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Here is an interesting account from page 176 highlighting another factor affecting the German logistical issues on the Eastern Front, one entirely of the Germans own making:

(view spoiler)["Local objections forced a reduction in the number of deportation trains leaving Germany in the late autumn, but the transports themselves could not be stopped entirely, despite the fact that they contributed to a severe shortage of railcars and bottlenecks in the transportation system crippling the German advance toward Moscow. Bock protested the continuing presence of 'Jew trains,' fearing that the 'arrival of these trains must result in the loss of an equal number of trains vital to supplying the attack,' but to little avail." (hide spoiler)]

Which brings me to mention this book that may be of interest on this subject:

Holocaust Versus Wehrmacht: How Hitler's "Final Solution" Undermined the German War Effort by Yaron Pasher

Reading Ostkrieg has got me interested in reading more about Genera Franz Halder. I will have to see if I can find an affordable copy of his war diary.


The Halder War Diary, 1939-1942 by Charles B. Burdick

Talking of the relationship between Adolf Hitler and his High Command (OKW & OKH) maybe I should try and read this book as some stage this year:

Twilight of the Gods: The Decline and Fall of the German General Staff in World War II by David Stone

I am sure it may also be of interest to others involved in this group read :)

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Reading Ostkrieg has got me interested in reading more about Genera Franz Halder. I will have to see if I can find an affordable copy of his war diary.


[bookcover:The Halder War Diary, 1939-1942|..."

The problem with the affordable copy, which I have, and the three volume set, which I have seen is how much information is lost.

Thank you for your insights, Lee !

Lee wrote: "Pamela wrote: " At what point in the war did the lack of oil start to really hinder the Germans?"

In one sense, it hindered them from the beginning: the Germans knew they needed to protect their s..."

hi Aussie Rick. Thanks for posting that website. Such great information, written so clearly


'Aussie Rick' wrote: "In fact Lee/Pamela, the oil/fuel shortage may have started affecting Wehrmacht operations earlier than 1944. According to the author of Ostkrieg (page 237) during the planning for offensive options..."

I wish this book had some maps !

There are a few maps at the front of the book (7 in total) but I would prefer maps placed in the relevant sections of the book as you read it.

I thought the author's discussion of Hitler's Haltebefehl (order to hold out) during the Russian counter-offensive before Moscow in 1941 was quite good (page 205):

(view spoiler)["Although, in retrospect, this decision has been much criticized by historians, at the time it likely seemed the only possible course of action. Withdrawal meant losing the heavy weapons and would not have halted the Russians in any case, while Bock himself worried about the very real possibility that, once begun, a retreat would turn into a disaster of Napoleonic proportions. Nor was a mobile defense a serious alternative, given the lack of vehicles, tanks, fuel, supplies, and the difficulty of movement on the snow-covered roads. As Bock and his army commanders had repeatedly pointed out, the only feasible solution lay in holding their positions and rushing reserves to fill the gaps. Hitler, then, was largely acceding to the advice of his generals, but with a new twist: not only had he taken command initiative away from them, but the order to stand fast would now be carried out in a rigid and uncompromising manner that meant the needless death of many Landsers. In the event, Hitler's intent to hold out up front until reinforcements arrived failed, not because it was inherently unreasonable, but as a result of the deficient German transport system." (hide spoiler)]

Agree re maps. Did not realise there were maps at front of book !!!

I am know unto the commencement of Operation Blau and it is apparent from Fritz's writing that he sees this another example of Hitler gambling and rolling the dice for military success with even less likelihood than in June 1941.

In reading Ostkreig and with all the economic and supply challenges the Germans faced in getting to the gates of Moscow, plus the unexpected continuing resilence of the Russians it does raise the question of how could Germany have ever invaded Russia and won. “Won�� being a cessation of military action on terms dictated by Germany.
A big plus with Ostkrieg is that the depth of the research by Fritz and the clarity and detail of the constraints facing the Germans stimulates the reader to consider how could the outcome ever have been different. A number of authors have contended that Germany got very close to defeating the Russians (one more battalion at Stalingrad�� etc) but from reding ostkrieg the impression is that success was never really likely.
So how could the Germans have defeated the Russians is a thought provoking question for all of us armchair strategists and probably worth a heading in its own right. Overy in his book “Why Germany lost the war�� covers some of these issues also in broad strategic terms.
Working on the basis that the Germans needed to attack sooner rather than latter as Russia only going to get stronger (and threat of US intervention) here are a few thoughts of possible alternate approaches in “successfully�� invading Russia

1) Take England out of the war whether by direct invasion or other options (see2) so that all German resources could be focussed upon the Soviets. Still doubtful that this option would have released enough military and industrial resources to make any difference and could have taken several years �� and also leave Germany open to Russian action whilst engaged in the west
2) Pursue the Mediterraen option of capturing Egypt and the oil fields of the middle east and evicting England. Improves German fuel situation, probably delays invasion by only a year, possibly brings Turkey in on the German side and the possibility of attacking the Caucus oil fields via Turkey/Iraq (rather than the long way around).
3) Persuade the Japanese to attack Russia in the east (rather than the US) so diverting Russian military resources and potentially preventing the Moscow counter offensive of early December. Question of how many resources actually diverted. Whilst Moscow might have fallen to the Germans, possibly in spring of 1942 rather than late 1941, still would not have resolved challenges facing Germans of declining military capabilities and industrial and material constraints. Probably just delayed German defeat.
4) Focus on taking Moscow and not be diverted to Ukraine in Sept 1941. Whilst Germans most likely have taken Moscow would not have stopped Russians from pursuing the war and leave Army Group Centre vulnerable to flank attacks. And reduce German access to resources of Donets and oil regions.
5) Regime change �� somehow remove Joseph Stalin from Soviet leadership with the view that his successors would sue for peace. Either through internal party action or external event recognising Stalin had so cowered all his colleagues that it would have been unlikely to occur internally. For the Germans an attempt to replicate the situation in France in 1940 where lack of political and military leadership and commitment assisted the Germans mightily. As many commentators have noted doubtful that any democracy would have sustained the fight against the invading Germans given the shock and awe and brutality of the opening weeks of the campaign and initial dramatic successes. Would Stalin’s removal have lead to a more accommodating Russian leadership and indeed would Hitler have agreed to any option other than unconditional surrender


Other options include such as awaiting until 1943 when economy fully running and re-armament completed (still doubtful) or a combination of approaches eg Mediteraen option plus Japanese involvement .

Interested in others input

I just received my copy of this title today! I will start it tomorrow and checkout the other comments here afterwards.

Sounds good Gregg, keen to hear your thoughts/observations once you get started.

Waiting for the tank buster Stuka to appear over the steppes of Russia in 1943. Can it hold back the vast hordes of T-34's rumbling to crush the Landsers positions:

Alex wrote: "I am know unto the commencement of Operation Blau and it is apparent from Fritz's writing that he sees this another example of Hitler gambling and rolling the dice for military success with even le..."

I think point one is interesting Alex.

If Britain was removed then it does add an angle on erasing any likelihood of US/Canadian seaborne supply into Britain and then onward to Russia, and of course removes the supply of British made munitions, weapons and other equipment by sea to Russia too.
The US/Canada could supply via Alaska and Pacific sea routes but I wonder how achievable in scale of requirements including cost (money, ships and men) that would have been.

Thanks for posting and asking the questions.

I like the sounds of option two if it was possible to drag Spain into the war to help neutralize Gibraltar although the author points out very good reasons why this wasn't really possible. However if the Axis could have taken Malta and pushed more resources into the Middle East, could that have worked? At least give Germany a breathing space for a year or more before the Allies mounted their offensives?

Alex wrote: "I am know unto the commencement of Operation Blau and it is apparent from Fritz's writing that he sees this another example of Hitler gambling and rolling the dice for military success with even le..."

I'd argue the opposite of #2: ignore the Mediterranean, and do not send anything across the sea. Lean on Mussolini to leave it alone, as well. If possible, do not let him pick a fight with the Greeks, either. Then sit back and dare the British to do anything about it. Before late 1942, there is nowhere near enough shipping for Britain (and the US) to land seriously anywhere on the Mediterranean coasts.

On the other side, all of the forces spent in North Africa become available for operations in Russia: perhaps a whole army of Italians, certainly their armored corps. The two cobbled-together panzer divisions of the Afrika Korps, plus the earlier arrival of the 2nd & 5th Panzer Divisions, which were badly delayed by the Balkans campaign and British naval action. Many planes and aircrews, German and Italian.

Point 4, I would argue for keeping the Ukrainian operations as is, but taking Leningrad instead of Moscow in the autumn. My limited wargaming experience has been that with Leningrad in the bag in 1941, Moscow becomes a viable target in 1942.

I don't disagree with you on the Mediterranean but once Hitler had committed forces to the Middle East it seemed like a better option to finish off the job there in a reasonably contained battle ground rathe than the ever expanding front in Russia which the author has shown to be like a funnel, the front ever widening with less and less material and men available to the Germans to cover effectively. Is this a easy way of coming through the back door?

I never like 'what ifs' and 'could have beens' I prefer straight history :)

It doesn't matter how many books I read on the Russian Front I am always amazed at the staggering loss of life, like these figures from page 214 in regards to the German drive on Moscow and the Soviet counter-offensive:

(view spoiler)[" ... Red Army losses had been staggering, the central Rzhev-Vyazma operation alone costing the Soviets some 272,000 lives. Overall, in the roughly four months of fighting between December and March, Zhukov's West Front lost 250,000 men and Konev's Kalinin Front some 150,000, while the battles around Demyansk cost the Soviets another 89,000 men. Red Army losses across the entire eastern front totalled 620,000 from January to March, compared with roughly 136,000 German deaths in the same period." (hide spoiler)]

Here is a book that I am yet to read of the fighting around Viaz'ma during Operation Typhoon:

The Viaz'ma Catastrophe, 1941: The Red Army's Disastrous Stand against Operation Typhoon by Lev Lopukhovsky

It is not only the Soviet losses when the Germans were in ascendency (1941,1942) but also their losses, and willingness to accept "staggering" losses, when the Russians started pushing the Germans back that are also mind blowing. In reading Ostkrieg I am now upto around the loss of Kiev in Nov 1943.

Fritzs analysis of the respective losses of the Soviets and Germans in manpower, tanks and planes from the Battle of Kursk are quite an eyeopener. He provides a completely different perspective of the impact of the battle with the tank losses by the Germans despite the "verdun" nature of the fighting as being quite small. In contrast the Russians had horrendous losses particularly on the 12th of July at the head on clash of tanks. Frietz concludes that the Germans definitely won this encounter although other strategic considerations (e.g. invasion of sicily, Russian counteroffensive at Orel)) led to Hitler calling Citadel off. The figures Fritz provides for the respective losses both on central and southern front are heavily weighted against the Germans.

Of course however by this stage every loss by the Germans on the Easternfront was unlikely to be replaced given requirements on western front and few resources. In contrast Soviets going from strength to strength and with every German retreat leading to more now freed Russians being available to the Red Army.

Despite the valour and skill of the Germans and their ability to inflict high casualties on the Russians by late 1943 they had no option but to continue to retreat. As the army became less mobile and more static, and ran out of reserves the front of the Ostheer in Fritz's words cannot but help to fragment. Again few German losses are covered and despite increasing armament production the Russian steamroller, aided by lend lease supplies cannot be stopped.

But as Aussie Ric notes the losses of the Russians are simply huge.

sorry absolute losses at Citadel are heavily weighted against Russians although you could argue the losses on a strategic basis are heavily weighted against the German (given scrapping the barrel of resources)

In regard to Lee's comments on war games that show capturing leningrad and Moscow as being a possible successful option I wonder if these games factor into the impact on Germany of not accessing the resources of the ukraine until say late 1942 (presuming Russia keeps on fighting after loss of Moscow). This I think I think is the strength of Ostkrieg and its coverage on resource and supply constraints.

With all Hitler's focus on securing the Caucaus oil in 1942 I wonder what the conditions of the oilfields would have been even if the Germans had been successful in reaching the oilfield given the destruction the Soviets made to the Maikop oilfields on retreating (Fritz quotes Geramn engineers as saying it would have taken at least six months to get Maikop oil production up and running after repairs)
There would also be the logistics of transporting the oil to the refineries in the balkans for refinering presuming the russian refineries destroyed.

Of course German possession of the oil fields, even if not producing anything would have significant impacts for the Russians as well given Fritz comments 90% of their oil came from the Caucuas

I think this link provides one of the better and more reasonable accounts of Kursk and the tank losses suffered by both sides:

I just started the book yesterday and am on page 72. Sorry, to draw anyone back... I just wanted to comment on the way Fritz covers the political, geopolitical, military, logistic and Nazi theology over Hitler's reasons for opening the move east. This is a different approach then the majority of books on the Eastern Front that I have read before. Other authors tend to concentrate on one or two of the subjects I mentioned above, usually just military.

Very true gregg and I found the further into the book the more the differences in Ostkrieg than some of his predecessors. I think it is a truly excellent piece of research and with many challenging conclusions including that some of hitlers actions were not as bad as his generals would have one believe. But the longer the war the war the worse the mistakes and the worse the consequences.

You won't be dragging us back Gregg nor anyone else starting a bit later, both Alex and myself will be more than happy to discuss the book at anytime :)

Your comments about the depth of the issues covered by the author is quite valid and one reason why this book has been so enjoyable to read so far. As Alex also mentioned the further you get into the book the author tends to challenge some previous held views on the war in the East.

Here is an account in relation to the operations of the Einsatzgruppen in Russia (page 219). I still have issues trying to comprehend the mentality of the men involved in these murders:

(view spoiler)[" ... To the south, during the early months of 1942, Einsatzgruppen C and D engaged in more extensive operations, murdering perhaps 75,000 people in all between the beginning of the Soviet attack and the end of March. In one particularly gruesome incident, 4,000-5,000 Jews were placed in stables that were then doused with the gasoline in such scare supply to the army and set afire. In Transnistria, 43,000 Jews in groups of 300-400, were shot while kneeling naked in the icy weather on the rim of a precipice; the shootings continued for days, interrupted only by the celebration of Christmas." (hide spoiler)]


For those interested in further reading on the Einsatzgruppen can check this book out:

Masters of Death: The SS-Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust by Richard Rhodes

From page 222 of the book, in regards to the number of foreign workers in Germany's workforce plus a funny quote from Erhard Milch:

(view spoiler)[" ... By the end of July, over 5 million foreign workers were employed in Germany, while, by the summer of 1943, the total foreign workforce had risen to 6.5 million, a figure that would increase by the end of 1944 to 7.9 million. By that time, foreign workers accounted for over 20 percent of the total German workforce, although, in the armaments sector, the figure topped 33 percent. In some specific factories and production lines, foreign workers routinely exceeded 40 percent of the total; indeed, by the summer of 1943, the Stuka dive bomber was, as Erhard Milch boasted, being '80% manufactured by Russians'." (hide spoiler)]

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Here is an account in relation to the operations of the Einsatzgruppen in Russia (page 219). I still have issues trying to comprehend the mentality of the men involved in these murders:

[spoilers ..."
Read my book Occupation and Insurgency, you will find it interesting I believe.

The fighting around Kharkov in May 1942 was extremely hard fought and provided an indicator of how hard future battles would be against Soviet forces once they fixed their control and command issues (from page 252):

(view spoiler)["In a brilliant display of skill and aggressiveness, the Germans had not only fought off a Soviet offensive but also encircled the would-be encirclers. Despite vast supplies of new weapons and an organizational restructuring, the Red Army remained plagued by command weaknesses, poor planning, supply difficulties, and inadequate control of the battlefield. Although elated at their success, thoughtful German observers remained troubled by the other constants in their Soviet enemy: his seemingly bottomless resources and the continued ferocity of his resistance. Kleist, surveying the battlefield, was startled by 'the harshness of the struggle': 'In places of the heaviest fighting, as far as one can see, the ground is so thickly covered with the bodies of men and horses that it is difficult to find a passage through for one's command car.' Mackensen, too, observed soberly that, if anything, the Russians had been 'more fanatical, more ruthless' than the year before and had displayed 'incredible courage and determination.' This was an annihilating battle, but one won 'only by an all-out effort'." (hide spoiler)]

Second Battle of Kharkov:

So has anyone else in the group picked up a copy of this book and started reading it yet?

Very insightful comment from the author on Hitler's predicament during mid-late 1942 in regards to a possible opening of a second front by the Allies (page 268):

(view spoiler)[" ... Nervous about just such a possibility, the Fuhrer directed that the powerful First and Second SS Panzer Divisions (Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and Das Reich), which should have spearheaded the First Panzer Army's drive into the Caucasus, be transferred to the west. Two weeks later, he further ordered that the elite Grossdeutschland Motorized Division be prepared for transportation to the west. Finally, he also decreed, despite the drain on the Wehrmacht's meagre fuel supplies, that the Channel and Atlantic coasts be developed into an 'unassailable fortress' in order 'to avoid the establishment of a second front.' There could, he declared to Speer and Keitel, be 'only one fighting front.' A more accurate explication of the German dilemma was hard to imagine: by building up his defenses in the west, Hitler hoped to deter the Allies from launching a second front in 1942, but at a cost to what was most important, seizing the oil fields in the Caucasus." (hide spoiler)]

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "So has anyone else in the group picked up a copy of this book and started reading it yet?"

I don't have it but your posts have made me want to read it. Very informative.

I am sure you will find it an interesting read once you get your hands on a copy :)

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "So has anyone else in the group picked up a copy of this book and started reading it yet?"

I just started it today. I'm afraid I am pretty far behind at this point. Some very interesting discussion points have been made so far. I'm looking forward to getting into the book.

Hi Jill, I will be keen to hear your thoughts on the book as you go. The thread will stay open for a while so take your time and enjoy!

I have now finished Ostkrieg and rate it highly for the comprehensive nature of its discussion of the Eastern Front , particularly its multi-prong approach which covers a lot of issues and stimulates considerable thinking. Not the book if you want a detailed examination of the war at the regimental level its strengths lie in the synthesis of many books on the eastern front and access to more recent Russian historical archives. It does canvass in depth such issues as: the key military campaigns, the thinking at the top levels of the NAZI party as well as the military, the everyday experiences of the Landser, the incredible and constant supply difficulties the Ostheer faced in Russia, economic and resource constraints and the interaction between the war and the Nazis evolving policy of genocide.
To me the selling point of the book was the access to recently released Russian material on the war which in a number of key areas re-interprets accepted wisdoms such as the outcome of the “clash of tanks�� at Kursk where he contends the German loss of tanks much lower than originally canvassed. As such decisions to break off action are made for strategic reasons unrelated to Citadel (eg invasion of Sicily)
Weaknesses of the book include the lack of relatively detailed campaign maps particularly as the Germans retreat, the brief mention of the Mars campaign and the focus on the German effort means we lack insights into some of the difficulties the Russians were facing.
Fritz highlights how un-prepared the German economy and military forces were for WW2 and that the stunning and un–expected victory over France actually lead Germany into a strategic cul-de-sac. Illustrates how Germany lost the strategic initiative after victory as deliberated over next steps and struggled to understand why Britain did not accept peace treaty.
Rather than Hitler jumping immediately to the conclusion that invading Russia should be a priority Fritz considers that Hitler came to this conclusion from a strategic perspective that also built on his long standing ideological opposition to the Soviet Bolshevik/Jewish “conspiracy�� Strategic influences include narrow window of opportunity for military action before US entry into war, Soviet Union designs on Baltic and Balkans and rejection of the
The initial chapters of the book upto the failure of Barbarossa at Moscow not only cover the military campaign but also focuses in depth how there was a certain inevitability about the German decision to commit its captured Jewish population to large scale industrial murder as other options (eg emigration) were no longer viable. Once the genocide commences the book does then focus much more on the military aspects of the war. Fritz does highlight how the majority of the deaths from the extermination camps occurred in 1942/early 1943, not a drawn out process over the war as I had always believed.

In reading Ostkreig and with all the economic and supply challenges the Germans faced in getting to the gates of Moscow, plus the unexpected continuing resilence of the Russians it does raise the question of how could Germany have ever invaded Russia and won.
A number of authors have contended that Germany got very close to defeating the Russians (one more battalion at Stalingrad�� etc) but from reading ostkrieg the impression is that success was never really likely. The initial problems with supply capabilities and poor armaments supply become more and more compounded by strategic and tactical mistakes by Hitler and senior military commanders as the war progresses.
Fritz is particularly scathing of the German decision in the summer of 1942 to split forces in attempting to take both the oil supplies of the Caucaus and Stalingrad. As Fritz notes this threw away Germany’s last chance to win the war before US entry and also typified the constant under-estimation by senior German commanders of their opponents. As a result the defeat at Stalingrad “marked a “point of no return��, rather than a turning point “as the Germans plunged into the abysss.”��
Ostkrieg highlights at length the sheer enormous cost in lives of the war on the eastern front and that even as the Germans were retreating the Soviets were still prepared to accept enormous and one sided losses. Psot Stalingrad the Germans could not afford any losses whilst the Russians were going from strength to strength as they recruited new soldiers from the liberated territories and the benefits of Western aid flowed in. For example at page 384 Fritz quotes Foreign Armies East figures that the Russians had lost 1.2 million men in last four months of 1943 (cf approx 250,000 Germans) but strength of Red Army grown to 5.5 ml troops.
Even in the assault on Berlin Fritz contends the Russians were loosing on a daily basis more tanks than at Kursk. He highlights how whilst the Russians were trying to replicate the German approaches towards deep armoured penetration they still continued to focus on frontal military assaults with consequent losses. It is not until Operation Bagration that the Russians put all their lessons together to crush Army Group Centre in a manner similar to the operations of the German panzers in 1941.
Ultimately failure of Barbarossa arose from number of factors: lack of clear campaign objective, distant and contradictory targets, resilence of Russian troops and geographical challenges, consistent under-estimations of military resources required for given tasks and shortfall of the German economy and resource endownments. Constraints in raw materials became dominant from an early stage of the campaign as did difficulties with supply with often choices between either munitions, fuel or food �� but not all three.
From the invasion of Russia and the supply constraints before Moscow to the lack of petrol in the 1942 campaigns Fritz highlights how the Germans never really got on top of the physical constraints of Russia to keep their troops supplied with food and weapons. Faced similar difficulties in the Middle East and quite an indictment of German planning.
As the war progressed and supplies tightened the German army do-motorised. As other authors have noted the vast majority of German soldiers entered Russia on foot, relying on horse drawn supplies, as had been the case with Napoleonic forces in 1812. As such the German army was a metal tipped fragile lance.
But like Robert Kershaw it highlights that the Ostheer essentially �� victored itself to death�� with every campaign success in 1941 and 1942 limiting the ability to achieve the next success. Citano has written some recent books on how the typical German approach to war �� focus on encirclement, limited campaigns with logistics secondary - found its failing in WW2, particularly in Russia as it became a war of attrition, ill suited to the German economy.
I would recommend this book to those first approaching the Eastern front to those who want to explore some of the factors behind the German defeat in more detail. I am so impressed by the scholarly and articulate approach of Stephen Fritz that I will be lining upto buy some of his other books on the Third Reich

Excellent review! I will definately read this as soon as I can get a copy.

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "So has anyone else in the group picked up a copy of this book and started reading it yet?"
I have ordered it from the library and am hoping they can find me a copy, will know if I'm successful by the 2nd Tuesday when the bookmobile arrives.

Jill wrote: "'Aussie Rick' wrote: "So has anyone else in the group picked up a copy of this book and started reading it yet?"

I just started it today. I'm afraid I am pretty far behind at this point. Some very..."

I'm not reading this one Jill but have enjoyed the discussion so far and please add yur own thoughts and views in as you go along.

Excellent summary of the book Alex, thanks for sharing with the group as I am sure it will interest a few members now and make them think about grabbing a copy.

I liked how the author put to rest the myth of 'the death ride of the panzers' in his discussion on Kursk.

Here is a pretty good article on Kursk:



A review on the book; Blood, Steel, & Myth: The II. SS Panzer Corps and the Road to Prochorowka by George Nipe:



Blood, Steel, and Myth: The II.SS-Panzer-Korps and the Road to Prochorowka, July 1943 by George M. Nipe

Hi Alex, thanks for that review. I'm a little overwhelmed with this book and the summaries you provide are helpful.



Alex wrote: "I have now finished Ostkrieg and rate it highly for the comprehensive nature of its discussion of the Eastern Front , particularly its multi-prong approach which covers a lot of issues and stimulat..."

Glad to be of help as of course is aussie ric and his pertinent comments. Despite maybe some dated perspectives i still think alan clark "Barbarossa" remains the benchmark for books on the eastern front for clarity and ease of reasoning without trading off detail for insights.

Have to agree with Alex that Barbarossa by Alan Clark is a classic book that is still a good, easy to read account to get you started on further more in-depth reading if you so desire.

Barbarossa by Alan Clark

Thank you Alex and Aussie Rick. I just ordered Barbarossa and look forward to reading it ! I have made it to page 300 in Ostkrieg, but I'm just getting lost trying to keep track of the battles, the geography and the fighting units.

Pamela wrote: "Thank you Alex and Aussie Rick. I just ordered Barbarossa and look forward to reading it ! I have made it to page 300 in Ostkrieg, but I'm just getting lost trying to keep track of the battles, the..."

I hope you enjoy Barbarossa, it should give you a good basic understanding of the campaign in the east. In regards to Ostkrieg I think if they had placed maps throughout the book when discussing the various campaigns and battles that would have made things easier to follow. Stick with it as its worth the effort :)

Pamela wrote: "Thank you Alex and Aussie Rick. I just ordered Barbarossa and look forward to reading it ! I have made it to page 300 in Ostkrieg, but I'm just getting lost trying to keep track of the battles, the..."

Slightly off-piste Pamela but you may also enjoy this. I thought it a good German depiction of five friends and how the war shaped and changed their lives including serving on the Eastern Front:

Excellent recommendation Geevee, I am thinking of watching it again as I bought the series on DVD.

Here is an excellent summary of the problem facing Germany in 1943, from page 330 in the book:

(view spoiler)["The ultimate problem, however, was twofold: for all its success, German armaments output in 1943, including tank production, was being swamped by that of its enemies. In that year alone, the Allies produced just about six times more aircraft, nearly five times the number of artillery pieces, and almost four times more tanks. In each of these categories, the United States alone doubled and tripled German output. More vitally, in the spring of 1943, the German war economy itself was drawn directly into the fighting as the Anglo-American bomber offensive began to achieve significant results. Tank production required massive amounts of steel, which Hitler had now reallocated to the army rather than the navy of Luftwaffe. Pursing ruthless efficiency, German steel mills had in March 1943 managed an impressive jump in output, a feat that, combined with the stabilization of the front in April, left Speer and Hitler optimistic that further large gains in steel production would follow. Instead, beginning hesitantly in March, then increasing in frequency and intensity from April through July, British Bomber Command began the Battle of the Ruhr. Intended both to cripple output in this vital industrial area and to destroy the fabric of urban life, the bombers not only killed thousands of people but also disrupted steel production just as the Nazis anticipated an armaments surge. Where a significant increase had been expected, steel output now fell. Not only did that lead to an immediate cutback in tank and ammunition production, but the disruption in the Ruhr also resulted in a supplier crisis as all manner of parts, castings, forgings, and components vital for continued production in plants outside the Ruhr were now in short supply. The result was sobering: in the second half of 1943, armaments output stagnated. As Speer acknowledged, Allied bombing negated the plans for a substantial increase in production. Not until spring 1944 would the armaments index again show a significant increase, one that would last through September, but then it was too late." (hide spoiler)]

Thank you ! Putting it on my summer movie list !!


Geevee wrote: "Pamela wrote: "Thank you Alex and Aussie Rick. I just ordered Barbarossa and look forward to reading it ! I have made it to page 300 in Ostkrieg, but I'm just getting lost trying to keep track of t..."