ŷ������

This is a buddy read open to anyone who is interested in joining in on Stephen Fritz's book; Ostkrieg.

I'll join in :)

Good to hear Chelsea, I am going to start reading my copy in a few days time. I just have to finish off volume two of Stalingrad first :)

I'm in

Good to hear Patrick. I started last night and the author offers a good overview in the Preface of what he wishes to present in the book and what themes he will be covering throughout the narrative.

In the first chapter of the book, 'Dilemma' the author references the book; Hitler Strikes Poland. I remember when this book was first published and I was tempted to get a copy. I may have to look around for a second hand copy :)

Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity by Alexander B. Rossino

How are folks going with Ostkrieg? I have found it an interesting account so far. In chapter two; 'Decision', I think the author provided a reasonable explanation of Hitler's reasoning for attacking Russia (page 42):

(view spoiler)["By late July 1940, then, the logic of the strategic, military, economic, and political situation seemed to be pointing in one direction: an attack on the Soviet Union. The increasing frustration at the stalemate with Great Britain, concern over growing American power, and fear of losing the military-political initiative resulted in a self-imposed time pressure in Hitler's mind: time was not on his side, as the enemies of Germany were growing stronger daily, so a decision one way or another had to be made. To the Fuhrer, a strike eastward offered the tantalizing possibility of solving all Germany's problems simultaneously. Economically, the dream of Lebensraum would be fulfilled; politically, a fatal blow would be struck at Jewish-Bolshevism; and, strategically, Britain's last two hopes would be eliminated. Not only would Russia be annihilated, but the resultant increase in Japanese power in the Pacific would also forces the United States to turn its attention away from Europe. Deprived of its twin swords, Britain would have no choice but to make peace." (hide spoiler)]

Just bought my copy today. I'll check in in the next day or two. Sitting down to start it now.

Patrick wrote: "Just bought my copy today. I'll check in in the next day or two. Sitting down to start it now."

Hi Patrick, good to hear, I will look forward to your observations and comments once you get into the book.

Hi Kurt, glad to hear that you will be able to join in soon, I'm sure we will have lots to talk about.

Still in chapter two (page 58), I found this information quite interesting:

(view spoiler)[" ... Between July and December 1941, that is, the first six months of Barbarossa, the production of army weapons actually fell by an average of 38 percent. The German war economy also suffered from a lack of skilled labor. To free workers for a return to industry, an elaborate system had been worked out in the winter of 1940-41 whereby experienced soldiers were given an 'armaments holiday' while new recruits were trained for the army. In this way, soldiers would manufacture the weapons they and their comrades would later use in the Soviet Union. Once these worker-soldiers returned in large numbers to the army, however, production would suffer, a potential for disaster that could be averted only if the campaign in Russia was short and did not involve above-average losses in men and material. Further compounding the problem, armaments industries attempted to delay the release of soldiers back to the army as long as possible, which cut into the time available for the training of the new divisions." (hide spoiler)]

The author stated that he would not be conducting research of the primary sources but utilising the research done by other authors and his Bibliography of titles used runs to over 50 pages with some well know and highly respected historians and their works.

I don't know about others but I always enjoy checking which books an author has referenced. One to see which books we have in common, and two, to see which books I should consider finding a copy for my own library :)

I've read this information before but figured I would mention it again for those who may not realise that this was an issue with the German invasion of Russia in 1941:

(view spoiler)[" ... To compound the problem, despite images of a motorized blitzkrieg force, the German army lacked motor vehicle capacity. Halder, in fact, had toyed with the idea of demotorizing the army after the Polish campaign because of a serious lack of vehicles and fuel. Amazingly, the German army used almost twice as many horses in World War II as it had in the previous war, 2.7 million as compared to 1.4 million. The Wehrmacht that attacked Russia was essentially composed of a steel tip mounted on a brittle wooded shaft as only a quarter of the invading force consisted of motorized units. The great mass of German soldiers advanced into Russia in June 1941 as soldiers had done for centuries, on foot and supported by horse-drawn transportation; indeed, the Germans employed some 650,000 horses in their blitzkrieg into Russia. The Wehrmacht, as Adam Tooze has stressed, was essentially a 'poor army,' as the Versailles restrictions and years of economic hardship in the 1920s and early 1930s had stifled the development of a large motor vehicle industry." (hide spoiler)]

From page 61 in chapter two of the book, a pretty damning German policy in regards to the invasion of Russia:

(view spoiler)["At a 2 May conference of state secretaries representing the ministries involved in the occupation, Thomas and Backe spelled out with remarkable clarity what this 'hunger policy' meant:

1. The war can be continued only if the entire armed forces are fed from Russia in the third year of the war.

2. Tens of millions of people will undoubtedly starve to death if that which we require is taken out of the country.

3. Of greatest importance is the securing and removal of oil crops ... with grain occupying a lower priority. Available fat and meat will presumably be consumed by the troops." (hide spoiler)]

If folks don't mind I may make mention of books on subjects mentioned in Ostkrieg that group members may find of interest for further reading.

For example in Chapter 3; 'Onslaught' the author makes a quick mention of the Russian fortress of Brest-Litovsk that held up the German advance during Barbarossa for a period of time.

Here is a book that covers that battle in detail if anyone wanted more information:

The Siege of Brest 1941: A Legend of Red Army Resistance on the Eastern Front by Rostislav Aliev

The author also makes use of Von Bock's diary, for those who are really keen Schiffer Publishing Ltd have published his dairies:

Generalfeldmarschall Fedor Von Bock: The War Diary, 1939-1945 by Klaus Gerbet

but was the German Army really a 'poor army'? From prior books I seem to have the impression that it was considered the most powerful and well-trained in the world at the time ?



'Aussie Rick' wrote: "I've read this information before but figured I would mention it again for those who may not realise that this was an issue with the German invasion of Russia in 1941:

[spoilers removed]"

Well trained and to a point well-equipped plus dogged, tenacious, courageous and well-organised at regimental/squadron level Pamela, but as operations got underway logistics & supply caused them terrible difficulties as mentioned above; as did the fact that the were still not a fully mechanised army (only the British at the start of the war were),

The complexity of some German weapons also made manufacture and maintenance harder - tanks such as Panther & Tiger are examples. That said the Germans were the until late in the war good at both recovering equipment (notably armour) to fix in the field and adapting others equipment.

The allied bombing campaign helped disrupt manufacturing and transport as did a lack of high quality raw materials.

Finally linking to the above is the interesting aspect of the war in the East but never to my mind given its full due was the allied (US, British and Canadian) supply of manufacturing equipment (presses, lathes, engines, furnaces etc) and thousands of aircraft, tanks, lorries/trucks, ammunition, fuel, bandages, medicines, chemicals, steel and so on. Huge amounts of weaponry and equipment never acknowledged as being important by Stalin for obvious reasons.

Hi Geevee, thank you for the clarification. At what point in the war did the lack of oil start to really hinder the Germans?

also what do you mean by "fully mechanized army" regarding Britain vs. Germany

The BEF that went to France in 1939 was fully motorized - all of there equipment and supplies could be moved by truck or tracked vehicles. This included their Arty.

Outside of the Armored Formations, the German transport was mainly horse drawn - IRRC about 90%, The standard inf div was almost entirely dependant on the horse for its prime movers. Even by 1941 that percentage hadn't dropped by much. In France and in Russia one of big operational problems caused by Blitzkrieg was the seperation this caused between the panzer/panzer grenedier divs and the rest of the army who had to walk:)

Pamela wrote: "but was the German Army really a 'poor army'? From prior books I seem to have the impression that it was considered the most powerful and well-trained in the world at the time ?



'Aussie Rick' wr..."

The French Army was considered the most powerful Army in Europe until the 1940 disaster.
The German Army was an Army of opposites. On the one hand they had Modern Panzer Divisions which had the newest military technology and the Luftwaffe which inspired dread in those on the ground. Stuka's would make dive bombing runs even if they had already dropped their bombs and had no ammunition to strafe targets.
On the opposite side of the coin, the Infantry was little better off than it had been in the first World War. I had a friend that would go on for quite a bit about how the sound of the Blitzkrieg was Horses moving along. In a very real sense the German Army was not what we would consider a Modern Army. It was a poor man's version of what a modern army would soon look like. Even their vaunted Panzer Divisions were not filled in a consistent manner. Never fully equipped, always having a wide range of Tanks filling out the TO&E, and never enough APC (which in this case would have meant half-tracked vehicles not a true APC, the Canadians were the first to go that route.)
Not until 1942 and the arrival of the American's on the scene would the first truly modern Army arrive on the scene, although it has to be admitted that the transition wasn't exactly seamless. The Russians too were making the transition, they had the problem of doing it while having someone trying to knock down the doors at the same time.
A good book on the subject of the German Army and its less than obvious weaknesses is.
The German Army 1933-1945


So if they were a poor Man's Modern Army how did they win? Well there is where they were probably the best at something prior to the actual start of the war and maintained something of an edge for quite a bit of it. Well two things actually. They were the best trained (probably) and the best led (for a great deal of the war).
Training had taken into account the defeats of the First World War, looked at what had worked and what had failed. So an accross the board change of tactics and training had taken place. The infantry would counter attack to take lost ground immediately to take advantage of the disorganization of the enemy, armor would help in breakthroughs and exploitation and the Luftwaffe would be a sort of free roaming artillery support. (The Luftwaffe was created almost solely as a ground support arm.)
The Leadership was some of the best available at the beginning of the war. Officers and NCO's had been trained to function two levels higher than their present position. They were taught to use their own initiative and how best to react. This was so ingrained that as time went on and the best of these Officers and NCO's feel their replacements would follow the blue print without thinking.
Maybe not the best equipped, but at the Middle Management level the best led. Made up for a lot of deficiencies elsewhere. Mores the pity.

Hi Pamela, I'd say from the start given the US supply (before entry as well as when in the war) was important as the US manufacture of synthetic oil was bigger in scale, more advanced technologically and far cheaper than the Germans'. The allies kept access to the middle eastern oil fields and disrupted German supply early on (Mediterranean / Middle East for example), and then attacked the German oil resources in the East aggressively with USAAF/RAF raids from Italy.

In terms of fully mechanised I mean no horses: the German army is seen in terms of its armoured and vehicle born troops from Blitzkrieg but behind this was a huge army reliant on horses. The British in 1940 had dispensed with all horses for combat operations.

Hope that helps :)

Another book I have that I must read on this subject is: Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism?: Horses and the German Army of World War II by Richard L. DiNardo

Pamela wrote: "also what do you mean by "fully mechanized army" regarding Britain vs. Germany"

Well their are a number of things that are included. The British Expeditonary force that went to France in 1940 was fully 'Mechanized' by the terms of the day, but not in a Modern sense. The Germans were never even close to being so. Most of their infantry used horse transport, not truck. (the Germans used any truck or vehicle they could to assist their transport problems. Including the largest case of grand theft motorized vehicle the world has ever seen.)
The BEF had enough vehicle transport to move the entire force. An impressive enough feat in spite of the relatively small size of the force. However in Modern parlance, truck born transportation of troops is considered Motorized instead of Mechanized. So occasionally brings up some confusion.
Incidentally, the US Army, which did show the first real template of a Modern Army, was never fully motorized, generally the infantry divisions could transport somewhere between a third to two/thirds at any one time, not the full unit. So as you can see the BEF had achieved something quite unique.

So interesting ! Did that help the BEF during Dunkirk evacuation, or was that simply due to the Germans decision to halt their advance?

Dj wrote: "Pamela wrote: "also what do you mean by "fully mechanized army" regarding Britain vs. Germany"

Well their are a number of things that are included. The British Expeditonary force that went to Fran..."

Thank you Geevee ! I am further enlightened. And putting DiNardo's book on my must-read list.

Geevee wrote: "Hi Pamela, I'd say from the start given the US supply (before entry as well as when in the war) was important as the US manufacture of synthetic oil was bigger in scale, more advanced technological..."




Geevee wrote: "Another book I have that I must read on this subject is: [book:Mechanized Juggernaut o..."

Thank you for the explanation !!

Dj wrote: "Pamela wrote: "also what do you mean by "fully mechanized army" regarding Britain vs. Germany"

Well their are a number of things that are included. The British Expeditonary force that went to Fran..."

Dj wrote: "Pamela wrote: "but was the German Army really a 'poor army'? From prior books I seem to have the impression that it was considered the most powerful and well-trained in the world at the time ?



'..."

I see. how interesting. never knew that !


happy wrote: "The BEF that went to France in 1939 was fully motorized - all of there equipment and supplies could be moved by truck or tracked vehicles. This included their Arty.

Outside of the Armored Formatio..."

Thanks guys for helping Pamela with her questions while I was sleeping :)

Pamela wrote: "So interesting ! Did that help the BEF during Dunkirk evacuation, or was that simply due to the Germans decision to halt their advance?

Dj wrote: "Pamela wrote: "also what do you mean by "fully me..."

Didn't have much to do with the Dunkirk evacuation. Did help in the withdrawals from the front when it was cracked open.

Geevee wrote: "Another book I have that I must read on this subject is: [book:Mechanized Juggernaut o..."

Added to TBR it looks like it will be a fun read.

Pamela wrote: "Thank you Geevee ! I am further enlightened. And putting DiNardo's book on my must-read list.

Geevee wrote: "Hi Pamela, I'd say from the start given the US supply (before entry as well as when in ..."

My pleasure Pamela, I'm pleased it was some help.

If you have a copy of the book Pamela the author has provided some 'Supplementary Data' on pages 491-497 which will give you an idea of the level of German war production and availability of raw materials compared to Russia, UK and the USA.

On page 89, where the author is talking about the initial success of Operation Barbarossa, he mentions;

"Fierce fighting at Lvov as well as furious Soviet counterattacks to the northwest at Rovno and Dubno, along the main axis toward Kiev, slowed the German advance for a week while creating a crisis on his southern flank that, ultimately, tempted Hitler to redirect forces from Army Group Center away from Moscow in order the secure Ukraine."

This has me thinking that maybe I need to read this forthcoming release:

Dubno 1941: The Greatest Tank Battle of the Second World War by Aleksei Isaev
Description:
In June 1941 - during the first week of the Nazi invasion in the Soviet Union �� the quiet cornfields and towns of Western Ukraine were awakened by the clanking of steel and thunder of explosions; this was the greatest tank battle of the Second World War. About 3,000 tanks from the Red Army Kiev Special Military District clashed with about 800 German tanks of Heeresgruppe South. Why did the numerically superior Soviets fail? Hundreds of heavy KV-1 and KV-2 tanks, the five-turret giant T-35 and famous T-34 failed to stop the Germans.

Based on recently available archival sources, A. Isaev describes the battle from a new point of view: that in fact it’s not the tanks, but armored units, which win or lose battles. The Germans during the Blitzkrieg era had superior T&OE for their tank forces. The German Panzer Division could defeat their opponents not by using tanks, but by using artillery, which included heavy artillery, motorized infantry and engineers. The Red Army’s armored unit - the Mechanized Corps - had a lot of teething troubles, as all of them lacked accompanying infantry and artillery. In 1941 the Soviet Armored Forces had to learn the difficult science - and mostly ‘art�� - of combined warfare. Isaev traces the role of these factors in a huge battle around the small Ukrainian town of Dubno. Popular myths about impregnable KV and T-34 tanks are laid to rest. In reality, the Germans in 1941 had the necessary tools to combat them.

The author also defines the real achievements on the Soviet side: the Blitzkrieg in the Ukraine had been slowed down. For the Soviet Union, the military situation in June 1941 was much worse than it was for France and Britain during the Western Campaign in 1940. The Red Army wasn't ready to fight as a whole and the border district’s armies lacked infantry units, as they were just arriving from the internal regions of the USSR. In this case, the Red Army tanks became the ‘Iron Shield�� of the Soviet Union; they even operated as fire brigades. In many cases, the German infantry - not tanks - became the main enemy of Soviet armored units in the Dubno battle. Poorly organized, but fierce, tank-based counterattacks slowed down the German infantry �� and while the Soviet tanks lost the battle, they won the war.

This is what Amazon.com had to say about the author:

Aleksei Isaev was born in 1974. Since the year 2004 up to the present date, he has written approximately 20 books on the history of the Eastern Front in the Second World War, with a particular emphasis on the events of 1941 and the Stalingrad battle.

In the chapter 'Onslaught', page 116, the author starts to give us a break down of Germany personal and equipment losses in Russia and the inadequacy of the replacements. It would appear that already Germany is losing the war of resources and material!

I think David Stahel provides an excellent coverage of the German offensive into Russia in 1941 in his series of books on the Russian campaign:

Operation Typhoon: Hitler's March on Moscow, October 1941 by David Stahel

Kiev 1941 by David Stahel

The Battle for Moscow by David Stahel

Duly noted. Thank you !


'Aussie Rick' wrote: "If you have a copy of the book Pamela the author has provided some 'Supplementary Data' on pages 491-497 which will give you an idea of the level of German war production and availability of raw ma..."

'Aussie Rick' wrote: "If you have a copy of the book Pamela the author has provided some 'Supplementary Data' on pages 491-497 which will give you an idea of the level of German war production and availability of raw ma..."

Thank you, DJ


Dj wrote: "Pamela wrote: "So interesting ! Did that help the BEF during Dunkirk evacuation, or was that simply due to the Germans decision to halt their advance?

Dj wrote: "Pamela wrote: "also what do you me..."

Dj wrote: "Pamela wrote: "So interesting ! Did that help the BEF during Dunkirk evacuation, or was that simply due to the Germans decision to halt their advance?

Dj wrote: "Pamela wrote: "also what do you me..."

Pamela wrote: "but was the German Army really a 'poor army'? From prior books I seem to have the impression that it was considered the most powerful and well-trained in the world at the time ?"

I'm in the middle of Soldaten: On Fighting, Killing, and Dying by Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer, which adds another perspective to this: the stepwise shift in German frames of reference from 1933 which allowed the militaristic element of the culture to swamp all else, and normalised brutality (I hope I'm not misrepresenting them too badly here).

While Britain, for most of the war, was more completely mobilised its armed forces remained 'civilians in uniform' at heart - as did those of the other democracies. Their opponents in the field had a starker mindset, at least to begin with. Increasing professionalism as the Allies embraced the existential nature of the struggle eventually levelled things off.

It's interesting to look at the transcripts of eavesdropped German prisoner-of-war conversations and see how some (often the older ones who remember other times) re-evaluate their views once freed from peer pressure.

On my to-read list. sounds very interesting.


Derek wrote: "Pamela wrote: "but was the German Army really a 'poor army'? From prior books I seem to have the impression that it was considered the most powerful and well-trained in the world at the time ?"

I'..."

Pamela wrote: " At what point in the war did the lack of oil start to really hinder the Germans?"

In one sense, it hindered them from the beginning: the Germans knew they needed to protect their sources of oil, the largest was in Romania. That led to being concerned about British intervention in the Balkans, and that drew off Axis attention and resources.

On the other hand, trying to obtain oil, or deny it to their opponents, led to German attacks towards Egypt and the Caucasus, and espionage meddling in Iraq and Iran.

Once the Allies started bombing German-occupied Europe, oil facilities were one target set, but not the only one. The bite on German fuel supplies came after early 1944, perhaps earlier. It was most noticed in the reduction of Axis flying time, pilots went up with fewer training hours-- also a result of increasing desperation and dwindling numbers of pilots.

Late in 1944, fuel shortages hit the ground forces, but there was no time when operations completely ground to a halt from lack of fuel. Some operations might have been scrapped during planning, for lack of fuel. More often, it led to reduced driving of vehicles, and a continued reliance on horse transport.

For the other Axis, I've read that the Italian fleet was often low in fuel reserves, and that limited their sorties into the Mediterranean as much as lack of air cover and/or reconnaissance.

In fact Lee/Pamela, the oil/fuel shortage may have started affecting Wehrmacht operations earlier than 1944. According to the author of Ostkrieg (page 237) during the planning for offensive options in Russia 1942:

"Fuel, too, was in such short supply that the Wehrmacht High Command cut the fuel ration to the Ostheer considerably, a blow to its mobility accentuated by the serious loss of horses."

You may find this information of interest:

I found this account (page 166) of the issues facing the German armaments industry in late 1941 an excellent summary of the contradictions of the German policies in the East:

(view spoiler)["The German war economy suffered from two serious deficiencies, both of which had been aggravated by the failure to win a quick victory: a shortage of manpower and a lack of vital raw materials. Because of the extensive losses on the eastern front, in the autumn more young men had to be drafted for the army, while many skilled laborers in reserved occupations were also sent to the front. This resulted in a serious shortage of workers in the armaments industry that the Germans attempted to remedy by employing more women and older men. The only really effective solution, however, was to use Russian prisoners of war. Not until the end of October, however, did Hitler drop his racial and ideological objections to the employment of Russian labor within Germany. On 31 October, he ordered the greatest possible exploitation of Russian labor, but, for most prisoners of war, this change of policy came too late. Amazingly, even as economic officials hoped that the serious labor problems could be overcome by deploying a large number of the 3 million Soviet prisoners, they seemed unaware of the fact that most of these men were either dead or physically unable to work. By German estimates, only 200,000 could be used immediately, as most of the others were 'unfit for employment owing to typhus and malnutrition.' Goering, as head of the Four-Year Plan, should have had more than a passing interest in providing suitable workers for the German armaments industry. Instead, he joked about the plight of Russian prisoners of war, telling Ciano in November, 'Hunger among Russian prisoners had reached such an extreme that ... it was no longer necessary to send them under armed guard [to the rear]. It is enough to put at the head of a column of prisoners a camp kitchen ... ; thousands and thousands of prisoners trail along like a head of famished animals.' The situation did not begin to improve until the spring of 1942, when Hitler ordered that Russian prisoners be given enough to eat." (hide spoiler)]

Some interesting observations of some Germans on the Eastern Front (page 171):

(view spoiler)["From late 1941, as well, some military administrators attempted to ensure at least minimal levels of foodstuffs for Soviet civilians, not for humane reasons but as a matter of practical self-interest. 'If the Russian campaign had been a Blitzkrieg, then we would not have had to take the civil population into consideration,' attested one army official. 'But an end is not in sight ... Under these circumstances it is irrational to follow a course that turns the civilian population 100% against us.' Observed another, in a harsh criticism of the illogic of Nazi policy: 'If we shoot the Jews, let the prisoners of war die, deliver a large part of the urban population to death by hunger, in the coming year lose a part of the rural population to hunger, the question remains unanswered: Who then will actually produce anything of economic value?' By the autumn, civilians doing 'useful work,' whether as laborers, agricultural workers, or security forces, received 1200 calories a day, a starvation diet to be sure, but better than the 850 calories accorded those not working for the Germans or the 420 for children under the age of fourteen and Jews." (hide spoiler)]

I have been reading Ostkrieg over the past week - interspersed with ocean swims �� such is summer in Australia. I have just reached the aptly named chapter “Reckoning�� which is the Soviet’s counter offensive in front of Moscow in December 1941 - Impressions so far with Ostkrieg

As the author Stephen Fritz notes in his excellent prologue this is a book not based on “primary research; rather it is intended as a synthesis, an integrated narrative��. It draws from extensive sources and notes the influence of the archival information first available after the fall of communism. It is also focus on the relationship between “war and genocide…mass murder and military operations��. It is very much focussed on the German perspective and the introductory chapters discuss the approach of the Nazis to dealing with the “jewish problem�� .
Whilst to date Ostkreig has provided an excellent overview of the Barbarossa campaign do not purchase the book if you are looking for a detailed military examination of the campaign at say the Divisional level �� rather it is a comprehensive but broad sweep of the campaign that also provides valuable insights into the thoughts of the commanders and the ordinary landser as the fighting progressed.
Fritz highlights how un-prepared the German economy and military forces were for WW2 and that the stunning and un–expected victory over France actually lead Germany into a strategic cul-de-sac. Illustrates how Germany lost the strategic initiative after victory as deliberated over next steps and struggled to understand why Britain did not accept peace treaty.
Rather than Hitler jumping immediately to the conclusion that invading Russia should be a priority Fritz considers that Hitler came to this conclusion from a strategic perspective that also built on his long standing ideological opposition to the Soviet Bolshevik/Jewish “conspiracy�� Strategic influences include narrow window of opportunity for military action before US entry into war, Soviet Union designs on Baltic and Balkans and rejection of the alternative options including those involving Italy.
Frtiz argues that Stalin was making use of the delivery of resources to Germany under the Nazi-Soviet Agreement as a bargaining weapon with Germany �� contrary to other historians who of view that Stalin bent over backwards to accommodate Hitler and prevent war. Even on eve of Barbarossa Russia dispatched supplies to Germany and the book demonstrates the risk the Germans faced in invading Russia in denying itself access to these much needed resources �� particularly grains and oil.
Wheareas initial studies of the Eastern Front such as Alan Clarks brilliant “Barbarossa�� focussed very much on the military campaigns of the war Fritz also examines in detail the short coming of the German economy and the lack of any sense of urgency in re tooling for a world war plus skilled labour shortfalls. His focus on economic issues particularly production and raw material stocks parallel many more recent books such as Tooze (Wages of Destruction) and highlight limited options Germany had for winning war. His descriptions of supply constraints for Operation Typhoon and the October attack on Moscow are detailed and extremely informative. Personally not read any book on Eastern Front that brings home so vividly the constraints facing Army Group Centre in October 1941
This includes highlighting the poor physical and mental standing of the ordinary Landser by early December�� commanders increasingly concerned re their ability to keep on fighting. Also highlights how key German generals particularly Franz Halder frustrated Hitler’s strategic decisions.
Concurrently Fritz highlights the inevitability about of the Nazis moving to industrial murder of the Jews as “frustrated at every turn ..when looking at approaches of emigration, expulsion and resettlement��. Reflected a process of “incremental radicalisation.�� As the failure to conclude the campaign in 1941 became more apparent so did the focus of the German leaders and the SS on implementing the final solution
Ultimately failure of Barbarossa arose from number of factors: lack of clear campaign objective, distant and contradictory targets, resilence of Russian troops and geographical challenges, consistent under-estimations of military resources required for given tasks and shortfall of the German economy and resource endownments. Constraints in raw materials became dominant from an early stage of the campaign as did difficulties with supply with often choices between either munitions, fuel or food �� but not all three.
Having reached the outskirts of Moscow the reader is left with the question how did the Germans get so close given all the constraints detailed by Fritz in regard to the German effort. This does highlight a weakness of the book in that with its German focus it does not go into great detail on the factors that constrained the Russian effort and that presumably allowed the Germans tactical successes despite their own constraints.
But like Robert Kershaw it highlights that the Ostheer essentially �� victored itself to death�� with every campaign success limiting the ability to achieve the next success. Citano has written some recent books on how the typical German approach to war �� focus on encirclement, limited campaigns with logistics secondary - found its failing in WW2, particularly in Russia as it became a war of attrition, ill suited to the German economy.
Whilst I have a fair few pages to go I am so impressed by the scholarly and articulate approach of Stephen Fritz that I will be lining upto buy some of his other books on the Third Reich

I will provide further comments maybe post the 1942 summer campaign.

That's an excellent summary of the book so far Alex, thanks for taking the time to type up your thoughts and share with the group as I am sure it will spark some interest now amongst some of the members.

Having read a bit further Ostkrieg has answered a question I have often wondered, namely how much equipment, tanks, artillery etc were salvaged by the Germans during the retreat from Moscow over the winter of 1941-42. It would appear very little was salvaged owing to winter conditions, lack of fuel and so was either destroyed by the germans as they retreated or simply left behind. Meant that by spring 1942 many german panzer divisions had between 9-15 tanks - as Fritz notes hardly worthy of the description. Such was the implications of the losses over barbarossa that the German army in the East was notably weaker at the start of 1942 than possibly at the start of the war. When combined with the problems the Germans were just beginning to fix in regard to industrial production no wonder Hitler beginning to express doubts on outcome of war

Alex wrote: "I have been reading Ostkrieg over the past week - interspersed with ocean swims �� such is summer in Australia. I have just reached the aptly named chapter “Reckoning�� which is the Soviet’s counter ..."

Appreciate the observations and thoughts Alex. I was interested to read these and thanks for taking the time to record them.

Alex wrote: "Having read a bit further Ostkrieg has answered a question I have often wondered, namely how much equipment, tanks, artillery etc were salvaged by the Germans during the retreat from Moscow over th..."

This is what David Stahel highlights in his books, that by the time the Germans reached Moscow they had suffered such losses in the mechanized forces in the kessel battles that they had in reality destroyed their armoured capability and weakened it beyond repair even before the Russian counterattack.

Another thing I like about this book is how the author shows us the transformation between the two dictators in the dealings with their generals. Hitler slowly begins to mistrust his commanders and starts to take more control over the decision making process, finally appointing himself as head of the OKH and starting to micro-manage decisions on the Eastern Front (although as the author correctly points out at times his decisions were not as bad as made out by post war memoires). On the other side we see Stalin slowly beginning to trust his commanders, especially Zhukov, Rokossovsky and others and letting them have a bigger say in the conduct of operations to the detriment of the Germans.