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This is the thread to discuss the Battle of Tannenburg (1914).

by John Keegan

BATTLE OF TANNENBURG

Source: Wikipedia



The Battle of Tannenberg was in August 1914 a decisive engagement between the Russian Empire and the German Empire in the first days of World War I, fought by the Russian First and Second Armies and the German Eighth Army between 23 August and 30 August 1914.

The battle resulted in the almost complete destruction of the Russian Second Army.

A series of follow-up battles destroyed the majority of the First Army as well, and kept the Russians off-balance until the spring of 1915.

The battle is notable particularly for a number of rapid movements of complete German corps by train, allowing a single German Army to present a single front to both Russian Armies.

Although the battle took place near Allenstein, Ludendorff's aide Max Hoffmann suggested to name it after Tannenberg in an attempt to erase the defeat in the medieval Battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg) of 1410 in which the Teutonic forces were defeated by the Poles and Lithuanians.

As pointed out by Christopher Clark, the actual Tannenberg is some thirty kilometres to the west, and there was no intrinsic reason - other than the historical battle and its emotive resonance in the narrative of German Nationalism - to name for it the 1914 battle.

From First World War.com

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Battles - The Battle of Tannenberg, 1914

Perhaps the most spectacular and complete German victory of the First World War, the encirclement and destruction of the Russian Second Army in late August 1914 virtually ended Russia's invasion of East Prussia before it had really started.

Russia's incursion into German territory was two-pronged. General Samsonov had begun to take his Second Army into the south-western corner of East Prussia whilst General Rennenkampf advanced into its north-east with the First Army. The two armies planned to combine in assaulting General Prittwitz's German Eighth Army, Rennenkampf in a frontal attack while Samsonov engulfed Prittwitz from the rear.

Such was the Russians' initial plan. Rennenkampf brought about a modification however following a scrappy victory against Eighth Army at the Battle of Gumbinnen, after which he paused to reconsolidate his forces.

Prittwitz, shaken by the action at Gumbinnen and fearful of encirclement, ordered a retreat to the River Vistula. Upon receipt of this news Helmuth von Moltke, the German Army Chief of Staff, recalled Prittwitz and his deputy von Waldersee to Berlin - an effective dismissal - and installed as their replacement the markedly more aggressive combination of Paul von Hindenburg - brought out of retirement at the age of 66 - and Erich Ludendorff as his Chief of Staff (having earlier distinguished himself at Liege).

Upon his arrival in East Prussia on 23 August Hindenburg immediately reversed Prittwitz's decision to withdraw, choosing instead to authorise a plan of action prepared by Colonel Maximilian Hoffmann, Prittwitz's deputy chief of operations. While Hindenburg and Ludendorff received much credit for the subsequent action at Tannenberg, the actual plan of attack was devised in detail by Hoffmann.

Hoffmann proposed a ploy whereby cavalry troops would be employed as a screen at Vistula, the intention being to confuse Rennenkampf who, he knew, held a deep personal vendetta with Samsonov (who had complained of Rennenkampf's conduct at the Battle of Mukden in 1905) and so would be disinclined to come to his aid if he had justifiable cause not to.

Meanwhile, General Hermann von Francois's I Corps were transported by rail to the far southwest to meet the left wing of Samsonov's Second Army. Hindenburg's remaining two corps, under Mackensen and Below, were to await orders to move south by foot so as to confront Samsonov's opposite right wing. Finally, a fourth corps was ordered to remain at Vistula to meet Samsonov as his army moved north. The trap was being set.

Samsonov meanwhile, bedevilled by supply and communication problems, was entirely unaware that Rennenkampf had chosen to pause and lick his wounds at Gumbinnen, instead assuming that his forces were continuing their movement south-west.

Samsonov was similarly unaware of Hoffmann's plan or of its execution. Assured that his Second Army was en route to pursue and destroy the supposedly retreating Eighth Army (and supported in doing so by overall commander Yakov Zhilinski, who was subsequently dismissed for his part in the following debacle), he continued to direct his army of twelve divisions - three corps - in a north-westerly direction towards the Vistula. The remaining VI Corps he directed north towards his original objective, Seeburg-Rastenburg.

On 22 August the bulk of Samsonov's forces reached the extremities of the German line, fighting (and winning) small actions as it continued to advance into the German trap of encirclement.

Ludendorff issued an order to General Francois to initiate the attack on Samsonov's left wing at Usdau on 25 August. Remarkably, Francois rejected what was clearly a direct order, choosing instead to wait until his artillery support was in readiness on 27 August. Ludendorff - along with Hoffmann - travelled to see Francois and to repeat the order. Reluctantly, Francois agreed to commence the attack, but complained of a lack of shells.

Whilst returning from their meeting with Francois, Hoffmann was passed two intelligence intercepts that had been transmitted by Rennenkampf and Samsonov, respectively, in the clear, i.e. unciphered. Their contents were explosive.

The first, sent by Rennenkampf, revealed the distance between his and Samsonov's armies. It further detailed his First Army's imminent marching plans, and these were not towards Samsonov's Second Army.

The import of the message was clear: the Germans need not fear intervention from the Russian First Army during their assault upon Samsonov's forces. The second intercepted message, from Samsonov, was similarly remarkable.

Having engaged - unsuccessfully - the heavily entrenched German XX Corps the previous day, 24 August, at the Battle of Orlau-Frankenau, Samsonov had noted what he took to be a general German withdrawal to Tannenberg and beyond. Consequently, his message provided detailed plans for his intended route of pursuit of the German forces.

With both messages in hand, Hoffmann promptly hurried after Ludendorff and Hindenburg and handed them the intercepts. While Ludendorff was sceptical as to their authenticity, Hindenburg, having heard Hoffmann tell of the personal quarrel between Rennenkampf and Samsonov, was inclined to alter the German Eighth Army's plans accordingly.

It was argued by Hindenburg and Hoffmann that Francois could, after all, await the arrival of sufficient artillery supplies before beginning his attack at Usdau, which in the event came two days later, on 27 August. Ludendorff, keen to assert his authority over Francois, insisted that the attack begin as originally scheduled.

Francois however had no intention of attacking without artillery support. Buying time he fell to bickering with Ludendorff and, as he intended, began his attack, by I Corps, on 27 August - and rapidly enjoyed marked success. Rapidly taking Soldau on the Russian border, and so cutting communication with Samsonov's centre, his forces confined Samsonov's left to the frontier.

Despite his success, Francois did not enjoy the trust of either Hindenburg nor, especially, Ludendorff again, particularly once they both moved to Berlin to take over the direction and conduct of the war.

At this stage Ludendorff, fearful that Rennenkampf's forces might yet suddenly join the fray, ordered Francois to move back north, another order ignored by Francois, who chose instead to take his corps east so as to prevent Samsonov's centre from retreating over the border. Although executed in disobedience of Ludendorff's clear order, his bold action contributed to the sweeping success that followed.

Helmuth von Moltke, the German Army Chief of Staff in Berlin, was similarly nervous of the German Army's prospects in the east. He astonished Ludendorff by telephoning him with notification that he was dispatching a cavalry division and three corps from the west to bolster the Eastern Front. Aware that the troops could be ill-afforded by the weakened German attack towards Paris - that is, by the precisely calculated execution of the Schlieffen Plan - Ludendorff protested that the reinforcements were unnecessary. Nevertheless they were sent.

Having decided on 25 August - the day he was passed the Russian radio intercepts - that Rennenkampf's forces were unlikely to attempt to join Samsonov Ludendorff sent the two corps stationed at Gumbinnen south where on the following day they met and brought into action Samsonov's VI Corps moving northwards at Bischofsburg. Surprised and disorganised, both divisions retreated separately for the Russian border.

Ignoring warnings of a massed German advance moving south, Zhilinksi directed Rennenkampf's First Army to the west to Konigsberg on 26 August, a considerable distance from Samsonov's plight. Given the degree of personal enmity between Rennenkampf and Samsonov - they had physically come to blows on at least one occasion - the former had no particular inclination to come to Samsonov's assistance.

Disastrously for Samsonov, Hoffmann and Ludendorff intercepted Zhilinksi's unciphered order to Rennenkampf. He promptly dispatched Below from Bischofsburg to rejoin the German centre, and sent Mackensen south to meet up with General Francois, where they joined in Willenberg, south of Bischofsburg, on 29 August. Samsonov was by now surrounded.

At last, on 28 August, Samsonov finally became aware of the peril he faced. Critically short of supplies and with his communications system in tatters, his forces were dispersed, and VI corps had already been defeated. Consequently he ordered a general withdrawal on the evening of 28 August.

It was too late for Samsonov's forces, as they scattered - many throwing down their weapons and running - directly into the encircling German forces. Relief from the Russian border in the form of counter-attacks were weak and insufficient.

95,000 Russians troops were captured in the action; an estimated 30,000 were killed or wounded, and of his original 150,000 total, only around 10,000 of Samsonov's men escaped. The Germans suffered fewer than 20,000 casualties and, in addition to prisoners captured over 500 guns. Sixty trains were required to transport captured equipment to Germany.

Samsonov, lost in the surrounding forests with his aides, shot himself, unable to face reporting the scale of the disaster to the Tsar, Nicholas II. His body was subsequently found by German search parties and accorded a military burial.

Hindenburg and Ludendorff were feted as heroes at home in Germany. Such was the lustre of the victory - combined with later albeit lesser successes at the First and Second Battles of the Masurian Lakes, that Hindenburg later replaced Erich von Falkenhayn as German Chief of Staff, bringing with him to Berlin Ludendorff as his quartermaster general.

A great propaganda victory, the scale of the Russian defeat shocked Russia's allies, who wondered whether it signalled the defeat of the Russian army. Such was not the case, as was demonstrated by the lesser scale of German victories at the Masurian Lakes. As always, the sheer weight of the Russian army ensured its survival. Even so, no Russian army penetrated German territory again until the close of the Second World War, in 1945.

Click here to read General von Hindenburg's summary of the battle. Click here to read Russian commander Vasily Gurko's summary. Click here to view film footage of captured Russian prisoners following the battle. To view maps charting the course of the battle click here; here; here; and here.

BBC: World Wars in Depth:

Below are two books that cover the Battle of Tannenburg for those interested in further reading:

by Dennis E. Showalter
Publishers blurb:
The Battle of Tannenberg (27-30 August, 1914) opened World War One with a decisive German victory over Russia - indeed, the Kaiser's only clearcut victory in a non-attritional battle during all four years of war. In this first paperback edition of the classic work, eminent military historian Dennis Showater analyses the battle's causes, effects and implications for subsequent German military policy. He destroys many myths, such as the supposed superiority of the German military commanders. The battle's mystique later served the Weimar Republic and Third Reich propagandists. For years the legend of Tannenberg helped to shape German nationalist ideology and military policy. As a result, in 1941, Hitler's Wehrmacht grossly underestimated Soviet military capability, leading to disaster in World War Two.

by John Sweetman
Publishers blurb:
In 1914 Russia's doomed Tsar, Nicholas II, ordered his armies to invade German territory as soon as they had mobilized. They moved faster than the Germans gave them credit for and panic stories of Cossacks running amok in East Prussia led the German High Command to call back two army corps from the invasion of France. The two Russian armies involved in the attack were led by generals that hated each other more than the Germans; their lack of cooperation and signal staff's tendency to transmit radio messages without bothering to encode them helped the Germans plan and execute a massive ambush. The Russian 2nd Army was annihilated and the Tsarist forces never recovered the initiative until their defeat in 1917.

Tannenberg: Erich Ludendorff And The Defence Of The German Eastern Border In 1914

by Perry Pierik (no photo)

Synopsis:

In this short monograph the author has tried to reflect the history of the battle at Tannenberg. Almost 70 years after Ludendorff passed away and almost 90 years after the battle, it helps us to remember the difficult genesis of the Europe we know now.

The first encounter of the empires of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany took place at Tannenberg as described in this book.

Collision of Empires: The War on the Eastern Front in 1914

by Prit Buttar (no photo)

Synopsis

Imperial Germany, Hapsburg Austria-Hungary, and Tsarist Russia clashed on a scale greater than the Western Front campaign to the Marne and the Race to the Sea in 1914.

Drawing on first-hand accounts and detailed archival research, this is a dramatic retelling of the the tumultuous events of the first year of World War I on the Eastern Front, with the battles of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes in East Prussia, followed by the Russo-Austrian clashes in Galicia and the failed German advance towards Warsaw.

With the centenary of the start of World War I in 2014, Collision of Empires is a timely re-discovery of the bitter fighting on this forgotten front. The fighting that raged from East Prussia, through occupied Poland, to Galicia and the Carpathian Mountains was every bit as bloody as comparable battles in Flanders and France, but - with the exception of Tannenberg - remains relatively unknown. As was the case in the West, generals struggled to reconcile their pre-war views on the conduct of operations and how to execute their intricate strategic plans with the reality of war. Lessons were learned slowly while the core of trained personnel, particularly officers and NCOs, in the armies of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia suffered catastrophic losses throughout 1914. Inadequacies in supply and support arrangements, together with a failure to plan for a long war, left all three powers struggling to keep up with events. In addition, the Central Powers had to come to terms with the dreaded reality of a war on two fronts: a war that was initially seen by all three powers as a welcome opportunity to address both internal and external issues, would ultimately bring about the downfall of them all. Prit Buttar, author of Battleground Prussia, provides a magisterial account of the chaos and destruction that reigned when three powerful empires collided.

The WWI Batttle of Tannenburg was a point of honor with the German military. A film was made of that battle just prior to the rise of the Nazi regime and was used for propaganda purposes by Hitler.

Tannenburg

Tannenberg is a 1932 Swiss–German war film directed by Heinz Paul and starring Hans Stüwe, Käthe Haack and Jutta Sauer. The film is based around the 1914 Battle of Tannenberg during the First World War. It focuses on a German landowner Captan von Arndt and his family.

It was shot on location in East Prussia and at UFA's Babelsberg Studios during the summer of 1932.It cost over half a million reichsmarks to make and employed 8,000 people. The film focused on a notable German victory and was in sharp contrast to recent anti-war films such as Westfront 1918. Tannenberg served as a national symbol in Germany, and was re-issued in 1936 during the Nazi era. The Producers made an effort to make the film as historically accurate as possible, and portrayed the Russian commanders respectfully. It was due to be released on 26 August 1932, the eighteenth anniversary of the battle, but was delayed by the censors acting on a request from the German President Paul von Hindenburg who was unhappy with his portrayal in the film and the première was pushed back until certain scenes had been cut.

(Source: Wikipedia)

This is a book of archival photographs of the Russian Army during the Great War. It appears from the GR description, that the author "sets the record straight" about the importance of that armed force and I wonder if the Battle of Tannenberg is mentioned since it pretty much wiped out the Russian forces.

The Russian Army in the First World War

by Nik Cornish(no photo)

Synopsis:

For 100 years little attention has been paid to the Russian army that fought the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians in the First World War on the Eastern Front. Yet the Tsar's army played a critical part in the global conflict and was engaged in a sequence of shattering campaigns that were waged on a massive scale on several fronts across eastern Europe. Nik Cornish, in this heavily illustrated account, sets the record straight. In a selection of almost 200 archive photographs he gives a graphic impression of the Russian army of the time, of the soldiers and commanders, and of the conditions in which they fought.

Tannenberg: Clash of Empires

by Dennis E. Showalter (no photo)

Synopsis:

An in-depth of study of the battle of Tannenburg, the major victory by the outnumbered German army over the Russian Empire in the opening months of World War I. It also studies Russo-German relations prior to the war, and the after effects of the battle on the history of Europe.

Responsible for the disaster of the Russian Army at Tannenberg, the General committed suicide.

"Alexander Samsonov (1858-1914), who oversaw the Russian military disaster at the Battle of Tannenberg, saw initial service in the Russian army as a cavalry officer, after graduating from the cavalry academy in St. Petersburg.

Samsonov saw combat service during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and, after serving a term as governor of Turkestan, was given command of the Russian Second Army when war broke out in August 1914, tasked, along with Paul von Rennenkampf, commander of First Army, with the Russian invasion of East Prussia.

Samsonov's first major action in East Prussia was however also his last. Poor communications with both Stavka headquarters and, more specifically, with First Army commander Rennenkampf (with whom Samsonov had a personal quarrel), led to Samsonov's forces being encircled by the German Eighth Army under Hindenburg and Ludendorff at Tannenberg between 26-30 August 1914.

With his Second Army virtually destroyed - of a total of 150,000 men under his command less than 10,000 escaped German capture - Samsonov, lost in wooded terrain, and unable to face reporting the scale of the disaster to Tsar Nicholas II, committed suicide by a shot to the head. It remains unclear whether his body was ever found."

(Source: WWI)

Jill wrote: "Tannenberg: Clash of Empires

by Dennis E. Showalter (no photo)

Synopsis:

An in-depth of study of the battle of Tannenburg, th..."

currently reading it. Will notify when reviewed.

Please let us know, Dimitri.....and thanks.

The classic book on the famous battle translated from the German.

Tannenberg "As It Really Was"

by General Max Hoffmann(no photo0

Synopsis:

General Max Hofmann was well known as a consummate planner, even by the high standards of the German Army of the First World War. Working as the operation hub on the Eastern Front he and his superiors, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, used superior strategy to offset the huge advantage of number that the enemy Russian army possessed. The greatest victory that they achieved was the dramatic battle of Tannenberg, still studied today as a masterpiece. In this memoir translated from the German, Hoffmann analyses from a leadership point of view of the battle and results of the military decisions and actions of the leaders. "Tannenberg is not the work of a single person. It is the result of the excellent schooling and development of our leaders and the incomparable performance of the German soldier " states the author. Includes 7 maps.

A short biography of one of the commanders at the Battle of Tannenberg.

Paul von Rennenkampf



Paul von Rennenkampf was born in 1854. He joined the Russian Army at 19 and six years later was sent to the Nikolaevsky Military Academy. After graduating in 1882 he was appointed to the General Staff and by 1900 had reached the rank of major-general.

Rennenkampf commanded a cavalry unit during the Boxer Rising (1900) and was responsible for the capture of Tsitsihar and Kirin. He also took part in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) but was criticised for his campaign in north-eastern Korea and was judged by The Times correspondent reporting the conflict as "a poor leader of men". After the Battle of Mukden in 1905, General Alexander Samsonov accused Rennenkampf of letting him down during the fighting and the two men came to blows.

After the Russo-Japanese War Rennenkampf regained some of his reputation when dealing with revolutionaries in Siberia. After this he was appointed Chief-of-Staff of the Vilno Military District.

On the outbreak of the First World War, Rennenkampf was given command of the Russian First Army for the invasion of East Prussia. His behaviour during the Battle of Tannenberg resulted in some members of the military high command trying to have him removed from office.

Rennenkampf was also criticised for his failure at the Battle of Lodz in November, 1914. This time he was dismissed and Rennenkampf retired to the Black Sea coast. Paul von Rennenkampf was killed in 1918 after refusing to join Bolshevik forces during the Russian Civil War.

The Battle of Tannenberg was not even fought in Tannenburg but but in Allenstein. However, the Germans, who were obsessed with military history named the battle after the Battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg) in which Germany was defeated. This book describes that battle which was fought in 1410.

The Battle of Grunwald

by Teresa Kaminski (no photo)

Synopsis

Teutonic Order - military religious order was formed at the end of the 12th century in Acre to provide care for pilgrims of crusades. With Christianity forces defeated in the Middle East, the Order moved to Eastern Europe. After Polish Duke Konrad I of Masovia asked the Teutonic knights for help in the Prussian Crusade, in the next years the order dishonestly extended its power on the Polish territory and the nearby countries. History of Poland 13th 14th 15th century
Battle at Plowce in 1331 interrupted the Teutonic campaign on Polish territories, but in the next year new Polish regions were seized, among them Dobrzyn Land. Nothing would help recover the stolen regions: Teutonic knights captured Nowa Marchia - a Polish territory for centuries - and attacked and ransacked old Polish Santok, among others.
Just like Poland, the adjacent Lithuania was now threatened by the order. Through arrangements, the knights received Samogitia from Lithuania and the right to Christianize the country. For decades, full of haughtiness and confidence, the knights converted pagan nations with sword while at the same time covering the order’s crime and insolence with heavenly rule.

The Battle of Tannenberg

It was the fight that made a national hero out of German commander Paul von Hindenburg, after his forces crushingly overcame the Russians.

Now, 100 years on from the crucial Battle of Tannenberg, some 200 history enthusiasts gathered on a hilly area in Poland for its reconstruction.

The critical engagement between the invading Russian Second Army and the German Eighth Army took place in the early days of the First World War.

Read more and see pictures of the reenactment at the following link.

Terrific site and pictures. That must have been an exciting reenactment. Sorry, I didn't see that post.

Betsy.......take a look at post #11 for more information on Samsonov.

Leveraging Operational Intelligence: The Battle of Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes

by Naval War College (no photo)

Synopsis:

A commander's ability to leverage operational intelligence remains a cornerstone for managing the uncertainty, fog, and friction of war in this era of seemingly endless advances in battlefield awareness and information dominance. Operational intelligence, properly understood and utilized, can become a force multiplier maximizing traditional operational art factors. The goal is information superiority thereby increasing the speed at which decisions are made, while preempting enemy choices and courses of action. The challenge for the intelligence practitioner is not new. Indeed, WWI provides insights into how contemporary military commanders resemble their counterparts from nearly a century ago.

The Battle of Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes, Russia's 1914 thrust into east Prussia as an opening salvo of WWI, was a disastrous defeat for Moscow due to German masterful leveraging of operational intelligence. German exploitation of intelligence from Signals, Human, and Imagery vis-à-vis aircraft observation, enabled them to crush the Czar's forces. The story of Tannenberg is a showcase of German successes to gain intelligence about the enemy while denying the Russians the same opportunity. Moreover, German commanders remained receptive and flexible, rapidly incorporating operational intelligence into tactical decision making. The reverse was true for the Russians.

Operational intelligence, and the courage and flexibility to incorporate it into tactical and strategic plans, can help commanders manage the enigmatics of war. It worked for the German army in 1914 and can work on today's technologically advanced battlefield.

The short film below is absolutely fascinating and is from the "World War I" documentary series about the Battle of Tannenberg with original footage.

Third time wasn't the charm either.

Have now seen this one too. Can you imagine not advancing your army just because you didn't like the commander of another army? And the Russians wondered why they lost?

The leadership of most of the armies was questionable, especially in the beginning of the conflict.. No one was prepared for the type of war in which they were involved. ......this was not the war of cavalry charges and flashing sabres. But not advancing because you didn't like the commander of the other army, is, frankly, the most idiotic thing I've ever heard. I did not know that until I watched the clip. I am going to watch other clips from that series which was made in Canada.....and doesn't the host/moderator get animated!!!!!!!!

This looks like it is in the wrong topic but the title of the book is misleading. It looks at Ludendorff during WWI and the power that he wielded. The battle of Tannenberg is discussed in detail.

The First Nazi, the Life and Times of General Erich Ludendorff

by Will Brownell (no photo)

Synopsis:

General Erich Luddendorf was one of the most important military individuals of the last century, yet today, one of the least known. One of the top two German generals of WWI, Luddendorf dominated not only his superior. Gen. Paul von Hindenburg, but also Germany’s head of state, Kaiser Wilhelm II. For years, Luddendorf was the military dictator of Germany. Ludendorff not only dictated all aspects of WWI, he refused all opportunities to make peace; he antagonized the Americans until they declared war; he sent Lenin into Russia to forge a revolution in order to shut down the Russian front; then he pushed for total military victory in 1918, in a rabid slaughter known as “The Ludendorff Offensive.�� Luddendorf lost the War in 1918. Shortly thereafter, he created the murderous legend that Germany had lost this war only because Jews had conspired on the home front, in what he called a “stab in the back.�� He soon forged an alliance with Hitler, endorsed the Nazis, and wrote maniacally about how Germans needed a new world war, to redeem the Fatherland. This savage man had staggering designs to build a gigantic state that would dwarf the British Empire, sweep across all of Africa, then the Middle East, Central Europe, Persia, even India. Simply stated, he wanted the world. His plans, person & ambitions were the prototype for his good younger friend, Adolf Hitler. All in all, Luddendorf was the key German, instrumental in both world wars & the Russian Revolution. He changed the 20th century beyond recognition.

The Eastern Front 1914 - 1920: From Tannenberg to the Russo-Polish War (The History of World War I)

by Michael S. Neiberg (no photo)

Synopsis:

With the aid of numerous black & white and colour photographs, many previously unpublished, this series recreates the battles & campaigns that raged across the surface of the globe, on land, at sea & in the air. The text is complemented by full-colour maps that guide the reader through specific actions & campaigns.