The History Book Club discussion
PRESIDENTIAL SERIES
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THE DISCUSSION IS OPEN - WEEK FOUR - PRESIDENTIAL SERIES: UNREASONABLE MEN - May 2nd - May 8th - Chapter Four- The Panic - (pages 79 - 106) - No Spoilers, please
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All, we do not have to do citations regarding the book or the author being discussed during the book discussion on these discussion threads - nor do we have to cite any personage in the book being discussed while on the discussion threads related to this book.
However if we discuss folks outside the scope of the book or another book is cited which is not the book and author discussed then we do have to do that citation according to our citation rules. That makes it easier to not disrupt the discussion. Thought that I would add that.
Folks who have participated on the Week One, Week Two, Week Three, Week Four thread or any combination of the above will be bolded and Weeks missing will be noted. All group members receiving books in this offer should be posting at least once per weekly thread in a timely basis. If I missed you on any of the Weekly threads - send me a PM saying which week is in question and tell the message number that I should look at.
(Updated as of May 22nd - up through message 170 )
Bentley - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Jill - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Christopher for Southern Cal - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Tomi - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Nita - Weeks One, Two, please get caught up by posting on Week Three, Week Four - not yet
Peter - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Teri - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Holly - Weeks One, please go back and respond on Week Two, please go back and respond on Week Three, Week Four - not yet
Hana - Weeks One, please go back and respond on Week Two, please go back and respond on Week Three, Week Four - not yet
Nick - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Mark - Weeks One, please go back and respond on Week Two, please go back and respond on Week Three, Week Four - not yet
Francie - Weeks One, Two, Three, Week Four
Lorna - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Vincent - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Betty - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four not yet
Mary from SC - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Rachel - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Jovita - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Jordan - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Michael - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Savannah - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
John - Weeks One, Two, please go back and respond on Week Three, Four
Kressel - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
David from Nebraska - Weeks One, Two, Three. Four
Simonetta - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Jason - Weeks One, Two, Three, Week Four - not yet
Other Jason Watts - Week One, please go back and respond to Week Two, Three, Four
Pamela - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Rhonda - Weeks One, please go back and respond on Week Two, please go back and respond on Week Three, Week Four - not yet
Bryan - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Teresa - Weeks One, please go back and respond on Week Two, please go back and respond on Week Three, Week Four - not yet
Jim from Michigan - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Glynn - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Lacey from Mississippi - Weeks One, please go back and respond on Week Two, please go back and respond on Week Three, Week Four - not yet
Kacy - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Helga - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Ann D from Nebraska - Weeks One, Two, please go back and respond to Week Three, Week Four - not yet
Robyn from New Mexico - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Robin (second Robin) - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Mary Ellen - Weeks One, please go back and respond on Week Two, please go back and respond on Week Three, Four
Steve D - Weeks One, Two, Three, Week Four - not yet
Jan from So Cal - Weeks One, Two, please go back and respond on Week Three, Week Four - not yet
Jason Page - Weeks One, Two, Three, Week Four - not yet
Gary from Penn - Weeks One, Two, Three, Four
Mike M - Weeks One, Two, please go back and respond on Week Three, Four
Laura R - Weeks One, please go back and respond on Week Two, please go back and respond on Week Three, Week Four - not yet
Alice - Weeks One, please go back and respond on Week Two, please go back and respond on Week Three, Week Four - not yet
Jack - Weeks One, Two, Three Four
Mary B from Tennessee - Weeks One, Two, Three, Week Four - not yet
Nathan C - Weeks One, Two, please go back and respond to Week Three, Week Four - not yet
Paul W - Weeks Two, please go back and respond to the preliminary questions for Week One, Three, Week Four - not yet
Kristie - Weeks One, please respond to the Week Two questions, please go back and respond to Week Three, Week Four - not yet
obs20 - Weeks Two - however still needs to go back to Week One and complete preliminary questions, Three, Week Four - not yet
Phillip - Weeks Two - however still needs to go back to Week One and complete preliminary questions, please go back and respond to Week Three, Week Four - not yet
Charles - Weeks Two - however still needs to go back to Week One and complete preliminary questions, please go back and respond on Week Three, Week Four
Lewis - AuthorQ&A, no response to preliminary questions and not keeping up with weekly posting - go back and post on Week One, Two, Three and Four needs posting and interact with posters
Have Not Posted on Week One or on the Week Two threads or on the Week Three or Four threads
10. Cosmic - sent PM
15. Steven McCarthy - sent PM
17. Michael F - DC - sent PM
18. Karen L - Arkansas - sent PM
19. Harold Jones - sent PM
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Therefore, you may discuss any element or quote, event or person or anything else dealing with Chapter Four and pages 79 though 106. You may also discuss anything that came before in the book - so the Preface through page 106 are the only pages that can be discussed here. Try to read with the group so that you are NOT posting any spoilers.
We do have spoiler threads where you can post anything - glossary, bibliography threads, the introduction and Book as a Whole thread.
But the weekly threads are non spoiler.
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The fourth week's reading assignment is:
Week Four -May 2nd - May 8th
Chapter Four - The Panic - (pages 79 - 109)
Chapter Overview and Summary:
Chapter Four - The Panic
The chapter begins with the following quote:
What in hell does this howling in Wall Street amount to? The country don't care what happens to those damned speculators. --- Uncle Joe
Chapter Three begins with October 1907 but then in the next segment moves back to January 13, 1903. The chapter ends on November 4, 1907.
"It was hard to get a loan in October. The cotton, tobacco, and wheat fields were bare and brown by then. By late October, New York's supply of available paper currency was nearly dry. The banks were solvent and held plenty of assets, but they had no cash to loan."
Fowler wanted to focus on bank notes and to increase their elasticity. Morgan and his colleagues wanted more elasticity, but they did not like Fowler's solution.
The earthquake of 1906 prompted a great gold movement from east to west. Most of it came from British insurance companies. The treasury secretary had warned Congress about "world wide money stringency" and pleaded for legislation to expand the money supply.
Some folks blamed Roosevelt; but Roosevelt blamed Foraker and felt that he had been representing Wall Street in attacking him. Most people assumed that Foraker was courting the black vote for the upcoming Republican primary because he was sponsoring a Senate resolution demanding all documents related to the Brownsville investigation. Things came to a head at the Gridiron Club.
Roosevelt was a brilliant tactician, he seldom looked beyond the next battle. LaFollette and Beveridge worked on their various bills without much success.
The only person who had the authority, the expertise and the capital to confront the panic was John Pierpont Morgan. Morgan had the respect and the authority to summon ten presidents of New York's largest trusts and ask them to put together a ten-million dollar pool to shore up the Trust Company of America. In fact, Morgan met the payroll for the city of New York (and not just once).
To offset the panic, US Steel planned to acquire TC&I but wanted to make sure that President Roosevelt had no objections. The steel merger buoyed people's spirits and America was relieved by this. The $25 million trust pool helped the stock markets rebound and the bank runs subsided. Wall Street's trauma was over but the rest of the country's had just begun. The GNP declined 11% - the recession was not long lived, but it was one of the most severe in American history.
However, no good deed goes unpunished. And meanwhile, President Roosevelt received hostility from both the Industrialists and Standpatters who blamed the panic on his railroad reforms.
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The Great 1906 San Francisco Earthquake
5:12 AM - April 18, 1906
San Francisco City Hall after the 1906 Earthquake. (from Steenbrugge Collection of the UC Berkeley Earthquake Engineering Research Center)
This photograph by Arnold Genthe shows Sacramento Street and approaching fire. (from Steenbrugge Collection of the UC Berkeley Earthquake Engineering Research Center)
This photograph, taken by George Lawrence from a series of kites five weeks after the great earthquake of April 18, 1906, shows the devastation brought on the city of San Francisco by the quake and subsequent fire. The view is looking over Nob Hill toward business district, South of the Slot, and the distant Mission. The Fairmont Hotel, far left. dwarfs the Call Building. (photo courtesy of Harry Myers).
About:
"The California earthquake of April 18, 1906 ranks as one of the most significant earthquakes of all time. Today, its importance comes more from the wealth of scientific knowledge derived from it than from its sheer size. Rupturing the northernmost 296 miles (477 kilometers) of the San Andreas fault from northwest of San Juan Bautista to the triple junction at Cape Mendocino, the earthquake confounded contemporary geologists with its large, horizontal displacements and great rupture length. Indeed, the significance of the fault and recognition of its large cumulative offset would not be fully appreciated until the advent of plate tectonics more than half a century later. Analysis of the 1906 displacements and strain in the surrounding crust led Reid (1910) to formulate his elastic-rebound theory of the earthquake source, which remains today the principal model of the earthquake cycle.
At almost precisely 5:12 a.m., local time, a foreshock occurred with sufficient force to be felt widely throughout the San Francisco Bay area. The great earthquake broke loose some 20 to 25 seconds later, with an epicenter near San Francisco. Violent shocks punctuated the strong shaking which lasted some 45 to 60 seconds. The earthquake was felt from southern Oregon to south of Los Angeles and inland as far as central Nevada. The highest Modified Mercalli Intensities (MMI's) of VII to IX paralleled the length of the rupture, extending as far as 80 kilometers inland from the fault trace. One important characteristic of the shaking intensity noted in Lawson's (1908) report was the clear correlation of intensity with underlying geologic conditions. Areas situated in sediment-filled valleys sustained stronger shaking than nearby bedrock sites, and the strongest shaking occurred in areas where ground reclaimed from San Francisco Bay failed in the earthquake. Modern seismic-zonation practice accounts for the differences in seismic hazard posed by varying geologic conditions.
As a basic reference about the earthquake and the damage it caused, geologic observations of the fault rupture and shaking effects, and other consequences of the earthquake, the Lawson (1908) report remains the authoritative work, as well as arguably the most important study of a single earthquake. In the public's mind, this earthquake is perhaps remembered most for the fire it spawned in San Francisco, giving it the somewhat misleading appellation of the "San Francisco earthquake". Shaking damage, however, was equally severe in many other places along the fault rupture. The frequently quoted value of 700 deaths caused by the earthquake and fire is now believed to underestimate the total loss of life by a factor of 3 or 4. Most of the fatalities occurred in San Francisco, and 189 were reported elsewhere".
Excerpted from Ellsworth, 1990.
Ellsworth, W.L., Lindh, A.G., Prescott, W.H., and Herd, D.G., 1981, The 1906 San Francisco earthquake and the seismic cycle, in Simpson, D.W., and Richards, P.G., eds., Earthquake Prediction: An international review (Maurice Ewing Series 4): Washington, American Geophysical Union, p. 126-140.
How long was the 1906 rupture?
"The above figure shows the extent of the 1906 rupture seen at the surface. (Slip on offshore segments of the San Andreas fault north and south of Shelter Cove is inferred from comparisons of geodetic observations made before and after 1906).
The total length is 296 miles (477 kilometers). For comparison, the 1989 Loma Pieta earthquake had a rupture length of about 25 miles (40 km)."
Source: U.S. Department of the Interior | U.S. Geological Survey
Page URL:
A Seismogram of the 1906 Earthquake
"Above is a seismogram recorded in Gottingen, Germany, 9100 kilometers away. It shows how the ground moved in Germany as a result of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. Time advances from left to right. Small wiggles, beginning 1/2 inch from left end, signal arrival of first compressional (P) waves. Large wiggles half way along represent arrival of slower-traveling shear (S) waves. The part of the record shown here spans about 1600 seconds or 26 minutes. The instrument subsequently went off-scale when surface waves arrived.
Compare the above 1906 seismogram to one recorded on the same instrument at the same location after the 1989 Loma Pieta earthquake."
Source: U.S. Department of the Interior | U.S. Geological Survey
Page URL:
Casualties and damage after the 1906 Earthquake
Stanford University 1906 Earthquake damage.
Dead - More than 3,000
A report of U.S. Army relief operations (Greely, 1906) recorded:
* 498 deaths in San Francisco
* 64 deaths in Santa Rosa
* 102 deaths in and near San Jose
A 1972 NOAA report suggested that 700-800 was a reasonable figure.
Gladys Hansen and Emmet Condon, after extensive research, estimated that over 3000 deaths were caused directly or indirectly by the catastrophe. The population of San Francisco at the time was about 400,000.
Sources: Greely, A.W., 1906, "Special Report of Maj. Gen. Adolphus W. Greely, U.S.A., Commanding the Pacific Division, on the Relief Operations Conducted by the Military Authorities of the United States at San Francisco and other Points"
Hansen, Gladys, and Condon, Emmet, 1989, Denial of Disaster: Cameron and Co., San Francisco, 160 p.
"The untold story and photographs of the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906."
NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), 1972, A study of earthquake losses in the San Francisco Bay Area - Data and Analysis, A report prepared for the Office of Emergency Preparedness: U.S. Department of Commerce, 220 p.
Homeless - 225,000
225,000 from a population of about 400,000.
A large circus tent, rented by the army, stands in the field in front of the U.S. Army General Hospital at the Presidio of San Francisco. The tent was used to house medical supplies after a fire damaged the hospital's supply room. The former Letterman Army General Hospital occupies the site. (from Museum of the City of San Francisco, Picture 47).
Refuges in one of the Army camps waiting for water. (from Museum of the City of San Francisco, Picture 46).
One of several large relief camps established by the U.S. Army at the Presidio of San Francisco. (from Museum of the City of San Francisco, Picture Presidio 2 ).
Buildings Destroyed - 28,000
""The 3-day conflagration following the earthquake caused substantially more damage than did the earthquake. The area of the burned district covered 4.7 square mile..." (NOAA report)".
By one count:
Wood buildings lost = 24,671
Howard Street near 17th Street in San Francisco. (from Steenbrugge Collection of the UC Berkeley Earthquake Engineering Research Center)
Brick buildings lost = 3,168
This photograph shows the wreckage of the Emporium Building on the left, and the James Flood Building at Market and Powell streets. (from Museum of the City of San Francisco, Picture 48.)
Damage after the 1906 earthquake. (from University of Nebraska at Lincoln, Gallery of the Open Frontier )
Total buildings lost = 28,188
Three surviving structures in the Financial District can be seen in this dramatic photo. At far left is the Kohl Building on Montgomery Street, the Merchants' Exchange Building on California and, in the center of the picture, the Mills Building on Montgomery. (from Museum of the City of San Francisco, Picture 49.)
Wreckage of buildings. (from University of Nebraska at Lincoln, Gallery of the Open Frontier)
San Francisco City Hall. Photo from the corner of Ninth and Market. (from University of Nebraska at Lincoln, Gallery of the Open Frontier)
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5:12 AM - April 18, 1906
Monetary Loss - More than $400 million
Estimated property damage (NOAA report): $400,000,000 in 1906 dollars from earthquake and fire, $80,000,000 from the earthquake alone.
Damaged buildings. (from University of Nebraska at Lincoln, Gallery of the Open Frontier)
Fire burns at Grove and Laguna Streets. View is along Grove Street. City Hall dome can be seen in the smoke cloud. (from Museum of the Ciy of San Francisco's, 16 Views of the Great Earthquake and Fire (PowerPoint )
Other great links:
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$100 in 1906 � $2,566.74 in 2016
Source: The Bureau of Labor Statistic's annual Consumer Price Index (CPI), which was established in 1913. Inflation data from 1665 to 1912 is sourced from a historical study conducted by political science professor Robert Sahr at Oregon State University.
Monetary Loss: $400,000,000 in 1906 dollars from the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake
1,000,000 x $2,566.74 in 2016 = $2,566,740,000 (2016 dollars)
Not sure if this is exact - but weigh in if it is not or if I made a bad miscalculation - this would have been worth about two and half billion dollars in today's dollars.
Source:
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Read more:
by Robert F. Bruner (no author)
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"What in hell does this howling in Wall Street amount to? The country don't care what happens to those damned speculators." --- Uncle Joe
Topic for Discussion:
What are your thoughts about Uncle Joe or this quote? Do you agree or disagree? Why or why not? This seemed so regional as if he were the head of the House which had nothing to do with New York or Wall Street - out of sight - out of mind.
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1. How many of you heard of the 1906 Earthquake of 1906? I think we are all familiar with the California propensity for earthquakes - but how many of you realized the extent of this disaster or that it caused the Panic of 1907? Or that it had such an effect on our GNP (a drop of 11%) - Or that unemployment settled in and jumped from 3 to 8%. Or that deflation set in? How would you explain the differences between inflation and deflation to a fellow group member? What is GNP?
2. There are always signs or red flags that disaster is around the corner. Why were these red flags ignored? What were the red flags in 1894?, 1906?, 1907 - before the Panic and before that recession?, before the Crash of 1929? Before the Depression? Before the Recession of 2008?
The author Michael Wolraich begins the chapter like this:
"It was hard to get a loan in October. The cotton, tobacco, and wheat fields were bare and brown by then. The orchards had gone yellow-orange, shedding their apples and peaches to become ordinary groves of trees. In the still-green cornfields, farmers sheared the ears from their stalks, stripped the husks, and tossed the naked yellow cobs onto wagons. Mist-snorting horses dragged the loaded vehicles to market towns where laborers heard the loads onto railcars and steamboats to join the great migration of fruits, vegetables, grains, and cloth fibers. The river of produce flowed to the cities for workers to bake into bread, roll into cigars, sew into clothing, crush into cans, or bundle into packages.
Paper migrated in the opposite direction. All year long, great green stacks of it gathered in reservoirs in the steel vaults of New York banks. Come autumn, the paper began to flow, surging across the Hudson and branching out to regional banks in a torrent before splitting into a million forks and trickling into the pockets of farmers and merchants like some immense river delta.
By late October, New York's supply of available paper currency was nearly dry. The banks were solvent and held plenty of assets, but they had no cash to loan. If you needed money at that time, you would have to pay high interest rates to get it -- if you could get it at all. If you couldn't get it, your business might collapse. If your business collapsed, your investors and creditors might need loans themselves, and they might have just as much trouble getting them, and their businesses might also collapse. As the contagion spread, the magnificent New York banks that seemed so healthy the week before might pale and swoon when their loans went bad one after another. Then everyone would go racing to recover the valuable paper they had given the banks for safekeeping.
But in October, there would not be a bank in New York with enough paper to satisfy everyone who wanted it. And that's when the panic would set in."
Topics for Discussion:
1. What is the environment set for disaster that the author is describing? What were the signs - why were they ignored? What set this financial implosion into motion? What if anything could have stopped it before it began?
2. What do you think is the common thread between all of these financial downturns in the United States or anywhere in the world for that matter? What sets them into motion? Are their causes different but their symptoms the same?
3. Why was representative Charles N. Fowler so obsessed with currency? He had been elected in 1894 during the peak of a terrible depression. A panic had started it. An ambitious rope company tried to corner the hemp market. It failed. The failure precipitated a stock market slump, which led to bank runs, which wrecked the economy and doomed Americans to four years of misery - the worst depression since the nation's founding. The source of the problem, Fowler believed was "inelastic currency". (page 80 of Unreasonable Men)
Panic of 1893
4. What do you think "inelastic currency" means? Why was the New York banking community, particularly Morgan not enthusiastic about Fowler's solution? What did they want and who were their allies?
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They have good macroeconomics videos which are easy, short and helpful and teach you tough concepts. These will be helpful in understanding this chapter - I will point out others which you might like to take up as a sidebar to help your reading and bolster your understanding of the terminology used in this chapter.
CONTENTS in the segment titled - Inflation - measuring the cost of living
Introduction
Measuring cost of living --inflation and the consumer price index
Real and nominal return
Deflation
Inflationary and deflationary scenarios
The Phillips curve: Inflation and unemployment
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On page 80 of Unreasonable Men - the author discusses "inelastic currency" which Fowler believed was the source of the problem in the depression of 1894.
"The source of the problem, Fowler believed, was inelastic currency. When the demand for money surged, there was no way to enlarge the supply to meet it. Banks might be flush with stocks, bonds, and other securities but they couldn't lend without currency. Companies might be stable and prosperous, but without cash, they couldn't expand their operations or even pay their employees. Investors couldn't trade, and consumers couldn't buy. During currency shortages, the economy was particularly susceptible to bank panics, stock market crashes, and other disruptions."
Topics for Discussion:
1. Were these some of the red flags that were ignored prior to the Panic of 1907? What were the similarities and what were the differences?
(Interesting article - )
2. Fowler tried twice to introduce a bill (1897 and January 1903 - midpoint of TR's first term) to release banks from the federal bond requirement. Under his asset currency plan, banks could issue notes backed by various securities in the same way they backed loans. When money was tight, the banks could issue new bank notes at will in proportion to their total assets. However, each time obstacles appeared - in 1903 what or who were the formidable obstacles preventing the bill from becoming a law. And why did this happen?
3. How was Aldridge's plan different than Fowlers and why did the Western bankers object to Aldridge's collusion with the New York banking community and how did the Populists view the competing bill?
4. Along comes Uncle Joe who like the folks who don't believe in climate change - stated "As far as the currency is concerned the country is in very good condition just now. Crops are fine and our foreign markets are good...I cannot see anything but good times ahead." Cannon would not budge on "rubber currency". What is your opinion of Uncle Joe regarding his understanding of economics and his ignoring all of the signs?
5. Then there was the biggest surprise of all. Who said - "The integrity of our currency is beyond question. And under present conditions it would be unwise and unnecessary to attempt a reconstruction of our entire monetary system." Why did he say it - how was he shortsighted - and more tactical than strategic or visionary. Was he a "thinking man" or was Steffins correct - "that he was forming his conclusions in his hips".
6. The earthquake of 1906 hits and things changed on a dime. Gold moved east to west. 60 Million had been shipped from London (14% of Britain's gold stock) The gold deficit unsettled the Bank of England - they had to raise interest rates. The New York banks were between a rock and a hard spot (harvest overflow and San Francisco construction) - warnings from the Treasury Secretary warned of "worldwide money stringency". What did this all mean? And why would the Asst Secretary then say that he "did not believe there will be another panic."
7. What should the country and TR have done to offset this kind of crisis? Did they miss their opportunities - when and what were they? - and how should they have accomplished this future plan? Or planned to avoid a financial crisis?
Article from the New York Times - 1906
by
Roger Lowenstein
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by Fowler, Charles N. (Charles Newell), 1852-1932
The Fowler Financial and Currency Bill: Speech in the House of Representatives
By Charles Newell Fowler
(no image) The Fowler Financial and Currency Bill: Speech in the House of Representatives, Thursday June 26, 1902 by Charles Newell Fowler (no photo)
NY Times Obit -
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For Chapter Four we are adding the following new glossary items:
1. Panic of 1907
2. Representative Charles N. Fowler of New Jersey
3. First Assistant Secretary of the Treasury James B. Reynolds
4. Senator Joseph Foraker of Ohio
5. Breaker- boys
6. Minority Leased John Sharp Williams
7. The United Copper Company and Fritz Augustus Heintze
8. The Knickerbocker Trust and President Charles T. Barney
9. Treasury Secretary George Cortelyou
10. Ransom H. Thomas, president of New York's Stock Exchange
11. New York Stock Exchange
12. Henry Frick of US Steel (Frick and Gary)
13. Edward King of the Union Trust Company
14. Grant B. Schley of Moore and Schley
15. Tennessee Coal and Iron Company
16. Secretary of the Interior James Garfield
17. What is GNP?
18. Woodrow Wilson - President of Princeton College at the time and of course he became President
19. Brownsville Affair of 1906
20.Albert J. Beverage and the First National Child Labor Bill
Here is the note that I posted before which includes the link:
d) We have the Glossary thread - a spoiler thread - where every day the moderators are putting together formal glossary entries on all of the important personages, events, bills, etc. in the book. We add them chapter by chapter every day and they make very interesting reading. Also please if you have ancillary material that you would like to add - please feel free to add your material, links, etc on this thread. It goes without saying that there is no self promotion. But this is a very important and useful thread for our readers. Please take advantage of this thread and use it often.
Here is the link: /topic/show/...
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The fourth week's reading assignment is:
Week Four -May 2nd - May 8th
Chapter Four - The Panic - (pages 79 - 109)
We are open -
First of all, thank you Bentley and the moderators for all of the information for this book in the chapter summaries and the glossary. It is a great help in understanding all aspects of this book and this chapter. This should be another great week of discussions and another great chapter. I really liked chapter 3 and will spend some time on all of the additional material provided in the glossary for chapter 4.Roosevelt was being blamed for the depressing stock market on page 84. “The New York Sun� newspaper denounced Roosevelt and stated “Government harassment� of the railroads and accused Roosevelt of seducing the workers with radical ideas that encouraged “social jealousy� and “hatred of wealth�. I was impressed on how steadfast Roosevelt was in his defense. He argued that the only way to protect the rich from violent impulses of the mob, was for government to gently correct society’s imbalances. He said, “There must be steady perseverance in the policy of control over corporations by the Government which I have advocated�. I think this parallels our society today. We certainly need government regulations in our financial sector, environmental policies, food and drug and other areas that our Government oversees.
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Yes, we do Helga - and the balance we need is to not zealously over regulate for the wrong reasons or under regulate due to powerful influences or greed. Hard to manage human nature's basic impulses and think of the common good or what is fair or that it is not wrong for one person to have more than another. But it is unfair to use those less fortunate unfairly and/or hurt somebody's health, well being or individual rights in order to make a profit at their expense. These are tough questions and tough decisions for societies in general. Being president is in someways a thankless job - if nobody is happy you may have struck the right balance and if one side is happy - you may have gone too far to the right or to the left. Steering a moderated course and righting wrongs and standing up to the powerful and defending the weak is not a job for the faint of heart.
And it is OK to change your mind once you have more information or different data points - however the media finds that to be wishy washy or "speaking with a forked tongue" or manipulating the public. In primaries that is probably true but when the rubber meets the road - you had better be thinking clearly and have the temperament to judge fairly based upon reason rather than ego. That is a tough place to be for a Theodore Roosevelt who had a modulated temperament but did have a big ego too and sometimes led from his hips.
But generally speaking he was a good and loyal man who stood up for the values that are important so his flaws were not always exaggerated.
Bentley wrote: "Chapter Four begins with another quote from Uncle Joe:"What in hell does this howling in Wall Street amount to? The country don't care what happens to those damned speculators." --- Uncle Joe ..."
I agree with this quote. In the early 1900s, bankers and financiers seemed to be a world apart from ordinary Americans. There were no personal finance bloggers or online trading sites making the stock market simple for each person. So, much of the "the country"--the average folks that Uncle Joe was alluding to--did not care deeply about Wall Street.
Bentley's 'Topics for Discussion' are excellent, again.I was aware of the 1906 earthquake; but, until reading this chapter, I didn't associate it with the Panic of 1907. Environmental disasters are often man-made (not merely "natural"), and they have social consequences. People ignore red flags (economic _and_ ecological) when they are overly optimistic or when they are unwilling to expend the effort needed to remedy the situation. This is exacerbated by the fact that we cannot pinpoint a sole cause of each financial downturn in American history. There are global fluctuations in markets, plus unwieldy credit policies, plus reckless speculation, plus...on and on. The perfect storm sometimes converges and implodes; sometimes it blows on by.
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"What in hell does this howling in Wall Street amount to? The country don't care what happens to those damned speculators." --..."
Uncle Joe felt that way but the harvest croppers needed the financing that they got and that money was coming from New York.
They should have cared (maybe they didn't) and everybody should have for that matter because that is where the money that they needed was coming from. And when it stopped - that was the end.
Page 79:
Paper migrated in the opposite direction. All year long, great green sacks of it gathered in reservoirs in the steel vaults of New York banks. Come autumn, the paper began to flow, surging across the Hudson and branching into more regional banks in a torrent before splitting int a million forks and trickling into the pockets of farmers and merchants like some immense river delta.
Mod
I was aware of the 1906 earthquake; but, until reading this chapter, I didn't associate it with the Panic of 1907. Environmental disasters a..."
Thank you Robin. I think a lot of folks are in the same boat and did not make the connection nor like I - did they realize the extent of the damage from the earthquake and the subsequent fire.
True - much of what you have said but there are always things that appear to be consistent with one crisis to another. How to remember history so that it counts for the future is something that never fails to amaze me - "Maybe it will be different this time".
Unfortunately, it usually isn't different.
Bentley wrote: "The Year was 1906:The Great 1906 San Francisco Earthquake
5:12 AM - April 18, 1906
San Francisco City Hall after the 1906 Earthquake. (from Steenbrugge Collection of the UC Berkeley Earthquake E..."
I was there for the Loma Prieta quake in 1989. It wasn't quite as strong as the one in 1906, and it didn't last as long. Overall, except for the tragedy at the Cypress Section of I-880, the area fared pretty well the second time.
One fact that Bently's very thorough post did not mention, is the San Francisco peninsula is actually a geologic magnifier. This explains why the impact to San Francisco was worse than the impact to the South Bay, although the South Bay (San Jose area) is closer to the quake.
In 1906, they didn't build to standards and as you can see in the photos, most buildings were made of brick. If there's brick construction in the Bay Area now, it's a facade. Brick walls and chimneys don't do well in earthquakes.
This chapter was really interesting to me. I've never thought about having economic prosperity, but without enough printed currency to go around. I think most people are not very liquid in their savings / capital now, and I know most businesses use just-in-time delivery relationships with their suppliers and don't like to keep cash on hand. I'm interested to read more on how they put systems in place to manage this problem. Hopefully, that will be covered in the book. I'm really interested to see which solutions are still in place today.
Mod
A very important fact - thank you Robyn - I did not know that the San Francisco peninsula was actually a geologic magnifier. Are you a geologist? Or a structural engineer?
Great comments Robyn - what about the older buildings that did survive the quake of 1906 and others - they appear to be brick - I am talking about the older buildings - has their curtain wall been revamped to codes.
Answers to discussion questions:Uncle Joe's quote:
I think Uncle Joe was a bit naive. Even thought the stock market tends to be driven by emotion sometimes, it's still at the heart of our economy. Although average people weren't necessarily investors in Uncle Joe's time, they were still impacted by the state of the market.
Earthquake:
I'm familiar with the event, but never tied it in to its impact to the Panic. The author does a great job of describing how all of the contributing events led to the Panic. As an engineer, I realize that "big" failures are seldom attributable to a single cause.
Panic Environment / leading factors:
This is kind of scary - everyone thought that the economy was in great shape, until the lack of circulating currency became an issue. Are we ostriches with our heads in the sand about our current economy? I've read articles that say we're primed for some pretty serious trouble, but the I see the markets and the Fed doing business as usual. I'm not quite sure what to think personally. I think in general, people are likely to ignore trouble signs if there's not a personal impact.
Common Threads:
Looks like the common thread is being complacent - happy with the way things are and not looking for indicators that things are headed in a bad direction. It seems that the different currencies offered by different banks and different types of government issued currency (gold & silver certificates) masked the issue.
Fowler:
I think he was able to ready the signs because he'd been through it once with the rope company. It seems odd that one company could crash a market, but I suppose everything and every company is related.
Inelastic currency:
This is the supply & demand relationship for cash. They didn't have enough cash printed, and no methodology to enable them to print more. Fowler wanted banks to be able to print money which was backed by various securities, not bonds. This would have been really scary with out 2008 junk mortgage bonds issue - currency issued on worthless securities? I'm so glad that banks can't issue currency now.
Mod
Ah you are an engineer! Thought so!
Yes, it is scary when there are warnings but nobody seems to be at home.
There are vast interconnections between everything that you buy, sell, hoard or exploit. Fowler was on the right track - he at least recognized a problem even though his solution as you pointed out would have made things worse. There does not seem to be a "magic pill".
Yes - once again - that would have been a massive mistake - you have images in your mind of them rolling out greenbacks in their basements (smile) - everything would have been worthless.
Bentley wrote: "Were you Robin - how interesting? A very important fact - thank you Robin - I did not know that the San Francisco peninsula was actually a geologic magnifier. Are you a geologist? Or a structural..."
I'm not sure what they did differently on the buildings that survived. There certainly weren't many. I suspect there's something slightly different with the geology of the lots they're on, or maybe the builders did something slightly different with the construction.
I'm not a geologist. But I did take structures as part of my aerospace engineering degree. There was a lot of discussion about construction methods after the 1989 quake, and my acoustics teacher covered the topic pretty thoroughly. He used to consult on dampers for buildings to reduce the impact of sway caused by the aerodynamics of the building. He knew a lot about flexibility - which is the key to earthquake resilience. They also put the whole building on "shocks" under the foundation in earthquake country to allow the building to avoid snapping.
Our biggest problem after the 1989 quake was power - systems were down so communications (especially phone) were down for a couple of days (longer for some folks). We could watch TV or listen to the radio once the power came up, but not get a message to family. The media blew some of it totally out of proportion and I couldn't let my parents know I was OK. By the way, the emergency broadcast system also fell on its face. It didn't work at all.
Mod
However many of the old Victorians - what San Fran calls the Painted Ladies did survive:
"Michael Larsen, co-author of "America's Painted Ladies," points out, too, that more than 13,000 Victorians are still standing. "The reality is that the city has the greatest collection of redwood Victorians in the country," he says.
Very interesting article:
The Great Quake: 1906-2006 / A city walker steps back 100 years
Tom Graham, Special to the Chronicle Published 4:00 am, Sunday, April 16, 2006
I know Robyn, during disasters anything can go wrong - and usually does - glad that you made it through OK.
Mod
Bentley wrote: "Chapter Four begins with another quote from Uncle Joe:"What in hell does this howling in Wall Street amount to? The country don't care what happens to those damned speculators."
I think people and the government should have cared in 1907 and in 2008. In both situations the market and banks had a great deal to do with the recessions. Short sellers started the problems when they couldn't cover their holdings in 1907 and the banks could not cover their loans in 2008. . (by the way I had never heard of the "curb"
market before this).
I still find it hard to believe that someone didn't go to jail for the loans they were grouping together and selling even though they knew they were worthless. Today with short sales, hedge funds and computers programed to react to movements in the markets still worry me.
The recession may not have happened without the market crashing, but it certainly was one of the factors. The economy might have been able to handle the earthquake if it was the only disaster.
Mod
Of course also remember that in 1907 over a million immigrants had come to the United States. But remember I cited the Bruner article above and he was comparing the 1907 panic and the 2008 panic and you can see from what he said - that much of what should have been done after the 2008 fiasco was never done and we lived through that one. And that is why we go from one fiasco to another.
In the Bruner article I posted above comparing 1907 to the 2008 debacle that all of us remember - Bruner said this:
In 1907, was the average American fonder of the Wall Street titans than "Joe Six-Pack" is today?
No. There was a growing distrust among average Americans toward the financial community in 1907—this reflected the extensive social changes in America. The Gilded Age spawned the age of Progressivism. Progressives gained traction because the incredible industrial expansion of the Gilded Age carried with it rising economic inequality, major societal changes (such as urbanization and industrialization), and shifts in political power. America saw the rise of movements involving worker safety and the new urban poor. Over a million people immigrated to the U.S. in 1907 alone, which was associated with urban crowding, problems of public health, and poverty. And of course the Gilded Age also produced extraordinary companies such as Standard Oil. John D. Rockefeller was the epitome of the monopolist who sought to corner industrial production in certain commodities. In 1907, Teddy Roosevelt gave two speeches that raised the level of hostility that the Progressives and the American public in general felt toward the financial community. In one speech Roosevelt referred to the "predatory man of wealth."
What reforms followed the 1907 panic?
Most importantly, it led to the founding of the U.S. Federal Reserve System. The act was passed in December of 1912, and is arguably the high water mark of the Progressive era. The panic was also associated with a change in the voting behavior of the American electorate, away from the Republicans who had dominated the post-Civil War era and toward the Democrats. Though Howard Taft was elected in 1908, Woodrow Wilson was elected in 1912, and fundamentally the Democratic Party dominated the first seven decades of the 20th century.
What reforms are we likely to see in the coming months?
I think we'll see some very pointed hearings in Congress, getting the facts, finding out what's broken down, what's happened. In the period from 1908 to 1913 there were a series of Congressional hearings that explored whether there was a money trust on Wall Street, and whether the leaders on Wall Street had triggered the panic out of their own self-interest. We may see the same starting in 2009.
If the next few years mirror past crises, we should not be surprised to see new legislation that consolidates oversight of the financial industry within one agency or at least a much smaller set of regulators. We are likely to see legislation requiring greater transparency and heightened levels of reporting on the status and soundness of financial institutions. We're almost certain to see limits on CEO pay and benefits for corporate leaders. We may even go so far as to see a new Bretton Woods type of meeting that would the restructure multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which were founded in 1944 and have since waned somewhat in their capacity to manage global crises.
Read more:
by
Roger Lowenstein
by Robert F. Bruner (no photo)
This photo shows curb market activity on Broad Street in front of the New York Stock Exchange. This sea of men and boys are relegated to the street to serve companies too small to be listed on the NYSE. At the end of Broad Street is Federal Hall, which is today a museum.
A boy in a window on Broad Street signals between a broker on the street and the office. Curb exchanges catered to the needs of companies too small to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Such alternative exchanges eventually grew up to be organizations like the AMEX and NASDAQ.
Organized in 1911, “to eliminate the irresponsible brokers and valueless stocks from the outside market,� the New York Curb did not move indoors until 1921 � and later became the American Stock Exchange.
Good article Jim:
The depressed appearance of the curb market of New York, July 31, just after New York Stock Exchange had been closed owing to the European situation.
July 31, 1914| Credit: Bettmann
New York Curb Exchange in 1902. The outdoor market began in 1842, and evolved into a large gathering that became so large and loud, the traders resorted to hand signals to communicate.
NYC: BROAD STREET, c1905. /nCrowd of men involved in curb exchange trading on Broad Street in New York City. Photograph, c1905.
NYC: BROAD STREET, c1906. /nCrowd of men involved in curb exchange trading on Broad Street in New York City. Photograph, c1906.
Mod
The “curbstone brokers� and the New York Curb in 1953 became the American Stock Exchange, which was acquired by the New York Stock Exchange in 2008.
Didn't they look like they were having a good old time?
I have definitely heard of the Great Earthquake of 1906. For two reasons: one - when the 1989 San Francisco earthquake occurred, it happened during the national broadcast of the World Series that was between of all teams: the Oakland Athletics and the San Francisco Giants; two - all throughout the rest of that evening, the earthquake was being covered on most channels and being compared to the earthquake from 1906. They showed the devastation of the 1906 earthquake which had all but leveled the city and compared it to the 1989 earthquake showing far less damage despite there being far more structures. The feeling we had in 1989 was despite how bad it looked, it was repairable. In 1906, there was no way anyone felt that safe.I don't recall which earthquake registered higher on the seismic scale but the point was that while it was a serious disaster, the reaction by the country was far more subdued in that we had experienced enough serious situations (wars, floods, hurricanes, etc.) that we knew what needed to be done to financially deal with the destruction.
In 1906, we are talking about a time where people had much less experience dealing with this type of destruction that it created "an end of the world" reaction. The world was still considered a big place in 1906 so seeing the pictures from the earthquake made people very concerned about whether or not one disaster would lead to another one.
The biggest fear in the minds of investors was where were the funds going to come from to rebuild San Francisco. I am sure most people wanted to help but not at the expense of going broke. Today (especially after 9-11), we don't respond to disasters with the same financial concern for a number of reasons: insurance companies, the red cross, FEMA, private charities, the national guard, etc.
Anyhow, the earthquake aside, I have always believed that "panics" are created but the big money movers because it causes prices to drop considerably which then enables the money movers to buy back shares at lower prices. This has more or less just occurred in the past week when Carl Icahn announced he was pulling out of Apple...the stock dropped quit a bit because his decision has caused a "panic" with the average investor to sell off their shares.
We don't have "panics"...we have misplaced trust in the hands of major money movers such as J P Morgan. If a company is a good company it will survive sell offs by creating bargains.
What struck me about this chapter was the author's description of a financial system that had not kept pace with the economy it was supposed to support. The bankers, like conservative Washington politicos felt it was fine the way it was because they were making money. Like the tsunami a mile offshore , they did not see the coming crush. It suggests the entire history of American finance from Hamilton to Morgan, a country and economy bursting but always exceeding its prudent capability to finance growth. The Panic of 06 was inevitable given the inflexible ("inelastic currency") nature of the the system. Like great tectonic plates slowly grinding their way to disaster, so the slowly grinding plates of the American financial system ground to a halt. The emergence of the Fed was the watershed moment in creating the kind of financial lubrication needed to power the economy. One can argue that Morgan was a 19th century man unsuited for the hazards of the 20th century economy and pressure points, and unwilling to wrap his mind around the need for change. Perhaps the American century would not have been possible without the Panic and the reform it spurred.
Like others, I knew about the '06 earthquake but had not connected it to the '07 panic. In recent years, I've started to notice the connection between events and economic trends. Notably from the side of corporations with layoffs/riffs and events like the...Presidential Elections. It seems like with a major change of President (i.e. Bush-->Obama, this year with Obama-->???) corporations seem to be going through a lot of layoffs, beefing up stock, in anticipation of a down trend this fall. Just speculation on my part, and I'll be interested to see what the country's financial situation is later this year.
Mod
Having been through Hurricane Sandy - I do wish we had the same sense of urgency and the same degree of response.
I wonder if his decision to pull out of Apple had anything to do with Trump and his tough talk about Apple. Apple I think has been trying to do the honorable thing but has been placed between a rock and a hard spot. Trump is always mentioning Icahn with the highest regard but in fact what I recall about Icahn in his hey day was that he was a corporate raider.
Not sure about your last paragraph - we have historically had panics - sometimes the money managers get caught short handed too - the last thing Morgan wanted was a panic of 1907 or New York City not being able to make its payroll or a run on the banks - only because of his power and outreach did the panic subside and things not get worse. Many good companies cannot survive when their loans are called in or they can't carry themselves through a rough patch or two. We would have lost the automotive industry in this last one without it being saved. And many financial institutions were rightly helped out too.
It is tough to assign blame but one thing that we can say is that when the signs are there - somebody should be doing something to prepare and prevent the situation from getting worse. It sure isn't our Congress - aren't they on another recess now?
Mod
It will be interesting Teri and I do not think many made the connection.
Mod
Good observations Charles as usual - Morgan was 70 at the time and still was probably the only person powerful enough and resourceful enough to bring the panic to a halt. I cannot fault him for his efforts then. But all of them were part of the problem at that time including Aldridge - Morgan just redeemed himself somewhat by being part of the solution (in terms of ending the Panic) - it could have been a whole lot worse without him.
Mod
Bentley wrote: "Chapter Four begins with another quote from Uncle Joe:"What in hell does this howling in Wall Street amount to? The country don't care what happens to those damned speculators." --- Uncle Joe
..."
I think Cannon was sort of half right about this.
Most people didn't care what happened to the speculators themselves, but, as the chapter makes clear, the effects of the crash were felt all over the country.
Money acts like grease in the machines of commerce; when the machine needs grease and there is none available, everything grinds to a halt.
. How many of you heard of the 1906 Earthquake of 1906? I think we are all familiar with the California propensity for earthquakes - but how many of you realized the extent of this disaster or that it caused the Panic of 1907? Or that it had such an effect on our GNP (a drop of 11%) - Or that unemployment settled in and jumped from 3 to 8%. Or that deflation set in? How would you explain the differences between inflation and deflation to a fellow group member? What is GNP? I had heard quite a bit about the earthquake. I knew it had bad effects throughout the USA, but I didn't know about the specifics.
Inflation and deflation are opposites. The same as with inflating or deflating a balloon. A certain amount of inflation is a sign of a healthy growing economy, but too much is problematic. Deflation is nearly always problematic.
There are always signs or red flags that disaster is around the corner. Why were these red flags ignored? What were the red flags in 1894?, 1906?, 1907 - before the Panic and before that recession?, before the Crash of 1929? Before the Depression? Before the Recession of 2008?The problem is that it is always easy to see the red flags after the crash has happened. But those same flags often show up and then - nothing happens.
But one problem is always liquidity and leverage. Investors are always seeking ways to make more. So, they borrow money to buy stock. The inelasticity of money that this chapter describes was one form of illiquidity. In 1929, the illiquidity was due to very high leverage - people bought stock on margin (that is, with borrowed money) and when the margin call came, they had to sell other stock.
So, the government made margin harder.
More recently, we have a huge market in derivatives (options and so on) which are another way of increasing risk and reward by reducing liquidity.
Not in direct reply to a question, but there is a wonderful book called Once in Golconda. Golconda is a mythical city in India - anyone who passes through gets rich. The book is about the crash of '29.But before every crash (and usually during every crash) there are lots of people saying "all is well" (it's like the scene near the end of the movie Animal House where there is rioting and fighting and total chaos and one guy shouting "Remain calm! All is well!").
by
John Brooks
Mod
"What in hell does this howling in Wall Street amount to? The country don't care what happens to those damned speculators." -..."
I guess Cannon could not see how the money was connected to the speculators - or how the New York banks made the money he took advantage of. Do not see Cannon as being anything but shortsighted.
Mod
Very true Peter.
Mod
There are a lot of safeguards already on the books which are ignored.
Mod
Are you saying that they are all in denial?
Bentley wrote: Are you saying we are all in denial?"Not all of us. But, during any "boom" period, a huge number of people are in denial. Not just stock market booms but any boom.
One of the Rothschilds (I forget which) was asked the secret to his financial success and replied "I never buy at the bottom and I always sell too soon".
Mod
The History Book Club
Books mentioned in this topic
Only Yesterday: An Informal History of the 1920's (other topics)The Great Depression: America 1929-1941 (other topics)
Flash Boys (other topics)
Boomerang: Travels in the New Third World (other topics)
The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression (other topics)
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Authors mentioned in this topic
Frederick Lewis Allen (other topics)John Kenneth Galbraith (other topics)
Amity Shlaes (other topics)
Robert S. McElvaine (other topics)
Michael Lewis (other topics)
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For the week of May 2nd through May 8th, we are reading Chapter Four of Unreasonable Men: Theodore Roosevelt and the Republican Rebels who Created Progressive Politics by Michael Wolraich.
The fourth week's reading assignment is:
Week Four - May 2nd - May 8th
Chapter Four - The Panic - (pages 79 - 106)
We will open up a thread for each week's reading. Please make sure to post in the particular thread dedicated to those specific chapters and page numbers to avoid spoilers. We will also open up supplemental threads as we did for other spotlighted books.
This book was kicked off on April 11th. It is never too late to start a book here at the History Book Club.
We look forward to your participation. Amazon, Barnes and Noble and other noted on line booksellers do have copies of the book and shipment can be expedited. The book can also be obtained easily at your local library, local bookstore or on your Kindle. This weekly thread will be opened up May 2nd.
There is no rush and we are thrilled to have you join us. It is never too late to get started and/or to post.
Bentley will be moderating this discussion and Assisting Moderators Teri, Jill, Bryan, Francie and Samanta will be backups.
The author Michael Wolraich will also be actively participating in the moderation with Bentley. We welcome him to the discussion.
Welcome,
~Bentley
TO ALWAYS SEE ALL WEEKS' THREADS SELECT VIEW ALL
REMEMBER NO SPOILERS ON THE WEEKLY NON SPOILER THREADS - ON EACH WEEKLY NON SPOILER THREAD - WE ONLY DISCUSS THE PAGES ASSIGNED OR THE PAGES WHICH WERE COVERED IN PREVIOUS WEEKS. IF YOU GO AHEAD OR WANT TO ENGAGE IN MORE EXPANSIVE DISCUSSION - POST THOSE COMMENTS IN ONE OF THE SPOILER THREADS. THESE CHAPTERS HAVE A LOT OF INFORMATION SO WHEN IN DOUBT CHECK WITH THE CHAPTER OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY TO RECALL WHETHER YOUR COMMENTS ARE ASSIGNMENT SPECIFIC. EXAMPLES OF SPOILER THREADS ARE THE GLOSSARY, THE BIBLIOGRAPHY, THE INTRODUCTION AND THE BOOK AS A WHOLE THREADS.
Notes:
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If you need help - here is a thread called the Mechanics of the Board which will show you how:
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Book as a Whole and Final Thoughts - SPOILER THREAD
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