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“Even if patients with a severed corpus callosum are in fact harboring two distinct loci of experience, this does not show that they or individuals with normal brains do not harbor many more experiencers within them, because the behaviors and reports elicited in experiments do not speak to that question. As Thomas Nagel points out in one of the first philosophical treatments of the split-brain phenomenon, there is no reason to think that verbalizability, or, we might add, any motor output capacity, is a necessary condition for subjective experience. Because measurable outputs will generally occur at the level of maximal integration - that is, at the level of the organism as a whole - they say rather little about the presence of subjective experience in subsystems that are nested within the main system, whether these subsystems are neuronal networks or even neurons themselves. The notion of nested experiencers may counterintuitive, but if we have learned any lesson from modern science, it is that the range of things that exist and the range of things that are intuitively plausible often fail to overlap. It is probably best, therefore, to remain agnostic as to whether there are nested experiencers within maximally integrated conscious systems.”