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Homo Sacer #II.1
State of Exception
Two months after the attacks of 9/11, the Bush administration, in the midst of what it perceived to be a state of emergency, authorized the indefinite detention of noncitizens suspected of terrorist activities and their subsequent trials by a military commission. Here, distinguished Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben uses such circumstances to argue that this unusual extension of power, or "state of exception," has historically been an underexamined and powerful strategy that has the potential to transform democracies into totalitarian states.
The sequel to Agamben's Homo Sovereign Power and Bare Life, State of Exception is the first book to theorize the state of exception in historical and philosophical context. In Agamben's view, the majority of legal scholars and policymakers in Europe as well as the United States have wrongly rejected the necessity of such a theory, claiming instead that the state of exception is a pragmatic question. Agamben argues here that the state of exception, which was meant to be a provisional measure, became in the course of the twentieth century a normal paradigm of government. Writing nothing less than the history of the state of exception in its various national contexts throughout Western Europe and the United States, Agamben uses the work of Carl Schmitt as a foil for his reflections as well as that of Derrida, Benjamin, and Arendt.
In this highly topical book, Agamben ultimately arrives at original ideas about the future of democracy and casts a new light on the hidden relationship that ties law to violence.
The sequel to Agamben's Homo Sovereign Power and Bare Life, State of Exception is the first book to theorize the state of exception in historical and philosophical context. In Agamben's view, the majority of legal scholars and policymakers in Europe as well as the United States have wrongly rejected the necessity of such a theory, claiming instead that the state of exception is a pragmatic question. Agamben argues here that the state of exception, which was meant to be a provisional measure, became in the course of the twentieth century a normal paradigm of government. Writing nothing less than the history of the state of exception in its various national contexts throughout Western Europe and the United States, Agamben uses the work of Carl Schmitt as a foil for his reflections as well as that of Derrida, Benjamin, and Arendt.
In this highly topical book, Agamben ultimately arrives at original ideas about the future of democracy and casts a new light on the hidden relationship that ties law to violence.
104 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2003
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About the author
Giorgio Agamben
211books935followersGiorgio Agamben is one of the leading figures in Italian and contemporary continental philosophy. He is the author of Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life; Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive; Profanations; The Signature of All Things: On Method, and other books. Through the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s he treated a wide range of topics, including aesthetics, literature, language, ontology, nihilism, and radical political thought.
In recent years, his work has had a deep impact on contemporary scholarship in a number of disciplines in the Anglo-American intellectual world. Born in Rome in 1942, Agamben completed studies in Law and Philosophy with a doctoral thesis on the political thought of Simone Weil, and participated in Martin Heidegger’s seminars on Hegel and Heraclitus as a postdoctoral scholar.
He rose to international prominence after the publication of Homo Sacer in 1995. Translated into English in 1998, the book’s analyses of law, life, and state power appeared uncannily prescient after the attacks on New York City and Washington, DC in September 2001, and the resultant shifts in the geopolitical landscape. Provoking a wave of scholarly interest in the philosopher’s work, the book also marked the beginning of a 20-year research project, which represents Agamben’s most important contribution to political philosophy.
In recent years, his work has had a deep impact on contemporary scholarship in a number of disciplines in the Anglo-American intellectual world. Born in Rome in 1942, Agamben completed studies in Law and Philosophy with a doctoral thesis on the political thought of Simone Weil, and participated in Martin Heidegger’s seminars on Hegel and Heraclitus as a postdoctoral scholar.
He rose to international prominence after the publication of Homo Sacer in 1995. Translated into English in 1998, the book’s analyses of law, life, and state power appeared uncannily prescient after the attacks on New York City and Washington, DC in September 2001, and the resultant shifts in the geopolitical landscape. Provoking a wave of scholarly interest in the philosopher’s work, the book also marked the beginning of a 20-year research project, which represents Agamben’s most important contribution to political philosophy.
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July 31, 2015
أشكر الأصدقاء في دار مدارات على نشر هذا الكتاب الثمين، والذي كان –م� قراءتي لفوكو وحنه أرندت- مفتاح مرحلة أخرى في وعيي السياسي الخاص، وكعادة هذه الكتب، فتخشى من اختزالها لو كتبت مراجعة لها على الجودريدز، وتحتفظ بنيّة -تبقى مؤجلة عادة- لكتابة مقالٍ وافٍ عنها.
January 11, 2021
6 January 2021 - very Roman, the executive declaration of iustitium, creating a kenomatic moment of anomie wherein each citizen becomes sovereign sufficient to exercise lethal force against purported foes of the alleged nomos, as here, the enemy legislature. That said, fuck Trump voters.
7 November 2020 - today reminds us plainly of Agamben's point in Volume I that "the sovereign is the point of indistinction between violence and law� (loc. cit. at 25), a moment of anomie inscribed in the center of the nomos in the dual person of the sovereign. Trump highlights this inscription and revels in placing everything on the knife's edge; Biden won't be able to erase it even if he won't call attention to it. That said, fuck Trump.
24 August 2019 - am again re-urging this because of the president's suggestion that he can halt international commerce via the state of exception:
15 February 2019 - Re-urging this today in the strongest possible terms because the president of the United States has declared a national emergency--a state of exception--on the basis of the following sleight of mind:
Part II of author’s Homo Sacer project.
Cute pamphlet in the benjaminian tradition. Probably the best 9/11 book that I’ve read, even though it only briefly mentions that event.
Point of departure is Schmitt’s “definition of the sovereign as ‘he who decides on the state of exception’� (1), the state of necessity, like civil war, wherein we find “juridical measures that cannot be understood in legal terms," and which appear "as the legal form of what cannot have legal form� (id.).
Notes that the SoE is like a lawful civil war, and notes the Third Reich as an SoE with a twelve-year duration (2), based on an emergency decree that created a “voluntary state of emergency� alongside the lawful constitutional order—which is a technique that “has become one of the essential practices of contemporary states, including so-called democratic ones� (id).
SoE is not a specialized area of law, but rather “a suspension of the juridical order� (4); SoE is furthermore a “creation of the democratic-revolutionary tradition and not the absolutist one� (5). Will note that “the idea that a suspension of law may be necessary for the common good is foreign to the medieval world� (26), which may, I think, be less about the SoE itself than about how things like “common good� may also be foreign to the medieval world, which may inhabit a kenomatic space (infra) of its own.
Text notes a number of sets of distinctions in wrestling with this: real v. fictive SoE (3); states of peace/war/siege, which escalate the centralization of military authority (5); pleromatic (state has plenitudo potestatis, the expansion of state power), v. kenomatic states (an “emptiness of law,� a return to a Hobbesian “state of nature�) (5-6); Schmitt’s “commissarial dictatorship� v. “sovereign dictatorship� (8, and then again in depth 32 ff.). Initially, dude wants to identify the SoE with a kenomatic state.
Wants therefore to trace the development of the concept toward the modern global SoE as manifested in the Patriot Act and ‘war on terror.� This section (11-22) covers several states' development. The brief US section is tremendous, noting the origin of the US SoE in the presidency of Lincoln, who “acted as an absolute dictator� (20) and suspended the writ of habeas corpus, and thereafter justified his actions to the legislature by stating, whatever their legality, they were based on popular demand and public necessity (id.). Congress dutifully ratified the executive acts. Later, Wilson “assumed even broader powers,� but instead of bypassing Congress, he went “each time to have the powers in question delegated,� which is apparently tres European (21) to the extent it prefers extraordinary statutes over a general declaration of the SoE. Because the Lincoln/Wilson expansions were rooted in two different sorts of war, by the time we get to FDR, all crises become warlike, and the president actually asked “the Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis—broad Executive power to wage war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe� in 1938 (22).
The function of these processes is apparently to inscribe durkheimian anomie within the juridical order: “The suspension of the norm does not mean its abolition, and the zone of anomie that it establishes is not (or at least claims not to be) unrelated to the juridical order� (23). This is traced back to the Decretum of Gratian: “If something is done out of necessity, it is done licitly, since what is not licit in law necessity makes licit. Likewise necessity has no law� (24). Greasers take this as an indication that necessity is truly the basis of law after all, which seems to set the SoE as the originary condition. Gross. But it gets worse as we move to the metagross:
That’s all kinda kickass—the master figure of blurriness, which renders certain thingies undecidable in the normal derridean/godelian sense (it is the most concrete metaphor used for what shall be revealed to be the plotinian hoion in volume VI--as the more normal metaphors are zones and thresholds of indistinction or indetermination). This causes a nasty aporia: “If a measure taken out of necessity is already a juridical norm and not simply fact, why must it be ratified and approved by law […]? And if instead if it not law, but simply fact, why do the legal effects of its ratification begin not from the moment it is converted into law, but ex tunc?� (29). As though that aporia were not completely disabling, author likewise identifies a worse one: though many writers think of the state of necessity as “an objective situation,� it is contingent upon a naïve assumption of “pure factuality� which the concept has contradicted (blurriness of law/fact, recall!) and is furthermore reliant upon “subjective judgment”—“‘the recourse to necessity entails a moral or political (or in any case, extrajuridical) evaluation, by which the juridical order is judged and is held worthy of preservation or strengthening even at the price of its possible violation,’� which renders it always already a “’revolutionary principle’� (30).
Working through Schmitt’s theory of dictatorship thereafter, author has occasion to observe Schmitt ‘s inscription of the SoE within the juridical order itself:
Mention is made briefly of Derrida’s essay on the ‘force de loi� (37), which works as a departure point for a consideration of the significance of “force of law� as a legal term:
SoE then explained as a modern instance of Roman iustitium, an analogy to solstitium, wherein something comes to standstill (law or sun, dig?). Iustitium was proclaimed as a response to the declaration of a tumultus, itself normally the result of the issuance of senatus consultum ultimum (41). (Gotta love that chain.) Iustitium was conceived by Roman jurists as “an interval and cessation of law,� or, as author says, “the production of a juridical void� (41-42). We should carry this in mind with the prior discussion of kenomatic states, states of nature, lacuna that is not anarchy, and so on. The of senatus consultum ultimum (SCU) is described by some as a quasi-dictatorship, but author regards that as manifestly erroneous; SCU is not a new office or power, but rather a caesura wherein “every citizen seems to be invested with a floating and anomalous imperium that resists definition within the terms of the normal order� (43), but nevertheless allows them to carry out any acts in defense of the state. He will deny that SCU and the iustitium can be read as dictatorship, which was a specific magistracy defined by a precise statute for a particular purpose—though it was of course an extraordinary office and statute. Because Schmitt and others confused SoE with dictatorship, they made the same error and fell into the aporias described supra. (Best note in the entire volume argues that fascists tend to be “indifferently presented as dictators,� but they normally aren’t within the scope of the definition, considering that they historically were duly authorized to take office, and then ruled constitutionally as well as from a parallel SoE (48).)
From the iustitium, dude summarizes: SoE is not dictatorship, but a zone of anomie; it is essential to the juridical order; acts committed during the SoE/iustitium have not legal definition and are within the khora of the law; and ‘force of law� is the way we conceive of the undefinability (51).
Text moves on to read the Benjamin/Schmitt debate, wherein we see the already familiar notions, such as SoE is where Schmitt tries to “inscribe anomie within the very body of the nomos (54), and so on. This section is mainly to rehabilitate Benjamin, as it has apparently been considered ‘scandalous� on the left for Benjamin to have been interested in the ideas of fascist Schmitt; it’s cool and interesting, but doesn’t really develop the ideas of the first half much further. Final two chapters are also very cool, but seem like coda I and coda II that run specific things inessential to the main argument (still very cool). My notes are littered with ‘cf. Griffin,� ‘cf. Bakhtin,� ‘cf. Adorno,� so it’s conceptually worthwhile. Works very well with Neumann’s Behemoth, insofar as the Third Reich was in that text described as a non-state subject to the overlapping polycratic authority of various actors who each held their own SoE/SCU bona fides.
Good stuff. Go read. Go read the entire series; the concepts from here and volume I follow through all the rest.
7 November 2020 - today reminds us plainly of Agamben's point in Volume I that "the sovereign is the point of indistinction between violence and law� (loc. cit. at 25), a moment of anomie inscribed in the center of the nomos in the dual person of the sovereign. Trump highlights this inscription and revels in placing everything on the knife's edge; Biden won't be able to erase it even if he won't call attention to it. That said, fuck Trump.
24 August 2019 - am again re-urging this because of the president's suggestion that he can halt international commerce via the state of exception:
For all of the Fake News Reporters that don't have a clue as toHis legal interpretation is not in accord with Youngstown Sheet and Tube, but that is a question for the judiciary, which he has stacked with pliable ideologues, who could simply decline to hear industry's suits as political questions, building on the expansion of the doctrine we saw in Rucho/Lamone on partisan gerrymandering.
what the law is relative to Presidential powers, China, etc., try looking at the Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977. Case closed!
15 February 2019 - Re-urging this today in the strongest possible terms because the president of the United States has declared a national emergency--a state of exception--on the basis of the following sleight of mind:
The southern border is a major entry point for criminals, gang members, and illicit narcotics [OH NOS]. The problem of large-scale unlawful migration through the southern border is long-standing [hardly an acute crisis then?], and despite the executive branch's exercise of existing statutory authorities, the situation has worsened in certain respects [but not all?] in recent years. In particular, recent years have seen sharp increases in the number of family units [wtf!] entering and seeking entry to the United States and an inability to provide detention space for many of these aliens while their removal proceedings are pending [as though none of them shall be entitled to asylum, in contravention of the Convention on Refugees, which the United States has ratified].Emphasis added to highlight the purported basis. NB that both the fictive basis (crime) and the actual basis (fertility) are completely ludicrous and unlawful pursuant to 50 USC 1601 et seq. We note that the occasion for this intrusion of anomie into the nomos is the manifest fertility of another group's population, which the pathological rightwing regards as surplus to be excluded. This politically disenfranchised life--Agamben's zoe--is useful insofar as it is to be excluded--the present moment's textbook example from author's prior book, .
Part II of author’s Homo Sacer project.
Cute pamphlet in the benjaminian tradition. Probably the best 9/11 book that I’ve read, even though it only briefly mentions that event.
Point of departure is Schmitt’s “definition of the sovereign as ‘he who decides on the state of exception’� (1), the state of necessity, like civil war, wherein we find “juridical measures that cannot be understood in legal terms," and which appear "as the legal form of what cannot have legal form� (id.).
Notes that the SoE is like a lawful civil war, and notes the Third Reich as an SoE with a twelve-year duration (2), based on an emergency decree that created a “voluntary state of emergency� alongside the lawful constitutional order—which is a technique that “has become one of the essential practices of contemporary states, including so-called democratic ones� (id).
SoE is not a specialized area of law, but rather “a suspension of the juridical order� (4); SoE is furthermore a “creation of the democratic-revolutionary tradition and not the absolutist one� (5). Will note that “the idea that a suspension of law may be necessary for the common good is foreign to the medieval world� (26), which may, I think, be less about the SoE itself than about how things like “common good� may also be foreign to the medieval world, which may inhabit a kenomatic space (infra) of its own.
Text notes a number of sets of distinctions in wrestling with this: real v. fictive SoE (3); states of peace/war/siege, which escalate the centralization of military authority (5); pleromatic (state has plenitudo potestatis, the expansion of state power), v. kenomatic states (an “emptiness of law,� a return to a Hobbesian “state of nature�) (5-6); Schmitt’s “commissarial dictatorship� v. “sovereign dictatorship� (8, and then again in depth 32 ff.). Initially, dude wants to identify the SoE with a kenomatic state.
Wants therefore to trace the development of the concept toward the modern global SoE as manifested in the Patriot Act and ‘war on terror.� This section (11-22) covers several states' development. The brief US section is tremendous, noting the origin of the US SoE in the presidency of Lincoln, who “acted as an absolute dictator� (20) and suspended the writ of habeas corpus, and thereafter justified his actions to the legislature by stating, whatever their legality, they were based on popular demand and public necessity (id.). Congress dutifully ratified the executive acts. Later, Wilson “assumed even broader powers,� but instead of bypassing Congress, he went “each time to have the powers in question delegated,� which is apparently tres European (21) to the extent it prefers extraordinary statutes over a general declaration of the SoE. Because the Lincoln/Wilson expansions were rooted in two different sorts of war, by the time we get to FDR, all crises become warlike, and the president actually asked “the Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis—broad Executive power to wage war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe� in 1938 (22).
The function of these processes is apparently to inscribe durkheimian anomie within the juridical order: “The suspension of the norm does not mean its abolition, and the zone of anomie that it establishes is not (or at least claims not to be) unrelated to the juridical order� (23). This is traced back to the Decretum of Gratian: “If something is done out of necessity, it is done licitly, since what is not licit in law necessity makes licit. Likewise necessity has no law� (24). Greasers take this as an indication that necessity is truly the basis of law after all, which seems to set the SoE as the originary condition. Gross. But it gets worse as we move to the metagross:
As a figure of necessity, the state of exception therefore appears (alongside revolution and the de facto establishment of a constitutional system) as an ‘illegal� but perfectly ‘juridical and constitutional� measure that is realized in the production of new norms (or of a new juridical order): […] ‘There are norms that cannot or should not be written; there are others that cannot be determined except when the circumstances arise for which they must serve� [internal citation omitted] The gesture of Antigone, which opposed the written law to the agrapta nomima [unwritten laws] is here reversed and asserted in defense of the constituted order. (28)This should appear very familiar to those of us who have faithfully read Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence,� especially as read through Derrida’s beautiful . The SoE is with revolution parcel to the status necessitates and accordingly in “an ambiguous and uncertain zone in which de facto proceedings, which are in themselves extra- or antijuridical, pass over into law, and juridical norms blur with mere fact—that is, a threshold where fact and law seem to become undecidable� (29).
That’s all kinda kickass—the master figure of blurriness, which renders certain thingies undecidable in the normal derridean/godelian sense (it is the most concrete metaphor used for what shall be revealed to be the plotinian hoion in volume VI--as the more normal metaphors are zones and thresholds of indistinction or indetermination). This causes a nasty aporia: “If a measure taken out of necessity is already a juridical norm and not simply fact, why must it be ratified and approved by law […]? And if instead if it not law, but simply fact, why do the legal effects of its ratification begin not from the moment it is converted into law, but ex tunc?� (29). As though that aporia were not completely disabling, author likewise identifies a worse one: though many writers think of the state of necessity as “an objective situation,� it is contingent upon a naïve assumption of “pure factuality� which the concept has contradicted (blurriness of law/fact, recall!) and is furthermore reliant upon “subjective judgment”—“‘the recourse to necessity entails a moral or political (or in any case, extrajuridical) evaluation, by which the juridical order is judged and is held worthy of preservation or strengthening even at the price of its possible violation,’� which renders it always already a “’revolutionary principle’� (30).
Working through Schmitt’s theory of dictatorship thereafter, author has occasion to observe Schmitt ‘s inscription of the SoE within the juridical order itself:
’Because the state of exception is always something different from anarchy and chaos, in a juridical sense, an order still exists in it, even if it is not a juridical order.� This specific contribution of Schmitt’s theory is precisely to have made such an articulation between state of exception and juridical order possible. (33)Readers of Bigg D will also note well--
But precisely because the decision here concerns the very annulment of the norm, that is, because the state of exception represents the inclusion and capture of a space that is neither outside nor inside (the space that corresponds to the annulled and suspended norm), ‘the sovereign stands outside of the normally valid juridical order, and yet belongs to it.�(35)--which is the triton genus, the khora as described in the Timaeus and made infamous by our favorite Francophone Algerian.
Mention is made briefly of Derrida’s essay on the ‘force de loi� (37), which works as a departure point for a consideration of the significance of “force of law� as a legal term:
The decisive point, however, is that in both modern and ancient documents the syntagma force of law refers in the technical sense not to the law but to those decrees (which, as we indeed say, have the force of law) that the executive power can be authorized to issue in some situations, particularly in the state of exception. That is to say, the concept of ‘force of law,� as a technical legal term, defines a separation of the norm’s vis obligandi, or applicability, from its formal essence, whereby decrees, provisions, and measures that are not formally laws nevertheless acquire their ‘force.� (38)Here, the nebulous ‘force of law� “floats as an indeterminate element that can be claimed both� by the state and the revolution, say (id.). SoE is “an anomic space [again] in which what is at stake is a force of law without law� through which “law seeks to annex anomie itself� (39), which is kinda awesome and gross at the same time.
SoE then explained as a modern instance of Roman iustitium, an analogy to solstitium, wherein something comes to standstill (law or sun, dig?). Iustitium was proclaimed as a response to the declaration of a tumultus, itself normally the result of the issuance of senatus consultum ultimum (41). (Gotta love that chain.) Iustitium was conceived by Roman jurists as “an interval and cessation of law,� or, as author says, “the production of a juridical void� (41-42). We should carry this in mind with the prior discussion of kenomatic states, states of nature, lacuna that is not anarchy, and so on. The of senatus consultum ultimum (SCU) is described by some as a quasi-dictatorship, but author regards that as manifestly erroneous; SCU is not a new office or power, but rather a caesura wherein “every citizen seems to be invested with a floating and anomalous imperium that resists definition within the terms of the normal order� (43), but nevertheless allows them to carry out any acts in defense of the state. He will deny that SCU and the iustitium can be read as dictatorship, which was a specific magistracy defined by a precise statute for a particular purpose—though it was of course an extraordinary office and statute. Because Schmitt and others confused SoE with dictatorship, they made the same error and fell into the aporias described supra. (Best note in the entire volume argues that fascists tend to be “indifferently presented as dictators,� but they normally aren’t within the scope of the definition, considering that they historically were duly authorized to take office, and then ruled constitutionally as well as from a parallel SoE (48).)
From the iustitium, dude summarizes: SoE is not dictatorship, but a zone of anomie; it is essential to the juridical order; acts committed during the SoE/iustitium have not legal definition and are within the khora of the law; and ‘force of law� is the way we conceive of the undefinability (51).
Text moves on to read the Benjamin/Schmitt debate, wherein we see the already familiar notions, such as SoE is where Schmitt tries to “inscribe anomie within the very body of the nomos (54), and so on. This section is mainly to rehabilitate Benjamin, as it has apparently been considered ‘scandalous� on the left for Benjamin to have been interested in the ideas of fascist Schmitt; it’s cool and interesting, but doesn’t really develop the ideas of the first half much further. Final two chapters are also very cool, but seem like coda I and coda II that run specific things inessential to the main argument (still very cool). My notes are littered with ‘cf. Griffin,� ‘cf. Bakhtin,� ‘cf. Adorno,� so it’s conceptually worthwhile. Works very well with Neumann’s Behemoth, insofar as the Third Reich was in that text described as a non-state subject to the overlapping polycratic authority of various actors who each held their own SoE/SCU bona fides.
Good stuff. Go read. Go read the entire series; the concepts from here and volume I follow through all the rest.
September 18, 2016
كتاب مكثّف للغاية وأكثر من رائع يتعرّض إلى تلك الحالة من اللامعيارية والتي قد تستخدمها الدولة في حالة الطوارئ ليتم خلالها استثناء السلطة من الإلزام القانوني تجاه مواطنيها ويصبح على إثرها المواطن قيد الاستهداف مستباحاً
يتدرّج بك الكتاب إلى أصل حالة الاستثناء بدايةً من الرومان إلى عصرنا هذا ليعطيك عمقاً تاريخياً لذلك المفهوم الخطير.. والخطير للغاية.
ولضرب مثال تقريبي للأذهان، يعتبر قانون الطوارئ في مصر هو أحد تجليات حالة الاستثناء.. حالة قد تتخلى فيها السلطة وتتحرر من كل التزام أخلاقي أو قانوني تجاه مواطنيها بحجّة استثناءٍ ما للحفاظ على الدولة وسلامتها وأمنها إلى آخر تلك الحجج.
المشكلة في حالة الاستثناء، حسبما فهمت، هو أنّه خلالها لا يمكن إيجاد رقيب ما على أفعال السلطة وبالتالي يعطي صلاحية مطلقة لها لتعطيل كل مظهر قانوني يحدّ من تحركاتها.
وفي داخل الكتاب إشارة إلى أنّ الثورة في حد ذاتها تمثّل حالة استثناء، وبالتالي وجب عليها الالتجاء إلى قوانينها الخاصّة لأنّها تنتهي فور التجائها إلى قوانين نفس النظام التي ثارت عليه.
لا أنكر عدم فهمي لأشياء كثيرة في هذا الكتاب وخصوصاً مع وجود الكثير من المصطلحات الألمانية في علم السياسة لكنّ ما ذكرتُ آنفاً كان إجمالاً لفكرة الكتاب وخطّه العريض.
أنصح كثيراً قرّاء هذا الكتاب بالاطلاع على محاضرة د. هبة رؤوف عزّت عن هذا الكتاب على اليوتيوب ففيها تتضح الصورة بشكل أكثر تفصيلاً.
تحيّاتي..
يتدرّج بك الكتاب إلى أصل حالة الاستثناء بدايةً من الرومان إلى عصرنا هذا ليعطيك عمقاً تاريخياً لذلك المفهوم الخطير.. والخطير للغاية.
ولضرب مثال تقريبي للأذهان، يعتبر قانون الطوارئ في مصر هو أحد تجليات حالة الاستثناء.. حالة قد تتخلى فيها السلطة وتتحرر من كل التزام أخلاقي أو قانوني تجاه مواطنيها بحجّة استثناءٍ ما للحفاظ على الدولة وسلامتها وأمنها إلى آخر تلك الحجج.
المشكلة في حالة الاستثناء، حسبما فهمت، هو أنّه خلالها لا يمكن إيجاد رقيب ما على أفعال السلطة وبالتالي يعطي صلاحية مطلقة لها لتعطيل كل مظهر قانوني يحدّ من تحركاتها.
وفي داخل الكتاب إشارة إلى أنّ الثورة في حد ذاتها تمثّل حالة استثناء، وبالتالي وجب عليها الالتجاء إلى قوانينها الخاصّة لأنّها تنتهي فور التجائها إلى قوانين نفس النظام التي ثارت عليه.
لا أنكر عدم فهمي لأشياء كثيرة في هذا الكتاب وخصوصاً مع وجود الكثير من المصطلحات الألمانية في علم السياسة لكنّ ما ذكرتُ آنفاً كان إجمالاً لفكرة الكتاب وخطّه العريض.
أنصح كثيراً قرّاء هذا الكتاب بالاطلاع على محاضرة د. هبة رؤوف عزّت عن هذا الكتاب على اليوتيوب ففيها تتضح الصورة بشكل أكثر تفصيلاً.
تحيّاتي..
August 11, 2021
هذا الكتاب من الصعب كتابة مراجعة وافية عنه.. ومن الصعب استيعابه بالأساس من القراءة الأولى.. ويحتاج قراءة ثانية وثالثة بكل تأكيد
حالة الإستثناء أبرز تجلي لها في وطننا العربي هو قانون الطوارئ .. المشكلة ان هناك حالات إستثناء ذكرها الكاتب تتمنى لو كنا نعيشها في أوطاننا.. نحن نعيش في حالة من الا حالة.. لا قانون حقيقي لا برلمان حقيقي لا اي شيء حقيقي.. الشيء الوحيد الحقيقي هو ذلك الجاثم علينا بقوة السلاح والحيلة.. والذي لا نختاره ولا نستطيع تغييره
الكتاب جميل وقوي ويحتاج لعدة قراءات وليس قراءة واحدة.. أنصح به بكل تأكيد
حالة الإستثناء أبرز تجلي لها في وطننا العربي هو قانون الطوارئ .. المشكلة ان هناك حالات إستثناء ذكرها الكاتب تتمنى لو كنا نعيشها في أوطاننا.. نحن نعيش في حالة من الا حالة.. لا قانون حقيقي لا برلمان حقيقي لا اي شيء حقيقي.. الشيء الوحيد الحقيقي هو ذلك الجاثم علينا بقوة السلاح والحيلة.. والذي لا نختاره ولا نستطيع تغييره
الكتاب جميل وقوي ويحتاج لعدة قراءات وليس قراءة واحدة.. أنصح به بكل تأكيد
June 26, 2019
فأصبحت حالة الاستثناء هي القاعدة...
January 14, 2019
يوماً ما قد يكون هناك مراجعة ، هذا ما أمله بشكل أدق
لكن علي الأقل سيكون هناك رجوع لهذا الكتاب كثيراً وقراءة أخرى بعد أن اقرأ كتاب الإنسان الحرام وأستزيد قليلاً عن فكرة السيادة عند كارل شميت والمفاهيم النظرية للدولة القومية الحديثة
February 24, 2015
لا أعطي الخمسه نجوم لأي كتاب بناءا علي الفائدة أو المحتوي المعرفي وحدهما ، بل علي الهم الذي يحمله المفكر ، وبغض النظر عن شخصيه المؤلف ومواقفه التي تتحري العدل ، فإن الإسم الذي إختاره لمشروعه الإنسان الحرام\المستباح كفيل بأن يشعرك بهَمه فضلا عن الدلالات المعرفيه لهذه المفهوم، لا أتحدث هنا عن محتوي الكتاب أوأفكاره وكذا ، بل عن المخاطره التي قام بها الناشر ، الكتاب في كثير منه تخصصي فني بعض الشئ يتحرك بين القانون والسياسية والإجتماع ويخرج من كل مناقشه بتحليل ونتائج هامه جدا، وللوهلة الاولي قد يظن الكثيرين أن الكتاب لايهمهم وتلك هي المخاطرة .
الفصل الرابع - صراع العمالقة حول فراغ- درة الكتاب .
ترجمة رائعة وكتاب منتقي ومُخاطرة شكرا مدارات .
الفصل الرابع - صراع العمالقة حول فراغ- درة الكتاب .
ترجمة رائعة وكتاب منتقي ومُخاطرة شكرا مدارات .
February 18, 2025
الكتاب صعب، ويحتاج فهمه إلى مجهود شديد خصوصًا للقارئ المطلع لا الدارس. إلا أنه كتاب استثنائي يجمع بين كونه مدخلًا إلى الأفكار التي يطرحها، وبين كونه مرجعًا يعاد النظر فيه باستمرار على فترات.
فما هي حالة الاستثناء؟ وما هو تاريخها بدءًا من روما إلى الآن؟ وفي يد من فرضها؟ وما هي حالة الإنسان الذي يعيش في ظلها؟
هل ترى حالة الاستثناء بعين الديكتاتورية أم الديمقراطية؟
وما علاقة حالة الاستثناء بالعالم الحالي، وكيف تحولت من كونها استثناء إلى حالة عامة؟
يجيب جورجيو أغامبين في هذا الكتاب المرهق الممتع الاستثنائي.
فما هي حالة الاستثناء؟ وما هو تاريخها بدءًا من روما إلى الآن؟ وفي يد من فرضها؟ وما هي حالة الإنسان الذي يعيش في ظلها؟
هل ترى حالة الاستثناء بعين الديكتاتورية أم الديمقراطية؟
وما علاقة حالة الاستثناء بالعالم الحالي، وكيف تحولت من كونها استثناء إلى حالة عامة؟
يجيب جورجيو أغامبين في هذا الكتاب المرهق الممتع الاستثنائي.
January 16, 2016
الكتاب مهم
مهم جدا
وصعب
صعب جدا
ولذلك فهو لا يقرأ مرة واحدة ولا دفعة واحدة
أجامبين من أكبر ناقدي الحداثة والدولة الحديثة
وكل كتاباته تدندن حول هذا الامر
يرد اجامبين هنا على اطروحات هيجل وكارل شميت حول السيادة والسلطة و الدولة وافتراضه انها الضامنة للحياة الرغدة وللأمن والامان والسلام والتقدم ويقول له ان حالة الاستثناء التي يعلق فيها القانون وتتوحش ؤالدولة دون رابط او قدرة على ايقافها مثل معسكرات النازية او جوانتانامو حديثا وأخيرا رابعة جميعها هي حالات متسقة تماما مع منطق الدولة الحديثة وان الدولة مؤهله بشكلها الحالي لاعادة انتاج هذه الحالة بستمرار كما يؤكد اننا اصبحنا نعيش تحت حالة ممتدة ومستمرة من الاستثناء بدعوى الامن القومي ومواجهة الارهاب وشتى الاسباب التي ليس لها او توصيف موضوعي وتخض بالكامل لرؤية الدولة الذاتية فحالة الاستثناء هي ما تراه الدولة استثناء
كما يؤكد اجامبين على خطأ رؤية شمت للاستثناء بأنه وضع قانوني او حالة داخلة في حيز الفكر القانوني ويقول بدوره انها حالة خارج القانون او وراء القانون ولا يستطيع القانون ان يتعامل معها
وان الاشخاص الخاضعين لحالة الاستثناء يتعرضون لما يسمى بـ ( الحياة العارية) بمعنى انهم يفقدون خصوصيتهم كبشر ويتعامل صاحب السيادة معهم على انهم كائنات لها وجود بيولوجي فقط دون ان يترتب على وجودهم البيولوجي اي حقوق او ااستحقاقات .
مهم جدا
وصعب
صعب جدا
ولذلك فهو لا يقرأ مرة واحدة ولا دفعة واحدة
أجامبين من أكبر ناقدي الحداثة والدولة الحديثة
وكل كتاباته تدندن حول هذا الامر
يرد اجامبين هنا على اطروحات هيجل وكارل شميت حول السيادة والسلطة و الدولة وافتراضه انها الضامنة للحياة الرغدة وللأمن والامان والسلام والتقدم ويقول له ان حالة الاستثناء التي يعلق فيها القانون وتتوحش ؤالدولة دون رابط او قدرة على ايقافها مثل معسكرات النازية او جوانتانامو حديثا وأخيرا رابعة جميعها هي حالات متسقة تماما مع منطق الدولة الحديثة وان الدولة مؤهله بشكلها الحالي لاعادة انتاج هذه الحالة بستمرار كما يؤكد اننا اصبحنا نعيش تحت حالة ممتدة ومستمرة من الاستثناء بدعوى الامن القومي ومواجهة الارهاب وشتى الاسباب التي ليس لها او توصيف موضوعي وتخض بالكامل لرؤية الدولة الذاتية فحالة الاستثناء هي ما تراه الدولة استثناء
كما يؤكد اجامبين على خطأ رؤية شمت للاستثناء بأنه وضع قانوني او حالة داخلة في حيز الفكر القانوني ويقول بدوره انها حالة خارج القانون او وراء القانون ولا يستطيع القانون ان يتعامل معها
وان الاشخاص الخاضعين لحالة الاستثناء يتعرضون لما يسمى بـ ( الحياة العارية) بمعنى انهم يفقدون خصوصيتهم كبشر ويتعامل صاحب السيادة معهم على انهم كائنات لها وجود بيولوجي فقط دون ان يترتب على وجودهم البيولوجي اي حقوق او ااستحقاقات .
October 10, 2024
For most of its short length, Agamben's monograph on the "state of exception" or "state of emergency" consists of a brilliant, penetrating, and extremely useful analysis of Carl Schmitt's theory of the state of emergency included in the latter's Political Theology. Schmitt's theory is not particularly easy to understand, and Agamben in an erudite and perceptive interpreter. He does an outstanding job of clarifying Schmitt's theory and in teasing out the core arguments that are at stake, such as Schmitt's pervasive concern with ontological realism.
Agamben subtly links Schmitt's quest for an actually-existing basis for law and the state to Heidegger's nostalgia for being through the judicious use of a quote from Plato's Sophist-one which also features prominently in the introduction to Being and Time-which refers to a "war between giants over being." In this case, the giants are Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin, and one of the most interesting sections of Agamben's book is his detailed analysis of the implicit debate those two authors carried out in their works, particularly in Benjamin's "Critique of Violence" and Trauerspiele dissertation.
In the final section, Agamben links the general problem of the state of emergency to the concept of auctoritas, or personal authority, in Roman law, and ends up with an argument that law is necessarily bound to a state of lawlessness, that they exist in constant dialectical tension that is instantiated by the state of emergency, where auctoritas refers to claims to power that have no basis in law.
In what is by far the worst part of the book, Agamben links this theory to the larger argument he makes in his Homo Sacer series, of which this book is a part: that the state of emergency makes possible the creation of extra-legal categories of action and status determination, categories that allow for arbitrary treatment and action. For Agamben, this category is exemplified by the "enemy combatants" status of the US War on Terror.
For some reason, Agamben sees that kind of breakdown in the margins of legal status as definitive of the course charted by Europe and the United States since the Second World War, and argues that the underlying dialectical tensions constitute the “working of the machine that is leading the West toward global civil war.�
Although I share deep concern about the indefinite and lawless detention of persons in Guantanamo Bay, I hardly see this as indicative of a core strategy by western governments to inaugurate indefinite states of emergency to facilitate the rise of a new fascist empire. It's deeply disappointing, after dozens of pages of brilliant and careful analysis, to see Agamben fall into a bizarre and paranoid thesis that strikes me as genuinely suggestive of mental illness. And the worst readings of this argument have only been substantiated in recent years, in which Agamben has baselessly testified before the Italian parliament that emergency measures to fight the spread of Covid 19 were unwarranted, and were in fact motivated by a sinister plot to coerce the masses into voluntarily surrendering their rights. His conspiracy-mongering included accusations that the severity of the illness was systematically exaggerated by a medical establishment that he describes as part and parcel of a global reactionary attempt by technocrats to rob people of their basic rights.
Four years later, the sinister global cabal he prophesied has failed to materialize, but Agamben has not retracted his dangerous, destructive claims. Instead, he has lent his authority to political extremists, with whom he clearly shares a tendency to paranoid fantasy.
In summary, the analysis and exegesis that comprises the vast majority of this book is extremely illuminating, but his ultimate argument is batshit crazy.
Agamben subtly links Schmitt's quest for an actually-existing basis for law and the state to Heidegger's nostalgia for being through the judicious use of a quote from Plato's Sophist-one which also features prominently in the introduction to Being and Time-which refers to a "war between giants over being." In this case, the giants are Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin, and one of the most interesting sections of Agamben's book is his detailed analysis of the implicit debate those two authors carried out in their works, particularly in Benjamin's "Critique of Violence" and Trauerspiele dissertation.
In the final section, Agamben links the general problem of the state of emergency to the concept of auctoritas, or personal authority, in Roman law, and ends up with an argument that law is necessarily bound to a state of lawlessness, that they exist in constant dialectical tension that is instantiated by the state of emergency, where auctoritas refers to claims to power that have no basis in law.
In what is by far the worst part of the book, Agamben links this theory to the larger argument he makes in his Homo Sacer series, of which this book is a part: that the state of emergency makes possible the creation of extra-legal categories of action and status determination, categories that allow for arbitrary treatment and action. For Agamben, this category is exemplified by the "enemy combatants" status of the US War on Terror.
For some reason, Agamben sees that kind of breakdown in the margins of legal status as definitive of the course charted by Europe and the United States since the Second World War, and argues that the underlying dialectical tensions constitute the “working of the machine that is leading the West toward global civil war.�
Although I share deep concern about the indefinite and lawless detention of persons in Guantanamo Bay, I hardly see this as indicative of a core strategy by western governments to inaugurate indefinite states of emergency to facilitate the rise of a new fascist empire. It's deeply disappointing, after dozens of pages of brilliant and careful analysis, to see Agamben fall into a bizarre and paranoid thesis that strikes me as genuinely suggestive of mental illness. And the worst readings of this argument have only been substantiated in recent years, in which Agamben has baselessly testified before the Italian parliament that emergency measures to fight the spread of Covid 19 were unwarranted, and were in fact motivated by a sinister plot to coerce the masses into voluntarily surrendering their rights. His conspiracy-mongering included accusations that the severity of the illness was systematically exaggerated by a medical establishment that he describes as part and parcel of a global reactionary attempt by technocrats to rob people of their basic rights.
Four years later, the sinister global cabal he prophesied has failed to materialize, but Agamben has not retracted his dangerous, destructive claims. Instead, he has lent his authority to political extremists, with whom he clearly shares a tendency to paranoid fantasy.
In summary, the analysis and exegesis that comprises the vast majority of this book is extremely illuminating, but his ultimate argument is batshit crazy.
February 27, 2020
"ورغم وضوح استحالة وجود صنف بشري خالد يتجسد مرة تلو المرة في شخص "أغسطس" أو "نابوليون" أو "هتلر"، بل هناك أنظمة قانونية متشابهة إلى حد ما، استغلت في ظروف متباينة بشكل ما"
"إن حالة الإستثناء قد بلغت اليوم أقصى انتشار لها على مستوى العالم. بهذه الطريقة أصبح بوسع العنف الحكومي محو السمة المعيارية للقانون أو مخالفتها دون مساءلة أو عقاب متجاهلاً بذلك القانون الدولي على المستوى الخارجي، ومنتجاً في الداخل حالة استثناء دائمة، ولا ينفك مع هذا يزعم قيامه بتطبيق القانون"
كتاب ثقيل جداً، وللمرة الأولى تقييمي يكون لإستيعابي للكتاب، وليس الكتاب ذاته
أعتقد أنه يتحتم علي العودة إليه مرة أخرى بعد قراءة مواضيع أخرى لأكون أكثر دراية بالموضوع
ربما، أكون قد فهمت الفكرة إجمالاً، ولكن هناك بعض التفاصيل التي استعصت على ��همي
"إن حالة الإستثناء قد بلغت اليوم أقصى انتشار لها على مستوى العالم. بهذه الطريقة أصبح بوسع العنف الحكومي محو السمة المعيارية للقانون أو مخالفتها دون مساءلة أو عقاب متجاهلاً بذلك القانون الدولي على المستوى الخارجي، ومنتجاً في الداخل حالة استثناء دائمة، ولا ينفك مع هذا يزعم قيامه بتطبيق القانون"
كتاب ثقيل جداً، وللمرة الأولى تقييمي يكون لإستيعابي للكتاب، وليس الكتاب ذاته
أعتقد أنه يتحتم علي العودة إليه مرة أخرى بعد قراءة مواضيع أخرى لأكون أكثر دراية بالموضوع
ربما، أكون قد فهمت الفكرة إجمالاً، ولكن هناك بعض التفاصيل التي استعصت على ��همي
June 8, 2014
The machine that will lead to global civil war
[Through my ratings, reviews and edits I'm providing intellectual property and labor to Amazon.com Inc., listed on Nasdaq, which fully owns ŷ.com and in 2013 posted revenues for $74 billion and $274 million profits. Intellectual property and labor require compensation. Amazon.com Inc. is also requested to provide assurance that its employees and contractors' work conditions meet the highest health and safety standards at all the company's sites.]
This book can be hardly understood outside the continental tradition of code law, and it makes no attempt at an archaeology of common law - where for example there's no decision-norm cleavage, as Entscheidung (Schmitt and Benjamin's 'decision' ) is exactly what generates law. From a common law perspective the essay might thus appear as a sequence of absurdities, but in its painstaking investigation of long forgotten diatribes and lost constitutions it has the merit to unearth the root meaning of a few relevant political phenomena, casting a new, not necessarily depressing light on them.
The book begins asking "what is political action?" and ends answering that "truly political is only that action, which cuts the nexus between violence and law". And violence and war are conceptually - even if sometimes not explicitly - at the center of the complicated to and fro between ancient texts and present times. Tumultus (uprising in Latin) is the core archaeological finding on which the whole theory of the state of exception, or suspension of law, hinges. This attention to civil war as the trigger to reactions that hollow out constitutions and institutions without ever abolishing them can be usefully transferred from the study of the borderline device of the state of exception to the heart of what we call democracy (by no means is this word used in the book - I'm referencing it at my own risk).
A generalization of tumultus from a democratic perspective is internal conflict. On a continuum from cosmos to chaos , i.e. from order and harmony to disorder and aggression, democracy is always half-way in its appearence and totally bent over chaos in its substance. There should be nothing surprising to this: a myriad of constituencies advancing their own agendas is just mess. And something to be happy about, if your power ends with your ballot. But if the idea of an "excess of democracy", as Samuel P. Huntington put it, gets traction, then tumultus can become the new name of democracy and the state of exception easily invoked and granted. Which is exactly what happens on a regular basis. It has to be clear that the target of all states of exception is democracy itself, or "the enemy within" in the words of Margaret Thatcher, especially when officially specific constituencies are singled out or external enemies and crises blamed. It is through a suspension of the intricacies of democracy that elites can then start thinking of global expansions, focusing their ambitions externally once the internal tumultus has been taken care of. This is why the author can conclude that the mechanism of the state of exception will eventually lead to global civil war.
Finally, what does it mean to undo the nexus between violence and law, or to open a space between the two where truly political action can unfold? Law is said to have been established ne cives ad arma ruant , i.e. so that the citizens not rush to arms. We should start thinking that there is no mechanism - be it law, or its suspension, whether codified in rites, traditions, religions or modern law codes - that can prevent conflict from playing out in our democratic societies. It is only by playing with conflict - and with law consequently - without fear (which is the opposite of violence) that political action can come of age.
[Through my ratings, reviews and edits I'm providing intellectual property and labor to Amazon.com Inc., listed on Nasdaq, which fully owns ŷ.com and in 2013 posted revenues for $74 billion and $274 million profits. Intellectual property and labor require compensation. Amazon.com Inc. is also requested to provide assurance that its employees and contractors' work conditions meet the highest health and safety standards at all the company's sites.]
This book can be hardly understood outside the continental tradition of code law, and it makes no attempt at an archaeology of common law - where for example there's no decision-norm cleavage, as Entscheidung (Schmitt and Benjamin's 'decision' ) is exactly what generates law. From a common law perspective the essay might thus appear as a sequence of absurdities, but in its painstaking investigation of long forgotten diatribes and lost constitutions it has the merit to unearth the root meaning of a few relevant political phenomena, casting a new, not necessarily depressing light on them.
The book begins asking "what is political action?" and ends answering that "truly political is only that action, which cuts the nexus between violence and law". And violence and war are conceptually - even if sometimes not explicitly - at the center of the complicated to and fro between ancient texts and present times. Tumultus (uprising in Latin) is the core archaeological finding on which the whole theory of the state of exception, or suspension of law, hinges. This attention to civil war as the trigger to reactions that hollow out constitutions and institutions without ever abolishing them can be usefully transferred from the study of the borderline device of the state of exception to the heart of what we call democracy (by no means is this word used in the book - I'm referencing it at my own risk).
A generalization of tumultus from a democratic perspective is internal conflict. On a continuum from cosmos to chaos , i.e. from order and harmony to disorder and aggression, democracy is always half-way in its appearence and totally bent over chaos in its substance. There should be nothing surprising to this: a myriad of constituencies advancing their own agendas is just mess. And something to be happy about, if your power ends with your ballot. But if the idea of an "excess of democracy", as Samuel P. Huntington put it, gets traction, then tumultus can become the new name of democracy and the state of exception easily invoked and granted. Which is exactly what happens on a regular basis. It has to be clear that the target of all states of exception is democracy itself, or "the enemy within" in the words of Margaret Thatcher, especially when officially specific constituencies are singled out or external enemies and crises blamed. It is through a suspension of the intricacies of democracy that elites can then start thinking of global expansions, focusing their ambitions externally once the internal tumultus has been taken care of. This is why the author can conclude that the mechanism of the state of exception will eventually lead to global civil war.
Finally, what does it mean to undo the nexus between violence and law, or to open a space between the two where truly political action can unfold? Law is said to have been established ne cives ad arma ruant , i.e. so that the citizens not rush to arms. We should start thinking that there is no mechanism - be it law, or its suspension, whether codified in rites, traditions, religions or modern law codes - that can prevent conflict from playing out in our democratic societies. It is only by playing with conflict - and with law consequently - without fear (which is the opposite of violence) that political action can come of age.
October 31, 2021
One of the essential characteristics of the state of exception-the provisional abolition of the distinction among legislative, executive, and judicial powers-here shows its tendency to become a lasting practice of government.
This was a challenging text about constitutional provisions for states of siege, martial law and other legal mechanisms during extreme times. The philosopher goes to lengths to detail how the metrics for such determinations and the means for such to restore itself are both grounded in a deconstructive ambiguity, an aporia. I did enjoy the close reading of Benjamin's Critique of Violence but felt a bit lost in efforts to compare such with Carl Schmitt, whom I'm not familiar except from the discussions in Simon Critchley's
I was also at a loss for references to Arendt's global civil war, which I admit I wasn't familiar with. Ultimately I felt the book was to serve as a warning bell for executive actions in lieu of the Patriot Act. Yet it is conceded in the text that this isn't a question of a fail-safe and that states of exception don't necessarily lead to death camps. It was also intriguing to ponder these possibilities in lieu of Klein's theories about Shock Doctrine.
Tandem read with Filipe
This was a challenging text about constitutional provisions for states of siege, martial law and other legal mechanisms during extreme times. The philosopher goes to lengths to detail how the metrics for such determinations and the means for such to restore itself are both grounded in a deconstructive ambiguity, an aporia. I did enjoy the close reading of Benjamin's Critique of Violence but felt a bit lost in efforts to compare such with Carl Schmitt, whom I'm not familiar except from the discussions in Simon Critchley's
I was also at a loss for references to Arendt's global civil war, which I admit I wasn't familiar with. Ultimately I felt the book was to serve as a warning bell for executive actions in lieu of the Patriot Act. Yet it is conceded in the text that this isn't a question of a fail-safe and that states of exception don't necessarily lead to death camps. It was also intriguing to ponder these possibilities in lieu of Klein's theories about Shock Doctrine.
Tandem read with Filipe
March 14, 2018
حالة الاستثناء كتاب استثنائي بكل المقاييس، في طريقة كتابته، في معناه، في مرماه، في الموضوع الذي يتناوله ويفتح به نوافذ كثيرة على مواضيع أخرى. لا أبالغ إن قلت أنه مرهق ومتعب أعياني حد أني وفي بعض محطاته توجعني عيناي من كثرة إعادة القراءة حتى أفهم ولو قليلا من الفكرة المطروحة. صحيح أنني لم أستوعب دقائق التفاصيل بدقة؛ خاصة مقارنته بين كارل شميت وفالتر بنيامين؛ ولم أمسك بها مسك المتقن لحرفتها. ولكني بفضل الله خرجت منه بأبواب مشرعة على حقول علم كثيرة أظنها تعينني جيدا وإن أعيت سيري.
البديع في هذا الكتاب هو ثراؤه بالمجاز. المجاز طاغ على كل الزوايا التي تناول منها جورجو أغامبين قضية حالة الاستثناء. حفر في اللغة نحو العمق.ربط كل الخيوط مع أصل واحد "أصل اللغة"، وكأن أغامبين يخبرنا أننا لن نفهم خبايا ما نرى إلا لو استوعبنا خفايا ما ننطق به من فكر.
أغامبين في هذا الكتاب لا يفكك حالة الاستثناء فحسب وإنما يفكك معها كل رحلاتنا من السيميائي إلى الدلالي!
لن ألخص الكتاب لأنني عاجزة عن ذلك، قد ألخصه بعد سنوات من البحث في تفاصيل ما لم أفهمه. أو عل همتي تقوى و أعيد قراءته قريبا ويفتح الله علي بفهم دقيق له ولكن إلى ذلك الحين دعونا نلقي نظرة على تفصيل مجازي جميل بديع رائع بنى عليه أغامبين نظرته لحالة الاستثناء. إنه مجاز "العتبة". العتبة هي ذاك الشبر الي يفصل بين الدار وما خارجها، يفصل به أغامبين بين القانون واللامعيارية. هذا الكتاب هو عن تلك العتبة قانونيتها من عدمها... كتاب يشرح أناقة وتمرس وحذلقة شميت وأمثاله في ربط القهر بالقانون.
البديع في هذا الكتاب هو ثراؤه بالمجاز. المجاز طاغ على كل الزوايا التي تناول منها جورجو أغامبين قضية حالة الاستثناء. حفر في اللغة نحو العمق.ربط كل الخيوط مع أصل واحد "أصل اللغة"، وكأن أغامبين يخبرنا أننا لن نفهم خبايا ما نرى إلا لو استوعبنا خفايا ما ننطق به من فكر.
أغامبين في هذا الكتاب لا يفكك حالة الاستثناء فحسب وإنما يفكك معها كل رحلاتنا من السيميائي إلى الدلالي!
لن ألخص الكتاب لأنني عاجزة عن ذلك، قد ألخصه بعد سنوات من البحث في تفاصيل ما لم أفهمه. أو عل همتي تقوى و أعيد قراءته قريبا ويفتح الله علي بفهم دقيق له ولكن إلى ذلك الحين دعونا نلقي نظرة على تفصيل مجازي جميل بديع رائع بنى عليه أغامبين نظرته لحالة الاستثناء. إنه مجاز "العتبة". العتبة هي ذاك الشبر الي يفصل بين الدار وما خارجها، يفصل به أغامبين بين القانون واللامعيارية. هذا الكتاب هو عن تلك العتبة قانونيتها من عدمها... كتاب يشرح أناقة وتمرس وحذلقة شميت وأمثاله في ربط القهر بالقانون.
March 23, 2020
Ensayo político poético sobre los fundamentos de los sistemas jurídicos modernos. La idea es gödeliana, creo que de manera inadvertida. El fundamento del estado moderno, el sistema jurídico que habilita el lenguaje de la ley, está perforado. Hay anomia en la base estructural de la ley. Como si el sistema implosionara para poder subsistir. La violencia vacía sería el fundamento de la ley que nos protege de la violencia. Lo bueno de Agamben es que recorre varios caminos paralelos que llevan a esta misma conclusión. Sigue un método genealógico parecido al de Foucault. Hace filología. Hace historia. Hace filosofía. Revisa etimologías, significados históricos, culturales. Pone lupa sobre el derecho romano, la potestas versus la auctoritas. Confronta a Schmitt con Benjamin, quizás su mejor logro. Molesta un poco el uso de fuegos de artificio. Y una histriónica sobriedad poética que asombra y enseguida cansa. Es un ensayo tan político, como estético. Ambos vectores se articulan en un mismo itinerario. La erudición de Agamben es contundente. Lo que quizás no sea tan asombroso es la tesis central. El derecho moderno es violencia, pura violencia de guerra camuflada en un discurso que parece de paz, de garantías. La democracia moderna es quizás un mal disimulado totalitarismo. La violencia vacía -esa que se deja ver desnuda en el Ausnahmenzustand- es la raíz de la democracia moderna. Como dijo Benjamin: Zeit und Raum ohne Grund ist Gewalt. Por eso le preocupaba tanto la secreta continuidad entre el fascismo y la democracia moderna. Es monstruoso. Una insondable violencia inhumana sería el fundamento de nuestra organización como sociedad humana, de nuestra búsqueda de paz. Pero, ¿quién disimula esta cruel advertencia? Ni los juristas, ni los filósofos, ni la sociedad civil. Sabemos que todo es ficción en el mundo del lenguaje, y que es irreconciliable con lo real. El motor es la arbitrariedad. El propósito es la racionalización. En este sentido, parece que Agamben descubrió América. O quizás sea demasiado violento decirlo de manera directa, demasiado benjaminiano, demasiado kafkiano. De ahí las piruetas ensayísticas. Mejor pensarlo así. Aunque Nietzsche lo dijo mejor: Wille zur Macht.
February 14, 2016
طيب
حالة الإستثناء - جورجو آغامبين
لِمَ الصَّمْتُ أَيُّهَا الفُقَهَاءِ حِيَالَ قَضَايَا تَهُمُّكُمْ !؟
هو الصراحة الواحد مش عارف يقول إيه :D
الكتاب من أثقل الكتب اللى قريتها فى حياتى
و هو يعتبر اول قراءة فعلية ليا السنة دى :D
الكتاب مش من نوعية الكتب الخفيفة اللى تتقرى فى يوم اتنين ثلاثة ولا فى المواصلات ولا تقضية وقت لا الكتاب عاوزك تكون متفرغ تماما ليه و انت بتقراله علشان تفهم
الكتاب بيتكلم عن القانون و الدولة و فرض حالة الإستناء و تطبيقها و علاقتها بالقانون و حالة الضرورة
الكتاب مهم بس فى نفس الوقت صعب
انا كنت بعيد فقرات كاملة من الاول علشان افهم بتتكلم على إيه
الملحمة فى 6 فصول بدأها بشرح حالة الضرورة و قوة القانون و تطبيقه و الفصل الثالث و الرابع بالنسبة ليا هم اهم فصول الكتاب
الثالث الخاص بشرح حالة الإيوستيتيوم " المرسوم الاخير للسيناتو " و علاقتها بالحاكم و سلطاته و نظرية تطبيقها و حال الدولة عند فرضها أكثر من رائع و بيوضح حاجات كثير عن طبيعة حالة الاستثناء و حاجات كانت مختفية فى الفصل الاول او مش مختفية لا صعب فهمها من اول وهلة
الباب الرابع بقى يا معلم بيتكلم عن الصراع على حالة الاستثناء و مين اللى يعرفها و ينظر ليها صح و الفصل بين السلطة السيادية و تطبيقها و افكار تانية مهمة جدا
ختاما الكتاب كويس جدا
نجمه للناشر " مدارات " فلولاها ما عرفت اغامبين
نجمة للمترجم اللى ابدع و خصوصا فى المصطلحات القابلة للتأويل و بتحمل أكثر من معنى
نجمتين للمحتوى الجبار بالنسبة لعدد الصفحات
هتقولى ليه فيه نجمة ناقصة هقولك الكتاب صعب يا عم لازم يتقرى تانى
بس هو كتاب ممتاز بمعنى الكلمة
حالة الإستثناء - جورجو آغامبين
لِمَ الصَّمْتُ أَيُّهَا الفُقَهَاءِ حِيَالَ قَضَايَا تَهُمُّكُمْ !؟
هو الصراحة الواحد مش عارف يقول إيه :D
الكتاب من أثقل الكتب اللى قريتها فى حياتى
و هو يعتبر اول قراءة فعلية ليا السنة دى :D
الكتاب مش من نوعية الكتب الخفيفة اللى تتقرى فى يوم اتنين ثلاثة ولا فى المواصلات ولا تقضية وقت لا الكتاب عاوزك تكون متفرغ تماما ليه و انت بتقراله علشان تفهم
الكتاب بيتكلم عن القانون و الدولة و فرض حالة الإستناء و تطبيقها و علاقتها بالقانون و حالة الضرورة
الكتاب مهم بس فى نفس الوقت صعب
انا كنت بعيد فقرات كاملة من الاول علشان افهم بتتكلم على إيه
الملحمة فى 6 فصول بدأها بشرح حالة الضرورة و قوة القانون و تطبيقه و الفصل الثالث و الرابع بالنسبة ليا هم اهم فصول الكتاب
الثالث الخاص بشرح حالة الإيوستيتيوم " المرسوم الاخير للسيناتو " و علاقتها بالحاكم و سلطاته و نظرية تطبيقها و حال الدولة عند فرضها أكثر من رائع و بيوضح حاجات كثير عن طبيعة حالة الاستثناء و حاجات كانت مختفية فى الفصل الاول او مش مختفية لا صعب فهمها من اول وهلة
الباب الرابع بقى يا معلم بيتكلم عن الصراع على حالة الاستثناء و مين اللى يعرفها و ينظر ليها صح و الفصل بين السلطة السيادية و تطبيقها و افكار تانية مهمة جدا
ختاما الكتاب كويس جدا
نجمه للناشر " مدارات " فلولاها ما عرفت اغامبين
نجمة للمترجم اللى ابدع و خصوصا فى المصطلحات القابلة للتأويل و بتحمل أكثر من معنى
نجمتين للمحتوى الجبار بالنسبة لعدد الصفحات
هتقولى ليه فيه نجمة ناقصة هقولك الكتاب صعب يا عم لازم يتقرى تانى
بس هو كتاب ممتاز بمعنى الكلمة
April 28, 2017
Giorgio Agamben's State of Exception continues down a path laid down by its exceptional precursor, Homo Sacer. While Homo Sacer's focus was on the nature of sovereignty and its increasing implication in the sphere of biological life, in State of Exception, Agamben turns his gaze directly towards the question of law and its relationship to power. And I really do mean law. Anyone expecting the colorful procession of anthropological discussions that adorned the pages of Homo Sacer will instead find themselves knee-deep in some incredibly dense interventions into debates on the nature and limits of law. Thus, although Agamben's usual cast of interlocutors are still present - Benjamin, Schmitt, Derrida, Arendt - more often than not, it's with little-known legal scholars and jurists with whom Agamben engages. In the hands of a lesser stylist, it could come off as vaunting; in the hands of Agamben, one feels the irresistible temptation to head to the library and devour each and every one of his references.
For a philosophile like myself, unused to the arcana of juridical discussion, it's uncharted territory, which makes State of Exception's slim ninety pages anything but a breezy read. For all that though, the effort is worth it. The central axis around which Agamben organizes his investigation is that of the relation between law and its own exception. Which is to ask: what happens when law authorizes its own suspension? Recall - to use of one Agamben's examples - the notorious Article 48 of the Weimar constitution which, when invoked, suspended certain fundamental rights guaranteed by that very constitution itself. Such a situation places the law in a 'state of exception' with itself: law suspends law, all the while nonetheless remaining in force. This paradoxical situation - the history of which is meticulously traced out by Agamben - gives rise to law emptied of any positive content, while nonetheless retaining its form. For Agamben, this zone of indeterminate law renders the entire juridical order into nothing less than a 'killing machine', whose end result can only lead towards "global civil war".
Just how and why this is so is best left to a reading of the book itself, but as with Homo Sacer, State of Exception implores us to find a way to 'stop the machine', to 'depose' of it, to use the term invoked by Benjamin and taken up by Agamben. In laying out the obscure logic that governs the state of exception (or rather, that the state of exception governs), Agamben's contribution is not so much a way forward as it is an attempt to illuminate what exactly it is we're to find our way forward from. Much of the book is given over to Agamben refuting various attempts to pacify, downplay, or ambiguate the stringent logic of the state of exception, an enterprise he takes up with with both delicacy and ferociousness. Indeed, the crowing jewel of the book is a chapter which finds Agamben playing mediator to a fascinating debate between the works of Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt, with Agamben tracing the parries and blows of each in brilliant detail (unsurprisingly for those familiar with Agamben, Benjamin comes out on top). More than just a tour de force of intellectual and historical scholarship, it's a debate which elegantly encapsulates all that's at stake in Agamben's overarching project. Of course if you want to see it play out, you'll have to read the book.
For a philosophile like myself, unused to the arcana of juridical discussion, it's uncharted territory, which makes State of Exception's slim ninety pages anything but a breezy read. For all that though, the effort is worth it. The central axis around which Agamben organizes his investigation is that of the relation between law and its own exception. Which is to ask: what happens when law authorizes its own suspension? Recall - to use of one Agamben's examples - the notorious Article 48 of the Weimar constitution which, when invoked, suspended certain fundamental rights guaranteed by that very constitution itself. Such a situation places the law in a 'state of exception' with itself: law suspends law, all the while nonetheless remaining in force. This paradoxical situation - the history of which is meticulously traced out by Agamben - gives rise to law emptied of any positive content, while nonetheless retaining its form. For Agamben, this zone of indeterminate law renders the entire juridical order into nothing less than a 'killing machine', whose end result can only lead towards "global civil war".
Just how and why this is so is best left to a reading of the book itself, but as with Homo Sacer, State of Exception implores us to find a way to 'stop the machine', to 'depose' of it, to use the term invoked by Benjamin and taken up by Agamben. In laying out the obscure logic that governs the state of exception (or rather, that the state of exception governs), Agamben's contribution is not so much a way forward as it is an attempt to illuminate what exactly it is we're to find our way forward from. Much of the book is given over to Agamben refuting various attempts to pacify, downplay, or ambiguate the stringent logic of the state of exception, an enterprise he takes up with with both delicacy and ferociousness. Indeed, the crowing jewel of the book is a chapter which finds Agamben playing mediator to a fascinating debate between the works of Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt, with Agamben tracing the parries and blows of each in brilliant detail (unsurprisingly for those familiar with Agamben, Benjamin comes out on top). More than just a tour de force of intellectual and historical scholarship, it's a debate which elegantly encapsulates all that's at stake in Agamben's overarching project. Of course if you want to see it play out, you'll have to read the book.
April 5, 2021
This should be absolutely required reading for anyone with a philosophical interest in the good life for people (individuals) and people (society). Staggering.
September 19, 2017
تبحث نظرية أغامبين باختصار مخل في العلاقة الجدلية بين القاعدة القانونية والواقع، بين الناموس واللامعيارية، والتي تصل لأعلى تكثفها في 'حالة الاستثناء' التي يعلق فيها صاحب السيادة القانون، بدعوى حماية النظام القانوني نفسه.
هذا الاستثناء احتفظ باستثنائيته في عصور مضت عبر التمايز المؤسسي بين عناصره الجدلية، لكنه تحول إلى قاعدة مع انصهار تلك العناصر وتوحدها في سلطة واحدة. هنا يستحيل صمام الأمان المفترض إلى كارثة مدمرة وآلة قاتلة.
يستثمر أغامبين شبكة من النطاقات المعرفية المختلفة ينتهي من خلالها إلى نسج أطروحة معقدة في القانون والسياسة، ويخلص ضمن استنتاجاته منها إلى أن حالة الاستثناء صارت بأوج انتشارها في العالم، وباتت الدول تفعل ما تشاء على المستوى الخارجي، وتنتهك القانون وتُفقده معياريته على المستوى الداخلي في حالة من الاستثناء المستدام بدعوى تطبيق القانون.
تعتبر أطروحة أغامبين مفيدة لنا خاصة مع المرحلة التأسيسية/ الانتقالية التي تمر بها الصومال، إذ تساهم في سعينا لفهم أكثر تركيبا لطبيعة السلطة ومشروعيتها من جهة وعلاقتها بالقانون ومعياريته من جهة أخرى، ويزيد من أهمية الأطروحة بالنسبة لنا أن جزءاً من أجهزة الدولة التنفيذية على الأقل قد تأسس على هامش حرب الإرهاب التي هي تمظهر صرف للحالة الـ"أغامبينية".
وكما يتكشف من مسودة قانون مكافحة الإرهاب المعروضة حالياً على البرلمان وقبلها قضية تسليم المواطن عبد الكريم شيخ موسى لإثيوبيا، فإن الاستثناء الذي تم تبريره بحماية النظام القانوني والدولة من تهديد وجودي، لم يكف عن الزحف على حيز القاعدة المعيارية (الدستور والقوانين)، وبالتالي فلا مانع من أن يستمر في التوسع أو تستمر الأجهزة التنفيذية في التغول حتى تنصهر فيها كل السلطة، لنصل إلى حالة تطابق كامل بين السلطة والقانون يكون عنوانها استباحة الإنسان، على شاكلة النموذج المتحقق حالياً في المناطق الصومالية بإثيوبيا على سبيل المثال لا الحصر.
وقد يستبعد أحدنا إمكانية انبثاق حالة من التأله السلطوي المطلق من رحم حكم دستوري (أو قريب منه)، لكن وكما يورد أغامبين في أطروحته، فإن تمظهري "حالة الاستثناء" المطْبِقة الأشد نقاءً في العصر الحديث، الفاشية والنازية، لم تعدما شرعية دستورية، إنما ما فتح الباب على مصراعيه لهما كان التطبيع مع الإستثناء وجره بذلك إلى خانة العادي في سياسة تلك الدول (الدستورية حتى حينه)، وذلك كأحدى تبعات الحرب العالمية الأولى.
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محتاج قطعاً لقراءة ثانية في الكتاب، فهو، على صغر حجمه النسبي، غني وتأسيسي، ولا يسع أي دارس أو مهتم بفلسفة القانون والسياسة إلا الإطلاع عليه.
هذا الاستثناء احتفظ باستثنائيته في عصور مضت عبر التمايز المؤسسي بين عناصره الجدلية، لكنه تحول إلى قاعدة مع انصهار تلك العناصر وتوحدها في سلطة واحدة. هنا يستحيل صمام الأمان المفترض إلى كارثة مدمرة وآلة قاتلة.
يستثمر أغامبين شبكة من النطاقات المعرفية المختلفة ينتهي من خلالها إلى نسج أطروحة معقدة في القانون والسياسة، ويخلص ضمن استنتاجاته منها إلى أن حالة الاستثناء صارت بأوج انتشارها في العالم، وباتت الدول تفعل ما تشاء على المستوى الخارجي، وتنتهك القانون وتُفقده معياريته على المستوى الداخلي في حالة من الاستثناء المستدام بدعوى تطبيق القانون.
تعتبر أطروحة أغامبين مفيدة لنا خاصة مع المرحلة التأسيسية/ الانتقالية التي تمر بها الصومال، إذ تساهم في سعينا لفهم أكثر تركيبا لطبيعة السلطة ومشروعيتها من جهة وعلاقتها بالقانون ومعياريته من جهة أخرى، ويزيد من أهمية الأطروحة بالنسبة لنا أن جزءاً من أجهزة الدولة التنفيذية على الأقل قد تأسس على هامش حرب الإرهاب التي هي تمظهر صرف للحالة الـ"أغامبينية".
وكما يتكشف من مسودة قانون مكافحة الإرهاب المعروضة حالياً على البرلمان وقبلها قضية تسليم المواطن عبد الكريم شيخ موسى لإثيوبيا، فإن الاستثناء الذي تم تبريره بحماية النظام القانوني والدولة من تهديد وجودي، لم يكف عن الزحف على حيز القاعدة المعيارية (الدستور والقوانين)، وبالتالي فلا مانع من أن يستمر في التوسع أو تستمر الأجهزة التنفيذية في التغول حتى تنصهر فيها كل السلطة، لنصل إلى حالة تطابق كامل بين السلطة والقانون يكون عنوانها استباحة الإنسان، على شاكلة النموذج المتحقق حالياً في المناطق الصومالية بإثيوبيا على سبيل المثال لا الحصر.
وقد يستبعد أحدنا إمكانية انبثاق حالة من التأله السلطوي المطلق من رحم حكم دستوري (أو قريب منه)، لكن وكما يورد أغامبين في أطروحته، فإن تمظهري "حالة الاستثناء" المطْبِقة الأشد نقاءً في العصر الحديث، الفاشية والنازية، لم تعدما شرعية دستورية، إنما ما فتح الباب على مصراعيه لهما كان التطبيع مع الإستثناء وجره بذلك إلى خانة العادي في سياسة تلك الدول (الدستورية حتى حينه)، وذلك كأحدى تبعات الحرب العالمية الأولى.
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محتاج قطعاً لقراءة ثانية في الكتاب، فهو، على صغر حجمه النسبي، غني وتأسيسي، ولا يسع أي دارس أو مهتم بفلسفة القانون والسياسة إلا الإطلاع عليه.
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December 4, 2021one day humanity will play with law just as children play with disused objects, not in order to restore them to their canonical use, but to free them from it for good.
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August 26, 2024Viel Carl Schmitt, viel Walter Benjamin, ausnahmsweise mal Heidegger und Arendt...
Scheinbar braucht es zur Einrichtung eines Rechts den rechtsfreien Raum.
Agamben setzt sich hierfür stark mit römischer Rechtsprechung auseinander.
Hier eine etwas wilde Sammlung:
"Der Ausnahmezustand ist kein Sonderrecht, sondern er bestimmt, indem er die Rechtsordnung suspendiert, deren Schwelle oder Grenzbegriff. "
"Es geht um die Suspendierung der gültigen Ordnung, damit ihr Bestehen gesichert wird."
"Das Recht, das nicht mehr praktiziert und nur studiert wird, [ist] die Pforte zur Gerechtigkeit." (Das ist von Benjamin)
"Einen Weg zur Gerechtigkeit zu bahnen heißt nicht Auslöschung, sondern Deaktivierung und Untätigkeit des Rechts."
Hier meine zwei Lieblingszitate:
"Eines Tages wird die Menschheit mit dem Recht spielen wie Kinder mit ausgedienten Gegenständen, nicht um sie wieder ihrem angestammten Gebrauch zuzuführen, sondern um sie endgültig von ihm zu befreien."
"Was der Schrein der Macht in seinem Zentrum enthält, ist der Ausnahmezustand - aber dieser ist wesentlich ein leerer Raum, in dem sich menschliches Handeln ohne Bezug zum Recht mit einer Norm ohne Bezug zum Leben konfrontiert sieht."
Warme Empfehlung für alle Politik-Philosophie-Interessierten und Juristen (für Jura-Studienabbrüche übernehme ich keine Verantwortung)
Scheinbar braucht es zur Einrichtung eines Rechts den rechtsfreien Raum.
Agamben setzt sich hierfür stark mit römischer Rechtsprechung auseinander.
Hier eine etwas wilde Sammlung:
"Der Ausnahmezustand ist kein Sonderrecht, sondern er bestimmt, indem er die Rechtsordnung suspendiert, deren Schwelle oder Grenzbegriff. "
"Es geht um die Suspendierung der gültigen Ordnung, damit ihr Bestehen gesichert wird."
"Das Recht, das nicht mehr praktiziert und nur studiert wird, [ist] die Pforte zur Gerechtigkeit." (Das ist von Benjamin)
"Einen Weg zur Gerechtigkeit zu bahnen heißt nicht Auslöschung, sondern Deaktivierung und Untätigkeit des Rechts."
Hier meine zwei Lieblingszitate:
"Eines Tages wird die Menschheit mit dem Recht spielen wie Kinder mit ausgedienten Gegenständen, nicht um sie wieder ihrem angestammten Gebrauch zuzuführen, sondern um sie endgültig von ihm zu befreien."
"Was der Schrein der Macht in seinem Zentrum enthält, ist der Ausnahmezustand - aber dieser ist wesentlich ein leerer Raum, in dem sich menschliches Handeln ohne Bezug zum Recht mit einer Norm ohne Bezug zum Leben konfrontiert sieht."
Warme Empfehlung für alle Politik-Philosophie-Interessierten und Juristen (für Jura-Studienabbrüche übernehme ich keine Verantwortung)
March 23, 2020
Leído en noviembre, a propósito del uso del estado de excepción en la revuelta chilena de octubre. Hoy, a propósito del Coronavirus, un estado de excepción permanente al estilo chino, con vigilancia absoluta de su población, se puede ofrecer a occidente como una alternativa en contra de las futuras crisis de salud y ambientales.
Este libro, como las distopias a lo 1984, vuelven a cobrar relevancia.
Este libro, como las distopias a lo 1984, vuelven a cobrar relevancia.
March 2, 2016
تدور أطروحة أغامبين حول إشكالية السيادة في الدولة الحديثة بطرحه سؤالا مهما هو لمن السيادة في الدولة الحديثة وما هو مصدر الشرعية ؟
ويجيب عنه عبر دراسة التقاطع بين القانوني والسياسي و على غرار فوكو وهابرماس يفكك أغامبين منظومة السلطة ويعريها بالإعتماد على آراء بنيامين وشميت
حول حالة الإستثناء كأداة لتغول الدولة على الإنسان وإستباحته
ويجيب عنه عبر دراسة التقاطع بين القانوني والسياسي و على غرار فوكو وهابرماس يفكك أغامبين منظومة السلطة ويعريها بالإعتماد على آراء بنيامين وشميت
حول حالة الإستثناء كأداة لتغول الدولة على الإنسان وإستباحته
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June 13, 2022إزاي القانون الوضعي بيحتاج لحيز من اللا معياري علشان يفضل قائم، ورغم إن ده شكله متناقض بس هي حقيقة على مر التاريخ. في أجزاء كتير مفهمتهاش لكن كان طول الوقت بيثير عندي اسئلة عن شرعية القوانين والسلطة وبيلفت نظري لظواهر قد تكون حقيقتها مختلفة عن شكلها. يمكن كنت هحب إنه يتكلم أكتر عن الوضع الحالي زي ما كان بيتكلم عن الدولة الرومانية -واللي أكيد كانت مفيدة علشان نشوف إزاي الحالة دي وجدت في أول صور القانون اللي نعرفها. في كلام كتير غير مرتب عايز أقوله بس هخليه لمرة تانية إذا كان في نصيب ورجعت قريته وأنا اكثر استعدادا :'D
February 10, 2018
Aunque por momentos es un libro algo complicado de leer -especialmente cuando se manda citas en latín sin traducción que le hacen perder a uno el hilo- es un a buena reflexión sobre cómo la ley en ocasiones no garantiza la vida y el derecho individual. Muy bueno para comenzar a entender lo que es estado de excepción y el lugar de éste en la historia de occidente.
October 15, 2020
Agamben'in Covid-19 salgınına karşı devletlerin aldığı tedbirleri eleştirdiği yazısı:
March 21, 2020
Mostly Homo sacer copypasta that through its prolonged (though not uninteresting) historical and philological investigations basically elliptically returns Benjamin's thesis of "pure violence" in Critique of Violence - a text you will more benefit from reading.
April 12, 2022
Yer yer katıldım yer yer katılmadım.Kafamı karıştan bir kitap oldu.Ama zaten Agamben korona döne-mindeki yorumlarıyla kafamı karıştıran biri.Şimdilerde ortalıkta pek gözükmemeyi tercih etmemesine çok anlam veremiyorum.Fikirleri mi değişti yoksa uygun ortamı mı bekliyor.Okurken bunları düşün-düm bir yandan da.İstina halinin devam etmesi için fırsat gözleyenleri,korona döneminde de sıklıkla gördük.Bu hali fırsata çevirip yaptığı şeylere ortam hazırlayanları da görmezden gelmemek gerek. Kitapta da yer yer tutarsızlıklar da vardı.Ama genel olarak ele aldığı konu ve fikir güzeldi.
December 13, 2015
هذا الكتاب يتناول موضوع ذو حساسية شديدة و في نفس الوقت تخصصي جدا الا وهو حالة الاستثناء ...أي عندما يتم تعليق القانون تحدث اشكالية الا و هي سيولةالمعايير والعقد الذي يربط اطراف الدولة بعضها ببعض و بالافراد؟
ويضرب المؤلف بامثلة من تاريخ المجتمع الغربي القديم و الحديث مبينا التناقضات التي تحدث في الدولة و علاقتها بالافراد من جراء حالةالاستثناء و التي يستغلها اصحاب السلطة في الدولة و بخاصة الحاكم في اتباع بعض السياسات دون اعتراض اجهزة الدولة المنوطة بمراقبة تلك السياسات
الكتاب ليس بالكتاب السهل وهو من نوعية الكتب الشديدة التخصصيةبحيث يصعيب على المرء استيعاب افكاره بسهولة...لقد اعدت قراءة العديد من الفقرات منه و قرات عدة مقالات عنه على الشبكة و لم استطع هضمه جيدا بعد ولاسيما الفصل المعنون بصراع للعمالقة حول الفراغ حيث تجد المؤلف يعرض فيه سجال الفكر بين ف��هاء القانون الغربيين حول موضوع حالة الاستثناء و بخاصة فالتر بنياميين و كارل شميت و رغم المتعة العقلية و المعرفية خلال هذا الفصل الا انه مرهق للغاية نظرا لتشعب الموضوع و ابعادة الكثيرة
هناك محاضرة للدكتورة هبة رؤوف تتناول فيها مناقشة اهم افكار الكتاب انصح بمشاهدتها أيضا بعد قراءة الكتاب
اعطيت الكتاب 3 نجوم فقط لأني لم اتطع كما ذكرت هضم افكاره بشكل جيد
ويضرب المؤلف بامثلة من تاريخ المجتمع الغربي القديم و الحديث مبينا التناقضات التي تحدث في الدولة و علاقتها بالافراد من جراء حالةالاستثناء و التي يستغلها اصحاب السلطة في الدولة و بخاصة الحاكم في اتباع بعض السياسات دون اعتراض اجهزة الدولة المنوطة بمراقبة تلك السياسات
الكتاب ليس بالكتاب السهل وهو من نوعية الكتب الشديدة التخصصيةبحيث يصعيب على المرء استيعاب افكاره بسهولة...لقد اعدت قراءة العديد من الفقرات منه و قرات عدة مقالات عنه على الشبكة و لم استطع هضمه جيدا بعد ولاسيما الفصل المعنون بصراع للعمالقة حول الفراغ حيث تجد المؤلف يعرض فيه سجال الفكر بين ف��هاء القانون الغربيين حول موضوع حالة الاستثناء و بخاصة فالتر بنياميين و كارل شميت و رغم المتعة العقلية و المعرفية خلال هذا الفصل الا انه مرهق للغاية نظرا لتشعب الموضوع و ابعادة الكثيرة
هناك محاضرة للدكتورة هبة رؤوف تتناول فيها مناقشة اهم افكار الكتاب انصح بمشاهدتها أيضا بعد قراءة الكتاب
اعطيت الكتاب 3 نجوم فقط لأني لم اتطع كما ذكرت هضم افكاره بشكل جيد
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August 19, 2015Agamben details the concept of the state of exception as the state in which the rule law is not voided or the law itself changed to allow for absolute rule, but rather the law is suspended. He claims it's a way of enacting de-facto dictatorship specific to Western democracies. His examples are Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy as well as France, Switzerland, Great Britain and the USA.
For those who believe in liberal democracy, the numerous examples of it's easily slippage into dictatorship should be eye-opening, and even more so considering that the ongoing economic crisisis certainly speeding up those process right now.
The main weakness, as far as I am concerned, is that both the state or the sovereign and the subjects are treated in the book as completely abstract entities. Subsequently the historical examples are dry lists of legal acts. There is no analysis of where the agency of the acting entities is coming from, no social forces at play, just history as a list of dates on one hand side, and on the other abstract philosophy.
For those who believe in liberal democracy, the numerous examples of it's easily slippage into dictatorship should be eye-opening, and even more so considering that the ongoing economic crisisis certainly speeding up those process right now.
The main weakness, as far as I am concerned, is that both the state or the sovereign and the subjects are treated in the book as completely abstract entities. Subsequently the historical examples are dry lists of legal acts. There is no analysis of where the agency of the acting entities is coming from, no social forces at play, just history as a list of dates on one hand side, and on the other abstract philosophy.
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