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This thread is open for members who wish to read and discuss any book or books covering warfare on the Russian Front during WW2; land, air or sea.

I'd love to participate but I have to finish a current book I'm reading first. As soon as I'm done that, count me in! It's a good subject and one I want to learn more on.

Cheers!

I need to finish up a book too, but I plan to startEastern Inferno: The Journals of a German Panzerjager on the Eastern Front, 1941 43 next week for the theme read.

Almost done with When Titans Clashed so exPeCt review.

Ethan wrote: "I'd love to participate but I have to finish a current book I'm reading first. As soon as I'm done that, count me in! It's a good subject and one I want to learn more on.

Cheers!"

No rush Ethan just join in when you can. I'll be a week before I join as I have a fiction tite in from the library.

Good selection A.L.! His experiences should make for interesting reading.

I am enjoying my theme book so far; The Battle for Moscow, its the third volume by David Stahel which I have read to date.

by David Stahel

His other books were Kiev 1941 and Operation Typhoon: Hitler's March on Moscow, October 1941, my current book follows on from where this book finished.

and by David Stahel

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "I am enjoying my theme book so far; The Battle for Moscow, its the third volume by David Stahel which I have read to date.
I think his first book in the series is:
Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East

by David Stahel

It was and I am yet to read that title :)

I think the three books above were part of a series the author wanted to publish in regards to the drive to Moscow.

This is a book coming out in June that I would dearly love to read but it's a bit pricey at the moment:


by Hermann Balck

Å·±¦ÓéÀÖ has been acting up cant post what I want a few minutes ago or the link for Barbarossa..
Think I need to reboot..

Theres a book that I read a library copy, but found in our Military Sales Clothing Store, "Supplying War" thats 39 dollars..
Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton

Martin van Creveld

One chapter covered the supply issues of the early going on theceastern front that was pretty good..

Some new video's (colour footage) uploaded to the main page of the group covering combat on the Russian Front if any one is interested.

Supplying War is one of the best books I have read. I was in Division Support Command, 2nd Armored Div. It was perfect for orienting me to the big picture and dovetailed nicely into my interest in military history. It covered a very big and complex subject clearly and gave historical examples. I think I still have my copy somewhere. I highly recommend it.

Howard wrote: "Supplying War is one of the best books I have read. I was in Division Support Command, 2nd Armored Div. It was perfect for orienting me to the big picture and dovetailed nicely into my interest in ..."

Yes it was a very good read. I was with Hell on Wheels in the early 70's, when they were at Hood, had a pretty good time.

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "This is a book coming out in June that I would dearly love to read but it's a bit pricey at the moment:


..."

I feel the same way, I really want the book, but that price is a little outside my comfort range. I always end up trying to play the game of see if I can wait for the book to go on sale or someone to sell a used copy, never seems to work for me. Book goes out of print and I end up paying more for a used copy then i could have for a new copy.

I did buy a few years ago a copy of the interrogation/intervivew with him by american forces after the war. Was intersting, but sure leaves me wanting to know more about the man and his actions during the war.

So probably about as close as I'm going to get to the theme read this month is the book I'm currently reading (ok one of the five I've listed as currently reading, but still):

by Robert Edwards

I've been meaning to read it for a while, especially with my obsession with Scandinavian military history - especially Finland in the second world war but never got around to it.

I don't know if a lot of other people have read it, but so far I've enjoyed the introduction and background before the actual fighting starts. Most accounts of the war start with the Russian demands and the attacks start right away. I'm getting some background of Finland and Finnish-Soviet relations between the first and second world war that is lacking in most other accounts. For example: the author claims that Finland had a 100% literacy rate (in a combination of languages) before the war. That seems astounding to me.

I hope his coverage of the actual war is just as interesting.

Jonathan wrote: "So probably about as close as I'm going to get to the theme read this month is the book I'm currently reading (ok one of the five I've listed as currently reading, but still):

. It is quite good.

Hi Jonathan, I have the same book but with a different title and cover:


by Robert Edwards

I have not read it yet nor this book:

by William R. Trotter

I enjoyed the book Gerald mentioned; The Hundred Day Winter War, I thought it provided a balanced and easy to read overview of this conflict.

by Gordon F. Sander

I my book The Battle for Moscow the author has been discussing the development of the Soviet commanders after Barbarossa. He mentioned that there were some good Soviet commanders before the invasion, that others learnt from the Germans but some were still stuck in the tactics of the Great War as shown by the cavalry charge of the 44th Mongolian Cavalry Division near Moscow in 1941. Some 2,000 Soviet cavalrymen were mown down by German defensive fire without any German losses.

Here is a great account of this incident if anyone is interested in reading about it:



by David Stahel

For previous read-togethers I've been looking at my big pile of books to read (the physical pile, not the TBR here on Å·±¦ÓéÀÖ), and taken a pass.

This month, however, I saw that I have -- hey, two birds with one stone!

I'm just about to start the Khalkin-Gol campaign, 1939. So far, the book is an easy read, and has spent some time in his prewar career. The parts about his personality and personal life are thin, largely (I suspect) from a lack of sources like we would have in the West.

His forceful personality is remarked on, as well as competence and professional study.

Sounds like an excellent book Lee and I'm happy to say I have an unread copy in my library so keep me posted on your thoughts on the book as it is bound to tempt me to go find my copy :)

In my book on the German offensive on Moscow the author mentions the soviet propaganda myth/legend of Panilov's twenty-eight heroes. Here is some interesting information on this story:

Here is a first-hand account from a German tanker of his experiences when confronting a crippled Russian KV-1 for the first time:

"We fired thirty shots into him. Nothing got through. There weren't 10 cm without a direct hit. We'd never experience anything like it."

The author mentions a report from the Das Reich Division who had encountered stiff resistance from the 78th Siberian Division. The report claimed that the fighting was the hardest it had experienced in the whole of the eastern campaign. "These men were said to fight to the last and that in the recent battle for Gorodischtsche no less than 812 dead enemy soldiers were counted in and around the village."

My current book has got me interested in reading Generalfeldmarschall Fedor Von Bock: The War Diary, 1939-1945. I have had my eye on this book for some time but never committed to getting a copy.


by Klaus Gerbet

I have recently read this older book on von Bock's Moscow campaign:

by Alfred W. Turney

Hi Rick,
Read VonBock diaries in conjunction with Halder War Diaries. The Halder War Diary, 1939-1942

per comment 24: I remember reading an account of a heavy Russian tank that was in the roadway unable to move. They tried to bring up an a gun but the tank knocked it out, so the Germans brought in an 88 at night and when the morning nautical twilight silhouetted the tank they finally took it out. If I recall the road was the only way through difficult terrain in that area and the Russian tank was holding up the advance.

Howard wrote: "per comment 24: I remember reading an account of a heavy Russian tank that was in the roadway unable to move. They tried to bring up an a gun but the tank knocked it out, so the Germans brought in ..."

If so that would most likely be North towards Leiningrad or the Marshes. As a likely place for such an encounter to take place.

Can anyone recommend a good title on the Soviet attack into China and Manchuria in August of 1945?

It was something I simply didn't have time to research well for X-Day: Japan. I had always presumed that the August 9 attack launch was pushed up from a later plan due to the atomic bomb reveal. It was a huge logistic problem to move and support that large an Army across Siberia, whether it moved out in August or September.

I get to go back and catch up on all the interesting tangents I didn't have time for now!

[For my purposes I asserted that the attack started a whole moon cycle later, in September, was hindered by a tough winter {which was true}, and the fighting broke up into multi-sided fronts a la Tom Clancy's The Bear and the Dragon. It kept them out of Japan proper at least.]
The Bear and the Dragon

Shawn...amazon has on kindle for 2.99 david glantz's short work on this. Glantz is pretty heavy on Soviet sources and bias but also very detailed.

Found it! Thanks.

Food for thought as we cover this:
1. When did Barbarossa become unwinnable?
a. Before it began---never should have attempted
b. Before it began because delay attacking Yugoslavia, Greece, and Crete
c. Smolensk
d. Yelnya
e. Tula
f. Failing to take Moscow 1941
g. Stalingrad August 1942
h. Stalingrad November 1942
I. Kursk
J. You name it

Good question Rory, I use to think it was after the failure to take Moscow in1941 but recent studies over the past decades tend to show at it was never really feasible to conquer Russia with the resources available to Germany at the commencement of Barbarossa.

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "Good question Rory, I use to think it was after the failure to take Moscow in1941 but recent studies over the past decades tend to show at it was never really feasible to conquer Russia with the re..."

Rick, I agree with you. Germany's blitzkrieg in the USSR was terrifying, but I do not think that Germany ever had sufficient resources to conquer the Soviet Union, particularly after the Soviets realized that the Japanese would seek war with the Western powers and not them.

Rory wrote: "Hi Rick,
Read VonBock diaries in conjunction with Halder War Diaries. The Halder War Diary, 1939-1942"

Funny enough I was only just looking at some second hand copies of Halder's war diaries but they are a bit expensive at the moment but I dare say sometime soon I will grab a copy for my library :)

Hi Gerald, it's a question that is bound to get a varied response with different views from within the group so it will be interesting to see what other members have to say.

I'd have to go with A, and F was the nail in the coffin..

Doubledf99.99 wrote: "I'd have to go with A, and F was the nail in the coffin.."

Good answer :)

Rory wrote: "Food for thought as we cover this:
1. When did Barbarossa become unwinnable?
a. Before it began---never should have attempted
b. Before it began because delay attacking Yugoslavia, Greece, and Cret..."

1. Day One. It was drawable, but never winnable.
The attack on Greece, Crete, Yugoslavia, did not delay Barbarossa. The weather did. The attack in the Balkans, did however cause considerable wear and tear on vehicles that were slated for follow on attacks.

Next questions--
1. If Germans didn't attack June 1941, when would the Wolf and the Bear go to war?
2. April 1941 the Germans helped negotiate "a strange neutrality" between Russia and Japan, effectively changing Japan's strategy to attack Britain, Dutch and US. Did the Siberian troops, and ironically the German diplomats, save Moscow? strange neutrality: Soviet-Japanese relations during the Second World War, 1941-1945.
3. Bombers---Battle of Britain saved Moscow as they had far less bombers available?

1. Most likely the next year or the year after, either way the USSR would have invaded German territory sooner or later. It is likely that in 41, that the Russians were thinking of going on the offensive, but not against Germany as 'Victor Suvorov' stated in his book, but Romania/Balkans. Such an act would have brought Germany and Russia to brink of war if not war.

2. In a very real sense, after the last go around between Japan and Russia, Japan wanted to stay out of that fight. There was almost nothing in Eastern Russia that would have been of strategic value to Japan, so strange, only in the sense that the Japanese historically didn't like the Russians, but no more strange than the pact with Russia and Germany.

3. Hmm, not in a strategic sense, but perhaps in a tactical one, due to losses of experienced crews and wear and tear on aircraft. No rest for the wicked as it were.

Rory wrote: "Food for thought as we cover this:
1. When did Barbarossa become unwinnable?
a. Before it began---never should have attempted
b. Before it began because delay attacking Yugoslavia, Greece, and Cret..."

A) I'm in the "Anything's possible, just vanishingly remote" camp, so Barbarossa might have succeeded somehow. I just don't see how.
B) This didn't help, since it delayed the arrival of a few units (primarily 2nd & 5th panzer divisions, didn't get re-equipped and redeployed until September, IIRC). Those absences weren't critical, but they sure could have been useful.
F) seems a good spot, but as one who's wargamed this theater a few times, I think the failure to get Leningrad in '41 was a bad call for the Germans. With that in hand, a '42 push for Moscow seems possible, and after that, the Soviets are greatly weakened for later in the war.
j) Sending German and Italian forces into North Africa in 1941 seems a poor idea, too, if the central focus is to be in Russia. There wasn't much, but every little bit more in the East might have helped. To me, it seems like a low-cost decision, If the Axis had given up Libya in the spring of 1941, what would they really have lost? The 1941 British were in no shape to invade Italy or hold onto Greece, and wouldn't be, until 1943 at the earliest. Much better to let the ocean keep them at bay, and not drain off planes, tanks, and men to a tertiary theater.

In one of the old gaming magazines, perhaps the AH General, a couple of guys wrote about a trip to Germany to do some archival research for an east front game. They were riding a bus and speculating as to whether the Germans could have won, etc. They looked up and an old German man was staring hard at them across the aisle of the bus. After a brief silence he said, "I vill tell you why ve lost. First (thumping his cane hard on the floor of the bus) It vas too bik; Zecond (thump) it vas too kolt; und Third (thump) Zer vas too many of zem. Interestingly someone commented on Van Crevald's "Supplying War." One of the salient points I got from that book was the absolute difficulty of waging conventional war more than 200 miles from a fully functioning railhead. The Wehnmacht made many requests of the Luftwaffe not to shoot up the Russian rolling stock so bad that it was useless when captured, but to no avail. Hitler's strategy of holding on to power meant loss of better cooperation between the branches of the military. There are a lot of what-ifs. I think the biggest pivot-point in that war was the desire of Nazi thinking that they could destroy such a big enemy. Sure, the Russians collapsed before the end of WWI and it was not unreasonable to think it could happen again, but Hitler was banking on it. When it was suggested they incorporate anti-Stalin populations, Hitler said he did not invade Russia to arm the slavs. Even so, there was a Vaslov Army of Slavic fighters willing to battle the Russians. It was easy (and shrewd) of Stalin to harp on the defense of the Motherland rather than the Communist Party system to rally the people and so much more when the Nazi policies became apparent. So the best chance of a favorable outcome for Germany might have been to split allegiances within their enemy and settle for large territorial gains that could be subsequently secured by treaty and counterplaying the inner tensions of the ememy. Of course, if Hitler had not been a hater of the untermenchen and dictator of the Reich the Germans would probably not have attacked at all.

Good discussion gents.

I like Lee's scenario/point F as I do wonder what the implication for a successful and quick investment of Leningrad with a positive outcome for the Germans in Moscow would have had to not just Russian plans and senior party morale but also on allied behaviour.

To my mind the Battle of Smolensk plays a key part in the journey and timeline. Had the Russians not been "successful" in delaying the advance what would this have meant to the above in terms of success; notably would it have removed the need for the later discussions the senior commanders had with Hitler on driving for Moscow and as such they would have continued driving to the capital with no north or south (and to Stalingrad) diversions?

However, even if the above went to plan other aspects of influence on the German side remain too: Luftwaffe capacity & capability to resupply ever lengthening fronts and depth of occupied land; Luftwaffe ability to conduct ground support and press strategic bombing; ground force not wholly mechanised - creating greater gaps in capability of units supporting mechanised units; German logistical and planning capacity to resupply and recharge Wehrmacht/SS units in the field including winter operations and unit rotation; and finally the treatment of various ethnic groups that lead to resistance/insurgency (or as we know it today asymmetric warfare) - points Howard makes well above my post here.

On balance then I suspect that even had the Germans taken Moscow the struggle to maintain military operations, supply its forces and manage/govern occupied lands would have immediately presented problems and grown in difficulty and mangeability.

One side aspect to a successful German operation would have been the pressure and concern brought by this to British India. A German neighbour (rather than Russian - the old Great Game sparring partner) to Afghanistan with possible access/influence to India and Persia (Iran) would have furrowed Churchill's brow even more.

Some well thought out and interesting responses to Rory's questions. Thanks for taking the time and effort to reply.

As far as German strategy over Leningrad is concerned, I imagine Hitler's decision not to take the city but to lay siege may have reflected the Finnish situation. The Finns were as rational as they were brave. They saw reason to exploit Barbarossa but did not go as far as Hitler wanted in helping his attack. The Finns obviously were considering the possibility of German defeat. Had they rolled the die and gone all out, it could have changed the situation in the north. But I am guessing, knowing how Hitler behaved on other matters, that he left Leningrad there as a looming prize or future threat to the Finns for their half- measured cooperation. Of more potential strategic importance would be Finnish/German advances to cut off Murmansk/Archangel.

All good points but at the end of the day the germans failure was a question of a failure of economics and leadership. At some stage Russia and Gemrany probably would have gone to war and from German perspective made more sense to go early rather than wait. But the failure to have the war economy operating in an effective manner maximising output and not producing competing weapons handicapped the armies in the field. If Speer had been in charge of the economy from 1938 it would have been interesting (as well if heydrich had led the SS - much more of a leader than Himmler)

Other failures included not getting the ukranians on side, co-ordinating with the Japanese and under-estimating Stalin. As long as Stalin was the Russian leader they were never going to surrender and given he had wiped out all opposition in the Great Trials he was always in a powerful position.

Rolling the dice and focussing on moscow might have been the one slim chance for success that the Germans had.

This passage from my current book; The Battle for Moscow, may just show how bad the German situation was compared to the Russians in November 1941. This account concerns the southern wing of the assault on Moscow:

" ... Schweppenberg's strength resided in his panzer force, but his three divisions fielded a total of just 100 tanks between them on 17 November. Major-general Hermann Breith's 3rd Panzer Division was the strongest with sixty tanks, followed by Langermann-Erlancamp's 4th Panzer Division with twenty-five tanks and lastly Colonel Rudolf-Eduard Licht's 17th Panzer Division with just fifteen tanks. While Breith and Langermann-Erlancamp were directed towards Tula, it was Licht's division (organised into an ad hoc battle group) that was charged with the capture of Kashira on the vital road to Moscow. Thus, it is no exaggeration to sy that while Reinhardt and Hoepner were attacking north of Moscow with hundreds of tanks, Guderian's advance was spearheaded by just fifteen tanks."

My book makes mention of trains desperately needed to bring supplies and equipment to the German forces in Army Group Centre being used to transport Jews from Germany and other occupied areas. I think this new book may be one that I may need to read sometime soon:

by Yaron Pasher