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Principles of Philosophy
Descartes's Principles 0. / Philosophy is his longest and most ambitious work; it is the only work in which he attempted to actually deduce scientific knowledge from Cartesian metaphysics, as he repeatedly claimed was possible. Whatever the success of this attempt, there can be no doubt that it was enormously influential. Cartesian celestial mechanics held sway for well over a century, and some of the best minds of that period, including Leibniz, Malebranche, Euler, and the Bernoullis, attempted to modify and quantify the Cartesian theory of vortices into an acceptable alternative to Newton's theory of universal gravitation. Thus, the Principles is not only of inherent and historical interest philosophically but is also a seminal document in the history of science and of 17th Century thought. Principles of Philosophy was first published in Latin, in 1644. In 1647, a French translation, done by the Abbe Claude Picot and containing a great deal of additional material and a number of alterations in the original text, was published with Descartes's enthusiastic approval. Unlike some English translations of portions of the Principles, this translation uses the Latin text as its primary source; however, a good deal of additional material from Picot's translation has been included. There are several reasons for this. First, there is good evidence that Descartes himself was responsible for some of the additional material, including, of course, the Preface to the French translation.
112 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1644
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About the author
René Descartes
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Meditations on First Philosophy
(1641) and
Principles of Philosophy
(1644), main works of French mathematician and scientist René Descartes, considered the father of analytic geometry and the founder of modern rationalism, include the famous dictum "I think, therefore I am."
A set of two perpendicular lines in a plane or three in space intersect at an origin in Cartesian coordinate system. Cartesian coordinate, a member of the set of numbers, distances, locates a point in this system. Cartesian coordinates describe all points of a Cartesian plane.
From given sets, {X} and {Y}, one can construct Cartesian product, a set of all pairs of elements (x, y), such that x belongs to {X} and y belongs to {Y}.
Cartesian philosophers include Antoine Arnauld.
René Descartes, a writer, highly influenced society. People continue to study closely his writings and subsequently responded in the west. He of the key figures in the revolution also apparently influenced the named coordinate system, used in planes and algebra.
Descartes frequently sets his views apart from those of his predecessors. In the opening section of the Passions of the Soul , a treatise on the early version of now commonly called emotions, he goes so far to assert that he writes on his topic "as if no one had written on these matters before." Many elements in late Aristotelianism, the revived Stoicism of the 16th century, or earlier like Saint Augustine of Hippo provide precedents. Naturally, he differs from the schools on two major points: He rejects corporeal substance into matter and form and any appeal to divine or natural ends in explaining natural phenomena. In his theology, he insists on the absolute freedom of act of creation of God.
Baruch Spinoza and Baron Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz later advocated Descartes, a major figure in 17th century Continent, and the empiricist school of thought, consisting of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume, opposed him. Leibniz and Descartes, all well versed like Spinoza, contributed greatly. Descartes, the crucial bridge with algebra, invented the coordinate system and calculus. Reflections of Descartes on mind and mechanism began the strain of western thought; much later, the invention of the electronic computer and the possibility of machine intelligence impelled this thought, which blossomed into the Turing test and related thought. His stated most in §7 of part I and in part IV of Discourse on the Method .
A set of two perpendicular lines in a plane or three in space intersect at an origin in Cartesian coordinate system. Cartesian coordinate, a member of the set of numbers, distances, locates a point in this system. Cartesian coordinates describe all points of a Cartesian plane.
From given sets, {X} and {Y}, one can construct Cartesian product, a set of all pairs of elements (x, y), such that x belongs to {X} and y belongs to {Y}.
Cartesian philosophers include Antoine Arnauld.
René Descartes, a writer, highly influenced society. People continue to study closely his writings and subsequently responded in the west. He of the key figures in the revolution also apparently influenced the named coordinate system, used in planes and algebra.
Descartes frequently sets his views apart from those of his predecessors. In the opening section of the Passions of the Soul , a treatise on the early version of now commonly called emotions, he goes so far to assert that he writes on his topic "as if no one had written on these matters before." Many elements in late Aristotelianism, the revived Stoicism of the 16th century, or earlier like Saint Augustine of Hippo provide precedents. Naturally, he differs from the schools on two major points: He rejects corporeal substance into matter and form and any appeal to divine or natural ends in explaining natural phenomena. In his theology, he insists on the absolute freedom of act of creation of God.
Baruch Spinoza and Baron Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz later advocated Descartes, a major figure in 17th century Continent, and the empiricist school of thought, consisting of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume, opposed him. Leibniz and Descartes, all well versed like Spinoza, contributed greatly. Descartes, the crucial bridge with algebra, invented the coordinate system and calculus. Reflections of Descartes on mind and mechanism began the strain of western thought; much later, the invention of the electronic computer and the possibility of machine intelligence impelled this thought, which blossomed into the Turing test and related thought. His stated most in §7 of part I and in part IV of Discourse on the Method .
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August 30, 2021
How do we know for certain that our perception of reality is true? How do we know that this reality is actuality, as we perceive it, and is not just our imagination? What are our limits on comprehension? Does absolute and certain knowledge exist? If it does, how can we differentiate the correct form of knowledge from the incorrect, and how do we go about acquiring this knowledge?
These, and other questions, left Descartes contemplating for years before he arrived at his method of reasoning, or better yet, his method of doubt.
Descartes claims that if we wish to arrive at a fact or truth we must initially free ourselves of all childhood prejudices, such as a misconception that the night sky is lit by tiny candle lights, but instead these lights are stars larger than our Sun. Next, we must eradicate all other false judgments from our memory and any other erroneous preconceived perceptions. Furthermore, we are to doubt the existence of all material things we are surrounded by including our physical bodies.
Descartes starts from scratch in order to attempt at proving anything, but is reluctant to solely depend on sense-perception due to their unreliability as our senses are often deceived. Therefore, Descartes decides to utilize his mind through its capacity of conceiving and imagination and humans' power of reasoning to arrive at a truth.
Before Descartes begins his process of reasoning he is uncertain if this state of what we refer to as reality is not some form of a dream? As he recalls his dreams feeling real in his sleep, only to realize they were dreams when he awoke. So, how do we know that this state of awakeness is not some form of illusion? Descartes further goes on to question: what if a demon takes over me and manipulates my mind and as a result, I am convinced of fallacious reasoning and reach wrong conclusions? All of this leads Descartes to go to the extremes and to doubt his own existence, as he cannot be certain of anything, only to realize that "we cannot doubt our existence without existing while we doubt". Therefore, every thought, no matter right or wrong, is proof of our existence. This is how Descartes arrived at his famous phrase "I think, therefore I am" and thus became his principal and fundamental knowledge and verification that our knowledge goes beyond our senses.
Descartes additionally argues that our sense of infinity cannot be achieved independently, without assistance, since we are a finite being with a finite mind composed of finite thoughts. Nonetheless, we can conceive this idea of infinity. How? Well, someone, something infinite, must have placed it in our minds. Who? A God, Descartes argues. Descartes' God is neither corporeal nor the originator of sins, malice, or weakness. He is a benevolent God that has equipped us with a good healthy mind and common sense and when we make a mistake it is due to a fault in our method of reasoning, as our freedom to act is indeterminate, and not a defect in our nature.
Descartes also states that our consciousness and thoughts are immaterial substances. Where our mind is an immaterial self and unquantifiable and distinct from our body which is measurable like all physical space. Therefore, thoughts cannot be mathematically expressed or measured. Hence, there is a clear distinction between the mind and the body.
Descartes with his distilled writing in the Principles of Philosophy (1644) introduces us to his principles of epistemology and natural philosophy in a textbook format. He covers a range of other topics which mostly reminded me of his Discourse on Method (1637), Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), and The World and Other Writings (1629-1633).
These, and other questions, left Descartes contemplating for years before he arrived at his method of reasoning, or better yet, his method of doubt.
Descartes claims that if we wish to arrive at a fact or truth we must initially free ourselves of all childhood prejudices, such as a misconception that the night sky is lit by tiny candle lights, but instead these lights are stars larger than our Sun. Next, we must eradicate all other false judgments from our memory and any other erroneous preconceived perceptions. Furthermore, we are to doubt the existence of all material things we are surrounded by including our physical bodies.
Descartes starts from scratch in order to attempt at proving anything, but is reluctant to solely depend on sense-perception due to their unreliability as our senses are often deceived. Therefore, Descartes decides to utilize his mind through its capacity of conceiving and imagination and humans' power of reasoning to arrive at a truth.
Before Descartes begins his process of reasoning he is uncertain if this state of what we refer to as reality is not some form of a dream? As he recalls his dreams feeling real in his sleep, only to realize they were dreams when he awoke. So, how do we know that this state of awakeness is not some form of illusion? Descartes further goes on to question: what if a demon takes over me and manipulates my mind and as a result, I am convinced of fallacious reasoning and reach wrong conclusions? All of this leads Descartes to go to the extremes and to doubt his own existence, as he cannot be certain of anything, only to realize that "we cannot doubt our existence without existing while we doubt". Therefore, every thought, no matter right or wrong, is proof of our existence. This is how Descartes arrived at his famous phrase "I think, therefore I am" and thus became his principal and fundamental knowledge and verification that our knowledge goes beyond our senses.
Descartes additionally argues that our sense of infinity cannot be achieved independently, without assistance, since we are a finite being with a finite mind composed of finite thoughts. Nonetheless, we can conceive this idea of infinity. How? Well, someone, something infinite, must have placed it in our minds. Who? A God, Descartes argues. Descartes' God is neither corporeal nor the originator of sins, malice, or weakness. He is a benevolent God that has equipped us with a good healthy mind and common sense and when we make a mistake it is due to a fault in our method of reasoning, as our freedom to act is indeterminate, and not a defect in our nature.
Descartes also states that our consciousness and thoughts are immaterial substances. Where our mind is an immaterial self and unquantifiable and distinct from our body which is measurable like all physical space. Therefore, thoughts cannot be mathematically expressed or measured. Hence, there is a clear distinction between the mind and the body.
Descartes with his distilled writing in the Principles of Philosophy (1644) introduces us to his principles of epistemology and natural philosophy in a textbook format. He covers a range of other topics which mostly reminded me of his Discourse on Method (1637), Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), and The World and Other Writings (1629-1633).
April 7, 2020
To Principia philosophiae είναι ένα διδακτικό εγχειρίδιο γραμμένο στα λατινικά από τον René Descartes στα 1644 και περιλαμβάνει τέσσερα μέρη:
1. De principiis cognitionis humanae (Για τις αρχές της ανθρώπινης γνώσης. Εδώ έχουμε μια σύνοψη των φιλοσοφικών αρχών του René Descartes περί της επιστημονικής γνώσης.
2. De Principiis rerum materialium (Για τις αρχές των υλικών πραγμάτων). Εδώ παρουσιάζεται η φυσική του Descartes, τι είναι σώμα, τι είναι κίνηση και οι νόμοι της κίνησης.
3. De Mundo adspectabili (Για τον ορατό κόσμο). Εδώ ασχολείται με τα ουράνια φαινόμενα, τον φωτισμό τους, την κίνησή τους (θεωρία για τις δίνες).
4. De Terra (Για τη Γη). Αναφέρεται στον τρόπο με τον οποίο σχηματίστηκε η γη, τα μικροσωματίδια που απαρτίζουν τα σώματα, φαινόμενα όπως η βαρύτητα, το φως, ο μαγνητισμός.
πρώτη έκδοση στα λατινικά
έκδοση της Γαλλικής μετάφρασης
Η συγκεκριμένη Ελληνική έκδοση δεν είναι πλήρης. Περιέχει, δυστυχώς, μόνο το πρώτο και δεύτερο μέρος του εγχειριδίου, μια εισαγωγή γραμμένη από την μεταφράστρια Βασιλική Γρηγοροπούλου (Διδάκτωρ Φιλοσοφίας), μια επιστολή του Descartes προς τον φίλο και συνεργάτη του Claude Clerselier (1614�1684) σχετικά με την κίνηση των σωμάτων, μια ευχαριστήρια επιστολή προς στην Ελισάβετ του Παλατινάτου (1618 � 1680, γνωστή και ως Ελισάβετ της Βοημίας), μια επιστολή αντί προλόγου προς τον Claude Picot (1601�1668), έναν λιμπερτίνο ιερέα και συνεργάτη του Descartes ο οποίος ανέλαβε να μεταφράσει το συγκεκριμένο έργο από τα λατινικά στα γαλλικά (η γαλλική μετάφραση κυκλοφόρησε στα 1647). Σε αυτήν την επιστολή παρομοιάζει τη Φιλοσοφία σαν ένα δέντρο, οι ρίζες του οποίου είναι η μεταφυσική, κορμός του είναι η Φυσική και τα κλαδιά που φυτρώνουν από αυτόν τον κορμό είναι όλες οι άλλες επιστήμες, οι οποίες μπορούν να αναχθούν σε τρεις πρωταρχικές: Μηχανική, Ιατρική και Ηθική. Στο τέλος παρατίθεται χρονολόγιο, βιβλιογραφία, λεξιλόγιο και ευρετήριο.
Στην Εισαγωγή της η Γρηγοροπούλου ασχολείται με το τρόπο διάρθρωσης (στυλ/ stylus) του περιεχομένου του Principia philosophiae που αποσκοπεί στο να έχει την μορφή και τη δομή διδακτικού εγχειριδίου (όπως αυτά νοούνται κατά τον 17ο αιώνα) αλλά ταυτόχρονα να διαφέρει από τα τυπικά συγγράμματα της Σχολαστικής διδασκαλίας.
Αναφέρει επίσης τη λογοκρισία που υπέστη το συγκεκριμένο έργο (από Προτεστάντες και Καθολικούς), το οποίο συν τοις άλλοις, στα 1663 (δέκα και πλέον χρόνια μετά τον θάνατο του Descartes), περιελήφθη στον κατάλογο απαγορευμένων βιβλίων (Index Librorum Prohibitorum) του Βατικανού και εντοπίζει την αντίδραση της Εκκλησίας στο γεγονός πως "εισήγαγε καινοτόμες θέσεις και αμφισβήτησε τις βασικές διδασκαλίες του σχολαστικισμού" πχ ο Descartes θεωρεί πως το σώμα και η ψυχή είναι δύο ξεχωριστά πράγματα και πως οι ίδιοι κανόνες που διέπουν τα υπόλοιπα φυσικά αντικείμενα/σώματα ισχύουν και για τα ανθρώπινα σώματα. Εξαιτίας αυτού θεωρήθηκε πως βλέπει τον άνθρωπο ως μηχανή και όχι ως θεϊκό δημιούργημα.
Επίσης στη εισαγωγή γίνεται αναφορά στο όραμα του Descartes για μία παγκόσμια επιστήμη που θα είναι απλή και κατανοητή από όλους, με μία κοινή γλώσσα, τα μαθηματικά, στον καρτεσιανό θεό πως ορίζεται ως η πρωταρχική αρχή/αιτία που θέτει τα πάντα σε κίνηση και στους καρτεσιανούς φυσικούς νόμους και πώς αυτοί επηρέασαν τους Christiaan Huygens και Isaac Newton (μη μεταφυσικοί φιλόσοφοι) καθώς και τους Nicolas Malebranche, Baruch Spinoza, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (μεταφυσικοί/δηλαδή αναζητούν την θεωρητική γνώση των πρώτων αρχών και των πρώτων αιτιών).
Το πρώτο μέρος που τιτλοφορείται De principiis cognitionis humanae (Για τις αρχές της ανθρώπινης γνώσης) .
Η αμφιβολία είναι απαραίτητη, όχι για τις υποθέσεις του πρακτικού βίου αλλά για την αναζήτηση της αλήθειας. Οι αισθήσεις μας μπορεί να μας εξαπατήσουν. Όποιος στοχάζεται με τάξη συμπεραίνει με βεβαιότητα πως ισχύει το "σκέπτομαι άρα υπάρχω" γιατί όταν κάτι σκέπτεται, αυτό το κάτι υπάρχει, το αντίθετο θα ήταν αντιφατικό, δηλαδή να μην υπάρχει τίποτα και αυτό το τίποτα να σκέπτεται.
Ως σκέψη ορίζονται όλα όσα γίνονται μέσα μας για τα οποία έχουμε συνείδηση (άμεση επίγνωση) καθώς η συνείδησή τους είναι μέσα μας. Γνωρίζουμε το πνεύμα μας καλύτερα από το σώμα μας, γιατί το πνεύμα μας μας οδηγεί τόσο στην επίγνωση τού ίδιου του πνεύματός μας όσο και στην επίγνωση των άλλων πραγμάτων. Εφόσον το πνεύμα μας έχει την ιδέα μιας τέλειας, αιώνιας και παντοδύναμης ύπαρξης πέρα από κάθε αμφιβολία, αυτό σημαίνει πως υπάρχει ένα τέλειο και υπέρτατο ον, δηλαδή ο θεός (σσ: οι ιδέες είναι τρόποι του σκέπτεσθαι και έχουν κάποιο αντικείμενο στο οποίο αναφέρονται).
Όλοι οι τρόποι του σκέπτεσθαι μπορούν να αναχθούν σε δύο γενικούς: η λειτουργία του νου και η λειτουργία της θέλησης και είναι απαραίτητες και οι δύο προκειμένου να κρίνουμε. Όταν πέφτουμε σε πλάνες δεν φταίει ο θεός, ούτε πάσχουμε από κάποια έλλειψη της φύσης μας (η οποία παραμένει η ίδια) αλλά η πλάνη προκύπτει από τον τρόπο που ενεργούμε (πράττουμε, χρησιμοποιούμε την ελευθερία μας) καθώς εφόσον έχουμε το αυτεξούσιο και ελευθερία θέλησης είναι στο χέρι μας να ενεργούμε ορθά και όχι εσφαλμένα. Από την άλλη το γεγονός πως όλα έχουν προκαθοριστεί από το θεό δεν καταργεί την ελευθερία μας, απλώς δεν είμαστε σε θέση να καταλάβουμε πώς ακριβώς γίνεται να συνυπάρχει ο θεϊκός προκαθορισμός η ανθρώπινη ελευθερία γιατί κάτι τέτοιο ξεπερνάει τα όρια της κατανόησής μας.
Ως σαφής αντίληψη ορίζεται αυτή που είναι παρούσα και πρόδηλη σε ένα προσεκτικό πνεύμα. Ως διακριτή αντίληψη ορίζεται η σαφής αντίληψη που είναι ξεχωρισμένη από όλες τις άλλες και ακριβής και περιέχει μέσα της μόνο ό,τι είναι σαφές. Τα αντικείμενα της αντίληψής μας είναι είτε πράγματα και τροποποιήσεις πραγμάτων είτε αιώνιες αλήθειες. Ως γενικά πράγματα ορίζονται η υπόσταση, διάρκεια, τάξη, αριθμός και όσα άλλα βρίσκονται σε όλα τα πράγματα. Ως νοητικά ή σκεπτόμενα πράγματα ορίζουμε όσα ανήκουν στο πνεύμα ή σκεπτόμενη υπόσταση (πχ αντίληψη και θέλημα) και ως υλικά πράγματα ορίζουμε όσα ανήκουν στο σώμα ή εκτεινόμενη υπόσταση (πχ μέγεθος, σχήμα, κίνηση, θέση, διαιρετότητα). Από τη στενή ένωση σώματος και πνεύματος προκύπτουν πράγματα όπως ορέξεις (πείνα, δίψα), τα πάθη της ψυχής (πχ αίσθημα λύπης, χαράς, οργής κτλ αλλά και αίσθημα πόνου, οσμής γεύσης, ήχου κτλ).
Ως υπόσταση ορίζεται ένα πράγμα που υπάρχει έτσι ώστε να μην χρειάζεται τίποτε άλλο για να υπάρχει. Μόνο μία τέτοια υπόσταση υπάρχει αυτή του θεού. Όσον αφορά τα δημιουργήματα του θεού, δηλαδή τα δημιουργημένα πράγματα, για εκείνα ως υποστάσεις ορίζονται όσα υπάρχουν έτσι ώστε να μην χρειάζονται τίποτε άλλο για να υπάρχουν πέρα από την συνδρομή του θεού. Όλα τα υπόλοιπα δημιουργημένα πράγματα που δεν μπορούν να υπάρξουν χωρίς κάποια άλλα πράγματα τα ορίζουμε ως ποιότητες ή κατηγορήματα των υποστάσεων.
Οι αιτίες που πέφτουμε σε πλάνη είναι: Οι προκαταλήψεις της παιδικής ηλικίας, το γεγονός ότι δεν μπορούμε να λησμονήσουμε αυτές τις προκαταλήψεις όταν μεγαλώνουμε, η κούραση όταν πρέπει να συγκεντρωθούμε σε πράγματα που δεν είναι παρόντα στις αισθήσεις, η λανθασμένη χρήση της γλώσσας, όταν συνδέουμε τις έννοιές μας με λέξεις που δεν ανταποκρίνονται ακριβώς στα πράγματα.
Το δεύτερο μέρος τιτλοφορείται ως De Principiis rerum materialium Για τις αρχές των υλικών πραγμάτων.
Εδώ ορίζει την ύλη ως ένα εκτεινόμενο πράγμα, δηλαδή κάτι που εκτείνεται σε μήκος, πλάτος βάθος και έχει όλες τις ιδιότητες ενός εκτεινόμενου πράγματος. Το ανθρώπινο σώμα είναι στενά συνδεδεμένο με το νου, η ανθρώπινη φύση είναι σύνθετη, η έκταση συνιστά τη φύση ενός σώματος.
Στη συνέχεια προχωρεί στον ορισμό της κίνησης ως ενέργειας μέσω της οποίας ένα σώμα μεταβαίνει από τον έναν τρόπο σε έναν άλλο και ειδικότερα είναι η μεταφορά ενός μέρους της ύλης ή ενός σώματος από τη γειτνίαση με τα σώματα με τα οποία έχει άμεση επαφή και που παρατηρούνται εν ηρεμία, στην εγγύτητα με άλλα σώματα. Ο θεός είναι η πρωτεύουσα αιτίας της κίνησης.
Οι Καρτεσιανοί νόμοι της φύσης:
1. Κάθε πράγμα, όσο εξαρτάται από το ίδιο, εμμένει πάντα στην ίδια κατάσταση κι έτσι ό,τι άπαξ κινείται, συνεχίζει πάντα να κινείται.
2. Κάθε κίνηση είναι από μόνη της ευθύγραμμη κι επομένως κάθε σώμα κινούμενο σε ένα κύκλο τείνει πάντα να απομακρύνεται από το κέντρο του κύκλου στον οποίο εγγράφεται.
3. Αν ένα σώμα προσκρούσει σε ένα άλλο ισχυρότερο από το ίδιο, δεν χάνει καθόλου την κίνησή του, αλλά αν προσκρούσει σε ένα ασθενέστερο χάνει τόση ποσότητα κίνησης όση μεταβιβάζει στο άλλο σώμα. Η μεταβολή της κίνησης ενός σώματος από την πρόσκρουσή του με άλλα σώματα προσδιορίζεται από μια σειρά από κανόνες.
Τέλος ορίζει τις διαφορές και τα χαρακτηριστικά των ρευστών και των στερεών σωμάτων και καταλήγει πως όλα τα φυσικά φαινόμενα μπορούν να εξηγηθούν μέσα από τα μαθηματικά και τη γεωμετρία.
Το τρίτο μέρος έχει ως τίτλο De Mundo adspectabili Για τον ορατό κόσμο
Είναι εξαιρετικά ενδιαφέρον και δίνει μια εικόνα για το πως θεωρούσε τον κόσμο ένας επιστήμονας του 17ου αιώνα, σχετικά με τα ουράνια σώματα, την κίνησή τους κτλ. Διάβαζα την μετάφραση που παραθέτει ο Jonathan Francis Bennett και η οποία προέρχεται από τη μετάφραση του John Cottingham (The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 τόμοι, εκδ. Cambridge University Press). Θεωρώ πως είναι καλή, απλή και κατανοητή αλλά προτείνω να μην χρησιμοποιηθεί για παραπομπές κατά τη συγγραφή επιστημονικών εργασιών. Για περισσότερες πληροφορίες
Επιπλέον στο απόσπασμα για την κίνηση των πλανητών (31. XXXI. Quomodo singuli Planetae deferantur) χρησιμοποίησα την μετάφραση των Valentine Rodger Miller και Reese P. Miller από το René Descartes: Principles of Philosophy: Translated, with Explanatory Notes, D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht / Boston / Lancaster, 1984
Ελλείψει ελληνικής μετάφρασης θα παραθέσω κάποια αποσπάσματα από λατινικά μαζί με τις αγγλικές μεταφράσεις γιατί φοβάμαι πως διαφορετικά θα μεταφέρω κάτι λάθος.
Στην παράγραφο 23 (XXIII) αναφέρει ο Descartes:
Fixas omnes in eadem sphaera non versari, sed unamquamque vastum spatium circa se habere, aliis Fixis destitutum
που σημαίνει: The fixed stars don’t all turn on the same sphere. Each is surrounded by a vast space that isn’t occupied by any other star.
(σσ. Όταν χρησιμοποιεί το όρο Stellae fixae εννοεί The stars δηλαδή the visible heavenly bodies of all kinds).
Εκεί λοιπόν εξηγεί πως:
Some astronomers have thought that all the fixed stars are situated on the surface of a single sphere, but that can’t be right if the sun is one of the fixed stars (or anyway is like the fixed stars in the facts about how it is situated). ·Why not?
Because it’s empirically obvious that the sun is much nearer to us than the fixed stars are, and therefore doesn’t share a sphere-surface with them·. The real situation is that the sun is surrounded by a vast space with no fixed stars in it, and the same must be true of each fixed star·. So each fixed star must be very distant from all the others, and the fixed stars must vary widely in how far they are from the sun and from us. . . .
Thus, in this figure, if S is the Sun, the stars of the F and f are fixed; and countless others, above and below and beyond the plane of this figure.
Και παραθέτει το εξής σχεδιάγραμμα προκειμένου να απεικονίσει την θεωρία του:
Σχετικά με την κίνηση των ουρανίων σωμάτων αναφέρει:
24. XXIV. Coelos esse fluidos.The heavens are fluid.
25. XXV. Coelos omnia corpora in se contenta secum deferre. The heavens carry along with them all the bodies that they contain.
26. XXVI. Terram in coelo suo quiescere, sed nihilominus ab eo deferri.
Quarto, cum videamus Terram nullis columnis suffultam, nullisque funibus appensam, sed circumquaque fluidissimo tantum coelo cinctam esse [...]
The earth is at rest in its own heaven which nevertheless carries it along. We see that the earth isn’t supported by columns or held up by cables, but is completely immersed in a very fluid heaven[...]
28. XXVIII. Terram, proprie loquendo, non moveri, nec ullos Planetas, quamvis a coelo transferantur. Strictly speaking the earth doesn’t move, nor do the planets, though they’re all carried along by the heaven.
Η θεωρία του Descartes για τις δίνες (vortex):
30. XXX. Planetas omnes circa Solem a coelo deferri.
Sic itaque sublato omni scrupulo de Terrae motu, putemus totam materiam coeli in qua Planetae versantur, in modum cujusdam vorticis, in cujus centro est Sol, assidue gyrare, ac ejus partes Soli viciniores celerius moveri quam remotiores, Planetasque omnes (e quorum numero est Terra) inter easdem istius coelestis materiae partes semper versari [...]
30. XXX. All the planets are carried round the sun by the heaven. Let’s stop worrying about the earth’s motion and suppose that the whole of the celestial matter—·the heaven·—in which the planets are located turns continuously like a vortex with the sun at its centre. Let us suppose further that the parts of the vortex nearer to the sun move faster than the parts further out from the sun, and that all the planets (earth included) always stay surrounded by the same portions of celestial matter. This single supposition lets us smoothly explain all the observed movements of the planets without bringing in any supplementary apparatus. At some places along a river the water twists around on itself and forms a whirlpool with bits of straw floating in it, ·and four features of this can help us to understand planetary motion:
(1) We see the straws carried around with the whirlpool.
(2) Sometimes we see a straw also spinning around its own centre.
(3) The straws nearer the centre of the whirlpool complete a revolution more quickly ·than the ones further out·.
(4) Although such a straw always has a circular motion, it almost never follows a perfect circle—there are usually some deviations from that. We can easily imagine all this happening in the same way with the planets, so that this single account explains all the planetary movements that we observe.
το δεύτερο των σημειώσεών μου εδώ
1. De principiis cognitionis humanae (Για τις αρχές της ανθρώπινης γνώσης. Εδώ έχουμε μια σύνοψη των φιλοσοφικών αρχών του René Descartes περί της επιστημονικής γνώσης.
2. De Principiis rerum materialium (Για τις αρχές των υλικών πραγμάτων). Εδώ παρουσιάζεται η φυσική του Descartes, τι είναι σώμα, τι είναι κίνηση και οι νόμοι της κίνησης.
3. De Mundo adspectabili (Για τον ορατό κόσμο). Εδώ ασχολείται με τα ουράνια φαινόμενα, τον φωτισμό τους, την κίνησή τους (θεωρία για τις δίνες).
4. De Terra (Για τη Γη). Αναφέρεται στον τρόπο με τον οποίο σχηματίστηκε η γη, τα μικροσωματίδια που απαρτίζουν τα σώματα, φαινόμενα όπως η βαρύτητα, το φως, ο μαγνητισμός.
πρώτη έκδοση στα λατινικά
έκδοση της Γαλλικής μετάφρασης
Η συγκεκριμένη Ελληνική έκδοση δεν είναι πλήρης. Περιέχει, δυστυχώς, μόνο το πρώτο και δεύτερο μέρος του εγχειριδίου, μια εισαγωγή γραμμένη από την μεταφράστρια Βασιλική Γρηγοροπούλου (Διδάκτωρ Φιλοσοφίας), μια επιστολή του Descartes προς τον φίλο και συνεργάτη του Claude Clerselier (1614�1684) σχετικά με την κίνηση των σωμάτων, μια ευχαριστήρια επιστολή προς στην Ελισάβετ του Παλατινάτου (1618 � 1680, γνωστή και ως Ελισάβετ της Βοημίας), μια επιστολή αντί προλόγου προς τον Claude Picot (1601�1668), έναν λιμπερτίνο ιερέα και συνεργάτη του Descartes ο οποίος ανέλαβε να μεταφράσει το συγκεκριμένο έργο από τα λατινικά στα γαλλικά (η γαλλική μετάφραση κυκλοφόρησε στα 1647). Σε αυτήν την επιστολή παρομοιάζει τη Φιλοσοφία σαν ένα δέντρο, οι ρίζες του οποίου είναι η μεταφυσική, κορμός του είναι η Φυσική και τα κλαδιά που φυτρώνουν από αυτόν τον κορμό είναι όλες οι άλλες επιστήμες, οι οποίες μπορούν να αναχθούν σε τρεις πρωταρχικές: Μηχανική, Ιατρική και Ηθική. Στο τέλος παρατίθεται χρονολόγιο, βιβλιογραφία, λεξιλόγιο και ευρετήριο.
Στην Εισαγωγή της η Γρηγοροπούλου ασχολείται με το τρόπο διάρθρωσης (στυλ/ stylus) του περιεχομένου του Principia philosophiae που αποσκοπεί στο να έχει την μορφή και τη δομή διδακτικού εγχειριδίου (όπως αυτά νοούνται κατά τον 17ο αιώνα) αλλά ταυτόχρονα να διαφέρει από τα τυπικά συγγράμματα της Σχολαστικής διδασκαλίας.
Αναφέρει επίσης τη λογοκρισία που υπέστη το συγκεκριμένο έργο (από Προτεστάντες και Καθολικούς), το οποίο συν τοις άλλοις, στα 1663 (δέκα και πλέον χρόνια μετά τον θάνατο του Descartes), περιελήφθη στον κατάλογο απαγορευμένων βιβλίων (Index Librorum Prohibitorum) του Βατικανού και εντοπίζει την αντίδραση της Εκκλησίας στο γεγονός πως "εισήγαγε καινοτόμες θέσεις και αμφισβήτησε τις βασικές διδασκαλίες του σχολαστικισμού" πχ ο Descartes θεωρεί πως το σώμα και η ψυχή είναι δύο ξεχωριστά πράγματα και πως οι ίδιοι κανόνες που διέπουν τα υπόλοιπα φυσικά αντικείμενα/σώματα ισχύουν και για τα ανθρώπινα σώματα. Εξαιτίας αυτού θεωρήθηκε πως βλέπει τον άνθρωπο ως μηχανή και όχι ως θεϊκό δημιούργημα.
Επίσης στη εισαγωγή γίνεται αναφορά στο όραμα του Descartes για μία παγκόσμια επιστήμη που θα είναι απλή και κατανοητή από όλους, με μία κοινή γλώσσα, τα μαθηματικά, στον καρτεσιανό θεό πως ορίζεται ως η πρωταρχική αρχή/αιτία που θέτει τα πάντα σε κίνηση και στους καρτεσιανούς φυσικούς νόμους και πώς αυτοί επηρέασαν τους Christiaan Huygens και Isaac Newton (μη μεταφυσικοί φιλόσοφοι) καθώς και τους Nicolas Malebranche, Baruch Spinoza, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (μεταφυσικοί/δηλαδή αναζητούν την θεωρητική γνώση των πρώτων αρχών και των πρώτων αιτιών).
Το πρώτο μέρος που τιτλοφορείται De principiis cognitionis humanae (Για τις αρχές της ανθρώπινης γνώσης) .
Η αμφιβολία είναι απαραίτητη, όχι για τις υποθέσεις του πρακτικού βίου αλλά για την αναζήτηση της αλήθειας. Οι αισθήσεις μας μπορεί να μας εξαπατήσουν. Όποιος στοχάζεται με τάξη συμπεραίνει με βεβαιότητα πως ισχύει το "σκέπτομαι άρα υπάρχω" γιατί όταν κάτι σκέπτεται, αυτό το κάτι υπάρχει, το αντίθετο θα ήταν αντιφατικό, δηλαδή να μην υπάρχει τίποτα και αυτό το τίποτα να σκέπτεται.
Ως σκέψη ορίζονται όλα όσα γίνονται μέσα μας για τα οποία έχουμε συνείδηση (άμεση επίγνωση) καθώς η συνείδησή τους είναι μέσα μας. Γνωρίζουμε το πνεύμα μας καλύτερα από το σώμα μας, γιατί το πνεύμα μας μας οδηγεί τόσο στην επίγνωση τού ίδιου του πνεύματός μας όσο και στην επίγνωση των άλλων πραγμάτων. Εφόσον το πνεύμα μας έχει την ιδέα μιας τέλειας, αιώνιας και παντοδύναμης ύπαρξης πέρα από κάθε αμφιβολία, αυτό σημαίνει πως υπάρχει ένα τέλειο και υπέρτατο ον, δηλαδή ο θεός (σσ: οι ιδέες είναι τρόποι του σκέπτεσθαι και έχουν κάποιο αντικείμενο στο οποίο αναφέρονται).
Όλοι οι τρόποι του σκέπτεσθαι μπορούν να αναχθούν σε δύο γενικούς: η λειτουργία του νου και η λειτουργία της θέλησης και είναι απαραίτητες και οι δύο προκειμένου να κρίνουμε. Όταν πέφτουμε σε πλάνες δεν φταίει ο θεός, ούτε πάσχουμε από κάποια έλλειψη της φύσης μας (η οποία παραμένει η ίδια) αλλά η πλάνη προκύπτει από τον τρόπο που ενεργούμε (πράττουμε, χρησιμοποιούμε την ελευθερία μας) καθώς εφόσον έχουμε το αυτεξούσιο και ελευθερία θέλησης είναι στο χέρι μας να ενεργούμε ορθά και όχι εσφαλμένα. Από την άλλη το γεγονός πως όλα έχουν προκαθοριστεί από το θεό δεν καταργεί την ελευθερία μας, απλώς δεν είμαστε σε θέση να καταλάβουμε πώς ακριβώς γίνεται να συνυπάρχει ο θεϊκός προκαθορισμός η ανθρώπινη ελευθερία γιατί κάτι τέτοιο ξεπερνάει τα όρια της κατανόησής μας.
Ως σαφής αντίληψη ορίζεται αυτή που είναι παρούσα και πρόδηλη σε ένα προσεκτικό πνεύμα. Ως διακριτή αντίληψη ορίζεται η σαφής αντίληψη που είναι ξεχωρισμένη από όλες τις άλλες και ακριβής και περιέχει μέσα της μόνο ό,τι είναι σαφές. Τα αντικείμενα της αντίληψής μας είναι είτε πράγματα και τροποποιήσεις πραγμάτων είτε αιώνιες αλήθειες. Ως γενικά πράγματα ορίζονται η υπόσταση, διάρκεια, τάξη, αριθμός και όσα άλλα βρίσκονται σε όλα τα πράγματα. Ως νοητικά ή σκεπτόμενα πράγματα ορίζουμε όσα ανήκουν στο πνεύμα ή σκεπτόμενη υπόσταση (πχ αντίληψη και θέλημα) και ως υλικά πράγματα ορίζουμε όσα ανήκουν στο σώμα ή εκτεινόμενη υπόσταση (πχ μέγεθος, σχήμα, κίνηση, θέση, διαιρετότητα). Από τη στενή ένωση σώματος και πνεύματος προκύπτουν πράγματα όπως ορέξεις (πείνα, δίψα), τα πάθη της ψυχής (πχ αίσθημα λύπης, χαράς, οργής κτλ αλλά και αίσθημα πόνου, οσμής γεύσης, ήχου κτλ).
Ως υπόσταση ορίζεται ένα πράγμα που υπάρχει έτσι ώστε να μην χρειάζεται τίποτε άλλο για να υπάρχει. Μόνο μία τέτοια υπόσταση υπάρχει αυτή του θεού. Όσον αφορά τα δημιουργήματα του θεού, δηλαδή τα δημιουργημένα πράγματα, για εκείνα ως υποστάσεις ορίζονται όσα υπάρχουν έτσι ώστε να μην χρειάζονται τίποτε άλλο για να υπάρχουν πέρα από την συνδρομή του θεού. Όλα τα υπόλοιπα δημιουργημένα πράγματα που δεν μπορούν να υπάρξουν χωρίς κάποια άλλα πράγματα τα ορίζουμε ως ποιότητες ή κατηγορήματα των υποστάσεων.
Οι αιτίες που πέφτουμε σε πλάνη είναι: Οι προκαταλήψεις της παιδικής ηλικίας, το γεγονός ότι δεν μπορούμε να λησμονήσουμε αυτές τις προκαταλήψεις όταν μεγαλώνουμε, η κούραση όταν πρέπει να συγκεντρωθούμε σε πράγματα που δεν είναι παρόντα στις αισθήσεις, η λανθασμένη χρήση της γλώσσας, όταν συνδέουμε τις έννοιές μας με λέξεις που δεν ανταποκρίνονται ακριβώς στα πράγματα.
Το δεύτερο μέρος τιτλοφορείται ως De Principiis rerum materialium Για τις αρχές των υλικών πραγμάτων.
Εδώ ορίζει την ύλη ως ένα εκτεινόμενο πράγμα, δηλαδή κάτι που εκτείνεται σε μήκος, πλάτος βάθος και έχει όλες τις ιδιότητες ενός εκτεινόμενου πράγματος. Το ανθρώπινο σώμα είναι στενά συνδεδεμένο με το νου, η ανθρώπινη φύση είναι σύνθετη, η έκταση συνιστά τη φύση ενός σώματος.
Στη συνέχεια προχωρεί στον ορισμό της κίνησης ως ενέργειας μέσω της οποίας ένα σώμα μεταβαίνει από τον έναν τρόπο σε έναν άλλο και ειδικότερα είναι η μεταφορά ενός μέρους της ύλης ή ενός σώματος από τη γειτνίαση με τα σώματα με τα οποία έχει άμεση επαφή και που παρατηρούνται εν ηρεμία, στην εγγύτητα με άλλα σώματα. Ο θεός είναι η πρωτεύουσα αιτίας της κίνησης.
Οι Καρτεσιανοί νόμοι της φύσης:
1. Κάθε πράγμα, όσο εξαρτάται από το ίδιο, εμμένει πάντα στην ίδια κατάσταση κι έτσι ό,τι άπαξ κινείται, συνεχίζει πάντα να κινείται.
2. Κάθε κίνηση είναι από μόνη της ευθύγραμμη κι επομένως κάθε σώμα κινούμενο σε ένα κύκλο τείνει πάντα να απομακρύνεται από το κέντρο του κύκλου στον οποίο εγγράφεται.
3. Αν ένα σώμα προσκρούσει σε ένα άλλο ισχυρότερο από το ίδιο, δεν χάνει καθόλου την κίνησή του, αλλά αν προσκρούσει σε ένα ασθενέστερο χάνει τόση ποσότητα κίνησης όση μεταβιβάζει στο άλλο σώμα. Η μεταβολή της κίνησης ενός σώματος από την πρόσκρουσή του με άλλα σώματα προσδιορίζεται από μια σειρά από κανόνες.
Τέλος ορίζει τις διαφορές και τα χαρακτηριστικά των ρευστών και των στερεών σωμάτων και καταλήγει πως όλα τα φυσικά φαινόμενα μπορούν να εξηγηθούν μέσα από τα μαθηματικά και τη γεωμετρία.
Το τρίτο μέρος έχει ως τίτλο De Mundo adspectabili Για τον ορατό κόσμο
Είναι εξαιρετικά ενδιαφέρον και δίνει μια εικόνα για το πως θεωρούσε τον κόσμο ένας επιστήμονας του 17ου αιώνα, σχετικά με τα ουράνια σώματα, την κίνησή τους κτλ. Διάβαζα την μετάφραση που παραθέτει ο Jonathan Francis Bennett και η οποία προέρχεται από τη μετάφραση του John Cottingham (The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 τόμοι, εκδ. Cambridge University Press). Θεωρώ πως είναι καλή, απλή και κατανοητή αλλά προτείνω να μην χρησιμοποιηθεί για παραπομπές κατά τη συγγραφή επιστημονικών εργασιών. Για περισσότερες πληροφορίες
Επιπλέον στο απόσπασμα για την κίνηση των πλανητών (31. XXXI. Quomodo singuli Planetae deferantur) χρησιμοποίησα την μετάφραση των Valentine Rodger Miller και Reese P. Miller από το René Descartes: Principles of Philosophy: Translated, with Explanatory Notes, D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht / Boston / Lancaster, 1984
Ελλείψει ελληνικής μετάφρασης θα παραθέσω κάποια αποσπάσματα από λατινικά μαζί με τις αγγλικές μεταφράσεις γιατί φοβάμαι πως διαφορετικά θα μεταφέρω κάτι λάθος.
Στην παράγραφο 23 (XXIII) αναφέρει ο Descartes:
Fixas omnes in eadem sphaera non versari, sed unamquamque vastum spatium circa se habere, aliis Fixis destitutum
που σημαίνει: The fixed stars don’t all turn on the same sphere. Each is surrounded by a vast space that isn’t occupied by any other star.
(σσ. Όταν χρησιμοποιεί το όρο Stellae fixae εννοεί The stars δηλαδή the visible heavenly bodies of all kinds).
Εκεί λοιπόν εξηγεί πως:
Some astronomers have thought that all the fixed stars are situated on the surface of a single sphere, but that can’t be right if the sun is one of the fixed stars (or anyway is like the fixed stars in the facts about how it is situated). ·Why not?
Because it’s empirically obvious that the sun is much nearer to us than the fixed stars are, and therefore doesn’t share a sphere-surface with them·. The real situation is that the sun is surrounded by a vast space with no fixed stars in it, and the same must be true of each fixed star·. So each fixed star must be very distant from all the others, and the fixed stars must vary widely in how far they are from the sun and from us. . . .
Thus, in this figure, if S is the Sun, the stars of the F and f are fixed; and countless others, above and below and beyond the plane of this figure.
Και παραθέτει το εξής σχεδιάγραμμα προκειμένου να απεικονίσει την θεωρία του:
Σχετικά με την κίνηση των ουρανίων σωμάτων αναφέρει:
24. XXIV. Coelos esse fluidos.The heavens are fluid.
25. XXV. Coelos omnia corpora in se contenta secum deferre. The heavens carry along with them all the bodies that they contain.
26. XXVI. Terram in coelo suo quiescere, sed nihilominus ab eo deferri.
Quarto, cum videamus Terram nullis columnis suffultam, nullisque funibus appensam, sed circumquaque fluidissimo tantum coelo cinctam esse [...]
The earth is at rest in its own heaven which nevertheless carries it along. We see that the earth isn’t supported by columns or held up by cables, but is completely immersed in a very fluid heaven[...]
28. XXVIII. Terram, proprie loquendo, non moveri, nec ullos Planetas, quamvis a coelo transferantur. Strictly speaking the earth doesn’t move, nor do the planets, though they’re all carried along by the heaven.
Η θεωρία του Descartes για τις δίνες (vortex):
30. XXX. Planetas omnes circa Solem a coelo deferri.
Sic itaque sublato omni scrupulo de Terrae motu, putemus totam materiam coeli in qua Planetae versantur, in modum cujusdam vorticis, in cujus centro est Sol, assidue gyrare, ac ejus partes Soli viciniores celerius moveri quam remotiores, Planetasque omnes (e quorum numero est Terra) inter easdem istius coelestis materiae partes semper versari [...]
30. XXX. All the planets are carried round the sun by the heaven. Let’s stop worrying about the earth’s motion and suppose that the whole of the celestial matter—·the heaven·—in which the planets are located turns continuously like a vortex with the sun at its centre. Let us suppose further that the parts of the vortex nearer to the sun move faster than the parts further out from the sun, and that all the planets (earth included) always stay surrounded by the same portions of celestial matter. This single supposition lets us smoothly explain all the observed movements of the planets without bringing in any supplementary apparatus. At some places along a river the water twists around on itself and forms a whirlpool with bits of straw floating in it, ·and four features of this can help us to understand planetary motion:
(1) We see the straws carried around with the whirlpool.
(2) Sometimes we see a straw also spinning around its own centre.
(3) The straws nearer the centre of the whirlpool complete a revolution more quickly ·than the ones further out·.
(4) Although such a straw always has a circular motion, it almost never follows a perfect circle—there are usually some deviations from that. We can easily imagine all this happening in the same way with the planets, so that this single account explains all the planetary movements that we observe.
το δεύτερο των σημειώσεών μου εδώ
April 6, 2020
Αυτό είναι το δεύτερο μέρος των σημειώσεών μου. Για το πρώτο μέρος
εδώ
Για την κίνηση των πλανητών αναφέρει:
31. XXXI. Quomodo singuli Planetae deferantur.
Sit itaque S Sol, et omnis materia coelestis eum circumjacens ita moveatur in easdem partes, nempe ab Occidente per Meridiem versus Orientem, sive ab A per B versus C, supponendo polum Borealem supra hujus figurae planum eminere: ut ea quae est circa Saturnum, impendat fere annos triginta ad eum per totum circulum saturnus deferendum; ea vero quae est circa Jovem, intra annos 12 illum cum ejus asseclis deferat per circulum �; sicque Mars duobus annis, Terra cum Luna uno anno, Venus octo mensibus, et Mercurius tribus, circuitus suos in circulis �, T, ♀, �, materia coeli eos deferente, absolvant.
31. XXXI. How the individual Planets are carried along.
Let us then suppose that S is the Sun, and that all the surrounding matter of the heaven turns in the same direction, namely from the West to the East via the South, or from A to C via B, assuming the North Pole to be elevated above the plane of this figure. As a result, the matter which surrounds Saturn takes almost thirty years to carry it completely around the circle marked h; and that the matter which surrounds Jupiter carries it, {together with the other little Planets which accompany it,� all the way} around the circle � in twelve years. By the same means, Mars in two years, the Earth and the Moon in one year, Venus in eight months, and Mercury in three, complete the revolutions which are indicated by the circles marked (respectively) �, T, ♀, �, .
Και παραθέτει το εξής σχεδιάγραμμα:
Σχετικά με τα τρία στοιχεία που απαρτίζουν τον ορατό κόσμο και τα σωματίδια (σσ ο Descartes δεν δεχόταν πως υπάρχει το κενό στη φύση και θεωρούσε πως ο κόσμος είναι πλήρης από μια άπειρα διαιρετή ύλη)
52. LII. Tria esse hujus mundi aspectabilis elementa.
Jam itaque duo habemus genera materiae valde diversa, quae duo prima elementa hujus mundi aspectabilis dici possunt. Primum est illius, quae tantam vim habet agitationis, ut aliis corporibus occurrendo, in minutias indefinitae parvitatis dividatur, et figuras suas ad omnes angulorum ab iis relictorum angustias implendas accommodet. Alterum est ejus, quae divisa est in particulas sphaericas, valde quidem minutas, si cum iis corporibus, quae oculis cernere possumus, comparentur; sed tamen certae ac determinatae quantitatis, et divisibiles in alias multo minores. Tertiumque paulo post inveniemus, constans partibus vel magis crassis, vel figuras minus ad motum aptas habentibus. Et ex his tribus omnia hujus mundi aspectabilis corpora componi ostendemus: nempe Solem et Stellas fixas ex primo, Coelos et secundo, et Terram cum Planetis et Cometis ex tertio. Cum enim Sol et Fixae lumen ex se emittant, Coeli illud transmittant, Terra, Planetae, ac Cometae remittant: triplicem hanc differentiam in aspectum incurrentem, non male ad tria elementa referemus.
52. There are three elements of this visible world. The two most basic elements of this visible universe are the following.
(1) The first element is composed of matter that is so violently agitated that when it meets other bodies it splits into particles of indefinite smallness, adapting itself to the shapes needed for it to fill all the gaps between the larger particles.
(2) The second element is composed of matter divided into spherical particles which are still much too small to be separately visible but have definite fixed sizes, though they can be divided into other much smaller particles.
(3) The third element, which I’ll expound soon, consists of particles that either •are much bulkier or •have shapes less suited for motion. I am going to show that all the bodies in this visible universe are composed of these three elements�
•the sun and fixed stars are composed of the first element
•the heavens are composed of the second, and
•the earth and planets and comets are composed of the third.
Συμπέασμα:
Σύμφωνα με τους φυσικούς νόμους του Descartes κάθε κίνηση είναι από μόνη της ευθύγραμμη. Με τη θεωρία του για τις δίνες και την απουσία κενού δίνει την αιτία που τα ουράνια σώματα κινούνται στις τροχιές τους. Από τα τρία είδη σωματιδίων που αναφέρει, τα μικρότερα απαρτίζουν τον ήλιο και τους απλανείς αστέρες. Τα σωματίδια του φωτός, επειδή κινούνται σε έναν χώρο που είναι πλήρης χωρίς κενό, ασκούν πίεση διαδοχικά το ένα στο άλλο. Αυτή η πίεση είναι το φως που κινείται ευθύγρα��μα όπως ακριβώς κάποιος που πιέζει μια μαγκούρα σε ένα σώμα και η δύναμη της πίεσης μεταφέρεται και γίνεται αντιληπτή από το ένα άκρο του ξύλου στο άλλο. Κατά αντιστοιχία από τα φωτεινά σώματα, τα σωματίδια τους φωτός ωθώντας το ένα το άλλο μέσα από τους ουρανούς και την ατμόσφαιρα φτάνουν ως τα μάτια μας.
Το τέταρτο και τελευταίο μέρος έχει τίτλο De Terra (Για τη Γη).
Γι' αυτό χρησιμοποίησα σε συνδυασμό με τα προηγούμενα το Selections from the Principles of Philosophy by René Descartes του John Veitch (1829-1894) από
Και αυτό είναι εξαιρετικά ενδιαφέρον γιατί περιγράφει τη γη όπως την αντιλαμβάνεται ένας επιστήμονας του 17ου αιώνα και τα συμπεράσματά του κάνοντας χρήση των διαθέσιμων επιστημονικών μέσων της εποχής του. θεωρεί πως η γη χωρίζεται σε τρία μέρη, το πρώτο είναι αυτό που βρίσκεται στον πυρήνα της και μοιάζει με τον ήλιο, το δεύτερο είναι ένα πυκνό και αδιαπέραστο κέλυφος που περιβάλλει τον πυρήνα και το τρίτο είναι το εξωτερικό περίβλημα της γης (βλέπε Distinctio Terrae in tres regiones).
Εδώ παραθέτει το εξής σχεδιάγραμμα:
Τα διάφορα σώματα στο τρίτο μέρος της γης δημιουργήθηκαν από τέσσερις δυνάμεις:
1. the general motion of celestial globules (κίνηση των ουράνιων σφαιριδίων).
2. gravity (βαρύτητα).
3. light (φως).
4. heat (θερμότητα).
Στη συνέχεια προχωρεί σε εξηγήσεις για διάφορα φαινόμενα όπως η φύση του αέρα, η φύση του νερού που μπορεί να γίνεται υδρατμός ή πάγος, το φαινόμενο της παλίρροιας, οι ιδιότητες του υδράργυρου, τα άλατα, τα μέταλλα, οι σεισμοί, τα ηφαίστεια, η φωτιά, η πυρίτιδα και τα στοιχεία που την απαρτίζουν, το γυαλί, οι μαγνήτες κτλ.
Έπειτα καταπιάνεται με ένα εξαιρετικά ενδιαφέρον θέμα, σχετικά με τις ανθρώπινες αισθήσεις (sensus):
189. CLXXXIX. Quid sit sensus, et quomodo fiat.
Sciendum itaque humanam animam, etsi totum corpus informet, praecipuam tamen sedem suam habere in cerebro, in quo solo non modo intelligit et imaginatur, sed etiam sentit: hocque opere nervorum, qui, filorum instar, a cerebro ad omnia reliqua membra protenduntur, iisque sic annexi sunt, ut vix ulla pars humani corporis tangi possit, quin hoc ipso moveantur aliquot nervorum extremitates per ipsam sparsae, atque earum motus ad alias eorum nervorum extremitates, in cerebro circa sedem animae collectas, transferatur, ut in Dioptricae capite quarto satis fuse explicui. Motus autem qui sic in cerebro a nervis excitantur, animam sive mentem intime cerebro conjunctam diversimode afficiunt, prout ipsi sunt diversi. Atque hae diversae mentis affectiones, sive cogitationes, ex istis motibus immediate consequentes, sensuum perceptiones, sive, ut vulgo loquimur, sensus appellantur.
189. What sensation is and how it operates.
The human soul, while united to the entire body, has its principal seat in the brain. That is where it not only understands and imagines but also has sensory awareness. Sensory awareness comes about by means of nerves that stretch like threads from the brain to all the limbs, and are joined together so that hardly any part of the human body can be touched without producing movement in several of the nerve-ends that are scattered around in that area. This movement is then transmitted to the other ends of the nerves which are all grouped together in the brain around the seat of the soul, as I explained very fully in my Optics chapter 4. The result of these movements� being set up in the brain by the nerves is that the soul or mind, being closely joined to the brain, is affected in various ways, corresponding to the various different sorts of movements. And the various different states of mind (i.e. thoughts) that are the immediate result of these movements are called ‘sense-perceptions�, or in ordinary speech ‘sensations�. [Remember that for Descartes every mental state or event is a ‘thought�. ]
Οι αισθήσεις χωρίζονται σε εσωτερικές και περιλαμβάνουν τις appetitus naturalis (natural appetites) και τις animi commotiones ή pathemata ( the emotions of the mind or passions) όπως πχ η χαρά, λύπη, αγάπη μίσος κτλ. και εξωτερικές που περιλαμβάνουν την αφή, γεύση, όσφρηση, ακοή, όραση.
Ως προς την ανθρώπινη ψυχή γι' αυτήν ο Descartes αναφέρει:
196. CXCVI. Animam non sentire, nisi quatenus est in cerebro. Τhe soul perceives only in so far as it is in the brain. Δηλαδή η ψυχή υπάρχει στο εγκέφαλο και από εκεί αισθάνεται/αντιλαμβάνεται όσα συμβαίνουν στα μέλη του σώματος.
Τέλος αναφέρεται στην ύπαρξη σωματιδίων που δεν μπορούν να γίνουν αντιληπτά από τις αισθήσεις:
201. CCI. Dari particulas corporum insensiles.
At multas in singulis corporibus particulas considero, quae nullo sensu percipiuntur: quod illi fortasse non probant, qui sensus suos pro mensura cognoscibilium sumunt. Quis autem potest dubitare, quin multa corpora sint tam minuta, ut ea nullo sensu deprehendamus?
201. CCI. Some corporeal particles can’t be perceived by the senses/That sensible bodies are composed of insensible particles.
But I do allow that each body contains many particles that are too small to be perceived through any of our senses; and this may upset those who take their own senses as the measure of what can be known. But who can doubt that many bodies are too minute to be detectable by our senses?
Κλείνοντας ο φιλόσοφος απευθύνεται στους αναγνώστες του με την εξής φράση:
nihilque ab ullo credi velim, nisi quod ipsi evidens et invicta ratio persuadebit.
Δεν θα ήθελα να πιστέψετε τίποτα από όσα έγραψα εκτός κι αν έχετε πειστεί γι' αυτά μέσα από τη δύναμη και τις αποδείξεις της λογικής.
Η ανάγνωση αυτού του εγχειριδίου ήταν μια απολαυστική εμπειρία. Η ανάγκη ανθρώπων σαν τον Descartes να αναπτύξουν το κριτικό τους πνεύμα και να καλλιεργήσουν τις λογικές τους δυνάμεις προκειμένου να κατανοήσουν τον κόσμο, σε μια εποχή όπου η επικρατούσα άποψη ήταν πως ο θεός δημιούργησε τα πάντα σε επτά ημέρες, είναι βαθύτατα συγκινητική. Ο ίδιος ξέρει πως πάει κόντρα στο κατεστημένο αλλά ταυτόχρονα ξέρει πως η κατεύθυνση στην οποία βαδίζει είναι η σωστή. Θέλει να καταστήσει τη γνώση προσιτή για όλους τους ανθρώπους και να τους απαλλάξει από τις πλάνες.
O Descartes έζησε στα 1596 � 1650. Στο διάστημα αυτό στην Ευρώπη σημειώθηκαν πολλά ξεσπάσματα Πανώλης. Ο ίδιος ο Descartes έχασε την μικρή του κόρη, την Francine, στα 1635 από οστρακιά. Σήμερα η ανθρωπότητα αντιμετωπίζει μια νέα πανδημία, αλλά δεν πρέπει να χάνουμε την ελπίδα και το κουράγιο μας, γιατί χάρη στα θεμέλια της νέας επιστήμης και και τον αγώνα ανθρώπων σαν τον Descartes, έχουμε τα επιστημονικά και τεχνολογικά μέσα για να την αντιμετωπίσουμε και να την καταπολεμήσουμε. Και θα πρέπει να συνεχίσουμε σε αυτόν τον δρόμο.
Με κριτικό πνεύμα, σωστή παιδεία, ελεύθερη από προκαταλήψεις και ιδιοτελή συμφέροντα, προσβάσιμη σε όλους τους ανθρώπους, πρέπει να θωρακίσουμε τις κοινωνίες μας. Πρέπει να κάνουμε υπομονή, σε λίγο θα έχουμε στη διάθεσή μας φάρμακα, θεραπείες και εμβόλια ώστε να νικήσουμε τον ιό. Και να θυμόμαστε πως, αν σήμερα δεν είμαστε στο σκοτάδι και δεν παλεύουμε στα τυφλά, το χρωστάμε σε όλους εκείνους που με αυτοθυσία και κίνδυνο της ζωής τους πάλεψαν και συνεχίζουν να παλεύουν για να κατακτήσουν την πολύτιμη επιστημονική γνώση που και αυτήν την φορά θα έρθει για να μας βγάλει από την αγωνία και το αδιέξοδο.
Κουράγιο, υπομονή, συμμόρφωση στις υποδείξεις της επιστημονικής κοινότητας, αισιοδοξία και φρόνηση.
εδώ
Για την κίνηση των πλανητών αναφέρει:
31. XXXI. Quomodo singuli Planetae deferantur.
Sit itaque S Sol, et omnis materia coelestis eum circumjacens ita moveatur in easdem partes, nempe ab Occidente per Meridiem versus Orientem, sive ab A per B versus C, supponendo polum Borealem supra hujus figurae planum eminere: ut ea quae est circa Saturnum, impendat fere annos triginta ad eum per totum circulum saturnus deferendum; ea vero quae est circa Jovem, intra annos 12 illum cum ejus asseclis deferat per circulum �; sicque Mars duobus annis, Terra cum Luna uno anno, Venus octo mensibus, et Mercurius tribus, circuitus suos in circulis �, T, ♀, �, materia coeli eos deferente, absolvant.
31. XXXI. How the individual Planets are carried along.
Let us then suppose that S is the Sun, and that all the surrounding matter of the heaven turns in the same direction, namely from the West to the East via the South, or from A to C via B, assuming the North Pole to be elevated above the plane of this figure. As a result, the matter which surrounds Saturn takes almost thirty years to carry it completely around the circle marked h; and that the matter which surrounds Jupiter carries it, {together with the other little Planets which accompany it,� all the way} around the circle � in twelve years. By the same means, Mars in two years, the Earth and the Moon in one year, Venus in eight months, and Mercury in three, complete the revolutions which are indicated by the circles marked (respectively) �, T, ♀, �, .
Και παραθέτει το εξής σχεδιάγραμμα:
Σχετικά με τα τρία στοιχεία που απαρτίζουν τον ορατό κόσμο και τα σωματίδια (σσ ο Descartes δεν δεχόταν πως υπάρχει το κενό στη φύση και θεωρούσε πως ο κόσμος είναι πλήρης από μια άπειρα διαιρετή ύλη)
52. LII. Tria esse hujus mundi aspectabilis elementa.
Jam itaque duo habemus genera materiae valde diversa, quae duo prima elementa hujus mundi aspectabilis dici possunt. Primum est illius, quae tantam vim habet agitationis, ut aliis corporibus occurrendo, in minutias indefinitae parvitatis dividatur, et figuras suas ad omnes angulorum ab iis relictorum angustias implendas accommodet. Alterum est ejus, quae divisa est in particulas sphaericas, valde quidem minutas, si cum iis corporibus, quae oculis cernere possumus, comparentur; sed tamen certae ac determinatae quantitatis, et divisibiles in alias multo minores. Tertiumque paulo post inveniemus, constans partibus vel magis crassis, vel figuras minus ad motum aptas habentibus. Et ex his tribus omnia hujus mundi aspectabilis corpora componi ostendemus: nempe Solem et Stellas fixas ex primo, Coelos et secundo, et Terram cum Planetis et Cometis ex tertio. Cum enim Sol et Fixae lumen ex se emittant, Coeli illud transmittant, Terra, Planetae, ac Cometae remittant: triplicem hanc differentiam in aspectum incurrentem, non male ad tria elementa referemus.
52. There are three elements of this visible world. The two most basic elements of this visible universe are the following.
(1) The first element is composed of matter that is so violently agitated that when it meets other bodies it splits into particles of indefinite smallness, adapting itself to the shapes needed for it to fill all the gaps between the larger particles.
(2) The second element is composed of matter divided into spherical particles which are still much too small to be separately visible but have definite fixed sizes, though they can be divided into other much smaller particles.
(3) The third element, which I’ll expound soon, consists of particles that either •are much bulkier or •have shapes less suited for motion. I am going to show that all the bodies in this visible universe are composed of these three elements�
•the sun and fixed stars are composed of the first element
•the heavens are composed of the second, and
•the earth and planets and comets are composed of the third.
Συμπέασμα:
Σύμφωνα με τους φυσικούς νόμους του Descartes κάθε κίνηση είναι από μόνη της ευθύγραμμη. Με τη θεωρία του για τις δίνες και την απουσία κενού δίνει την αιτία που τα ουράνια σώματα κινούνται στις τροχιές τους. Από τα τρία είδη σωματιδίων που αναφέρει, τα μικρότερα απαρτίζουν τον ήλιο και τους απλανείς αστέρες. Τα σωματίδια του φωτός, επειδή κινούνται σε έναν χώρο που είναι πλήρης χωρίς κενό, ασκούν πίεση διαδοχικά το ένα στο άλλο. Αυτή η πίεση είναι το φως που κινείται ευθύγρα��μα όπως ακριβώς κάποιος που πιέζει μια μαγκούρα σε ένα σώμα και η δύναμη της πίεσης μεταφέρεται και γίνεται αντιληπτή από το ένα άκρο του ξύλου στο άλλο. Κατά αντιστοιχία από τα φωτεινά σώματα, τα σωματίδια τους φωτός ωθώντας το ένα το άλλο μέσα από τους ουρανούς και την ατμόσφαιρα φτάνουν ως τα μάτια μας.
Το τέταρτο και τελευταίο μέρος έχει τίτλο De Terra (Για τη Γη).
Γι' αυτό χρησιμοποίησα σε συνδυασμό με τα προηγούμενα το Selections from the Principles of Philosophy by René Descartes του John Veitch (1829-1894) από
Και αυτό είναι εξαιρετικά ενδιαφέρον γιατί περιγράφει τη γη όπως την αντιλαμβάνεται ένας επιστήμονας του 17ου αιώνα και τα συμπεράσματά του κάνοντας χρήση των διαθέσιμων επιστημονικών μέσων της εποχής του. θεωρεί πως η γη χωρίζεται σε τρία μέρη, το πρώτο είναι αυτό που βρίσκεται στον πυρήνα της και μοιάζει με τον ήλιο, το δεύτερο είναι ένα πυκνό και αδιαπέραστο κέλυφος που περιβάλλει τον πυρήνα και το τρίτο είναι το εξωτερικό περίβλημα της γης (βλέπε Distinctio Terrae in tres regiones).
Εδώ παραθέτει το εξής σχεδιάγραμμα:
Τα διάφορα σώματα στο τρίτο μέρος της γης δημιουργήθηκαν από τέσσερις δυνάμεις:
1. the general motion of celestial globules (κίνηση των ουράνιων σφαιριδίων).
2. gravity (βαρύτητα).
3. light (φως).
4. heat (θερμότητα).
Στη συνέχεια προχωρεί σε εξηγήσεις για διάφορα φαινόμενα όπως η φύση του αέρα, η φύση του νερού που μπορεί να γίνεται υδρατμός ή πάγος, το φαινόμενο της παλίρροιας, οι ιδιότητες του υδράργυρου, τα άλατα, τα μέταλλα, οι σεισμοί, τα ηφαίστεια, η φωτιά, η πυρίτιδα και τα στοιχεία που την απαρτίζουν, το γυαλί, οι μαγνήτες κτλ.
Έπειτα καταπιάνεται με ένα εξαιρετικά ενδιαφέρον θέμα, σχετικά με τις ανθρώπινες αισθήσεις (sensus):
189. CLXXXIX. Quid sit sensus, et quomodo fiat.
Sciendum itaque humanam animam, etsi totum corpus informet, praecipuam tamen sedem suam habere in cerebro, in quo solo non modo intelligit et imaginatur, sed etiam sentit: hocque opere nervorum, qui, filorum instar, a cerebro ad omnia reliqua membra protenduntur, iisque sic annexi sunt, ut vix ulla pars humani corporis tangi possit, quin hoc ipso moveantur aliquot nervorum extremitates per ipsam sparsae, atque earum motus ad alias eorum nervorum extremitates, in cerebro circa sedem animae collectas, transferatur, ut in Dioptricae capite quarto satis fuse explicui. Motus autem qui sic in cerebro a nervis excitantur, animam sive mentem intime cerebro conjunctam diversimode afficiunt, prout ipsi sunt diversi. Atque hae diversae mentis affectiones, sive cogitationes, ex istis motibus immediate consequentes, sensuum perceptiones, sive, ut vulgo loquimur, sensus appellantur.
189. What sensation is and how it operates.
The human soul, while united to the entire body, has its principal seat in the brain. That is where it not only understands and imagines but also has sensory awareness. Sensory awareness comes about by means of nerves that stretch like threads from the brain to all the limbs, and are joined together so that hardly any part of the human body can be touched without producing movement in several of the nerve-ends that are scattered around in that area. This movement is then transmitted to the other ends of the nerves which are all grouped together in the brain around the seat of the soul, as I explained very fully in my Optics chapter 4. The result of these movements� being set up in the brain by the nerves is that the soul or mind, being closely joined to the brain, is affected in various ways, corresponding to the various different sorts of movements. And the various different states of mind (i.e. thoughts) that are the immediate result of these movements are called ‘sense-perceptions�, or in ordinary speech ‘sensations�. [Remember that for Descartes every mental state or event is a ‘thought�. ]
Οι αισθήσεις χωρίζονται σε εσωτερικές και περιλαμβάνουν τις appetitus naturalis (natural appetites) και τις animi commotiones ή pathemata ( the emotions of the mind or passions) όπως πχ η χαρά, λύπη, αγάπη μίσος κτλ. και εξωτερικές που περιλαμβάνουν την αφή, γεύση, όσφρηση, ακοή, όραση.
Ως προς την ανθρώπινη ψυχή γι' αυτήν ο Descartes αναφέρει:
196. CXCVI. Animam non sentire, nisi quatenus est in cerebro. Τhe soul perceives only in so far as it is in the brain. Δηλαδή η ψυχή υπάρχει στο εγκέφαλο και από εκεί αισθάνεται/αντιλαμβάνεται όσα συμβαίνουν στα μέλη του σώματος.
Τέλος αναφέρεται στην ύπαρξη σωματιδίων που δεν μπορούν να γίνουν αντιληπτά από τις αισθήσεις:
201. CCI. Dari particulas corporum insensiles.
At multas in singulis corporibus particulas considero, quae nullo sensu percipiuntur: quod illi fortasse non probant, qui sensus suos pro mensura cognoscibilium sumunt. Quis autem potest dubitare, quin multa corpora sint tam minuta, ut ea nullo sensu deprehendamus?
201. CCI. Some corporeal particles can’t be perceived by the senses/That sensible bodies are composed of insensible particles.
But I do allow that each body contains many particles that are too small to be perceived through any of our senses; and this may upset those who take their own senses as the measure of what can be known. But who can doubt that many bodies are too minute to be detectable by our senses?
Κλείνοντας ο φιλόσοφος απευθύνεται στους αναγνώστες του με την εξής φράση:
nihilque ab ullo credi velim, nisi quod ipsi evidens et invicta ratio persuadebit.
Δεν θα ήθελα να πιστέψετε τίποτα από όσα έγραψα εκτός κι αν έχετε πειστεί γι' αυτά μέσα από τη δύναμη και τις αποδείξεις της λογικής.
Η ανάγνωση αυτού του εγχειριδίου ήταν μια απολαυστική εμπειρία. Η ανάγκη ανθρώπων σαν τον Descartes να αναπτύξουν το κριτικό τους πνεύμα και να καλλιεργήσουν τις λογικές τους δυνάμεις προκειμένου να κατανοήσουν τον κόσμο, σε μια εποχή όπου η επικρατούσα άποψη ήταν πως ο θεός δημιούργησε τα πάντα σε επτά ημέρες, είναι βαθύτατα συγκινητική. Ο ίδιος ξέρει πως πάει κόντρα στο κατεστημένο αλλά ταυτόχρονα ξέρει πως η κατεύθυνση στην οποία βαδίζει είναι η σωστή. Θέλει να καταστήσει τη γνώση προσιτή για όλους τους ανθρώπους και να τους απαλλάξει από τις πλάνες.
O Descartes έζησε στα 1596 � 1650. Στο διάστημα αυτό στην Ευρώπη σημειώθηκαν πολλά ξεσπάσματα Πανώλης. Ο ίδιος ο Descartes έχασε την μικρή του κόρη, την Francine, στα 1635 από οστρακιά. Σήμερα η ανθρωπότητα αντιμετωπίζει μια νέα πανδημία, αλλά δεν πρέπει να χάνουμε την ελπίδα και το κουράγιο μας, γιατί χάρη στα θεμέλια της νέας επιστήμης και και τον αγώνα ανθρώπων σαν τον Descartes, έχουμε τα επιστημονικά και τεχνολογικά μέσα για να την αντιμετωπίσουμε και να την καταπολεμήσουμε. Και θα πρέπει να συνεχίσουμε σε αυτόν τον δρόμο.
Με κριτικό πνεύμα, σωστή παιδεία, ελεύθερη από προκαταλήψεις και ιδιοτελή συμφέροντα, προσβάσιμη σε όλους τους ανθρώπους, πρέπει να θωρακίσουμε τις κοινωνίες μας. Πρέπει να κάνουμε υπομονή, σε λίγο θα έχουμε στη διάθεσή μας φάρμακα, θεραπείες και εμβόλια ώστε να νικήσουμε τον ιό. Και να θυμόμαστε πως, αν σήμερα δεν είμαστε στο σκοτάδι και δεν παλεύουμε στα τυφλά, το χρωστάμε σε όλους εκείνους που με αυτοθυσία και κίνδυνο της ζωής τους πάλεψαν και συνεχίζουν να παλεύουν για να κατακτήσουν την πολύτιμη επιστημονική γνώση που και αυτήν την φορά θα έρθει για να μας βγάλει από την αγωνία και το αδιέξοδο.
Κουράγιο, υπομονή, συμμόρφωση στις υποδείξεις της επιστημονικής κοινότητας, αισιοδοξία και φρόνηση.
May 14, 2016
تا یه جاهاییش رو، به خاطر اطلاعات کلی سابقم از دکارت، همراهش پیش می رفتم. اما از یه جاهایی به بعد رو دیگه یه اصل در میون متوجه میشدم.
چند اصل راجع به مفهوم "خلأ" و این که ممکن نیست ما "خلأ" داشته باشیم صحبت کرده بود که جالب بود. من مدتی دنبال این بودم که آیا فلاسفه ی قدیم امکان "خلأ" رو قبول داشتن یا نه، و اینجا یافتم جوابم رو.
از کتاب:
انسان هنگام راه رفتن، برای این که بداند پای خود را کجا می گذارد، بدون شک بهتر است از چشمان خود استفاده کند تا این که چشمان خود را ببندد و به راهنمایی دیگران تکیه کند. البته حالت اخیر باز بهتر از آن است که چشمان خود را ببندد و بدون یاری کسی، کورکورانه راه بسپرد.
زیستن بدون فلسفه، مثل این است که انسان چشم خود را بسته باشد و برای باز کردن آن ها نکوشد. و فقط زیستن در سایه ی کسانی که فلسفه مطالعه می کنند کافی نیست؛ انسان باید خود بدین امر اقدام کند.
چند اصل راجع به مفهوم "خلأ" و این که ممکن نیست ما "خلأ" داشته باشیم صحبت کرده بود که جالب بود. من مدتی دنبال این بودم که آیا فلاسفه ی قدیم امکان "خلأ" رو قبول داشتن یا نه، و اینجا یافتم جوابم رو.
از کتاب:
انسان هنگام راه رفتن، برای این که بداند پای خود را کجا می گذارد، بدون شک بهتر است از چشمان خود استفاده کند تا این که چشمان خود را ببندد و به راهنمایی دیگران تکیه کند. البته حالت اخیر باز بهتر از آن است که چشمان خود را ببندد و بدون یاری کسی، کورکورانه راه بسپرد.
زیستن بدون فلسفه، مثل این است که انسان چشم خود را بسته باشد و برای باز کردن آن ها نکوشد. و فقط زیستن در سایه ی کسانی که فلسفه مطالعه می کنند کافی نیست؛ انسان باید خود بدین امر اقدام کند.
September 20, 2014
خیلی خوب توضیح داده بود تا جایی که می تونست و خیلی جلوتر از زمان خودش بود به نظرم؛ امّا از یه جاییش به بعد به دلیل نقص های زیاد علم اون زمان، دیگه نتونسته بود درست توجیه کنه و حتی مترجمش هم حدود 200تا اصلش رو ترجمه نکرده بود.
در کل برای بازشدن دید فلسفی تون خیلی خوبه، ولی فقط تا آخر فصل سومش.
در کل برای بازشدن دید فلسفی تون خیلی خوبه، ولی فقط تا آخر فصل سومش.
August 27, 2015
I'd give this five stars, but both editions I've come across, Barnes & Noble and a digital reprint from Amazon, do not contain the whole Principles of Philosophy. Much of the science is missing like a description of Descartes' laws of motion and his vortex theory of planetary motion. This is unfortunate because that is the main reason to read this today, as part of the history of scientific thought. What we get is the entire first book which summarizes the arguments in the Meditations, and moves onto a deeper elaboration of his ontology. This is the most interesting part of the book and is very important to understanding how Descartes relates to the Scholastic tradition.
Basically, instead of ten categories like Aristotle had, we have three or four depending on how you look at it. There are substances, principle attributes, modes, and maybe accidents. Or substance, quality, quantity, and affection (maybe). Gone are relation, action, passivity, place, time, and position. Using the famous method of doubt, Descartes denies or severely scrutinizes Hylomorphism (that every form has a corresponding material object) by arguing that what we think corresponds to something actually existing could only be a fiction of the mind. Real as thought, but not objectively. Given that, formal reality is different from objective reality. Fire does not have its own form, but has both an ideational content (color, smell, heat) and objective material content (motion in space). Position is just how something is situated among other object. Time is the duration of something in existence, but not something in of itself (without space).
For Aristotle a substance is an individual thing. For Descartes substance is a distinct thing, known conceptually. His new standard for ontology is how doubtable it is as something existing independently. And so substances are designated by innate ideas. What always accompanies my perception of material objects is what reflects their true and distinct nature, which is spatial extension. Whatever I can doubt about the reality of my thoughts, there is always thinking and its modes willing, feeling, affirming, denying.
This was intended to a be a textbook to replace the Aristotelean/Scholastic curriculum in schools. The very way it was written shows. It is written in a fairly subjective way almost without reference to anybody else except the thoughts and musings of the author. Everything in the book is quite parsimonious, following from what is said in the first half of Book I. He even says in Book IV that "there is no phenomenon of nature whose explanation has been omitted in this treatise." A bold claim. I think he is right, if you accept his foundational presuppositions. Overall it reads like a synthesis of Scholastic/Medieval philosophy and materialism. He acknowledges that he "made no use of any principle which was not received and approved by Aristotle." And to today's readers I think he is right. The language he used seems archaic today. Offering a proof of God and talking about substance for instance. He briefly mentions Democritus, mostly to deny more influence from him than anybody else. He was probably talking like this to avoid conflict with Catholicism and avoid charges of atheism because he is in retrospect key to the materialist, mechanistic conception of the universe. Nonetheless I see a synthesis between the old and emerging "corpuscular" or atomistic views of the universe which reigned until around the 20th century.
Basically, instead of ten categories like Aristotle had, we have three or four depending on how you look at it. There are substances, principle attributes, modes, and maybe accidents. Or substance, quality, quantity, and affection (maybe). Gone are relation, action, passivity, place, time, and position. Using the famous method of doubt, Descartes denies or severely scrutinizes Hylomorphism (that every form has a corresponding material object) by arguing that what we think corresponds to something actually existing could only be a fiction of the mind. Real as thought, but not objectively. Given that, formal reality is different from objective reality. Fire does not have its own form, but has both an ideational content (color, smell, heat) and objective material content (motion in space). Position is just how something is situated among other object. Time is the duration of something in existence, but not something in of itself (without space).
For Aristotle a substance is an individual thing. For Descartes substance is a distinct thing, known conceptually. His new standard for ontology is how doubtable it is as something existing independently. And so substances are designated by innate ideas. What always accompanies my perception of material objects is what reflects their true and distinct nature, which is spatial extension. Whatever I can doubt about the reality of my thoughts, there is always thinking and its modes willing, feeling, affirming, denying.
This was intended to a be a textbook to replace the Aristotelean/Scholastic curriculum in schools. The very way it was written shows. It is written in a fairly subjective way almost without reference to anybody else except the thoughts and musings of the author. Everything in the book is quite parsimonious, following from what is said in the first half of Book I. He even says in Book IV that "there is no phenomenon of nature whose explanation has been omitted in this treatise." A bold claim. I think he is right, if you accept his foundational presuppositions. Overall it reads like a synthesis of Scholastic/Medieval philosophy and materialism. He acknowledges that he "made no use of any principle which was not received and approved by Aristotle." And to today's readers I think he is right. The language he used seems archaic today. Offering a proof of God and talking about substance for instance. He briefly mentions Democritus, mostly to deny more influence from him than anybody else. He was probably talking like this to avoid conflict with Catholicism and avoid charges of atheism because he is in retrospect key to the materialist, mechanistic conception of the universe. Nonetheless I see a synthesis between the old and emerging "corpuscular" or atomistic views of the universe which reigned until around the 20th century.
December 18, 2023
Als ich damals in Juli dieses Buch durchlaß und die Kernpunkte von Descartes' Philosophie zu verstehen beging, war ich dermaßen seinem mathematischen Rationalismus gegenüber überdrüssig, dass ich es vermied, hier einige simple Gedanken dazu zu schreiben, auch zuletzt deswegen, weil ich nur ungern über philosophische Systeme schreibe - mein individueller Gedanke kommt dabei zu kurz. Ich laß aber eben noch einmal einige Seiten dieser Prinzipien, um meine Erinnerung aufzufrischen und um den Unterschied zu Lord Bacon besser verstehen zu können mit dessen Philosophie ich mich gegenwärtig ein wenig beschäftige.
Bacon wollte die moderne Wissenschaft seiner Zeit auf die ursprüngliche Wahrheit gründen, welche in den einzelnen Erfahrungen des Menschen enthalten ist; er lehrte das Denken von seiner Peripherie aus zu beginnen. Descartes, auf den einheitlichen Charakter aller Wissenschaft reflektierend, wies darauf hin, daß der Ausgangspunkt des Denkens in seinem Zentrum liegen müsse, und er fand dieses Zentrum laut dieden Prinzipien in dem Selbstbewußtsein der Vernunft.
Diese Verschiedenheit des Ausgangspunktes bedingt freilich auch eine gleiche Verschiedenheit des Fortganges. Die Baconsche Methode ging im Prinzip von der Peripherie in das Zentrum, sie stieg von den zerstreuten einzelnen Tatsachen der Erfahrung zu allgemeineren Sätzen auf, um sich mit langsamer Annäherung zu einer universalen Erkenntnis zu erheben. Descartes, im selbstbewußten Mittelpunkt des Denkens Fuß fassend, suchte von da aus die Erkenntnis mit systematischer Allseitigkeit auf den gesamten Kreis des Universums ausstrahlen zu lassen und wollte nichts als Wissen anerkennen, was nicht seine Herkunft aus jenem Mittelpunkte aufweisen könne. So steht der induktiven die deduktive, der empiristischen die rationalistische Methode gegenüber.
Soviel ist mir nun klar, doch trotz der Differenzen gab es auch ganz gewiß Übereinstimmungen resultierend in der Aufgabe, durch deren Lösung Descartes der Begründer der rationalistischen Philosophie wurde. Die Philosophie ist bei ihm keine Erfahrungswissenschaft, wie sie bei Bacon erscheint, sondern eine "Vernunftwissenschaft", wenn ich das so nennen darf. Ihre Methode muß deduktiv sein.
Aber die deduktive Methode des scholastischen Syllogismus, welche sich quer durch das ganze Mittelalter aufrecht hielt, darf es auch nicht sein. Es handelt sich also um die Begründung einer neuen Methode der philosophischen Deduktion, die nicht syllogistischer Natur ist, und diese Aufgabe löst Descartes überaus scharfsinnig im Hinblick auf eine Wissenschaft, in der er selbst Meister war, und welche von der Unzulänglichkeit der Empirie und der Unfruchtbarkeit des Syllogismus gleichweit entfernt ist; die Mathematik. Die Geburtsstätte der Baconschen Philosophie ist das Laboratorium des physikalischen Experiments, die rationalistische Philosophie entspringt in dem Kopfe eines einsam grübelnden Mathematikers, der die Menschen mied.
Beide Systeme haben, wie das meist so ist, ihre Höhepunkte und Schwächen, doch es ist gleichsam faszinierend, wie Ideen und Gedanken sich früher von einem Punkt zum anderen weiterentwickelten, indem sie einander zu widerlegen suchten und dem etwaigen Stillstand der sich gelegentlich einstellte, trotzten. Ich für meinen Teil vermag Systemen aller Art wenig abzugewinnen, denn ich halte es mit Nietzsche als er klarsichtig erklärte, jener Hang sei ein Mangel an Rechtschaffenheit.
Bacon wollte die moderne Wissenschaft seiner Zeit auf die ursprüngliche Wahrheit gründen, welche in den einzelnen Erfahrungen des Menschen enthalten ist; er lehrte das Denken von seiner Peripherie aus zu beginnen. Descartes, auf den einheitlichen Charakter aller Wissenschaft reflektierend, wies darauf hin, daß der Ausgangspunkt des Denkens in seinem Zentrum liegen müsse, und er fand dieses Zentrum laut dieden Prinzipien in dem Selbstbewußtsein der Vernunft.
Diese Verschiedenheit des Ausgangspunktes bedingt freilich auch eine gleiche Verschiedenheit des Fortganges. Die Baconsche Methode ging im Prinzip von der Peripherie in das Zentrum, sie stieg von den zerstreuten einzelnen Tatsachen der Erfahrung zu allgemeineren Sätzen auf, um sich mit langsamer Annäherung zu einer universalen Erkenntnis zu erheben. Descartes, im selbstbewußten Mittelpunkt des Denkens Fuß fassend, suchte von da aus die Erkenntnis mit systematischer Allseitigkeit auf den gesamten Kreis des Universums ausstrahlen zu lassen und wollte nichts als Wissen anerkennen, was nicht seine Herkunft aus jenem Mittelpunkte aufweisen könne. So steht der induktiven die deduktive, der empiristischen die rationalistische Methode gegenüber.
Soviel ist mir nun klar, doch trotz der Differenzen gab es auch ganz gewiß Übereinstimmungen resultierend in der Aufgabe, durch deren Lösung Descartes der Begründer der rationalistischen Philosophie wurde. Die Philosophie ist bei ihm keine Erfahrungswissenschaft, wie sie bei Bacon erscheint, sondern eine "Vernunftwissenschaft", wenn ich das so nennen darf. Ihre Methode muß deduktiv sein.
Aber die deduktive Methode des scholastischen Syllogismus, welche sich quer durch das ganze Mittelalter aufrecht hielt, darf es auch nicht sein. Es handelt sich also um die Begründung einer neuen Methode der philosophischen Deduktion, die nicht syllogistischer Natur ist, und diese Aufgabe löst Descartes überaus scharfsinnig im Hinblick auf eine Wissenschaft, in der er selbst Meister war, und welche von der Unzulänglichkeit der Empirie und der Unfruchtbarkeit des Syllogismus gleichweit entfernt ist; die Mathematik. Die Geburtsstätte der Baconschen Philosophie ist das Laboratorium des physikalischen Experiments, die rationalistische Philosophie entspringt in dem Kopfe eines einsam grübelnden Mathematikers, der die Menschen mied.
Beide Systeme haben, wie das meist so ist, ihre Höhepunkte und Schwächen, doch es ist gleichsam faszinierend, wie Ideen und Gedanken sich früher von einem Punkt zum anderen weiterentwickelten, indem sie einander zu widerlegen suchten und dem etwaigen Stillstand der sich gelegentlich einstellte, trotzten. Ich für meinen Teil vermag Systemen aller Art wenig abzugewinnen, denn ich halte es mit Nietzsche als er klarsichtig erklärte, jener Hang sei ein Mangel an Rechtschaffenheit.
February 10, 2024
Läsning 2: Vid denna läsning ser jag fördelar som jag inte såg förra gången. Distinktionen mellan intellekt och vilja, och de ur denna följande diskussionerna om var gränsen för mänskligt ansvar går är spännande och välgjorda.
June 3, 2010
The seventeenth century saw a dramatic rise in mechanistic and mathematical explanations in science, descriptions of the natural world that referred only to the motion of matter (often in the form of mathematical formulas) in order to account for all observable phenomena. Descartes was not the first scientist to develop a mechanistic, mathematical science, though he was influential in its development and perhaps was the most ambitious scientist in terms of his scope. He was, however, the first to give a thorough and comprehensive philosophical response to the demands raised by this new way of viewing the world. His writings initiated a dramatic revision of philosophical method and concerns.
Descartes explains in the preface to the Principles why he felt the need to give a philosophical response to the new science in the first place. As he writes there, he viewed all of human knowledge as a tree, each part relying heavily on the others for vitality. The trunk of the tree he compared to physics, and the branches to the applied sciences of medicine, mechanics, and morals. The roots, giving support and nourishment to the entire system, he claimed, was metaphysics, the philosophical study of the nature of God, the world, and everything in it. The Principles was intended as a coherent picture of the entire tree, his magnum opus, which he hoped would serve as a textbook, should his work ever be taught at the universities.
In order to understand why Descartes felt that a new metaphysics was needed to ground his new physics, it is important to have a sense of the worldview he was reacting to. Both Descartes' philosophy and his physics are best viewed as a response to the Aristotelian-influenced Scholastics, who had dominated the intellectual scene for almost 2000 years. According to the Scholastic view, all of natural philosophy reduced to the study of change. Explanations relied heavily on the obscure metaphysical notions of "essence", the characteristic that makes something the sort of thing that it is, "matter," the thing that remains constant through change, and "form," the thing that changes when change occurs. Also crucial to these accounts of change were the four elements: earth, air, fire, and water. The most basic units of existence of this view, substances, are all various mixtures of these four elements.
Descartes believed that the obscure metaphysical notions of matter, form, and the elements needlessly complicated the picture of the world. More specifically, the inclusion of such concepts made it impossible to give explanations purely in terms of the motion of matter (which is precisely what the new mechanistic physics sought to do). In order to clear the way for a new scientific outlook, Descartes had to dramatically simplify the metaphysical picture. Where the Scholastics had posited numerous types of substances, each with their own essence and each requiring their own type of explanation in terms of earth, air, fire, and water, Descartes argued that there were only two types of substances in the world. There was mental substance, whose essence was thinking, and there was physical substance, whose essence was extension. Since the entire observable world thus reduced to a single sort of substance (i.e. physical substance or body), all natural phenomena could be explained by relying on just a small number of principles, based entirely on the property of extension. Physics conveniently collapsed into geometry, the study of extended body.
Given his mechanistic picture of the world, on which all explanation could be given in terms of the extension of physical substance, Descartes also needed a new epistemology, or theory of cognition, to complement his new physics and metaphysics. Scholastic philosophers, following Aristotle, believed that all human knowledge comes through the senses. That is to say, they were empiricists. However, their empiricism was of a very naïve form; they believed that our senses are incapable of systematically deceiving us about the kinds of things that are in the world. If the senses tell us that there are colors, then there are colors. If the senses tell us that there are enduring objects, such as tables and chairs, then there are enduring objects. The trustworthiness of the senses was built into the conception of how perception operated: the one perceiving, on this view, took on the form of the thing perceived, became, in a very obscure sense, like the object of perception. Yet in Descartes' picture of the world, there was no such thing as color, sound, odor, taste, heat. There was only extension and the properties that arose from it, such as size, shape, and motion. In order to defend his physics and metaphysics, therefore, Descartes was forced to come up with a new understanding of where human knowledge comes from. Knowledge could not come from our senses, because our senses tell us that we live in a colorful, loud, odorous, tasty, hot, cold world.
In order to rid knowledge of sensory influence, Descartes' freed the intellect from the senses altogether. Where the Scholastics had claimed that nothing got into the intellect except through the senses, in Descartes' theory of cognition, certain concepts are present in the intellect at birth. According to Descartes, human beings are born with certain innate concepts, concepts such as "God," "extension," "triangle," and "something cannot come from nothing." Using these innate concepts, and our faculty of reason, we can trace chains of logical connections and unravel all the possible knowledge in the world.
Both Descartes' metaphysics and his epistemology have been hugely influential in the history of philosophy. In fact, Descartes is largely responsible for setting the modern philosophical conversation in motion. John Locke, Baruch Spinoza, G.W. Leibniz, George Berkeley, and Immanuel Kant, all modeled their metaphysical positions on the Cartesian picture, presenting their own radically modified versions of Descartes' view. Even today, Descartes' theory of the nature of mind, and of mind's relation to body, continues to play a central role in philosophical debates. In epistemology, Descartes' terminology and his conception of a purely intellectual faculty found their way into the writings of John Locke, Blaise Pascal, Baruch Spinoza, and G.W. Leibniz. His concern with the limitations of human reason in its pursuit of knowledge was picked up by an even wider circle.
Descartes' theory of knowledge also gave rise to the most famous split in the history of modern philosophy, the divide between the rationalists and the empiricists. The rationalists (Nicolas Malebrance, Baruch Spinoza, and G.W. Leibniz) accepted the Cartesian idea that humans have a purely intellectual faculty that can serve as a reliable source of substantive knowledge about the world. The empiricists (most famously, John Locke, Thomas Reid, George Berkeley, and David Hume) also believed in the existence of Descartes' purely intellectual faculty, but they were dubious that this faculty could tell us anything, except tautological truths, without the help of the senses. This debate, too, rages on even today, with the two sides gaining and losing respectability at one another's expense, on a decades-long cycle.
The union between mind and body that Descartes posits at the end of Part IV, raises two big worries: (1) what can it mean for two distinct substances to form a union and (2) how can an immaterial substance causally interact with a material one? Many people still consider these worries the biggest obstacle to Descartes' dualistic theory (and thus, in a sense, to his entire metaphysics and physics). Luckily, Descartes' contemporary critics with their modern counterparts and pressed him on these questions in their correspondences. From these correspondences we can arrive at Descartes' answer to these puzzling problems. In his response, Descartes seems to merge these two questions, and to answer them both with an intuition that has been validated by later advances in science and philosophy.
First let us see why Descartes merges the two questions. In order to understand why Descartes does this, it is important to see how Descartes explains the union between mind and body. The best way to describe the union, Descartes claims in IV, as well as in Meditation VI, and in a letter to his friend Regius, is by appealing to the fact that we sense the actions done to body, rather than intellectually perceiving them. When someone else's hand gets burned, we perceive that fact in a very different way than we perceive the burning of our own hand. This is because mind and body are unified.
This way of describing the union seems to imply that the connection between mind and body is causal. To say that the mind and body form a union, it seems, is to say that there is a dense network of causal interactions between mind and body; whenever something is done to body, something happens to mind. In order to answer the first challenge—what can it mean for two distinct substances to form a union, Descartes must answer the second—how can an immaterial substance causally interact with a material one. Descartes answers this question in a correspondence with Princess Elizabeth. There he attempts to challenge the supposition that the only kind of comprehensible interaction is contact interaction, i.e. an interaction in which two material substances come into physical contact, thereby affecting each other. It is perfectly obvious, he rightly claims, that mind and body do interact; we observe this interaction constantly. And because he takes himself to have proven incontrovertibly that mind is immaterial, he believes it must follow that immaterial substances can interact with material substances. The only hurdle to this inference is the flawed supposition that all interaction is contact interaction.
In order to invalidate this supposition, he appeals to a commonly held view regarding gravity. Most people, he claims, implicitly conceive of gravity (which, being pre-Newtonian, he refers to as heaviness) as something distinct from bodies, something that can exist on its own in the absence of body. This, however, involves a conception of a non-extended substance causally interacting with bodies. Though this conception is mistaken (remember that, according to Descartes, gravity is merely a property of body), the intuition present in this mistake—that something immaterial can act on something material—is exactly what is needed in order to defeat the view that only contact interaction is conceivable. We can, therefore, conceive of an immaterial mind acting on a material body and vice versa.
Descartes' intuition—that not all interaction need be contact interaction and that immaterial-material interaction is no more mysterious that material- material interaction—seems to have been largely validated by later advances in science and philosophy. David Hume showed that material-material interactions are not the obvious, well-understood phenomena we take them to be. The evidence we are left with for material interactions is no more than the evidence Descartes insists on for mind-body interaction: we just constantly see it happen. So contact interaction is just as mysterious as material-immaterial interaction. And, in fact, according to modern science, there is absolutely no interaction involving contact between bodies; one body acts on another by way of an electromagnetic field. Descartes' biggest problem, then, is not a problem specifically for his philosophy at all.
Descartes explains in the preface to the Principles why he felt the need to give a philosophical response to the new science in the first place. As he writes there, he viewed all of human knowledge as a tree, each part relying heavily on the others for vitality. The trunk of the tree he compared to physics, and the branches to the applied sciences of medicine, mechanics, and morals. The roots, giving support and nourishment to the entire system, he claimed, was metaphysics, the philosophical study of the nature of God, the world, and everything in it. The Principles was intended as a coherent picture of the entire tree, his magnum opus, which he hoped would serve as a textbook, should his work ever be taught at the universities.
In order to understand why Descartes felt that a new metaphysics was needed to ground his new physics, it is important to have a sense of the worldview he was reacting to. Both Descartes' philosophy and his physics are best viewed as a response to the Aristotelian-influenced Scholastics, who had dominated the intellectual scene for almost 2000 years. According to the Scholastic view, all of natural philosophy reduced to the study of change. Explanations relied heavily on the obscure metaphysical notions of "essence", the characteristic that makes something the sort of thing that it is, "matter," the thing that remains constant through change, and "form," the thing that changes when change occurs. Also crucial to these accounts of change were the four elements: earth, air, fire, and water. The most basic units of existence of this view, substances, are all various mixtures of these four elements.
Descartes believed that the obscure metaphysical notions of matter, form, and the elements needlessly complicated the picture of the world. More specifically, the inclusion of such concepts made it impossible to give explanations purely in terms of the motion of matter (which is precisely what the new mechanistic physics sought to do). In order to clear the way for a new scientific outlook, Descartes had to dramatically simplify the metaphysical picture. Where the Scholastics had posited numerous types of substances, each with their own essence and each requiring their own type of explanation in terms of earth, air, fire, and water, Descartes argued that there were only two types of substances in the world. There was mental substance, whose essence was thinking, and there was physical substance, whose essence was extension. Since the entire observable world thus reduced to a single sort of substance (i.e. physical substance or body), all natural phenomena could be explained by relying on just a small number of principles, based entirely on the property of extension. Physics conveniently collapsed into geometry, the study of extended body.
Given his mechanistic picture of the world, on which all explanation could be given in terms of the extension of physical substance, Descartes also needed a new epistemology, or theory of cognition, to complement his new physics and metaphysics. Scholastic philosophers, following Aristotle, believed that all human knowledge comes through the senses. That is to say, they were empiricists. However, their empiricism was of a very naïve form; they believed that our senses are incapable of systematically deceiving us about the kinds of things that are in the world. If the senses tell us that there are colors, then there are colors. If the senses tell us that there are enduring objects, such as tables and chairs, then there are enduring objects. The trustworthiness of the senses was built into the conception of how perception operated: the one perceiving, on this view, took on the form of the thing perceived, became, in a very obscure sense, like the object of perception. Yet in Descartes' picture of the world, there was no such thing as color, sound, odor, taste, heat. There was only extension and the properties that arose from it, such as size, shape, and motion. In order to defend his physics and metaphysics, therefore, Descartes was forced to come up with a new understanding of where human knowledge comes from. Knowledge could not come from our senses, because our senses tell us that we live in a colorful, loud, odorous, tasty, hot, cold world.
In order to rid knowledge of sensory influence, Descartes' freed the intellect from the senses altogether. Where the Scholastics had claimed that nothing got into the intellect except through the senses, in Descartes' theory of cognition, certain concepts are present in the intellect at birth. According to Descartes, human beings are born with certain innate concepts, concepts such as "God," "extension," "triangle," and "something cannot come from nothing." Using these innate concepts, and our faculty of reason, we can trace chains of logical connections and unravel all the possible knowledge in the world.
Both Descartes' metaphysics and his epistemology have been hugely influential in the history of philosophy. In fact, Descartes is largely responsible for setting the modern philosophical conversation in motion. John Locke, Baruch Spinoza, G.W. Leibniz, George Berkeley, and Immanuel Kant, all modeled their metaphysical positions on the Cartesian picture, presenting their own radically modified versions of Descartes' view. Even today, Descartes' theory of the nature of mind, and of mind's relation to body, continues to play a central role in philosophical debates. In epistemology, Descartes' terminology and his conception of a purely intellectual faculty found their way into the writings of John Locke, Blaise Pascal, Baruch Spinoza, and G.W. Leibniz. His concern with the limitations of human reason in its pursuit of knowledge was picked up by an even wider circle.
Descartes' theory of knowledge also gave rise to the most famous split in the history of modern philosophy, the divide between the rationalists and the empiricists. The rationalists (Nicolas Malebrance, Baruch Spinoza, and G.W. Leibniz) accepted the Cartesian idea that humans have a purely intellectual faculty that can serve as a reliable source of substantive knowledge about the world. The empiricists (most famously, John Locke, Thomas Reid, George Berkeley, and David Hume) also believed in the existence of Descartes' purely intellectual faculty, but they were dubious that this faculty could tell us anything, except tautological truths, without the help of the senses. This debate, too, rages on even today, with the two sides gaining and losing respectability at one another's expense, on a decades-long cycle.
The union between mind and body that Descartes posits at the end of Part IV, raises two big worries: (1) what can it mean for two distinct substances to form a union and (2) how can an immaterial substance causally interact with a material one? Many people still consider these worries the biggest obstacle to Descartes' dualistic theory (and thus, in a sense, to his entire metaphysics and physics). Luckily, Descartes' contemporary critics with their modern counterparts and pressed him on these questions in their correspondences. From these correspondences we can arrive at Descartes' answer to these puzzling problems. In his response, Descartes seems to merge these two questions, and to answer them both with an intuition that has been validated by later advances in science and philosophy.
First let us see why Descartes merges the two questions. In order to understand why Descartes does this, it is important to see how Descartes explains the union between mind and body. The best way to describe the union, Descartes claims in IV, as well as in Meditation VI, and in a letter to his friend Regius, is by appealing to the fact that we sense the actions done to body, rather than intellectually perceiving them. When someone else's hand gets burned, we perceive that fact in a very different way than we perceive the burning of our own hand. This is because mind and body are unified.
This way of describing the union seems to imply that the connection between mind and body is causal. To say that the mind and body form a union, it seems, is to say that there is a dense network of causal interactions between mind and body; whenever something is done to body, something happens to mind. In order to answer the first challenge—what can it mean for two distinct substances to form a union, Descartes must answer the second—how can an immaterial substance causally interact with a material one. Descartes answers this question in a correspondence with Princess Elizabeth. There he attempts to challenge the supposition that the only kind of comprehensible interaction is contact interaction, i.e. an interaction in which two material substances come into physical contact, thereby affecting each other. It is perfectly obvious, he rightly claims, that mind and body do interact; we observe this interaction constantly. And because he takes himself to have proven incontrovertibly that mind is immaterial, he believes it must follow that immaterial substances can interact with material substances. The only hurdle to this inference is the flawed supposition that all interaction is contact interaction.
In order to invalidate this supposition, he appeals to a commonly held view regarding gravity. Most people, he claims, implicitly conceive of gravity (which, being pre-Newtonian, he refers to as heaviness) as something distinct from bodies, something that can exist on its own in the absence of body. This, however, involves a conception of a non-extended substance causally interacting with bodies. Though this conception is mistaken (remember that, according to Descartes, gravity is merely a property of body), the intuition present in this mistake—that something immaterial can act on something material—is exactly what is needed in order to defeat the view that only contact interaction is conceivable. We can, therefore, conceive of an immaterial mind acting on a material body and vice versa.
Descartes' intuition—that not all interaction need be contact interaction and that immaterial-material interaction is no more mysterious that material- material interaction—seems to have been largely validated by later advances in science and philosophy. David Hume showed that material-material interactions are not the obvious, well-understood phenomena we take them to be. The evidence we are left with for material interactions is no more than the evidence Descartes insists on for mind-body interaction: we just constantly see it happen. So contact interaction is just as mysterious as material-immaterial interaction. And, in fact, according to modern science, there is absolutely no interaction involving contact between bodies; one body acts on another by way of an electromagnetic field. Descartes' biggest problem, then, is not a problem specifically for his philosophy at all.
Shelved as 'to-keep-reference'
July 15, 2016En su libro "Los principios de la filosofía", Descartes pretende deducir todas las leyes que rigen el movimiento de los cuerpos tomando tres leyes primeras como premisas: la ley de inercia, la ley del movimiento rectilíneo y la ley del choque. Estas tres leyes, a su vez, se deducen de los atributos de Dios.
Historia de las Ideas de la Modernidad. Unidad 2.
Historia de las Ideas de la Modernidad. Unidad 2.
September 20, 2019
�"إذا كنت باحثاً حقيقياً عن الحقيقة، فمن الضروري أن تشك ولو لمرة واحدة في حياتك، وبكل شيء قدر الإمكان".
February 10, 2024
كتاب قصير يطرح فيه ديكارت افكارة ومذهبة الفلسفي بشكل مبسط اكثر
في البداية تحدث عن الميتافيزيقا الخاصة به بالرغم من كونه تحدث عنها من قبل في كتاب اكبر من هذا اسمه تأملات في الفلسفة الاولى ويقصد في الفلسفة الاولى الميتافيزيقا
وقال ان كل يقين كان يوما ما شك وبدا في برهنه
فكرة الشك الخاصة به وعندما شك في كل شيء هل هو موجود ام وهم لان شعورك على وجودة ليس دليل فانت في الحلم تشعر بكل شيء وتظنه حقيقة رغم انه وهم، عندما شك ادرك انه يفكر لانه لا يمكنه ان يشك دون ان يفكر وعندما فكر ادرك انه موجود لانه لا يمكنك ان تفكر الا اذا كنت موجود فخرجت مقولته الشهيرة
انا اشك اذا انا افكر انا افكر اذا انا موجود
و من ثم تحدث عن الفيزيقا وعن الوجود وعن الله سبحانه وتعالى واثبت وجوده فعلى عكس من قبلة من الفلاسفة بنى ديكارت فلسفته على وجود الله وعلل ذلك تعليل عقلاني لان في تلك الفتره بدأت نقاشات بين ملحدين ونصارى فكان فرضا يأتي ملحد الى نصراني
يقول له :ما الدليل على ان الله موجود
يقول له النصراني : لانه مذكور في الانجيل
من ثم يقول الملحد : ما الدليل على صحة الانجيل
يرد النصراني : لانه من الله
-: ما الدليل على وجود الله؟
-: لانه مذكور في الانجيل
من ثم دوامه لا تنتهي لكن ديكارت بنى فلسفته على وجود الاله وبرهن عليها برهان منطقي
عموما كتاب جيد لكن معظم الافكار الي فيه مذكوره في كتاب مقال عن المنهج وكتاب تأملات في الفلسفة الاولى يعني الكتاب تقريبا ما هو الا شرح لأفكار ديكارت بشكل ابسط ودمج في شرح الميتافيزيقا والفيزيقا في كتاب واحد صغير
ميتافيزيقا = ماوراء الطبيعة
الفيزيقا = الطبيعة
في البداية تحدث عن الميتافيزيقا الخاصة به بالرغم من كونه تحدث عنها من قبل في كتاب اكبر من هذا اسمه تأملات في الفلسفة الاولى ويقصد في الفلسفة الاولى الميتافيزيقا
وقال ان كل يقين كان يوما ما شك وبدا في برهنه
فكرة الشك الخاصة به وعندما شك في كل شيء هل هو موجود ام وهم لان شعورك على وجودة ليس دليل فانت في الحلم تشعر بكل شيء وتظنه حقيقة رغم انه وهم، عندما شك ادرك انه يفكر لانه لا يمكنه ان يشك دون ان يفكر وعندما فكر ادرك انه موجود لانه لا يمكنك ان تفكر الا اذا كنت موجود فخرجت مقولته الشهيرة
انا اشك اذا انا افكر انا افكر اذا انا موجود
و من ثم تحدث عن الفيزيقا وعن الوجود وعن الله سبحانه وتعالى واثبت وجوده فعلى عكس من قبلة من الفلاسفة بنى ديكارت فلسفته على وجود الله وعلل ذلك تعليل عقلاني لان في تلك الفتره بدأت نقاشات بين ملحدين ونصارى فكان فرضا يأتي ملحد الى نصراني
يقول له :ما الدليل على ان الله موجود
يقول له النصراني : لانه مذكور في الانجيل
من ثم يقول الملحد : ما الدليل على صحة الانجيل
يرد النصراني : لانه من الله
-: ما الدليل على وجود الله؟
-: لانه مذكور في الانجيل
من ثم دوامه لا تنتهي لكن ديكارت بنى فلسفته على وجود الاله وبرهن عليها برهان منطقي
عموما كتاب جيد لكن معظم الافكار الي فيه مذكوره في كتاب مقال عن المنهج وكتاب تأملات في الفلسفة الاولى يعني الكتاب تقريبا ما هو الا شرح لأفكار ديكارت بشكل ابسط ودمج في شرح الميتافيزيقا والفيزيقا في كتاب واحد صغير
ميتافيزيقا = ماوراء الطبيعة
الفيزيقا = الطبيعة
June 22, 2020
يسعى ديكارت في هذا الكتاب إلى عرض فلسفته كاملة بشكل أوضح مما سبق له فعله في مؤلفاته الأخرى، فيعرض ميتافيزيقاه التي يعدها مبادئ المعرفة الحقة، ثم ينتقل إلى المعارف المتعلقة بالسماء والأرض وأهم الظواهر التي تكتنفها كالهواء والحرارة والثقل والمغناطيسية. بعد ذلك، ينتقل إلى فروع الفيزيقا وهي الطب والميكانيكا، ثم ينتهي إلى الأخلاق التي تعد في نظره اكتمال الفلسفة وغايتها النهائية .
ينقسم كتاب "مبادئ الفلسفة" إلى أربعة أجزاء أولها "مبادئ المعرفة البشرية"، وهو بمثابة الميتافيزيقا التي سيؤسس عليها ديكارت الفيزيقا، هذه التي يفصل فيها القول في الأجزاء الثلاثة اللاحقة وهي "مبادئ الأشياء المادية"، "السماء" و"الأرض". ألغى ديكارت الجزئين الخامس والسادس المتعلقين ب"الحيوان" و"الإنسان" لعدم توفره على المعطيات الكافية بشأن هذين الموضوعين .
بسبب عدم توفره على الإمكانات اللازمة وعلى الوقت الفسيح، لم يتمكن ديكارت من تطبيق منهجه على مجالات المعادن والنبات والحيوان والإنسان، وهي المواضيع المكملة للفيزيقا، فترك وصية لخلفائه من العلماء الذين ستتوفر لديهم القدرة المادية والعقلية التي ستمكنهم من التفرغ لعمل هذه الأبحاث والتقدم في سبيل اكتشاف معارف جديدة حول الطبيعة .
تتضمن هذه الترجمة الجزء الأول فقط من كتاب "مبادئ الفلسفة". في هذا الجزء يعرض ديكارت سلسلة من التعريفات والقضايا التي تتعلق بطبيعة النفس وملكاتها وحدود قدراتها، و بكمالات الإله وصفاته. تشكل هذه السلسلة من المواد (المواد تعبير للمترجم يطلقه على القضايا التي يتشكل منها مضمون الكتاب، و عددها 76) استدلالات يقيمها ديكارت على مبادئ فلسفته. ويثبت بواسطة هذه الاستدلالات مجموعة من النتائج التي تهم :
.طبيعة العالم من جهة انقسامه إلى جوهرين: الفكر والامتداد
طبيعة العلاقة بين الملكتين الرئيسيتين للنفس: المعرفة والإرادة، وما يترتب عنها من اعتبارات تهم منهج البحث عن الحقيقة.
.طبيعة العلاقة بين ماهية الإله ووجوده فيما يخص مسألة إمكان أو وجوب وجود الإله، و طبيعة العلاقة بين الإنسان والإله
يشترط ديكارت في المبادئ الأولى لأي فلسفة أن تكون بديهية واضحة بذاتها للعقل، وأن يكون ممكنا إستنباط كل معارف الواقع منها، وذلك وفق تسلسل القضايا البديهية.
بهذا الترتيب، يقلب ديكارت التصور القديم للفلسفة رأسا على عقب، فالمدرسيون ينطلقون في مباحثهم من المنطق ثم الأخلاق إلى الفيزيقا وأخيرا الميتافيزيقا، فتكون غاية البحث الفلسفي عندهم هي الإجابة عن الأسئلة المتعلقة بالإله والنفس. بينما يبدأ ديكارت فلسفته بالميتافيزيقا، ثم الفيزيقا التي تنقسم إلى الميكانيكا والطب، وانتهاء بالأخلاق التي هي غاية التفلسف الحق عند ديكارت. فالمعرفة بالنسبة إليه لا قيمة لها إن لم تحقق المنفعة للإنسان في بدنه ونفسه وأخلاقه، إذ أن المعرفة الحقيقية بالضرورة تقود إلى الأفعال الصحيحة وبالتالي فإنها تقود الإنسان نحو الخير .
غير أن ديكارت يخبرنا بشيء قد يبدو أنه لا يتوافق مع هذه الغاية العملية التي يجعلها شرطا للتفلسف الصحيح، وهذا الشيء يتمثل في اعتباره غاية الغايات بالنسبة للإنسان العاقل هي السعي إلى معرفة الحقيقة بواسطة عللها الأولى، وهي الحكمة بالنسبة إليه. إذن، هل نسمح لأنفسنا بوصف ديكارت بالتناقض؟ ليس في الأمر تناقض إذا ما علمنا أن ديكارت يضع صلاح العقل شرطا لصلاح الإرادة، والإرادة هي مولد حركة الإنسان وعمله، فيكون بذلك السعي نحو الحكمة هو نفسه سعيا إلى العمل السديد الذي تصلح به حياة الإنسان، أي سعيا إلى الأخلاق الصحيحة .
ينتقد ديكارت الفلسفة المدرسية التي كانت شائعة في عصره، فقد كانت تفسد استعدادات الأشخاص لتعلم الفلسفة الصحيحة لكونها لا تعلمهم إلا المنطق الأرسطي العقيم ولا تدربهم إلا على حفظ أقوال من جاء قبلهم والانخراط في المجادلات التي كانوا يخوضونها فيها. بينما يصف فلسفته بكونها بسيطة و تبلغ مستوى عميقا من اليقين . (ديكارت، معجم الفلاسفة ص298، جورج طرابيشي
واجه ديكارت حربا فكرية-نفسية شنها عليه لاهوتيو عصره، سواء من هم من أهل بلده فرنسا أو من أهل بلدان أوروبية أخرى، والسبب من وراء هذه الحرب يتمثل في المحاولة التي استأنفها ديكارت محاولة تقويض الفلسفة المدرسية التي سيطر عليها التقليد الأرسطي، وهي محاولة بدأت منذ عصر النهضة في القرن السادس عشر. فكتب التأملات لكي يعوض بها ميتافيزيقا أرسطو، وقواعد المنهج كبديل عن كتاب الأورغانون، وكتاب "في العالم" كمقابل للفيزيقا الأرسطية. كما أنه أظهر نزوعا إلى التحرر من سلطة الفكر التقليدي المدرسي بتوسله الشك منهجا في التعامل مع المعرفة السابقة، والبداهة الذاتية كمعيار أوحد للحقيقة. ورغم أنه لم يتناول العقائد الدينية بالنقد، بل إنه قد جعل الإله هو الضامن الوحيد لإمكان الحقيقة، إلا أن مؤسسة اللاهوت لم تتوانى عن ملاحقته والسعي إلى النيل من سمعته، بل إلى محاكمته، لسبب واحد هو الخروج عن التقليد ومحاولة فتح أفق جديد للفكر .
في القرن السابع عشر لم يكن تاريخ الفلسفة بعد علما، فكان المفكرون يصنفون الفلاسفة القدماء إلى شكاك و يقينيين، غير أن معرفتهم بكلا الصنفين رغم محدوديتها كانت دقيقة وسليمة. حاول ديكارت في فلسفته أن يستوعب التيارين الرئيسيين في الفلسفة: الشكية واليقينية. يرجع الأولى إلى سقراط وأفلاطون، والثانية إلى أرسطو. بدأ فلسفته بالشك، لكنه ارتقى بهذا الشك إلى مستوى ألغي فيه بذاته لصالح اليقين الذي لا يمكن إقامة فلسفة بدونه، فاعترف بالحقائق التي قال بها أرسطو غير أنها كانت مختلطة بأوهام وأخطاء، فحاول تخليصها من هذه الأخطاء .
يميز ديكارت بين نوعين من الفضائل: الفضائل الحقيقية، هي التي تنتج عن المعرفة الحقيقية السليمة، والفضائل المزيفة التي تنتج عن معرفة خاطئة. فالبنسبة لديكارت، لا ينفصل العقل والإرادة أحدهما عن الآخر، فترتبط الأخلاق بالمعرفة ارتباطا وثيقا. إذ أن الخير الأسمى يتمثل في توجه إرادة الإنسان نحو الخير، وفي هذا اكتمال الحكمة، دون أن يشترط في هذا الإنسان القدرة على تحقيق ذلك الخير في الواقع، خصوصا إذا اعتبرنا العالم قسمان: قسم خارجي محكوم بقوانين طبيعية ولا سلطان للإنسان عليه، و قسم داخلي تحوز الذات قدرة على السيطرة على وقائعه وحالاته .
هكذا تكون الفضيلة من الوجهة الداخلية توجيها سليما للإرادة نحو الخير، ومن الوجهة الخارجية خضوعا للنظام العالم وانسجاما معه، وبهذا الانسجام يتحقق الخير الأكمل. هذا المبدأ هو نفسه تصور الرواقيين للأخلاق، فالأخلاق بالنسبة لديكارت هي أعلى مراتب الحكمة وهي أيضا اكتمال الفلسفة، و تتمثل هذه الحكمة في الحياة وفقا لنظام العالم و إخضاع الإرادة لنظام الأشياء .
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من خلال إهداء الكتاب إلى الأميرة إليزابيث ابنة ملك بوهيميا، ومن خلال الكلام الذي يوجهه ديكارت إليها، أن هذه الأميرة ذات قدرات عقلية نادرة وعالية، حتى أنه ينفي كون أحد غيرها قد تمكن من فهم كل مؤلفاته بذلك الوضوح الذي فهمتها به هي. يشير إلى أن غايته من وراء كتابة هذا الإهداء تكمن في رغبته في أن تكون خصال هذه الأميرة وصفاتها قدوة لمن سيقرؤون الكتاب من الأجيال المقبلة.
ترجم عثمان أمين هذا الكتاب من أصله اللاتيني مستعينا بالترجمة الفرنسية الأولى التي قدم لها ديكارت نفسه، وبترجمات فرنسية أخرى حديثة. كما ترجم عثمان كتبا أخرى لديكارت هي "تأملات في الفلسفة الأولى" و "مقال في المنهج"، كما قام بتأليف كتاب حول نفس الفيلسوف عنوانه "ديكارت".
ينقسم كتاب "مبادئ الفلسفة" إلى أربعة أجزاء أولها "مبادئ المعرفة البشرية"، وهو بمثابة الميتافيزيقا التي سيؤسس عليها ديكارت الفيزيقا، هذه التي يفصل فيها القول في الأجزاء الثلاثة اللاحقة وهي "مبادئ الأشياء المادية"، "السماء" و"الأرض". ألغى ديكارت الجزئين الخامس والسادس المتعلقين ب"الحيوان" و"الإنسان" لعدم توفره على المعطيات الكافية بشأن هذين الموضوعين .
بسبب عدم توفره على الإمكانات اللازمة وعلى الوقت الفسيح، لم يتمكن ديكارت من تطبيق منهجه على مجالات المعادن والنبات والحيوان والإنسان، وهي المواضيع المكملة للفيزيقا، فترك وصية لخلفائه من العلماء الذين ستتوفر لديهم القدرة المادية والعقلية التي ستمكنهم من التفرغ لعمل هذه الأبحاث والتقدم في سبيل اكتشاف معارف جديدة حول الطبيعة .
تتضمن هذه الترجمة الجزء الأول فقط من كتاب "مبادئ الفلسفة". في هذا الجزء يعرض ديكارت سلسلة من التعريفات والقضايا التي تتعلق بطبيعة النفس وملكاتها وحدود قدراتها، و بكمالات الإله وصفاته. تشكل هذه السلسلة من المواد (المواد تعبير للمترجم يطلقه على القضايا التي يتشكل منها مضمون الكتاب، و عددها 76) استدلالات يقيمها ديكارت على مبادئ فلسفته. ويثبت بواسطة هذه الاستدلالات مجموعة من النتائج التي تهم :
.طبيعة العالم من جهة انقسامه إلى جوهرين: الفكر والامتداد
طبيعة العلاقة بين الملكتين الرئيسيتين للنفس: المعرفة والإرادة، وما يترتب عنها من اعتبارات تهم منهج البحث عن الحقيقة.
.طبيعة العلاقة بين ماهية الإله ووجوده فيما يخص مسألة إمكان أو وجوب وجود الإله، و طبيعة العلاقة بين الإنسان والإله
يشترط ديكارت في المبادئ الأولى لأي فلسفة أن تكون بديهية واضحة بذاتها للعقل، وأن يكون ممكنا إستنباط كل معارف الواقع منها، وذلك وفق تسلسل القضايا البديهية.
بهذا الترتيب، يقلب ديكارت التصور القديم للفلسفة رأسا على عقب، فالمدرسيون ينطلقون في مباحثهم من المنطق ثم الأخلاق إلى الفيزيقا وأخيرا الميتافيزيقا، فتكون غاية البحث الفلسفي عندهم هي الإجابة عن الأسئلة المتعلقة بالإله والنفس. بينما يبدأ ديكارت فلسفته بالميتافيزيقا، ثم الفيزيقا التي تنقسم إلى الميكانيكا والطب، وانتهاء بالأخلاق التي هي غاية التفلسف الحق عند ديكارت. فالمعرفة بالنسبة إليه لا قيمة لها إن لم تحقق المنفعة للإنسان في بدنه ونفسه وأخلاقه، إذ أن المعرفة الحقيقية بالضرورة تقود إلى الأفعال الصحيحة وبالتالي فإنها تقود الإنسان نحو الخير .
غير أن ديكارت يخبرنا بشيء قد يبدو أنه لا يتوافق مع هذه الغاية العملية التي يجعلها شرطا للتفلسف الصحيح، وهذا الشيء يتمثل في اعتباره غاية الغايات بالنسبة للإنسان العاقل هي السعي إلى معرفة الحقيقة بواسطة عللها الأولى، وهي الحكمة بالنسبة إليه. إذن، هل نسمح لأنفسنا بوصف ديكارت بالتناقض؟ ليس في الأمر تناقض إذا ما علمنا أن ديكارت يضع صلاح العقل شرطا لصلاح الإرادة، والإرادة هي مولد حركة الإنسان وعمله، فيكون بذلك السعي نحو الحكمة هو نفسه سعيا إلى العمل السديد الذي تصلح به حياة الإنسان، أي سعيا إلى الأخلاق الصحيحة .
ينتقد ديكارت الفلسفة المدرسية التي كانت شائعة في عصره، فقد كانت تفسد استعدادات الأشخاص لتعلم الفلسفة الصحيحة لكونها لا تعلمهم إلا المنطق الأرسطي العقيم ولا تدربهم إلا على حفظ أقوال من جاء قبلهم والانخراط في المجادلات التي كانوا يخوضونها فيها. بينما يصف فلسفته بكونها بسيطة و تبلغ مستوى عميقا من اليقين . (ديكارت، معجم الفلاسفة ص298، جورج طرابيشي
واجه ديكارت حربا فكرية-نفسية شنها عليه لاهوتيو عصره، سواء من هم من أهل بلده فرنسا أو من أهل بلدان أوروبية أخرى، والسبب من وراء هذه الحرب يتمثل في المحاولة التي استأنفها ديكارت محاولة تقويض الفلسفة المدرسية التي سيطر عليها التقليد الأرسطي، وهي محاولة بدأت منذ عصر النهضة في القرن السادس عشر. فكتب التأملات لكي يعوض بها ميتافيزيقا أرسطو، وقواعد المنهج كبديل عن كتاب الأورغانون، وكتاب "في العالم" كمقابل للفيزيقا الأرسطية. كما أنه أظهر نزوعا إلى التحرر من سلطة الفكر التقليدي المدرسي بتوسله الشك منهجا في التعامل مع المعرفة السابقة، والبداهة الذاتية كمعيار أوحد للحقيقة. ورغم أنه لم يتناول العقائد الدينية بالنقد، بل إنه قد جعل الإله هو الضامن الوحيد لإمكان الحقيقة، إلا أن مؤسسة اللاهوت لم تتوانى عن ملاحقته والسعي إلى النيل من سمعته، بل إلى محاكمته، لسبب واحد هو الخروج عن التقليد ومحاولة فتح أفق جديد للفكر .
في القرن السابع عشر لم يكن تاريخ الفلسفة بعد علما، فكان المفكرون يصنفون الفلاسفة القدماء إلى شكاك و يقينيين، غير أن معرفتهم بكلا الصنفين رغم محدوديتها كانت دقيقة وسليمة. حاول ديكارت في فلسفته أن يستوعب التيارين الرئيسيين في الفلسفة: الشكية واليقينية. يرجع الأولى إلى سقراط وأفلاطون، والثانية إلى أرسطو. بدأ فلسفته بالشك، لكنه ارتقى بهذا الشك إلى مستوى ألغي فيه بذاته لصالح اليقين الذي لا يمكن إقامة فلسفة بدونه، فاعترف بالحقائق التي قال بها أرسطو غير أنها كانت مختلطة بأوهام وأخطاء، فحاول تخليصها من هذه الأخطاء .
يميز ديكارت بين نوعين من الفضائل: الفضائل الحقيقية، هي التي تنتج عن المعرفة الحقيقية السليمة، والفضائل المزيفة التي تنتج عن معرفة خاطئة. فالبنسبة لديكارت، لا ينفصل العقل والإرادة أحدهما عن الآخر، فترتبط الأخلاق بالمعرفة ارتباطا وثيقا. إذ أن الخير الأسمى يتمثل في توجه إرادة الإنسان نحو الخير، وفي هذا اكتمال الحكمة، دون أن يشترط في هذا الإنسان القدرة على تحقيق ذلك الخير في الواقع، خصوصا إذا اعتبرنا العالم قسمان: قسم خارجي محكوم بقوانين طبيعية ولا سلطان للإنسان عليه، و قسم داخلي تحوز الذات قدرة على السيطرة على وقائعه وحالاته .
هكذا تكون الفضيلة من الوجهة الداخلية توجيها سليما للإرادة نحو الخير، ومن الوجهة الخارجية خضوعا للنظام العالم وانسجاما معه، وبهذا الانسجام يتحقق الخير الأكمل. هذا المبدأ هو نفسه تصور الرواقيين للأخلاق، فالأخلاق بالنسبة لديكارت هي أعلى مراتب الحكمة وهي أيضا اكتمال الفلسفة، و تتمثل هذه الحكمة في الحياة وفقا لنظام العالم و إخضاع الإرادة لنظام الأشياء .
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من خلال إهداء الكتاب إلى الأميرة إليزابيث ابنة ملك بوهيميا، ومن خلال الكلام الذي يوجهه ديكارت إليها، أن هذه الأميرة ذات قدرات عقلية نادرة وعالية، حتى أنه ينفي كون أحد غيرها قد تمكن من فهم كل مؤلفاته بذلك الوضوح الذي فهمتها به هي. يشير إلى أن غايته من وراء كتابة هذا الإهداء تكمن في رغبته في أن تكون خصال هذه الأميرة وصفاتها قدوة لمن سيقرؤون الكتاب من الأجيال المقبلة.
ترجم عثمان أمين هذا الكتاب من أصله اللاتيني مستعينا بالترجمة الفرنسية الأولى التي قدم لها ديكارت نفسه، وبترجمات فرنسية أخرى حديثة. كما ترجم عثمان كتبا أخرى لديكارت هي "تأملات في الفلسفة الأولى" و "مقال في المنهج"، كما قام بتأليف كتاب حول نفس الفيلسوف عنوانه "ديكارت".
January 29, 2025
There is a vast difference between real and apparent virtues; and there is also a great discrepancy between those real virtues that proceed from an accurate knowledge of the truth, and such as are accompanied with ignorance or error.
As we were at one time children, and as we formed various judgments regarding the objects presented to our senses, when as yet we had not the entire use of our reason, numerous prejudices stand in the way of our arriving at the knowledge of truth; and of these it seems impossible for us to rid ourselves, unless we undertake, once in our lifetime, to doubt of all those things in which we may discover even the smallest suspicion of uncertainty.
When the mind afterwards reviews the different ideas that are in it, it discovers what is by far the chief among them—that of a Being omniscient, all-powerful, and absolutely perfect; and it observes that in this idea there is contained not only possible and contingent existence, as in the ideas of all other things which it clearly perceives, but existence absolutely necessary and eternal.
As we were at one time children, and as we formed various judgments regarding the objects presented to our senses, when as yet we had not the entire use of our reason, numerous prejudices stand in the way of our arriving at the knowledge of truth; and of these it seems impossible for us to rid ourselves, unless we undertake, once in our lifetime, to doubt of all those things in which we may discover even the smallest suspicion of uncertainty.
When the mind afterwards reviews the different ideas that are in it, it discovers what is by far the chief among them—that of a Being omniscient, all-powerful, and absolutely perfect; and it observes that in this idea there is contained not only possible and contingent existence, as in the ideas of all other things which it clearly perceives, but existence absolutely necessary and eternal.
April 24, 2024
This book is very dry and difficult to get through, and I will have to read it a couple more times before I feel confident in saying I understand what Descartes means. But I'm not discouraged, because that's exactly what the author suggests, undoubtedly because he understood the depth of the ideas in which he was writing. There are so many pearls of knowledge to glean from his treatise, though, and I feel like so many people would benefit from the rough path to enlightenment that Descartes so skillfully guides. I know that a good many people would find the reading impossibly difficult and wind up rejecting all philosophy as only stuff that only geniuses can fathom. But that's not what philosophy is- it's a mountain that anyone can ultimately scale. If you want to enjoy the benefits of a clear and resolved mind, then you should read this book.
February 10, 2025
الإله الديكارتي : الكمال و المثل الكامله, الوحده بين الماهيه ( أي ما في العقل البشري ) و الوجود ( أي ما هو خارجه ), وهو الفكر أيضا
الله لايدرك بالحواس هو غير جسماني لأن الجسد هو دلاله النقص الإنساني.
الله لا متناهي, الأشياء الأخري كالأرقام مثلا هي لا محدودة .
مفهوم الزمن المجزيء .
اختلاف ديكارت مع المنظور الاسلامي حيث انه ينفي فكره تغير الله و تماهي فكره الله مع الزمن ( كل يوم هو في شأن ) و كيفياته او احواله و انما لله فقط ( صفات ) .
مبدأ الشك للتفرقه بين الواقع و الأحلام .
طرائق التمييز
1- التتمييز الواقعي بين جوهرين
2- التمييز من حيث الحال أي من الامتداد
3- التمييز المنطقي من حيث الفكر أي تمييز الجوهر بذاته
كتاب خارج من مطابع الكنيسة غالبا .
ديكارت لو كان علي أيامه منوم ما كانش هيبقي فيلسوف .
الله لايدرك بالحواس هو غير جسماني لأن الجسد هو دلاله النقص الإنساني.
الله لا متناهي, الأشياء الأخري كالأرقام مثلا هي لا محدودة .
مفهوم الزمن المجزيء .
اختلاف ديكارت مع المنظور الاسلامي حيث انه ينفي فكره تغير الله و تماهي فكره الله مع الزمن ( كل يوم هو في شأن ) و كيفياته او احواله و انما لله فقط ( صفات ) .
مبدأ الشك للتفرقه بين الواقع و الأحلام .
طرائق التمييز
1- التتمييز الواقعي بين جوهرين
2- التمييز من حيث الحال أي من الامتداد
3- التمييز المنطقي من حيث الفكر أي تمييز الجوهر بذاته
كتاب خارج من مطابع الكنيسة غالبا .
ديكارت لو كان علي أيامه منوم ما كانش هيبقي فيلسوف .
January 9, 2025
O primeiro e o segundo capítulos são sensacionais, Descartes em sua melhor forma. O livro trata de física, astronomia, química e geologia. O capítulo sobre física é ótimo. Passei pelo de astronomia sem dar muita atenção e parei no de geologia. São capítulos muito difíceis e a leitura só vale a pena pela curiosidade.
March 14, 2025
"Porém, relativamente às verdades em que a Teologia não interfere, bem parece inaceitável que um Homem que queira ser filósofo tome por verdadeiro o que não conheça como tal, e que prefira fiar-se nos sentidos, isto é, nos juízos inconsiderados da sua infância, em vez do que a razão lhe dita, desde que esteja em estado de a bem conduzir."
December 31, 2023
A good introduction to Cartesian metaphysics.
January 11, 2025
الشك كمنطلق أساسي وأولي للوصول إلى الحقائق التي نرجوا بلوغها ، من سمات كتاب مبادئ الفلسفة «les principes de la philosophie» بل وأول مسلمة على الباحث عن الحقيقة أن لايشك فيها وهو أن يشكّ في كلّ شيء ، خصوصا وأن معرفتنا بالأشياء هي معرفة في غالب الأحيان تتميز بقصرِ النّظر، ومتأثرة بالطابع الجسماني الذي يتأثر بالأحاسيس والمشاعر، خصوصا تلك التي كونها في مقتبل أعمارنا، الشيء الذي يجعلنا عرضة للخطأ وللحكم الخاطئ للأشياء التي ندعي معرفتها وتمييزها الحقة.
October 23, 2018
Cartesian philosophy is like a tree. The foundation -- or roots -- is comprised of his conclusions (which he reaches via radical methodical doubt until he finds various "certainties" with lead from one to the other) in the domain of metaphysics; his books "Discourse on the Method" and "Meditations" cover his metaphysical doctrines. The trunk of the tree is physics while the branches from the trunk are the sciences, such as medicine, morality, mechanics, cosmology, biology, etc.
This book is divided into four parts, mostly dealing with metaphysics, the material world (or world of extension), cosmology, and geophysics/ magnetism
Part 1 is basically a rehashing of his other work on metaphysics (see "Meditations")
Part 2 are his conclusions concerning the external world of objects, mostly centered upon the idea of space, what it is, and how to think about it. It seems like this might be the philosophical groundwork for Cartesian geometry
Part 3 concerns cosmology. According to Descartes, all things tend to all revolve around their center. Why? That's the way God made it! (he did not have Newton's solution yet, but he did know Galileo, Copernicus, and Tycho). According to his theory, there are three basic "elements" in the universe -- he gives his reasoning and the qualities of each; for example, the sun is made of only the first element, it is the most dense and also has the most energy (it is the source of fire). Descartes thought that each star, each planet, each moon, each body was its own "tourbillon," or "whirlwind" in English in that all the particles in that system revolved around their center.
Part 4 mostly concerns his geological speculations concerning the earth and physical speculations concerning fire and magnets. He correctly divided the earth into layers almost like we have today, but instead made up of his three primary elements. Like is said earlier, fire is the primary element escaping from the "pores" of each object. His speculations on magnetism are a bit complicated.
Overall, this book was exceedingly boring and this is by far his largest work. I would not recommend it to anyone unless you are like me, and have set it as your goal to read the read the life's work of Descartes (other than his correspondence). I typically like the writing style of Descartes since he is very concerned with being "clear" and "distinct" and each point flows logically (somehow at least, he was very far off on many things in this work) from the previous ones. One great positive insight I took away was, I think, a better understanding of where Leibniz was coming from in his "Monadology;" he no doubt had an influence from this.
This book is divided into four parts, mostly dealing with metaphysics, the material world (or world of extension), cosmology, and geophysics/ magnetism
Part 1 is basically a rehashing of his other work on metaphysics (see "Meditations")
Part 2 are his conclusions concerning the external world of objects, mostly centered upon the idea of space, what it is, and how to think about it. It seems like this might be the philosophical groundwork for Cartesian geometry
Part 3 concerns cosmology. According to Descartes, all things tend to all revolve around their center. Why? That's the way God made it! (he did not have Newton's solution yet, but he did know Galileo, Copernicus, and Tycho). According to his theory, there are three basic "elements" in the universe -- he gives his reasoning and the qualities of each; for example, the sun is made of only the first element, it is the most dense and also has the most energy (it is the source of fire). Descartes thought that each star, each planet, each moon, each body was its own "tourbillon," or "whirlwind" in English in that all the particles in that system revolved around their center.
Part 4 mostly concerns his geological speculations concerning the earth and physical speculations concerning fire and magnets. He correctly divided the earth into layers almost like we have today, but instead made up of his three primary elements. Like is said earlier, fire is the primary element escaping from the "pores" of each object. His speculations on magnetism are a bit complicated.
Overall, this book was exceedingly boring and this is by far his largest work. I would not recommend it to anyone unless you are like me, and have set it as your goal to read the read the life's work of Descartes (other than his correspondence). I typically like the writing style of Descartes since he is very concerned with being "clear" and "distinct" and each point flows logically (somehow at least, he was very far off on many things in this work) from the previous ones. One great positive insight I took away was, I think, a better understanding of where Leibniz was coming from in his "Monadology;" he no doubt had an influence from this.
April 27, 2017
Once again I find myself with Descartes in the beginning only to be disappointed shortly there after. He starts with... "In order to seek truth, it is necessary once in the course of our life to doubt as far as possible of all things." And though he closes with "I desire no one to believe anything I may have said unless he is constrained to by the force & evidence of reason..." he literally just finished saying that "...what God has revealed is incomparably more certain than anything else, and that we ought to submit our belief to the divine authority rather than to our own judgment even although perhaps the light of reason should with the greatest clearness and evidence appear to suggest to us something contrary to what is revealed." This is quite inconsistent, not to mention profoundly unscientific.
Descartes did not trust the senses, and for good reason. However, when he said "...we ought to prefer the divine authority to our perception..." but also said, "I submit all my opinions to the authority of the church..." I'm inclined to wonder how much of a difference he saw between the two.
Most of this book was frankly kind of boring & repetitive. I often found myself just wanting him to get to the point, and whenever he finally did, his conclusion not only didn't follow, but his "evidence" for it actually supports the opposite conclusion. For example, he spent much time demonstrating how the "soul" & "mind" are so woven to our bodies that basically all of our experiences & emotions can be explained as nerve firings resulting in subjective perceptions based on our physical dispositions. Then after explaining away all the characteristics attributed to our souls in terms of brain activity, he acts as if he just demonstrated that souls must therefore exist. His arguments for God are not much better.
Descartes did not trust the senses, and for good reason. However, when he said "...we ought to prefer the divine authority to our perception..." but also said, "I submit all my opinions to the authority of the church..." I'm inclined to wonder how much of a difference he saw between the two.
Most of this book was frankly kind of boring & repetitive. I often found myself just wanting him to get to the point, and whenever he finally did, his conclusion not only didn't follow, but his "evidence" for it actually supports the opposite conclusion. For example, he spent much time demonstrating how the "soul" & "mind" are so woven to our bodies that basically all of our experiences & emotions can be explained as nerve firings resulting in subjective perceptions based on our physical dispositions. Then after explaining away all the characteristics attributed to our souls in terms of brain activity, he acts as if he just demonstrated that souls must therefore exist. His arguments for God are not much better.
August 18, 2013
Genel olarak sevdim, en çok da yaratıcı ile âlakalı kısımları tabii. bir de evvela kısaca yazıp sonra uzunca anlatmasını. Alıntı ile gelecek olursam:
Nasıl kaldığımız yıkıntıyı yeniden yapmaya başlamadan önce yıkmak, gereç biriktirmek ve mimar bulmak ya da evin mimarı oluyorsanız, sonra dikkatle planını çizmekle yetinmeyip de aynı zamanda bu işle uğraşırken rahatça oturabilecek başka ev bulmanız da gerekiyorsa; bu iş gibi usum ( us mu? :( - eyfi) beni yargılarımda kararsız olmaya zorlarken, işlerimde kararsız kalmamak ve böylelikle elimden geldiğince mutlu yaşayabilmek için de kendime, üç ya da dört normdan oluşan eğreti bir ahlak benimsedim. Birincisi, Tanrı'nın çocukluğumdan beri içinde yetişmeme iyilik ve inayet (kayra) buyurduğu dine sağlamca bağlanarak, yurdumun yasa ve törelerine uymak, başka her şeyde kendimi, birlikte yaşayacağım kimselerin en akıllıları tarafından genellikle yerine getirilen en ölçülü ve aşırılıktan en uzak kanılara göre yönetmekti... İkinci normum, elimden geldiği ölçüde, işlerimde yetkili ve inatçı ve en kuşkulu kanıları bile, bir kez kabullendikten sonra güvenilir ve şaşmaz kanılarmış gibi her zaman inatla izlemekti. Üçüncü norm, her zaman işi talihe bırakmak yerine kendimi yenmeye ve dünyanın düzeninden çok, kendi isteklerimi değiştirmeye ve genellikle düşüncelerimizden başka hiçbir şeyin tamamıyla elimizde olmadığına, dolayısıyla bizim dışımızda olan nesnelere ilişkin elimizden geleni yaptıktan sonra, gücümüzün yetmediği tüm nesnelerin bizim için salt olanaksız olduğuna alışmaktır.
Nasıl kaldığımız yıkıntıyı yeniden yapmaya başlamadan önce yıkmak, gereç biriktirmek ve mimar bulmak ya da evin mimarı oluyorsanız, sonra dikkatle planını çizmekle yetinmeyip de aynı zamanda bu işle uğraşırken rahatça oturabilecek başka ev bulmanız da gerekiyorsa; bu iş gibi usum ( us mu? :( - eyfi) beni yargılarımda kararsız olmaya zorlarken, işlerimde kararsız kalmamak ve böylelikle elimden geldiğince mutlu yaşayabilmek için de kendime, üç ya da dört normdan oluşan eğreti bir ahlak benimsedim. Birincisi, Tanrı'nın çocukluğumdan beri içinde yetişmeme iyilik ve inayet (kayra) buyurduğu dine sağlamca bağlanarak, yurdumun yasa ve törelerine uymak, başka her şeyde kendimi, birlikte yaşayacağım kimselerin en akıllıları tarafından genellikle yerine getirilen en ölçülü ve aşırılıktan en uzak kanılara göre yönetmekti... İkinci normum, elimden geldiği ölçüde, işlerimde yetkili ve inatçı ve en kuşkulu kanıları bile, bir kez kabullendikten sonra güvenilir ve şaşmaz kanılarmış gibi her zaman inatla izlemekti. Üçüncü norm, her zaman işi talihe bırakmak yerine kendimi yenmeye ve dünyanın düzeninden çok, kendi isteklerimi değiştirmeye ve genellikle düşüncelerimizden başka hiçbir şeyin tamamıyla elimizde olmadığına, dolayısıyla bizim dışımızda olan nesnelere ilişkin elimizden geleni yaptıktan sonra, gücümüzün yetmediği tüm nesnelerin bizim için salt olanaksız olduğuna alışmaktır.
August 25, 2021
Descartes'in düşüncesi ve çözümlemelerinde garip bir tutarsızlık var ve açıkçası okurken bu düşünceden bir türlü kurtulamadım. Salt akıl ve net bir yöntem ile ulaştığı sonuçlar aslında epey varsayımsal ve kabuller üzerine kurulu. Varlığı, sonluyu, sonsuzu doğru düzgün tartışmadan tanrıya ulaşabiliyor. Ya da yokluğu tartışmadan kategorik olarak reddediyor ve sonra maddenin sonlu parçalara sahip olamayacağını öne sürüveriyor. Diğer yandan da göreliliğin önünü açma potansiyeli olan bir gözlemi, gemideki adamın karaya göre hareket ettiğini ama gemiye göre durduğunu paylaşarak, dünyanın da pekala durağan olmayabileceğine de yelken açmış oluyor. O zaman durmak ve hareketin tamamen göreli bir şey olduğu sonucuna koşabilecekken, bir anda durup "yer hareket etmediğine göre" gibi kabullere tekrar sarılıyor.
Demek istediğim, hedefi mutlak olanı bulmak olan birine göre açık şekilde fazlaca varsayım yapıyor ve bununla barışık olabiliyor. Bu tutarsızlık da metni anlamamı, biraz da duygusal açıdan, zorlaştırdı. Örneğin "varsayımlarım şunlardır, bu varsayımları henüz ispatlayamadım, ama ispatladığımda onları da açacağım" gibi bir not düşmüş olmasını bekledim.
Çevirisi metnin kendisi gibi biraz zorlayıcı olmuş, uzun ve soyut cümlelerin içinden çıkmak hiç kolay olmadı, yer yer de çıkamadığımı itiraf etmeliyim.
Demek istediğim, hedefi mutlak olanı bulmak olan birine göre açık şekilde fazlaca varsayım yapıyor ve bununla barışık olabiliyor. Bu tutarsızlık da metni anlamamı, biraz da duygusal açıdan, zorlaştırdı. Örneğin "varsayımlarım şunlardır, bu varsayımları henüz ispatlayamadım, ama ispatladığımda onları da açacağım" gibi bir not düşmüş olmasını bekledim.
Çevirisi metnin kendisi gibi biraz zorlayıcı olmuş, uzun ve soyut cümlelerin içinden çıkmak hiç kolay olmadı, yer yer de çıkamadığımı itiraf etmeliyim.
September 11, 2019
"Aklını her zaman gücü yettiği ölçüde iyi kullanabilen ve tüm işlerinde en iyi olduğuna inandığı şeyi yapmak için sağlam ve durağan bir istence sahip olan bir kimse, doğasının el verdiği oranda, gerçekten bilgedir ve yalnızca bundan dolayı doğru, yürekli ve ölçülü olduğu yanla diğer tüm erdemlere sahiptir." Sf 30
"Gerçeği arayanın yaşamında bir kez tüm nesnelerden gücü yettiği ölçüde kuşku duyması gerekir." sf 51
"Yanlışlarımızın ilk ve başlıca nedeni çocukluğumuzda edindiğimiz önyargılardır." sf 103
Kitabın İkinci Bölümü'nde Descartes'ın matematiksel formüller ve fizik kuralları ile anlatmaya çalıştığı felsefi kavramlar dışında, Modern Felsefenin Kurucusu ile bu kitabıyla tanıştığım için memnunum. İkinci bölümü anlamama sebebim tamamen benim sözel ve dilsel alanlara yatkın olup, sayısal konularda ezelden beri başarısız olmamdan kaynaklanıyor.
Bu tür kitaplar bir solukta okunup bitirilecek kurgusal romanlardan olmadığı için, yaşamımızın farklı çağlarında açıp okunabilecek ve her yaşta farklı bilgiler öğrenebileceğimiz kitaplardan olduğunu düşünüyorum.
"Gerçeği arayanın yaşamında bir kez tüm nesnelerden gücü yettiği ölçüde kuşku duyması gerekir." sf 51
"Yanlışlarımızın ilk ve başlıca nedeni çocukluğumuzda edindiğimiz önyargılardır." sf 103
Kitabın İkinci Bölümü'nde Descartes'ın matematiksel formüller ve fizik kuralları ile anlatmaya çalıştığı felsefi kavramlar dışında, Modern Felsefenin Kurucusu ile bu kitabıyla tanıştığım için memnunum. İkinci bölümü anlamama sebebim tamamen benim sözel ve dilsel alanlara yatkın olup, sayısal konularda ezelden beri başarısız olmamdan kaynaklanıyor.
Bu tür kitaplar bir solukta okunup bitirilecek kurgusal romanlardan olmadığı için, yaşamımızın farklı çağlarında açıp okunabilecek ve her yaşta farklı bilgiler öğrenebileceğimiz kitaplardan olduğunu düşünüyorum.
April 9, 2017
Рене Декарт окончательно укрепился во мнении � необходимо менять устоявшуюся модель подготовки подрастающих поколений. Со времён древнегреческих философов минуло порядочное количество лет, а лучшие умы Европы продолжают в своих воззрениях опираться на работы Аристотеля. Не осталось для Декарта авторитетов, теперь он должен стать авторитетом, осветить путь к познанию собственным сиянием. Важным к тому шагом послужило написание труда «Первоначала философии». Этот труд призван изменить представления о мире, побудить людей мыслить самостоятельно. Сей труд должен был быть понятным каждому, затрагивать всевозможные аспекты современности. Он разделён на четыре части: Об основах человеческого познания, О началах материальных вещей, О видимом мире, О Земле.
June 16, 2020
Pročitao sam celu knjigu, doduše fragmetarno u različito vreme iz različitih predmeta tokom osnovnih studija filozofije. Preporučujem čitanje na engleskom prevodu (uglavnom zbog šturosti srpsko-hrvatskog prevoda i nedostatka fusnota). U delu je na "matematički način" prikazana Dekartova epistemologija i Metafizika koja se pojavljuje i u "meditacijama". Korisno je napomenuti da se u ovom delu pojavljuju i definicije supstancije i atributa (51-60 tačka prvog dela). Drugi deo je posvećen Dekartovoj fizici. Upravo zbog ovog drugog dela dajem visoku ocenu. Za drugi deo posebno naglašavam preporuku čitanja na engleskom prevodu. sa komentarima ako je moguće! Dekartova fizika poseduje mnogo zanimljivog i inspirativnog "mesa" za dalje tumačenje kao i moguće povezivanje sa kasnijim fizičarima (Lajbnic, Njutn).
March 5, 2016
I believe this work might be called principles of physics as much as philosophy. Building upon a foundation of idealism, he gradually erects a model of physical reality, delving into extension, color, and all the many modes of material existence. Most of the points are somewhat obvious from observation, but one has to perfectly enumerate what is know before it can be expanded, or as he puts it:
"But as it is not from the roots or the trunks of trees that we gather the fruit, but only from the extremities of their branches, so the principal utility of philosophy depends on the separate uses of its parts, which we can only learn last of all."
Overall, a worthy read, and an absolute necessity for budding idealists.
"But as it is not from the roots or the trunks of trees that we gather the fruit, but only from the extremities of their branches, so the principal utility of philosophy depends on the separate uses of its parts, which we can only learn last of all."
Overall, a worthy read, and an absolute necessity for budding idealists.
April 25, 2021
Descartes intended Principles of Philosophy as "a presentation of his philosophical system ‘in an order which will make it easy to teach�". Appealing as this framing might be, one who wishes to acquaint (or reacquaint) himself with "the father of modern philosophy" might best look elsewhere. While Descartes' most important ideas are all present, there is little here that he did not better express elsewhere previously. Put simply, Principles lacks the spark of inspiration that made Meditations on First Philosophy so profound. Reading or re-reading that earlier work will likely offer the reader greater reward.
February 1, 2022
I mean. I’m not really going to say anything bad about this.
Imagine if I did. “Descartes doesn’t know what he’s talking about!�! He got it wrong!
Part of my shitty review might be attributed to the fact that I read this over the course of a couple days fueled by anxiety and Wild Turkey Whisky.
Seriously though. This is BOOOORRRRRIIIINNNNGGGG. Not a real page turner. However, if you’re looking to begin a journey into utter existentialism, and are fascinated by this idea of mind body dualism� then have I got the book for you!
Imagine if I did. “Descartes doesn’t know what he’s talking about!�! He got it wrong!
Part of my shitty review might be attributed to the fact that I read this over the course of a couple days fueled by anxiety and Wild Turkey Whisky.
Seriously though. This is BOOOORRRRRIIIINNNNGGGG. Not a real page turner. However, if you’re looking to begin a journey into utter existentialism, and are fascinated by this idea of mind body dualism� then have I got the book for you!
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