Earlier this summer I had read both Rachel Maddow’s “Blowout� and “Drift.� The central thesis of “Drift� can be summarized as “The war powers vested in Congress had long neglected their duty to check the executive, leading to an expansion of power and inevitable procurement of an unending state of war.� Although my politics lean left and I tend to agree inherently with this sentiment, I found it important to understand the argument of the other side. Who better to tell the other side than the former director of the NSA and CIA? Of course critics can argue Hayden is clearly biased in his articulations of the Intelligence Community and Bush administration opinions on the legality of programs and methods. However, I think Hayden makes the case: of course these are questionable, it is the duty of intelligence professionals to go to the complete bounds of what is legally permitted. I consider myself a bit of a political junkie, however, I will warn readers this is a complete alphabet soup if you’re not particularly familiar with the web of acronyms affiliated with the intel community you may need to reread sections to coherently understand and absorb the value in this book. Overall I think it was well written and is a great counter narrative for those predisposed to view espionage as an assault on liberty, rather than a defense of it.
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