“Philosophy is not only a truth or a true description; it is rather, or should be, a description of the True [�.] Truth (Wahrheit) is the correct and complete ‘revelation� (= description) of Being and of the Real through coherent Discourse (Logos)� (A. Kojève, The Idea of Death in the Philosophy of Hegel 1933-34, p.115, in: Interpretation a Journal of Political Philosophy 1973, Volume 3, Issue 2,3)

“t³ó±ð task of philosophy consists in uniting these presuppositions: to posit being in non-being, as becomingâ€� (G W F Hegel, The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy 1801, p.93, State University Press of New York, 1977)

“philosophizing must aim to posit this manifold as internally connected, and there necessarily arises the need to produce a totality of knowing, a system of science.� (G W F Hegel, p.113)

“As soon as we have realized - and ultimately no one has helped us do so more than Hegel himself - that the task of philosophy thus posed only means that a single philosopher should accomplish what can only be accomplished by the whole human race in its progressive development - as soon as we realize this, there is an end to all philosophy in the hitherto accepted sense of the word. We abandon ‘absolute truth�, which is unattainable along this path or by any single individual, and instead we pursue attainable relative truths along the path of the positive sciences and of the syntheses of their results by means of dialectical thought. With Hegel philosophy as such comes to an end: on the one hand, because in his system he recapitulates its whole development in the most splendid fashion, and on the other, because he shows us, albeit unconsciously, the way out of this labyrinth of systems to real positive knowledge of the world.� (F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy 1886, p.11, FLP, Peking, 1976)

“t³ó±ð science exhibits itself as a circle returning upon itself, the end being wound back into the beginning, the simple groundâ€� (G W F Hegel, Science of Logic 1812, p.842, Routledge, 2010)

“With the appearance of Marxism as the scientific world outlook of the proletariat ends the old period in the history of philosophy, when philosophy was the occupation of isolated individuals, the possession of philosophical schools consisting of a small number of philosophers and their disciples, detached from life and the people, and alien to the people. Marxism is not such a philosophical school. On the contrary, it supersedes the old philosophy � philosophy that was the property of a small elite, the aristocracy of the intellect. It marked the beginning of a completely new period in the history of philosophy, when it became a scientific weapon in the hands of the proletarian masses in their struggle for emancipation from capitalism.� (A. A. Zhdanov, On Literature, Music and Philosophy 1948, p.80, NEPH, Toronto, 2022)

“t³ó±ð historicality of Dasein is the basis for a possible kind of historiological understanding which in turn carries with it the possibility of getting a special grasp of the development of historiology as a science.â€� (M. Heidegger, Being and Time 1927, p.381, Blackwell, 1998)

“t³ó±ð historicality [fact of begin historical] of Dasein [being-there] is the basis for a possible kind of historiological [scientific] understanding which in turn carries with it the possibility of getting a special grasp of the development of historiology as a science.â€� (M. Heidegger, p.381)

�the locus of the problem of history has already been decided. This locus is not to be sought in historiology as the science of history. Even if the problem of 'history' is treated in accordance with a theory of science […] as long as the question is formulated this way, history becomes in principle accessible only as the Object of a science. Thus the basic phenomenon of history, which is prior to any possible thematizing by historiology and underlies it, has been irretrievably put aside.� (M. Heidegger, p.427)

“Our next aim is to find the right position for attacking the primordial question of the essence of history […]The most obvious ambiguity of the term 'history' is one that has often been noticed, and there is nothing 'fuzzy' about it. It evinces itself in that this term may mean the 'historical actuality' as well as the possible science of it. We shall provisionally eliminate the signification of 'history' in the sense of a ‘science of history� (historiology).� (M. Heidegger, p.429-430)

“The question of whether the object of historiology is just to put once-for-all 'individual' events into a series, or whether it also has 'laws' as its objects, is one that is radically mistaken. The theme of historiology is neither that which has happened just once for all nor something universal that floats above it, but the possibility which has been factically existent.� (M. Heidegger, p.447)

“t³ó±ð […] genesis of historiology as a science [â€�.] This projection will serve to prepare us for the clarification of the task of destroying the history of philosophy historiologicallyâ€� (M. Heidegger, p.444)

“As soon as we have realized - and ultimately no one has helped us do so more than Hegel himself - that the task of philosophy thus posed only means that a single philosopher should accomplish what can only be accomplished by the whole human race in its progressive development - as soon as we realize this, there is an end to all philosophy in the hitherto accepted sense of the word. We abandon ‘absolute truth�, which is unattainable along this path or by any single individual, and instead we pursue attainable relative truths along the path of the positive sciences and of the syntheses of their results by means of dialectical thought. With Hegel philosophy as such comes to an end: on the one hand, because in his system he recapitulates its whole development in the most splendid fashion, and on the other, because he shows us, albeit unconsciously, the way out of this labyrinth of systems to real positive knowledge of the world.� (F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy 1886, p.11, FLP, Peking, 1976)
“Hegel’s absolute idealism transcended history� and, synthesized all past philosophies in a system…� (J. Hyppolite, Preface in: Studies on Marx and Hegel 1955, p.V, Harper Torchbooks, 1969)
“In Hegel the phenomenology and the history of philosophy are thus literally the history of the metamorphosis of philosophy into truth. This is the reason that Hegel is the last philosopher, in whom the race of philosophers attains its entelechy…� (L. Althusser, On Content in the Thought of G W F Hegel 1947, in: The Spectre of Hegel Early Writings, p.103, Verso, 2014)
“Hegel articulate[d], in the Phenomenology [Philosophy of Right], his profoundest idea: the identity of truth and reality.� (L. Althusser, p.155)
“In philosophy truth is had when the conception corresponds to reality.� (G W F Hegel, Philosophy of Right 1821, p.30, Prometheus, 1996)
“Truth and reality were thus brought into harmony in the historical totality that Hegel experienced [�.] Hegel abolished philosophy and founded science� (L. Althusser, p.156)

“historiology, like any science, is, as a kind of Being of Dasein, factically 'dependent' at any time on the 'prevailing world-view� [ideology] Beyond this, we must inquire into the ontological possibility of how the sciences have their source in Dasein's state of Being.� (M. Heidegger, p.444)

“The necessity for predicting the rise and fall of the Nile, created Egyptian astronomy, and with it the dominion of priests, as directors of agriculture.� (K. Marx, Capital Vol. 1 1867, p.515, L&W, 2010)

“t³ó±ð historical materialist almost necessarily conceives time as a mathematical dimension, while for the born artist, on the contrary, - as the lyrics of every land show us - the distance-impressions made by deep landscapes, clouds, horizon and setting sun attach themselves without an effort to the sense of a future.â€� (O. Spengler, The Decline of the West, Form and Actuality 1918, p.99-100, Martino, 2022)

“t³ó±ð science of sciences, mathematicsâ€� (O. Spengler, p.98)

“Mathematics is not more rigorous than historiology, but only narrower, because the existential foundations relevant for it lie within a narrower range.� (M. Heidegger, Being and Time 1927, p.195, Blackwell, 1998)

“history […] should never be able to […] become pure science, something like mathematics.� (F. Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History 1873, p.12, Cosimo, 2005)

“science is always natural science. [�.] Is there, then, a science of History at all? [�.] each of these experiments is a historical event possessing a date and not recurring.� (O. Spengler, p.153)

“t³ó±ð man of fact and the poet do not and cannot understand one another. Hence comes, too, that tendency of historical study, which must inevitably contain an element of the childish, the dreamy, the Goethian, to dress up as a science, to be (using its own naive word) ‘materialisticâ€�, at the imminent risk of becoming a mere physics of public life.â€� (O. Spengler, p.98)

“historical and natural-science data are different. The latter consistently repeat themselves, the former never. The latter are truths, the former facts.� (O. Spengler, p.154)

“A materialist conception of history, ruled by laws of causal Nature, leads to [...]� (O. Spengler, p.152)

“he does not regard economic categories as the theoretical expression of historical relations of production, corresponding to a particular stage of development in material production, but arbitrarily transforms them into pre-existing eternal ideas, and that in this roundabout way he arrives once more at the standpoint of bourgeois economy. �

� When the economists say that present-day relations -- the relations of bourgeois production -- are natural, they imply that these are the relations in which wealth is created and productive forces developed in conformity with the laws of nature. These relations therefore are themselves natural laws independent of the influence of time. They are eternal laws which must always govern society. Thus there has been history, but there is no longer any.

â€� he and the utopians are hunting for a so-called â€ÈÙ³¦¾±±ð²Ô³¦±ðâ€� by means of which they want to devise a priori a formula for the ‘solution of the social question,â€� instead of deriving their science from a critical knowledge of the historical movement, a movement which itself produces the material conditions of emancipationâ€� Science for him reduces itself to the slender proportions of a scientific formula; he is the man in search of formulasâ€� He wants to soar as the man of science above the bourgeois and the proletarians; he is merely the petty bourgeois…â€� (K. Marx, On Proudhon to J. B. Schweitzer 1865, in: The Poverty of Philosophy 1847, p.217-8, FLP, Peking, 1978)

“so far as there are laws in history, the laws are of no value and the history of no value either. (F. Nietzsche, p.61)

“The 20th Century, while keeping the word Socialism, has replaced an ethical philosophy […] by a praxis of economic everyday questions.� (O. Spengler, p.374)

“Socialism is political economy turned into the ethical� (O. Spengler, p.367)

“t³ó±ð Ricardian theory, that the entire social product belongs to the workers as their product because they are the sole real producers, leads directly to communism. But, as Marx indicates too in the above-quoted passage, formally it is economically incorrect, for it is simply an application of morality to economics. According to the laws of bourgeois economics, the greatest part of the product does not belong to the workers who have produced it. If we now say: that is unjust, that ought not to be so, then that has nothing immediately to do with economics. We are merely saying that this economic fact is in contradiction to our sense of morality. Marx, therefore, never based his communist demands upon this, but upon the inevitable collapse of the capitalist mode of production which is daily taking place before our eyes to an ever greater degree; he says only that surplus value consists of unpaid labour, which is a simple fact. But what formally may be economically incorrect, may all the same be correct from the point of view of world history. If the moral consciousness of the mass declares an economic fact to be unjust, as it has done in the case of slavery or serf labour, that is a proof that the fact itself has been outlived, that other economic facts have made their appearance, owing to which the former has become unbearable and untenable.â€� (F. Engels, Preface to the First German Edition 1884, p.6, in: K. Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy 1847, FLP, Peking, 1978)

“this is the aspect of it that has always dominated ‘the world�, and has encouraged ambitious little men to interfere in it. It was because their eyes were set on this, and its rationalistic structure, that Rousseau and Marx could persuade themselves that they could alter the ‘course of the world� by a theory.� (O. Spengler, p.144)

�The more man changes nature, the deeper and more completely he cognises it� nature exists before it is cognised by man, to whom it tells its secrets when he alters it and to the extent that he alters it.� (M. E. Omelyanovsky, Dialectics in Modern Physics 1973, p.44-5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979)