The History Book Club discussion
POLITICAL SCIENCE
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS - GENERAL
message 252:
by
Jerome, Assisting Moderator - Upcoming Books and Releases
(new)
An upcoming book:
Release date: September 15, 2014
The Global Republic: America's Inadvertent Rise to World Power
by Frank Ninkovich (no photo)
Synopsis:
For decades the United States has been the most dominant player on the world’s stage. The country’s economic authority, its globally forceful foreign policy, and its leading position in international institutions tend to be seen as the result of a long-standing, deliberate drive to become a major global force. Furthermore, it has become widely accepted that American exceptionalism—the belief that America is a country like no other in history—has been at the root of many of the country’s political, military, and global moves. Frank Ninkovich disagrees.
One of the preeminent intellectual historians of our time, Ninkovich delivers here his most ambitious and sweeping book to date. He argues that historically the United States has been driven not by a belief in its destiny or its special character but rather by a need to survive the forces of globalization. He builds the powerful case that American foreign policy has long been based on and entangled in questions of global engagement, while also showing that globalization itself has always been distinct from—and sometimes in direct conflict with—what we call international society.
In the second half of the twentieth century, the United States unexpectedly stumbled into the role of global policeman and was forced to find ways to resolve international conflicts that did not entail nuclear warfare. The United States's decisions were based less in notions of exceptionalism and more in a need to preserve and expand a flourishing global society that had become essential to the American way of life.
Sure to be controversial, The Global Republiccompellingly and provocatively counters some of the deepest and most common misconceptions about America’s history and its place in the world.
Release date: September 15, 2014
The Global Republic: America's Inadvertent Rise to World Power

Synopsis:
For decades the United States has been the most dominant player on the world’s stage. The country’s economic authority, its globally forceful foreign policy, and its leading position in international institutions tend to be seen as the result of a long-standing, deliberate drive to become a major global force. Furthermore, it has become widely accepted that American exceptionalism—the belief that America is a country like no other in history—has been at the root of many of the country’s political, military, and global moves. Frank Ninkovich disagrees.
One of the preeminent intellectual historians of our time, Ninkovich delivers here his most ambitious and sweeping book to date. He argues that historically the United States has been driven not by a belief in its destiny or its special character but rather by a need to survive the forces of globalization. He builds the powerful case that American foreign policy has long been based on and entangled in questions of global engagement, while also showing that globalization itself has always been distinct from—and sometimes in direct conflict with—what we call international society.
In the second half of the twentieth century, the United States unexpectedly stumbled into the role of global policeman and was forced to find ways to resolve international conflicts that did not entail nuclear warfare. The United States's decisions were based less in notions of exceptionalism and more in a need to preserve and expand a flourishing global society that had become essential to the American way of life.
Sure to be controversial, The Global Republiccompellingly and provocatively counters some of the deepest and most common misconceptions about America’s history and its place in the world.
What Do the European Union Election Results Mean?
Source: Brookings
We learned five important things from the elections to the European Parliament whose votes are still being counted this morning:
1. Protest parties critical of the status quo in Brussels did very well, as expected... but not well enough to upset the fundamental balance of power in Brussels
2. The elections may slow the movement of power to the Parliament
3. The Italian government was substantially bolstered by the results
4. The French and UK governments were weakened a bit
5. Most other governments avoided serious new problems
Author: Douglas J. Elliott (not in goodreads)
Full Article:
Source: Brookings
We learned five important things from the elections to the European Parliament whose votes are still being counted this morning:
1. Protest parties critical of the status quo in Brussels did very well, as expected... but not well enough to upset the fundamental balance of power in Brussels
2. The elections may slow the movement of power to the Parliament
3. The Italian government was substantially bolstered by the results
4. The French and UK governments were weakened a bit
5. Most other governments avoided serious new problems
Author: Douglas J. Elliott (not in goodreads)
Full Article:
message 254:
by
Jerome, Assisting Moderator - Upcoming Books and Releases
(new)
An upcoming book:
Release date: January 2, 2015
A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s
by Daniel J Sargent (no photo)
Synopsis:
During the 1970s, American foreign policy faced a predicament of clashing imperatives-U.S. decision maker, already struggling to maintain stability and devise strategic frameworks to guide the exercise of American power during the Cold War, found themselves hampered by the emergence of dilemmas that would come to a head in the post-Cold War era. Their choices proved to be of enormous consequence for the development of American foreign policy in the final decades of the twentieth century and beyond.
In A Superpower Transformed, historian Daniel J. Sargent chronicles how policymakers across three administrations worked to manage complex international changes in a tumultuous era. Drawing on many newly-released archival documents and interviews with key figures, including President Jimmy Carter and Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Sargent explores the collision of geopolitics and globalization that pervaded the decade. From the Nixon administration's efforts to stabilize a faltering Pax Americana; to Henry Kissinger's attempts to devise new strategies to manage or mitigate the consequences of economic globalization after the oil crisis of 1973-74; to the Carter administration's embrace of human rights promotion as a central task for foreign policy, Sargent explores the challenges that afflicted US policymakers in the 1970s, offering new insights into the complexities that emerged as the new forces of globalization and human rights transformed the United States as a superpower.
A sweeping reinterpretation of a pivotal era, A Superpower Transformed is a must-read for anyone interested in U.S. foreign relations, American politics, globalization, economic policy, human rights, and contemporary American history.
Release date: January 2, 2015
A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s

Synopsis:
During the 1970s, American foreign policy faced a predicament of clashing imperatives-U.S. decision maker, already struggling to maintain stability and devise strategic frameworks to guide the exercise of American power during the Cold War, found themselves hampered by the emergence of dilemmas that would come to a head in the post-Cold War era. Their choices proved to be of enormous consequence for the development of American foreign policy in the final decades of the twentieth century and beyond.
In A Superpower Transformed, historian Daniel J. Sargent chronicles how policymakers across three administrations worked to manage complex international changes in a tumultuous era. Drawing on many newly-released archival documents and interviews with key figures, including President Jimmy Carter and Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Sargent explores the collision of geopolitics and globalization that pervaded the decade. From the Nixon administration's efforts to stabilize a faltering Pax Americana; to Henry Kissinger's attempts to devise new strategies to manage or mitigate the consequences of economic globalization after the oil crisis of 1973-74; to the Carter administration's embrace of human rights promotion as a central task for foreign policy, Sargent explores the challenges that afflicted US policymakers in the 1970s, offering new insights into the complexities that emerged as the new forces of globalization and human rights transformed the United States as a superpower.
A sweeping reinterpretation of a pivotal era, A Superpower Transformed is a must-read for anyone interested in U.S. foreign relations, American politics, globalization, economic policy, human rights, and contemporary American history.
What Iran Really Wants
Iranian Foreign Policy in the Rouhani Era
By Mohammad Javad Zarif

President Hassan Rouhani and the author in Davos, Switzerland, January 2014. (Eric Piermont / Getty)
Foreign policy is a critical component in the lives, conduct, and governance of all nation-states. But it has become even more significant in recent years as interstate relations have grown ever more complex. The inexorable rise in the number of international players -- including multilateral organizations, nonstate actors, and even individuals -- has further complicated policymaking. Meanwhile, the ongoing process of globalization -- however conceived and defined, whether lauded or despised -- has brought its inescapable weight to bear on the foreign policies of all states, whether large or small, developed or developing.
Since its establishment by a popular revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has grappled with these challenges. The postrevolutionary foreign policy of Iran has been based on a number of cherished ideals and objectives embedded in the country’s constitution. These include the preservation of Iran’s independence, territorial integrity, and national security and the achievement of long-term, sustainable national development. Beyond its borders, Iran seeks to enhance its regional and global stature; to promote its ideals, including Islamic democracy; to expand its bilateral and multilateral relations, particularly with neighboring Muslim-majority countries and nonaligned states; to reduce tensions and manage disagreements with other states; to foster peace and security at both the regional and the international levels through positive engagement; and to promote international understanding through dialogue and cultural interaction.
Remainder of article:
Iranian Foreign Policy in the Rouhani Era
By Mohammad Javad Zarif

President Hassan Rouhani and the author in Davos, Switzerland, January 2014. (Eric Piermont / Getty)
Foreign policy is a critical component in the lives, conduct, and governance of all nation-states. But it has become even more significant in recent years as interstate relations have grown ever more complex. The inexorable rise in the number of international players -- including multilateral organizations, nonstate actors, and even individuals -- has further complicated policymaking. Meanwhile, the ongoing process of globalization -- however conceived and defined, whether lauded or despised -- has brought its inescapable weight to bear on the foreign policies of all states, whether large or small, developed or developing.
Since its establishment by a popular revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has grappled with these challenges. The postrevolutionary foreign policy of Iran has been based on a number of cherished ideals and objectives embedded in the country’s constitution. These include the preservation of Iran’s independence, territorial integrity, and national security and the achievement of long-term, sustainable national development. Beyond its borders, Iran seeks to enhance its regional and global stature; to promote its ideals, including Islamic democracy; to expand its bilateral and multilateral relations, particularly with neighboring Muslim-majority countries and nonaligned states; to reduce tensions and manage disagreements with other states; to foster peace and security at both the regional and the international levels through positive engagement; and to promote international understanding through dialogue and cultural interaction.
Remainder of article:

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry will meet with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif late Friday in Vienna, as a crucial deadline looms to reach a comprehensive deal on Iran's nuclear program.
U.S. officials say former European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton will also take part in the meeting.
The deadline for a deal is Monday and Kerry said Thursday there are no plans for an extension.
The negotiations were originally due to end in July, but with no agreement in place the two sides decided to give themselves another six months.
British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond says there is still a "significant gap" between the parties in the negotiations. But he says if Iran shows flexibility the international team will reciprocate.
Iran's official news agency reported realier that Zarif may return to Tehran for talks late Friday with senior Iranian officials. But a member of the delegation later told Iranian news agencies the talks had not yet reached a stage that necessitated Zarif to leave Vienna.
VOA State Department correspondent Scott Stearns says U.S. diplomatic activity indicates the Obama administration is preparing allies concerned about Iran's nuclear ambitions - chiefly Turkey and Saudi Arabia - for the possibility of a deal.
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden visits Turkey Friday for talks, while Kerry met on Thursday with the foreign ministers of France and Saudi Arabia to discuss the negotiations on Iran's atomic program. President Obama met with the Saudi National Guard minister in Washington earlier this week.
Iran and six world powers -- the U.S., Britain, China, France, Russia and Germany -- have been trying for a year to reach a deal that would scale back Iran's nuclear program in exchange for reduced sanctions.
The U.S. and its allies have long argued that Iran is trying to build nuclear weapons. Iran says its nuclear research is only for peaceful purposes.
(Source: )

By Daniel Trotta and Steve Holland

Alan Gross (C) and his wife Judy face a news conference in Washington hours after his release from Cuba on December 17, 2014. Cuba released Gross after five years in prison in a reported prisoner exchange.
HAVANA/WASHINGTON (Reuters) - President Barack Obama announced the United States would restore diplomatic relations it severed with Cuba more than 50 years ago, drawing resistance from lawmakers opposed to reconciling with the communist-run island.
After 18 months of secret talks facilitated by the Vatican and Canada, Obama and Cuban President Raul Castro agreed by phone on Tuesday on a prisoner exchange and the opening of embassies in each other's countries.
In a television speech on Wednesday, Obama announced the end of what he called a rigid and outdated policy of isolating Cuba that had been ineffective in achieving change on the island.
Obama said the moves were made possible by Havana's release of American Alan Gross, 65, who had been imprisoned in Cuba for five years.
Cuba is also releasing an intelligence agent who spied for the United States and was held for nearly 20 years, and the United States in return freed three Cuban intelligence agents held in the United States.
At the same time Castro hailed the exchange of prisoners and praised Obama. Known for his low-key style, Castro avoided triumphal statements in his televised address but said the release of the three Cubans was a cause of "enormous joy for their families and all of our people."
Obama said Pope Francis, the first Latin American pontiff, had played an active role in pressing for Gross' release. A sizable part of Cuba's population is Roman Catholic. The Vatican worked closely with both sides and hosted in-person meetings of U.S. officials, senior Obama administration officials said.
The policy shift will mean an opening to some commerce and transportation without ending a longstanding trade embargo. That is codified in legislation and needs congressional approval that Obama said he would seek, but he will likely face a struggle.
While travel restrictions that make it hard for most Americans to visit will be eased, the door will not yet be open for broad U.S. tourism on the Caribbean island.
Cuba and the United States have been ideological foes since soon after the 1959 revolution that brought Raul Castro's older brother, Fidel Castro, to power. Washington broke diplomatic relations with Havana in 1961 and the United States has maintained its trade embargo on the island, 90 miles (140 km) south of Florida, for more than 50 years.
CRITICS CHALLENGE OBAMA
Critics of Obama's announcement said Cuba should not be rewarded when it has not changed.
Former Florida Governor - and potential 2016 Republican presidential candidate - Jeb Bush was cited by USA Today as saying, "I don't think we should be negotiating with a repressive regime to make changes in our relationship."
Although a growing number of U.S. lawmakers favor more normal ties, those lawmakers are still mostly Democrats, and after big midterm election gains in November, Republicans will control both houses of Congress in the new year.
Senator Marco Rubio, a Cuban American Republican, said he would use his role as incoming chairman of a key Senate Foreign Relations Committee to try to block the plan and was committed to doing all he could to "unravel" it.
Whatever the criticism at home, Obama's move was made with the political liberty of a president who, midway through his second term, no longer faces an electorate.
His move could bolster Democratic hopes of retaining the support of Latino voters as the party looks ahead to the presidential election in 2016. Republican candidates seeking to carve out some of the Latino vote may have difficulty arguing against the Cuba move.
Americans are largely open to establishing diplomatic relations with the Cuban government, according to a Reuters/Ipsos poll of more than 31,000 adults conducted between July and October.
Around one-fifth said they opposed such a move, while 43 percent said the United States should restore relations with Cuba and around 37 percent said they were unsure.
CUBAN AMERICANS SPLIT
News of the changes rippled fast through the 1.5 million-strong Cuban American community in the United States, hailed by some who are keen to see closer ties with the island and condemned by others.
Older Cubans who left the island soon after the revolution have remained opposed to ties with either Castro brother in power. Younger Cubans, who left more recently or were born in the United States, have shown more interest in warmer relations.
"It's amazing," said Hugo Cancio, who arrived in Miami in the 1980 Mariel boatlift and runs a magazine with offices in Miami and Havana. "This is a new beginning, a dream come true for the 11.2 million Cubans in Cuba, and I think it will provoke a change of mentality here too in this community."
Washington's policy towards Cuba survived the demise of Soviet communism and the end of the Cold War as the United States pushes for democratic reform in Cuba. Flashpoints in U.S.-Cuba hostilities included the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 that brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.
Raul Castro, who took over from Fidel Castro when his brother retired in 2008, has carried out some economic reforms but maintained a one-party political system.
In his remarks, Obama said Cuba still needed to make changes, including economic reforms and improving human rights.
GROSS CASE
Obama said the Gross case had stalled his ambitions to try to reset relations with Havana, calling it a "major obstacle."
Cuba arrested Gross on Dec. 3, 2009, and sentenced him to 15 years in prison for importing banned technology and trying to establish clandestine Internet service for Cuban Jews. Gross had been working as a subcontractor for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
Gross's lawyer and family have described him as mentally vanquished, gaunt, hobbling and missing five teeth. Speaking to reporters after arriving in the United States, Gross thanked Obama for all he had done to secure his release and said he did not blame the Cuban people for his ordeal.
His case raised alarm about USAID's practice of hiring private citizens to carry out secretive assignments in hostile places. Cuba considers USAID another instrument of continual U.S. harassment dating back to 1959.
The three Cuban intelligence agents, jailed since 1998, are Gerardo Hernandez, 49, Antonio Guerrero, 56, and Ramon Labañino, 51. Two others had been released before on completing their sentences - Rene Gonzalez, 58, and Fernando Gonzalez, 51. The three arrived in Cuba on Wednesday, Castro said.
Despite their decades of animosity, the two countries have long been engaged on a host of issues such as immigration, drug interdiction and oil-spill mitigation.
(Additional reporting by Matt Spetalnick, Patricia Zengerle, Roberta Rampton and Richard Cowan; Writing by Frances Kerry; Editing by Howard Goller)
(Source: )



By Daniel Trotta and Steve Holland
Alan Gross (C) and his wife Judy face a news conference in Washington hours after his release from Cu..."
Actually this might provide the USA with more influence in this part of the world. Democraties should lead by example. Many will prefer Obama's game in Cuba to Putin's play in Crimea. There will be opponents to this initiative in the US but that is par for the course. A president at the end of his second mandate is well positioned to provoke some changes in the foreign policy arena.


Excellent point Daniel and Bryan I think you are correct - the Pope also being a South American is in a good position to improve relationships in other countries in that part of the world not only Cuba which he played an important role in.
I have always thought that US relationships stopped short south of Mexico - you never hear much except the volatile rhetoric we had heard from Hugo Chavez in Venezuela before his passing.
I have always thought that US relationships stopped short south of Mexico - you never hear much except the volatile rhetoric we had heard from Hugo Chavez in Venezuela before his passing.

The Cuban relationship is a very emotional issue in the US but after 60 years it is time to move on. If not it is like the vendetta in Corsica: generations fight on forever for events of the past. Reuniting families should be such an important issue.
This opening will probably bring credibility to the US south of Mexico.
Yes, I am hoping that the good will heads South - maybe the Pope can do something with Argentina - have never thought things were that rosy with that country either.

North Korea’s Power Behind the Throne
The Hermit Kingdom’s covert state surveillance organ has started revealing itself to the outside world.
By JANG JIN-SUNG
Nov. 6, 2014 12:05 p.m. ET

POWER PLAY: Hwang Pyong So visited South Korea in April with the kind of security detail normally reserved for the country’s supreme leader. YONHAP/EUROPEAN PRESSPHOTO AGENCY
Given how little is known about the inner workings of North Korea, the world has been watching with keen interest first the disappearance and now the return of Kim Jong Un. Whispers of upheaval within the current regime have been circulating ever since the 31-year-old Kim assumed the role of supreme leader almost three years ago. But they reached a fever pitch during his month-long absence for what is now being reported as an ankle surgery.
When Kim’s uncle, Jang Song Thaek, was arrested and executed in December 2013, many believed that it was a symptom of internal struggle, that Kim was still seeking to consolidate power and eliminate the factions undermining the authority he inherited from his father, Kim Jong Il. The mistake, however, is to believe that power in the Hermit Kingdom still rests on the shoulder of one man, even if that man is a descendant of Kim Il Sung, the country’s founder and “Eternal President.�
The notion of an infallible “Supreme Leader,� in North Korea as elsewhere, has long been part of a narrative for the consumption of its people. Under Kim Jong Il, the Korean Workers� Party’s Organization and Guidance Department became the nerve center of the surveillance and enforcement systems that safeguarded the supreme leader’s rule, engaging directly with the state’s central institutions and highest-ranking cadres. It was the key to Kim Jong Il’s concentration of dictatorial authority, the tool he used to consolidate power and eliminate his opponents since the late 1970s. The OGD ultimately brought together under one section all of Kim Jong Il’s personal bodyguards, the military and the surveillance institutions.
Publicly, Kim Jong Il scrupulously enforced a principle of modesty to keep the OGD hidden and direct all focus towards the idea of an infallible Supreme Leader. Behind the scenes, however, all North Korean institutions came under the monitoring of Kim Jong Il’s hidden enforcers through the Party Committee system for upholding the Supreme Leader’s guidance. Official hierarchies that were supposed to reflect the leadership of North Korea remained unchanged from the previous era; meanwhile, elite cadres entrusted with overseeing policy formation, strategic planning or implementation in essential areas were monitored by surveillance mechanisms and controlled through party structures. All lines of reporting converged on the OGD.
After Kim Jong Il’s death, however, a number of events have undermined the notion of a Supreme Leader with absolute authority. The highly publicized purge of Jang Song Thaek was the most blatant, shattering the fiercely guarded notion of infallibility among the Kim family, at least in the official narrative.
Now the OGD is coming out of hiding as a nexus of power. This was most pronounced with the appointment in April 2014 of Hwang Pyong So, the OGD first deputy director of military affairs, as the head of the General Political Bureau, the North Korean military’s highest public office. On his recent visit to South Korea, Mr. Hwang even showed up with the kind of close protection previously reserved only for the supreme leader. This is the kind of demonstration that in a different era would have been considered a “factional crime.�
Most impressive is that any of this was allowed to happen at all. The OGD continues to monopolize the mechanisms of enforcement and control, but now its method of maintaining power is evolving in fundamental ways. Perhaps it feels that Kim’s “infallible authority� is no longer sufficient.
And it’s no wonder if Kim Jong Un finds his grip over the OGD to be tenuous: Beginning in the early 1970s, Kim Jong Il worked diligently with his university classmates to form a power base through the OGD, obsessively implementing numerous purges to secure a political system in which only he could hold power. In contrast, Kim Jong Un’s classmates are foreigners from his school days in Switzerland, while the OGD continues to be run by his father’s most experienced, uncompromising and viciously astute associates.
The reality of power in North Korea is that hereditary succession on its own is not sufficient. Moreover, the economic collapse and the ensuing marketization of the 1990s—which for many elites brought wealth to the fore—made material success more important than a reliance on loyalty alone. Thus it is not only a question of maintaining surface continuity from one supreme leader to another; it is also about the guardians of Kim Jong Il’s power system and their managing the confluence of power and wealth.
North Korea watchers should look out for the OGD’s efforts, such as Mr. Hwang’s, to breach the surface, and the decisions that are made according to the increasing weight of this publicly exercised power. The OGD will strive not to safeguard the ruling Kim’s power, but rather to protect his legitimacy. Its own interests—co-opting and controlling the spheres of influence that might otherwise threaten their system’s entrenched grip over North Korea—will increasingly come to the fore.
Mr. Jang is a former official of North Korea’s United Front Department. He is the author of “Dear Leader� and chief editor of New Focus International.
(Source: )


By Lizette Alvarez Feb. 1, 2015

A boat carrying 24 Cubans south of Key West, Fla., on Jan. 1. They were sent back. Credit U.S. Coast Guard
MIAMI � In the wake of President Obama’s move to rekindle diplomatic ties with Cuba, Cuban-American legislators in Washington and local officials in Florida are calling for reconsideration of a once-sacrosanct element of American foreign policy � the 1966 law that gives Cubans broader protections than any other immigrants arriving in the United States.
Critics of the law, joined by the hard-line Cuban-American congressional delegation, say it is being abused by recent waves of Cuban arrivals who regularly travel back and forth between Cuba and the United States as economic, not political, refugees.
Written during the height of tensions with the Soviet Union, the Cuban Adjustment Act was meant to offer safe haven for Cuban refugees fleeing oppression from their Communist government. The law allows all Cubans who reach the United States, legally or illegally, to become permanent residents in a year and a day. Five years later, they can become United States citizens.
The law is still popular with most Cubans in Florida. But influential Cuban-American politicians argue that the moves to normalize relations undercut the rationale for the law � that it protected refugees from an outlaw government at a time they did not have the option of returning home.
Critics also say the law is being abused by criminals who take advantage of it to ferry money between Cuba and the United States, and then flee to Cuba rather than risk arrest.
Representative Carlos Curbelo, a newly elected Republican Cuban-American from Florida, said he would draft legislation to make it more difficult for Cubans who come seeking jobs, and not protection from the Castro government, to avail themselves of the law.
“The president’s actions on Cuba have severely undermined the law because he has essentially recognized the Cuban government as legitimate,� Mr. Curbelo said. He added, “The United States has offered one of the most generous immigration laws perhaps in history, and certainly that is being abused systematically.�
His reservations are shared by other Cuban-Americans in Congress, including Senator Marco Rubio, Republican of Florida, and Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey. But, reflecting the delicacy of the issue among Cubans, the others have not detailed any corrective action.
Their concerns are also shared by the Miami-Dade County Commission in Florida, which recently voted unanimously to ask Congress to revise the law.
“I think the law should be eliminated,� Bruno Barreiro, the commissioner who sponsored the resolution, said the week before the vote. “How can someone claim to be politically persecuted, have a special path to residency and citizenship, and a year and a day after being here travel back to Cuba?�
The commissioners� position reflects a divide between many recent and older immigrants from Cuba. Many earlier immigrants say the law should only protect Cubans fleeing political oppression. Newer immigrants, who benefit most from the law, are more likely to support its blanket application to all Cuban immigrants. But the Cubans who have been here longest have the most political clout.
For now, the law stands, and Obama administration officials say they do not intend to weaken it. Nor are there plans to modify a 1995 immigration policy that allows the United States Coast Guard to return to Cuba the Cubans it stops at sea, unless they claim political persecution. Under this “wet feet, dry feet� approach, those who make it to American soil can avail themselves of the Cuban Adjustment Act.
Fear that the policy would change after President Obama’s announcement led to a surge in Cubans jumping on boats and rafts headed for Florida in the past month. The numbers have begun to decline since the government emphasized that no change was imminent.
“A change in policy is not being considered,� said Alejandro Mayorkas, deputy secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, who attributed the rumors of a policy change to smugglers trying to drum up business.
Because it is a law, Congress can repeal the adjustment act, but not easily. It can do so only after the president has determined that a “democratically elected government in Cuba is in power.�
The law also remains a matter of contention between American and Cuban officials. During recent negotiations in Havana, a Cuban official said the law tempted Cubans to risk their lives at sea, enriched smugglers and siphoned away Cuban professionals.
American officials shrugged off the complaints. “We explained to the Cuban government that our government is completely committed to upholding the Cuban Adjustment Act,� said Alex Lee, the State Department official who was in charge of the migration-related portion of the talks.
But immigration analysts said the law had become increasingly difficult to defend because it so clearly favored Cubans over other would-be immigrants facing repression and oppression in their home countries.
“At a time when we are working so hard to send back Central Americans who are fleeing levels of persecution at least similar to what happens in Cuba, that double standard will definitely be looked at,� said Marc R. Rosenblum, an immigration expert for the Migration Policy Institute, a nonpartisan research group.
With the possibility of an immigration debate in Congress this year, the law is now an easier target for Republicans eager to crack down on immigration, and for lawmakers from agricultural states who want the economic embargo lifted to facilitate exports to Cuba. A bipartisan group of senators introduced a bill on Thursday to lift all travel restrictions to Cuba.
“The law is an outlier,� said Guillermo J. Grenier, a sociologist at Florida International University. “It just hangs out there begging to be hit like a piñata.�
Cuban immigration to the United States continues to grow, with 20,000 Cubans a year arriving legally with visas. Thousands more reached the United States in the past year by the Mexican border, by plane or by sea.
And in 2014, nearly 40,000 Cubans received tourist visas, many of them valid for five years. That number climbed steeply after President Raúl Castro relaxed Cuba’s exit permit rules. It is unclear how many of those visitors will choose to stay permanently, immigration analysts say. Supporters of the 1966 law say that as long as the Cuban government detains and harasses dissidents and the United States maintains its embargo, the law is justified.
Some in Congress, like Representative Zoe Lofgren of California, the ranking Democrat on the immigration subcommittee, said the solution was to broaden protections for other immigrants, not reduce them for Cubans.
“I’m not suggesting we put Cubans in jail,� she said. “I’m suggesting we should also have a more generous policy for other people freeing oppression.�
Many in South Florida, like Francisco José Hernández, a 1960s exile and the president of the Cuban American National Foundation, which works to foster democracy in Cuba, said the economic and political success of Cuban-Americans was based in large part on the law.
“To renounce it,� he said, “doesn’t make sense.�
(Source: )


By BBC

Greece's anti-austerity government is presenting its first concrete proposals for an alternative debt plan at an emergency meeting of eurozone finance ministers in Brussels.
The government wants to overhaul 30% of its bailout obligations, replacing them with a 10-point plan of reforms.
But EU ministers have warned that Greece must abide by existing terms.
The EU-IMF bailout for the debt-laden country expires on 28 February and Greece does not want it extended.
Instead the new Athens government is asking for a "bridge agreement" that will enable it to stay afloat until it can agree a new four-year reform plan with its EU creditors.
Thousands of left-wing demonstrators have rallied in Athens in support of their government's proposition.
Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras's government won a confidence vote on Tuesday, with the support of 162 deputies in the 300-seat parliament.
The Athens stock exchange then fell by 4% ahead of the emergency Eurogroup meeting, which will see Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis unveil the controversial debt proposals.
The Syriza-led government says the conditions of the �240bn (£182bn; $272bn) bailout - sweeping spending cuts and public sector job losses - have impoverished Greece.
It rejects the "troika" team - the EU, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Central Bank (ECB) - overseeing the bailout's implementation.
High stakes
The government's proposal for overhauling its bailout comes in four parts, according to a finance ministry source widely quoted in Greek media.
Under the first part, Greece would co-operate on 70% of its bailout conditions but wants to scrap 30% - replacing it with 10 new reforms to be agreed with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It is unclear what these would be.
At a joint press conference on Wednesday, OECD head Angel Gurria told Mr Tsipras that his organisation would "work with Greece in getting growth back not only on the books but also... to the Greek citizens".
The government's plan also includes bond swaps and a proposal to reduce the primary budget surplus target for this year to 1.49% of GDP, rather than the 3%.
What does Greece owe?
However a swift deal with the EU is considered unlikely. Most finance ministers - including Germany's Wolfgang Schaeuble - are insisting that Greece must not renege on its bailout conditions.
Speaking ahead of the Eurogroup meeting, its president, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, said he did not expect a deal with Greece on Wednesday but that the group would listen to Greece's ideas.
Meanwhile the head of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, praised Greek officials as "competent", but warned that reaching an agreement would take time.
The finance ministers will report to EU leaders who will take up the issue at their first summit with Mr Tsipras on Thursday.
Clashing
On the eve of the meeting, Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis did not rule out clashing with his eurozone counterparts, saying: "If you are not willing to even contemplate a rift, then you are not negotiating."
The stakes of the talks are high because of fears that a Greek debt default could push it out of the euro, triggering turmoil in the EU.
Greece's debt currently stands at more than �320bn (£237bn) - about 174% of its economic output (GDP).
Last month's election win by radical left-wing party Syriza has led to suggestions that Greece could forge closer ties with Russia, although Greek officials have downplayed the idea.
After meeting his Greek counterpart Nikolaos Kotzias on Wednesday, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Moscow would consider a request for financial aid from Athens if it came - despite Russia's own financial difficulties caused by Western sanctions over the crisis in Ukraine.
The Greek Defence Minister, Panos Kammenos, previously said Greece might seek funding from Russia, China or the US if it failed to reach a new debt agreement with the eurozone.
Source:


The current European situation is unsustainable as the southern European countries won't hold for much longer. Not only do they have difficulties in meeting the budget, but people's lives have dramatically became worse. You may complain about not having books, Skeetor, but there are many people starving in Greece and in a lesser degree in Portugal (including children who go hungry to school and in the latter case that's made worse by the fact wages are much lower than in most of the European Union) and others are dying in hospitals due to not being attended in time or not having medical supplies, just to give two examples, because I could speak about chaos in the other spheres of state, including the judicial system (the libertarian Portuguese government isn't even capable of assuring protection and law as Nozick defended). Besides that, a state is different from a family in the sense it may default without being forced to pay anything. I don't defend it in an unilateral way, but one of the differences should be clear.
As such, SYRIZA's election in Greece (they are actually what would be called "center-left" a few decades ago) reflects the despair of millions of Greeks who want improvements in their lives (under the austerity system they might not see them for 40 years!) while expelling the corrupt establishment from power and its policies are the only way to save Europe from collapse (a "Grexit" would be the end of the Euro and, consequently, of the European Union) and the usual European History's cycle.
I hope nobody is offended with my personal ideas. Forgive me, Skeetor, if I offended you, but I don't like the way how many times the media, for instance, portrays the Portuguese as "lazy" (the average Portuguese worker actually works more than the German, but produces much less) while the Germans are viewed as "hard-working" and "finantially sound" (has anyone heard about the 5 trillions of social security debt Germany has possibly hidden?).
Jose I appreciate your views and agree it is a complex situation but Greece has not been it's best ambassador in terms of being financially responsible either.

I am not sure what choices are left to Europe - Greece could take them all down and you are right - Greece is not the only irresponsible partner. Italy and Portugal as you correctly point our are not doing that well either and have similar stories.

I do appreciate the difficulties that the population is suffering. I meant my comment to indicate that a lot of countries overspend on worthless, risky, unsustainable endeavors in order to keep their voters, supporters, cronies, etc., appeased.
I do believe however, that countries lending money do have a right to negotiate how it is spent. Hopefully everyone can reach an agreement.
Skeeter in this case the Greek government was lying to the banks as to how much debt the country was carrying. And if the banks do not lend more - then this is a disaster for the world. The nepotism in Greece runs rampant.
However there are over 10,000 living in the streets of Athens penniless. And the Greek Orthodox Church is feeding another 250,000 - a very bad situation.
It does not excuse the deception by the Greek government or irresponsible financial practices of Portugal or Italy. One other thing - if Germany is willing to help even if it is first to help themselves and the banks - after everybody has been deceived you cannot bite the hand that feeds you.
And I am extremely sympathetic to the plight of the people and believe they need aide. And I realize Jose that this is a very personal situation for you as well - being that you are from Portugal. It is hard when a country is being bailed out after being deceptive - they usually do not get the best terms. I do hope that the people themselves receive aide and are not suffering through hard times. Bank loans and a country's debt mean little to a family who is just trying to feed their children and keep a roof over their head. I understand that. But the big picture dictates that Greece take responsibility.
However there are over 10,000 living in the streets of Athens penniless. And the Greek Orthodox Church is feeding another 250,000 - a very bad situation.
It does not excuse the deception by the Greek government or irresponsible financial practices of Portugal or Italy. One other thing - if Germany is willing to help even if it is first to help themselves and the banks - after everybody has been deceived you cannot bite the hand that feeds you.
And I am extremely sympathetic to the plight of the people and believe they need aide. And I realize Jose that this is a very personal situation for you as well - being that you are from Portugal. It is hard when a country is being bailed out after being deceptive - they usually do not get the best terms. I do hope that the people themselves receive aide and are not suffering through hard times. Bank loans and a country's debt mean little to a family who is just trying to feed their children and keep a roof over their head. I understand that. But the big picture dictates that Greece take responsibility.

Germany is primarily an exporting country, and needs one set of policies to keep its factories humming. The major challenge for Greece, on the other hand, is unemployment, which requires a different approach. Germany is the European powerhouse (4th largest economy in the world), and has pretty much forced policy on the rest of the EU. That can't keep working. Even Germany will be hurting if some of the countries it relies on to buy exports can't even feed themselves.
I'm only halfway through the book, so I don't know whether the author makes any recommendations or just lays out the problem. The book probably hasn't covered new info that someone who closely followed the situation in the news wouldn't have, but it's nice to get a summary of events to this point, with some analysis. I may not always agree with his analysis, but it's still interesting.



Very true Dave - I believe the unemployment rate is over 50% for young people - staggering. Germany is getting a little overbearing and appears to be dictating terms.
I echo what Teri stated about letting us know your final thoughts on what is going on.
I echo what Teri stated about letting us know your final thoughts on what is going on.


Synopsis:
The world has seldom been as dangerous as it is now. Rogue regimes—governments and groups that eschew diplomatic normality, sponsor terrorism, and proliferate nuclear weapons—threaten the United States around the globe. Because sanctions and military action are so costly, the American strategy of first resort is dialogue, on the theory that “it never hurts to talk to enemies.� Seldom is conventional wisdom so wrong.
Engagement with rogue regimes is not cost-free, as Michael Rubin demonstrates by tracing the history of American diplomacy with North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, the Taliban’s Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Further challenges to traditional diplomacy have come from terrorist groups, such as the PLO in the 1970s and 1980s, or Hamas and Hezbollah in the last two decades. The argument in favor of negotiation with terrorists is suffused with moral equivalence, the idea that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. Rarely does the actual record of talking to terrorists come under serious examination.
While soldiers spend weeks developing lessons learned after every exercise, diplomats generally do not reflect on why their strategy toward rogues has failed, or consider whether their basic assumptions have been faulty. Rubin’s analysis finds that rogue regimes all have one thing in common: they pretend to be aggrieved in order to put Western diplomats on the defensive. Whether in Pyongyang, Tehran, or Islamabad, rogue leaders understand that the West rewards bluster with incentives and that the U.S. State Department too often values process more than results.
Teri is just posting some of the books of various ideas and beliefs on foreign affairs and is not endorsing this book one way or the other - this is the goodreads or publisher synopsis.
However your question is a good one and I do hope that folks will join in.
I think that negotiations are always key but some countries use them as a ploy to buy more time or to push their own agenda thinking that time is on their side. Diplomacy is very difficult for sure - how do you know that the other side is telling the truth or will do what they promised - many often do not although some have followed through. Are they just stringing us along or do they really want to find a solution. What is their motivation in negotiating at all. If we do not talk to our enemies or negotiate then what are the other solutions on the table or what other problems will be face if we don't? What is the cost to both sides?
However Rogue nations are something else entirely I think. They already have the persona of being bad actors and threatening to kill people if you do not do what they want you to do. I think all of these Rogue organizations all pretend to be the victim trying to make the Western diplomats feel that they do not have the stronger moral position. It is sad if these nations believe that by being bad they get concessions.
What are your thoughts Daniel? Negotiating with terrorists whether they be pirates of Somalia or warlords somewhere else does not usually end with fair terms for the real victims and only invites additional terrorist activities because they were successful.
However your question is a good one and I do hope that folks will join in.
I think that negotiations are always key but some countries use them as a ploy to buy more time or to push their own agenda thinking that time is on their side. Diplomacy is very difficult for sure - how do you know that the other side is telling the truth or will do what they promised - many often do not although some have followed through. Are they just stringing us along or do they really want to find a solution. What is their motivation in negotiating at all. If we do not talk to our enemies or negotiate then what are the other solutions on the table or what other problems will be face if we don't? What is the cost to both sides?
However Rogue nations are something else entirely I think. They already have the persona of being bad actors and threatening to kill people if you do not do what they want you to do. I think all of these Rogue organizations all pretend to be the victim trying to make the Western diplomats feel that they do not have the stronger moral position. It is sad if these nations believe that by being bad they get concessions.
What are your thoughts Daniel? Negotiating with terrorists whether they be pirates of Somalia or warlords somewhere else does not usually end with fair terms for the real victims and only invites additional terrorist activities because they were successful.
message 287:
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Jerome, Assisting Moderator - Upcoming Books and Releases
(new)
Watchdogs on the Hill: The Decline of Congressional Oversight of U.S. Foreign Relations
by Linda Fowler (no photo)
Synopsis:
An essential responsibility of the U.S. Congress is holding the president accountable for the conduct of foreign policy. In this in-depth look at formal oversight hearings by the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, Linda Fowler evaluates how the legislature's most visible and important watchdogs performed from the mid-twentieth century to the present. She finds a noticeable reduction in public and secret hearings since the mid-1990s and establishes that American foreign policy frequently violated basic conditions for democratic accountability. Committee scrutiny of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, she notes, fell below levels of oversight in prior major conflicts.
Fowler attributes the drop in watchdog activity to growing disinterest among senators in committee work, biases among members who join the Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, and motives that shield presidents, particularly Republicans, from public inquiry. Her detailed case studies of the Truman Doctrine, Vietnam War, Panama Canal Treaty, humanitarian mission in Somalia, and Iraq War illustrate the importance of oversight in generating the information citizens need to judge the president's national security policies. She argues for a reassessment of congressional war powers and proposes reforms to encourage Senate watchdogs to improve public deliberation about decisions of war and peace.
Watchdogs on the Hill investigates America's national security oversight and its critical place in the review of congressional and presidential powers in foreign policy.

Synopsis:
An essential responsibility of the U.S. Congress is holding the president accountable for the conduct of foreign policy. In this in-depth look at formal oversight hearings by the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, Linda Fowler evaluates how the legislature's most visible and important watchdogs performed from the mid-twentieth century to the present. She finds a noticeable reduction in public and secret hearings since the mid-1990s and establishes that American foreign policy frequently violated basic conditions for democratic accountability. Committee scrutiny of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, she notes, fell below levels of oversight in prior major conflicts.
Fowler attributes the drop in watchdog activity to growing disinterest among senators in committee work, biases among members who join the Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, and motives that shield presidents, particularly Republicans, from public inquiry. Her detailed case studies of the Truman Doctrine, Vietnam War, Panama Canal Treaty, humanitarian mission in Somalia, and Iraq War illustrate the importance of oversight in generating the information citizens need to judge the president's national security policies. She argues for a reassessment of congressional war powers and proposes reforms to encourage Senate watchdogs to improve public deliberation about decisions of war and peace.
Watchdogs on the Hill investigates America's national security oversight and its critical place in the review of congressional and presidential powers in foreign policy.


Sounds very interesting, especially in light of recent events.


Synopsis:
As the U.S. experience in Iraq following the 2003 invasion made abundantly clear, failure to properly plan for risks associated with postconflict stabilization and reconstruction can have a devastating impact on the overall success of a military mission. In Waging War, Planning Peace, Aaron Rapport investigates how U.S. presidents and their senior advisers have managed vital noncombat activities while the nation is in the midst of fighting or preparing to fight major wars. He argues that research from psychology specifically, construal level theory can help explain how individuals reason about the costs of postconflict noncombat operations that they perceive as lying in the distant future.
In addition to preparations for "Phase IV" in the lead-up to the Iraq War, Rapport looks at the occupation of Germany after World War II, the planned occupation of North Korea in 1950, and noncombat operations in Vietnam in 1964 and 1965. Applying his insights to these cases, he finds that civilian and military planners tend to think about near-term tasks in concrete terms, seriously assessing the feasibility of the means they plan to employ to secure valued ends. For tasks they perceive as further removed in time, they tend to focus more on the desirability of the overarching goals they are pursuing rather than the potential costs, risks, and challenges associated with the means necessary to achieve these goals. Construal level theory, Rapport contends, provides a coherent explanation of how a strategic disconnect can occur. It can also show postwar planners how to avoid such perilous missteps."
message 291:
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Jerome, Assisting Moderator - Upcoming Books and Releases
(new)
An upcoming book:
Release date: September 22, 2015
Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy
by David Milne (no photo)
Synopsis:
Worldmaking is a fresh and compelling new take on the history of American diplomacy. Rather than retracing a familiar story of realism versus idealism, David Milne suggests that U.S. foreign policy has also been crucially divided between those who view statecraft as an art and those who believe it can aspire toward the certainties of science.
Worldmaking follows a colorful cast of characters who built on each other's ideas to create the policies we have today. Woodrow Wilson’s Universalism and moralism led Sigmund Freud to diagnose a messiah complex. Walter Lippmann was an internationally syndicated columnist who commanded the attention of leaders as diverse as Theodore Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Charles de Gaulle. Paul Wolfowitz was the intellectual architect of the 2003 invasion of Iraq—an ardent admirer of Wilson’s attempt to “make the world safe for democracy.� Each was engaged in a process of worldmaking, formulating strategies that sought to deploy the nation’s vast military and economic power—or indeed its retraction through a domestic reorientation—to “make� a world in which America is best positioned to thrive.
From the age of steam engines to the age of drones, Milne reveals patterns of aspirant worldmaking that have remained impervious to the passage of time. The result is a panoramic history of U.S. foreign policy driven by ideas and the lives and times of their creators.
Release date: September 22, 2015
Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy

Synopsis:
Worldmaking is a fresh and compelling new take on the history of American diplomacy. Rather than retracing a familiar story of realism versus idealism, David Milne suggests that U.S. foreign policy has also been crucially divided between those who view statecraft as an art and those who believe it can aspire toward the certainties of science.
Worldmaking follows a colorful cast of characters who built on each other's ideas to create the policies we have today. Woodrow Wilson’s Universalism and moralism led Sigmund Freud to diagnose a messiah complex. Walter Lippmann was an internationally syndicated columnist who commanded the attention of leaders as diverse as Theodore Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Charles de Gaulle. Paul Wolfowitz was the intellectual architect of the 2003 invasion of Iraq—an ardent admirer of Wilson’s attempt to “make the world safe for democracy.� Each was engaged in a process of worldmaking, formulating strategies that sought to deploy the nation’s vast military and economic power—or indeed its retraction through a domestic reorientation—to “make� a world in which America is best positioned to thrive.
From the age of steam engines to the age of drones, Milne reveals patterns of aspirant worldmaking that have remained impervious to the passage of time. The result is a panoramic history of U.S. foreign policy driven by ideas and the lives and times of their creators.

Weiss and Hassan, journalists and analysts in this region of the Middle East, have followed the rise of ISIS from it's early days as the descendant of Al Qaeda in Iraq. I learned that part of his people.
their success is due to the fact that many of Saddam Hussein's trained officers are leading their military efforts - and we're talking mid-level officers who actually did the work, not the generals who were usually political or family appointees. ISIS isn't just a "rabble in arms." I was also appalled by how Syrian leader Assad has played the situation to his own benefit at the expense of
Two things would have earned this book a higher rating from me. Maps would have helped a lot, and occasionally the authors seem to assume that we know more than we do. Still, I believe that with this background, I can now stay up with the news reports and better understand what's happening.



Speakers:
Archie Brown, Professor Emeritus of Politics and Emeritus Fellow, St. Antony’s College, Oxford University; Aut..."
I am interested in reading





Fine job on the citations. You can actually mention the book/author as normal in your text and put the citations at the bottom. When there is no Author's image, you can simply just put the author's name and then (no photo) afterwards.


Ray wrote: "Bentley wrote: "Why 1989? The Fall of the Berlin Wall and the End of the Cold War (Video)
Speakers:
Archie Brown, Professor Emeritus of Politics and Emeritus Fellow, St. Antony’s College, Oxford..."


Synopsis:
Westerners tend to divide the political world into "good" democracies and "bad" authoritarian regimes. But the Chinese political model does not fit neatly in either category. Over the past three decades, China has evolved a political system that can best be described as "political meritocracy." "The China Model" seeks to understand the ideals and the reality of this unique political system. How do the ideals of political meritocracy set the standard for evaluating political progress (and regress) in China? How can China avoid the disadvantages of political meritocracy? And how can political meritocracy best be combined with democracy? Daniel Bell answers these questions and more.
Opening with a critique of "one person, one vote" as a way of choosing top leaders, Bell argues that Chinese-style political meritocracy can help to remedy the key flaws of electoral democracy. He discusses the advantages and pitfalls of political meritocracy, distinguishes between different ways of combining meritocracy and democracy, and argues that China has evolved a model of democratic meritocracy that is morally desirable and politically stable. Bell summarizes and evaluates the "China model"--meritocracy at the top, experimentation in the middle, and democracy at the bottom--and its implications for the rest of the world.
A timely and original book that will stir up interest and debate, "The China Model" looks at a political system that not only has had a long history in China, but could prove to be the most important political development of the twenty-first century.


Synopsis:
An epic, multigenerational story of courage and sacrifice set in a tropical dictatorship, The Rebel of Rangoon captures a gripping moment of possibility in Burma (Myanmar)
Once the shining promise of Southeast Asia, Burma in May 2009 ranks among the world’s most repressive and impoverished nations. Its ruling military junta seems to be at the height of its powers. But despite decades of constant brutality—and with their leader, the Nobel Peace Prize–laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, languishing under house arrest—a shadowy fellowship of oddballs and misfits, young dreamers and wizened elders, bonded by the urge to say no to the system, refuses to relent. In the byways of Rangoon and through the pathways of Internet cafes, Nway, a maverick daredevil; Nigel, his ally and sometime rival; and Grandpa, the movement’s senior strategist who has just emerged from nineteen years in prison, prepare to fight a battle fifty years in the making.
When Burma was still sealed to foreign journalists, Delphine Schrank spent four years underground reporting among dissidents as they struggled to free their country. From prison cells and safe houses, The Rebel of Rangoon follows the inner life of Nway and his comrades to describe that journey, revealing in the process how a movement of dissidents came into being, how it almost died, and how it pushed its government to crack apart and begin an irreversible process of political reform. The result is a profoundly human exploration of daring and defiance and the power and meaning of freedom.



Synopsis:
Are we on the cusp of détente with Iran? Conventional wisdom certainly seems to believe so. In the aftermath of the interim nuclear deal struck in November 2013 between the Islamic Republic and the P5+1 powers (the United States, France, England, Russia, China and Germany), hopes are now running high for a historic reconciliation between Iran's clerical regime and the West.
Yet there is ample reason for skepticism that the United States and Europe can truly curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions by diplomatic means. Moreover, the current focus on Iran’s nuclear program not he part of the Western governments is deeply dangerous, because it fails to recognize—let alone address—Iran’s other international activities, or its foreign policy ambitions. Those objectives reveals Ilan Berman, are global in scope, and they are growing.
Iran's Deadly Ambition explains how America's retraction from the Middle East has created significant breathing room for an Iranian regime that not long ago was on the political ropes. Economically, the Islamic Republic is "out of the box" that was erected over the past decade-and-a-half by Western sanctions, thanks to the "interim" nuclear deal. As a result, Iran's leaders are again thinking big about their country and its place in the world. America faces stark choices: to confront Iran's nuclear ambitions and global activities, or to accept and accommodate the region's newest hegemon, with all that that portends for American security and the safety of its allies.
message 300:
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Jerome, Assisting Moderator - Upcoming Books and Releases
(new)
Sailing the Water's Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy
by Helen V. Milner (no photo)
Synopsis:
When engaging with other countries, the U.S. government has a number of different policy instruments at its disposal, including foreign aid, international trade, and the use of military force. But what determines which policies are chosen? Does the United States rely too much on the use of military power and coercion in its foreign policies? Sailing the Water's Edge focuses on how domestic U.S. politics--in particular the interactions between the president, Congress, interest groups, bureaucratic institutions, and the public--have influenced foreign policy choices since World War II and shows why presidents have more control over some policy instruments than others. Presidential power matters and it varies systematically across policy instruments.
Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley consider how Congress and interest groups have substantial material interests in and ideological divisions around certain issues and that these factors constrain presidents from applying specific tools. As a result, presidents select instruments that they have more control over, such as use of the military. This militarization of U.S. foreign policy raises concerns about the nature of American engagement, substitution among policy tools, and the future of U.S. foreign policy. Milner and Tingley explore whether American foreign policy will remain guided by a grand strategy of liberal internationalism, what affects American foreign policy successes and failures, and the role of U.S. intelligence collection in shaping foreign policy. The authors support their arguments with rigorous theorizing, quantitative analysis, and focused case studies, such as U.S. foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa across two presidential administrations.
Sailing the Water's Edge examines the importance of domestic political coalitions and institutions on the formation of American foreign policy.

Synopsis:
When engaging with other countries, the U.S. government has a number of different policy instruments at its disposal, including foreign aid, international trade, and the use of military force. But what determines which policies are chosen? Does the United States rely too much on the use of military power and coercion in its foreign policies? Sailing the Water's Edge focuses on how domestic U.S. politics--in particular the interactions between the president, Congress, interest groups, bureaucratic institutions, and the public--have influenced foreign policy choices since World War II and shows why presidents have more control over some policy instruments than others. Presidential power matters and it varies systematically across policy instruments.
Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley consider how Congress and interest groups have substantial material interests in and ideological divisions around certain issues and that these factors constrain presidents from applying specific tools. As a result, presidents select instruments that they have more control over, such as use of the military. This militarization of U.S. foreign policy raises concerns about the nature of American engagement, substitution among policy tools, and the future of U.S. foreign policy. Milner and Tingley explore whether American foreign policy will remain guided by a grand strategy of liberal internationalism, what affects American foreign policy successes and failures, and the role of U.S. intelligence collection in shaping foreign policy. The authors support their arguments with rigorous theorizing, quantitative analysis, and focused case studies, such as U.S. foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa across two presidential administrations.
Sailing the Water's Edge examines the importance of domestic political coalitions and institutions on the formation of American foreign policy.
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But one Sunday at 3..."
Lol, I can't imagine a teenager reading something like that. Then again, I read it when I was about seventeen or so. A very interesting read.