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Lily wrote: "@67 Christopher wrote: "'....and to crown all, some unfathomable superciliousness gives you the Bedlamite hope that BECAUSE you are able to tyrannize over yourselves—Stoicism is self-tyranny—Nature..."

... und irgend ein abgründlicher Hochmuth giebt euch zuletzt noch die �մDZ�����ä�ܲ������-Hoffnung ein, dass, weil ihr euch selbst zu tyrannisiren versteht - Stoicismus ist Selbst-Tyrannei -, auch die Natur sich tyrannisiren lässt:

�մDZ�����ä�ܲ������ is literally "mad-house (inhabitant)"- so Bedlamite is right, although Kaufmann might say this is "Victorian." (Elizabethan, in fact)

edited

Wait a tick... did he say Toll House?



Mmmm... Toll House....

Christopher wrote: "Tollhaueser is literally "mad-house (inhabitant)"- so Bedlamite is right, although Kaufmann might say "Victorian." (Elizabethan, in fact)"

THX, Chris! My head wasn't playing with the "rightness" of the translation so much as the "meaning."

(Also, playing with significance/validity of the personification/anthropomorphism of "Nature.")

Lily wrote: "How fascinating! The use of "'Bedlamite' hope" here.... I am wondering what was the German word/expression N used."

Christopher is right, in the original the word used is "�մDZ�����ä�ܲ������-Hoffnung." Tollhaus is a madhouse (bedlam) or what we would call a psychiatric ward. 'Hoffnung' means hope. So what Nietzsche is saying here I would translate as "mad hope" .

Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "I don't know if he's going Hume on us or not, but at least Hume explains his reasons for questioning a (tight) binding between cause and effect. Nietzsche at this point explains nothing, but seems to be saying either we rely too much on cause and effect or cause and effect doesn't exist at all. ."

It's interesting to follow this argument back a little. Nietzsche doesn't often present a linear, logical argument; he gives us emotional outbursts, which makes him far more entertaining to read, but sometimes difficult to follow.

The cause and effect discussion is a product of his free will analysis, which concludes that both free will and unfree will are mythical creations. I think his argument comes down to this: human beings are not to be thought of in the same way that natural scientists think of the natural world. The "cause and effect" that we see when one object strikes another in the physical world cannot be transferred to human behavior, which is what those who believe in "unfree will" do.

The contrary argument, that will is free in an unlimited sense, is the product of oversimplification. Nietzsche supposes that the will is a compound of sensation, thinking, and an "affect of superiority" -- all of which are contingent in some sense. The upshot is that the will is neither entirely free nor entirely unfree -- the truth is somewhere in the middle. For all its bluster, his argument is oddly Aristotelian, at least in this case.

But the point of the argument is not to demonstrate anything in particular about the freedom or unfreedom of the will. It's to show how philosophical bias operates. Nietzsche believes that philosophers yearn for "immediate certainties," ala Descartes, and that this yearning ultimately results in a dogmatism that ignores facts to the contrary. It has more to do with ego than it does with discovery.

Section 17 is wonderful in this regard. He observes that a

"thought comes when it wishes, and not when I wish, so that it is a falsification of the facts of the case to say that the subject I is the condition of the predicate think. It thinks; but that this 'it' is precisely the famous old 'ego' is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an 'immediate certainty.' "

Does anyone else get the impression that the 23 sections in this chapter were written separately whenever an idea struck the author and then put in a drawer, like Pascal's Pensees, and then brought out and shuffled together and sent to the printer?

Thomas wrote: "thought comes when it wishes, and not when I wish, so that it is a falsification of the facts of the case to say that the subject I is the condition of the predicate think. It thinks; but that this 'it' is precisely the famous old 'ego' is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an 'immediate certainty.'..."

Thanks, Thomas. I appreciate it.

I had made a note or two about not having control over when thoughts pop into my mind. When I have trouble recalling something or figuring something out, the conscious me sometimes moves on to something else while the problem continues to be worked in the background by some unnamed background processor.

Then, suddenly, maybe an hour later or the next day, this background processor sends an interrupt to the conscious me and says, "Look at this, is that what you were looking for?" And often it is.

This is so much a part of how my brain works that I seldom give it a second thought, but when I do, I'm awe struck, and I come away wondering what that background processor is called and how it truly functions?

And I was wondering if this is what Nietzsche was thinking of when he made this comment, because the experience leaves the impression that thoughts just pop into our minds. But do they really? Or is it an illusion created by the brain to help us multiprocess? Or is it real functionality created to assist us in focusing on more immediate and serious concerns, like where we are walking and what's around us, while the mind continues to work the problem?

Roger wrote: "Does anyone else get the impression that the 23 sections in this chapter were written separately whenever an idea struck the author and then put in a drawer, like Pascal's Pensees, and then brought..."

Yes. It's like they were transferred straight from notebook to book.

Roger wrote: "Does anyone else get the impression that the 23 sections in this chapter were written separately whenever an idea struck the author and then put in a drawer, like Pascal's Pensees, and then brought..."

Nietzsche did jot down ideas as they came to him, and later assemble revised selections of them as parts of later books, the notes serving as his rough drafts. In the first part of "Beyond Good and Evil" the passages do seem to stand alone, without much connection between them.

That was my impression on first reading BGE (longer ago than I like to think), but I eventually realized that in the first section(s) he was introducing themes he would pick up in more detail in later portions -- although it took a couple of re-readings (and guidance from Kaufmann and Hollingdale) to see how parts of it fit together.

I still have the impression of several loose ends. For good for bad, Nietzsche was consistent in refusing to reduce his thought to a then-fashionable (and dogmatic) "System," which might have exposed gaps or inconsistencies in his argument.

Annoyingly, Nietzsche apparently intended "Beyond Good and Evil" to *need* several readings, with reflections between them, to catch his full meaning. Even the most astute reader may be puzzled on first acquaintance with it, but find passages entertaining. Which puts it a step beyond Kant and Hegel, whose prose also demands careful consideration, but usually isn't very inviting.

Nietzsche's next book, "On the Genealogy of Morals" (or "...of Morality," depending on whose translation you have), is somewhat more conventionally arranged as three short treatises investigating specific ideas (all found in "Beyond Good and Evil"), but its arguments, too, may be clearer on re-reading.

Your impression does seem to be a fair description of his aphoristic "Human, All-Too-Human" series, the three volumes of which eventually ran to about 1400 short sections, gathered under somewhat topical headings. Except that each passage was highly polished, and not thrown in without careful consideration.

(See Wikipedia for its sections and three-part publishing history: )

But I haven't yet given the Cambridge translation of it a fair chance so far, and that is just a first impression.

The same lack of a continued argument seems to characterize "The Dawn" (or "Daybreak," and various other translations), but again I don't have enough experience with it to judge for myself.

I think that there are some stronger interconnections in the similar-looking "The Gay Science" (Kaufmann's translation, based on Nietzsche's Provencal sub-title: an older translation was "The Joyful Wisdom"). It had two editions, a four-book one preceding "Zarathustra" (its original ending is the later book's opening section), and an expanded five-book version immediately preceding "Beyond Good Evil." However, I haven't read it in many years, and I'm not familiar with the secondary literature on the subject, which might change my mind, one way or the other.

If I can make the time, I will see what the "Blackwell Companion to Nietzsche" has to say about the unity (or lack of unity) in the aphoristic works.

I think Nietzsche says several times that his books are carefully constructed, and that the read should look ahead and behind (Vor- und ruck-sichtig= carefully and reflectively) to discern his meaning.

He also says, either in section one or section two, that his tempo has been carefully considered, and that he prefers an Allegro to a Lente.

I wish I had the quotes at my fingertips. But no, he didn't just slap this section together out of his notebook. He did like to think of himself as a musician, so maybe he will introduce a 'secondary theme' in a short statement which will be developed later.

Christopher wrote: "He also says, either in section one or section two, that his tempo has been carefully considered, and that he prefers an Allegro to a Lente...."

You might be thinking about §27. §28. I think it gives that impression of disorganised and incoherent notes because the structure he does design and plan for is not necessarily based on rational arguments, assertions, or narratives. But rather, he plays with mood, tempo, pace, tension, oppositions/ symmetry etc.

Of course, I first encountered Nietzsche when I was studying literary modernism, so how I read him is coloured by subsequent generations of literary writers (including Freud, whom I loosely class as a modernist.)

Lia wrote: "I think it gives that impression of disorganised and incoherent notes because the structure he does design and plan for is not necessarily based on rational arguments, assertions, or narratives. But rather, he plays with mood, tempo, pace, tension, oppositions/ symmetry etc...."

So he wants to be a musician or a philosopher? That's a rhetorical question. Sometimes you have to make choices. If you choose style over communication because you think your style can really shake things up, then fewer may understand, but you will probably be called avant-garde and always have a loyal if small following.

But do people read you to learn something or to look hip? If there is one philosopher who seems to be a fad, it's Nietzsche. Perhaps I'll see something I don't see now and warm to him, but as of now I feel like I'm traversing a board that is half maze and half jigsaw puzzle, and the rules for playing have yet to be published.

Patrice wrote: "i find him annoying too. but when i read genealogy of morals i thought he was great."

Okay. Thanks. That's encouraging.

Oh you wait, there will be poetry!

One thing worth considering is that this (BGE) is Nietzsche’s 13th book. Nietzsche said BGE is saying the same thing as Zarathustra, but Z poetically, and BGE philosophically. He also said to a journalist that BGE is his “most far-reaching and important book�� (but he described GM as some kind of footnote or supplementary material to BGE, so he might be meaning BGE and GM together, with BGE as primary text). What if all his works work together as one piece, but each part with a different style, or tone?

Or am I reading too much Joyce into Nietzsche? (Sorry. )

Anyway, knowing that Nietzsche deliberately plans for different styles and effects for each book he published, Nietzsche said he wants to be philosophical here, let’s read on and judge if he achieved that. For all we know, he could be trolling when he said that ...

Oh, I'll continue on. I just couldn't resist.

Nietzsche is so good at seduction :p. Too bad it didn’t work on Salomé.

"The fundamental belief of metaphysicians is the belief in oppositions of values."

Can someone please explain this "oppositions of values", I find it rather difficult to understand

@Bryan: I mostly agree with you about Nietzsche not demilitarizing (Oh BTW, Ovid punned the hell out of love and war, or an epic about the war of erotic conquest... I know, I know, I’ll stick Ovid back into his own rabbit hole.)

Bryan wrote: “In the Preface, I read that Nietzsche is comparing the 'philosophy of the dogmatists' (mostly Plato, it seems) to astrology--something that was a stage in our growth. ��

But, splitting hair for sport here: Nietzsche said Plato invented “a dogmatist's error.�� Plato invented them, but do we know Plato actually believed them? And do we know if Nietzsche is accusing Plato of actually dogmatically believing in the things he invented? Could Nietzsche be referring to people who believe everything Plato said to be the Truth as dogmatists? (Maybe that’s why Nietzsche seems against being so serious...)

Also, the astrology thing ... led me to my other rabbit hole: Kant’s childhood fascination with “the Starry Sky Above Me and the Moral Law Within Me��!! See, Truth (TM) isn’t everything, even for someone as cold and hard and scientific as Kant, he still cares about moral!

Bryan wrote: ��...So, what it seems to me that Nietzsche is saying is that while overcoming this drastic error of the belief in the soul that Europe of that time had built up a kind of intellectual arsenal to fight that battle. Now that the battle was won, there was still the energy, the tension, the arsenal left over. Nietzsche wants to use this arsenal rather than demilitarize...��

I mostly agree, but I suspect he isn’t just taking the “arsenal left over,�� or the energy. Metaphysics (or the dogma) is dying, a new kind of philosopher/ poet/ artist/creator is wanted! But the direction they go isn’t arbitrary, Metaphysics isn’t quite totally dead yet. We still have to go beyond these annoying opposing pairs: real and ideal, good and evil, being and not-being, presence and absence, stability and change...

Marlon wrote: ""The fundamental belief of metaphysicians is the belief in oppositions of values."

Can someone please explain this "oppositions of values", I find it rather difficult to understand"

The sentence has been translated pretty much word for word.
"Der Grundglaube der Metaphysiker ist der Glaube an die Gegensätze der Werte."

The word "Gegensatz" can be translated as: opposite, contrast, conflict, difference, antithesis

My freebe kindle English translation:
"The fundamental belief of metaphysicians is THE BELIEF IN ANTITHESES OF VALUES." (captitals in text)

So the belief in "oppositions of values" is a belief in dialectics?

Isn't the very first sentence in the book a question about how something can arise from its opposite? The noble from the base, the truth from deception...

Alternative translations “out there��:

“the faith in opposite values�� (Kaufmann)

“the faith in antithetical values�� (Hollingdale).

Christopher wrote: "truth from deception..."

Didn't Dimitri in Crime and Punishment keep saying, "We lie and lie again until we come upon the truth," or something like that.

If Nietzsche gets in to his Uberman" theory here, I would love to compare and contrast it to Doestoevsky's "Great Man" theory.

Marlon wrote: "So the belief in "oppositions of values" is a belief in dialectics?"

I understood him to be saying that traditionally, people have thought of values as complete opposites that had nothing to do with each other. For example, there are people who think of good and evil as separate entities. This was what I thought he was talking about. On the other hand, there are people who think of evil as a movement away from good. In this case, they are not completely separate, but connected somehow. I could be completely off this being what he means though. If it is what he means, then I don't know that he can say categorically that all metaphysicians have thought this way....

Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "If Nietzsche gets in to his Uberman" theory here, I would love to compare and contrast it to Doestoevsky's "Great Man" theory."

Unfortunately (or not), in BGE Nietzsche leaves out explicit mention of two of the three main themes announced in "Zarathusta" -- the Eternal Recurrence of everything, and the Ubermensch.

I think that the book is stronger without them (or at least without Eternal Recurrence, which raises cosmological issues that Nietzsche never dealt with).

Christopher wrote: "Isn't the very first sentence in the book a question about how something can arise from its opposite? The noble from the base, the truth from deception..."

You mean the first sentence of §2 right?

“‘How could something originate in its antithesis? Truth in error, for example? Or will to truth in will to deception? Or the unselfish act in self-interest? Or the pure radiant gaze of the sage in covetousness? Such origination is impossible; he who dreams of it is a fool, indeed worse than a fool; the things of the highest value must have another origin of their own �� they cannot be derivable from this transitory, seductive, deceptive, mean little world, from this confusion of desire and illusion! In the womb of being, rather, in the intransitory, in the hidden god, in the “thing in itself�� �� that is where their cause must lie and nowhere else!�� �� This mode of judgement constitutes the typical prejudice by which metaphysicians of all ages can be recognized...��

Note the scare-quote. I’m pretty sure he’s snarking past metaphysicians and their profoundly strange and paradoxical utterances.

Plato posits we can only know truth from another world of forms, for example (truth from false perceptions in this world.). Or love of beautiful bodies turning into love of the good, another item outside of the natural world. Or lust like other natural animals leading to unselfish love. (Schopenhauer.) Or appearance vs thing-in-itself (scare-quote re-emphasized) of Kant.. I’m sure he’s snarking other metaphysicians too, these are the ones that seem tangentially related.

Somehow he wants to get us "beyond" good and evil. I understood the gist of this passage as meaning that traditionally metaphysics/faith has been based on opposites (such as "good" and "evil") which had been dubbed "truth." Now he sees a new philosophy on the horizon that sheds light on this deception.

It sounds like he’s saying, metaphysicians invented another world because this natural world we can assess is pre-judged to be base, low, bad, not good enough. So based on this kind of pre-judgments (of moral? Taste? Value?) they went forth to invent a “higher�� world, which they claim they “discovered��, and call that the truth. But it’s valued not because it’s true, it’s valued because it’s invented after they judged the natural world as not valuable.

Blockquote:

The "non-free will" is mythology; in real life it is only a question of STRONG and WEAK wills.—It is almost always a symptom of what is lacking in himself, when a thinker, in every "causal-connection" and "psychological necessity," manifests something of compulsion, indigence, obsequiousness, oppression, and non-freedom; it is suspicious to have such feelings—the person betrays himself. And in general, if I have observed correctly, the "non-freedom of the will" is regarded as a problem from two entirely opposite standpoints, but always in a profoundly PERSONAL manner: some will not give up their "responsibility," their belief in THEMSELVES, the personal right to THEIR merits, at any price (the vain races belong to this class); others on the contrary, do not wish to be answerable for anything, or blamed for anything, and owing to an inward self-contempt, seek to GET OUT OF THE BUSINESS, no matter how. The latter, when they write books, are in the habit at present of taking the side of criminals; a sort of socialistic sympathy is their favourite disguise. And as a matter of fact, the fatalism of the weak-willed embellishes itself surprisingly when it can pose as "la religion de la souffrance humaine"; that is ITS "good taste."

I got well into the second section in the Zimmern translation, but I just reached para. 22 in the German.

I think if I were in, say, a final exam, and had to translate a page, my grade would be a "C."- but I have read it in translation two or three times, which makes the German easier.

It sounds like lip-service coming from me, but Nietzsche really had one of THE greatest German prose styles.

←Resentful envy intensifies to Category 5.

I need to learn German >_<

Lia wrote: "←Resentful envy intensifies to Category 5.

I need to learn German >_<"

I'm a little resentful too... double reading Jenseits has slowed my roll.

Think of all the Grant Morrison Batman I still have to read!

If this is a carefully planned and well organized book, as has been asserted, these first parts should be the beginning of some great argument; full of premises, and even some conclusions to use as premises to persuade us of some greater conclusion to come.

Without agreeing or disagreeing yet, what do we have so far? All philosophies until now have been poor and personal productions that all fail because they are twisted and biased, false and flawed constructs driven by a questionable need to discover and reveal "the truth", in fact the will to truth should be devalued because it is not our prime motivation.

Plato is wrong because his forms are backwards, (forms are real, everyday items here on earth are mere images of those forms). . .and the unsupported claim that some great "good" exists, which Christians carry on today.

Stoics are wrong because they simply hijacked the indifference of nature and called it their own.

I am not sure what he thinks of Epicureanism

It took a hundred years until Greece came to realize who this garden god Epicurus was.—Did they realize?

What should they have realized about who Epicurus was? Someone who proposed a different highest good that might have more value than the other higher good being proposed by other philosophers?

David wrote: "If this is a carefully planned and well organized book, as has been asserted, these first parts should be the beginning of some great argument; full of premises, and even some conclusions to use as..."

I kind of dispute this characterization of "what we have so far."

Dogmatic philosophy has been like astrology- which led to the building of pyramids.

Say Plato did not discover the forms, he invented them- and they dominated philosophy for 2,000 years (and the transition from paganism to Christianity). That's a powerful invention.

But from Descartes to now- "free thought" (which, paradoxically, denies free will- has steadily undermined the Platonic structure and is becoming dogmatic itself.

Philosophers have been powerful, but naive.

Christopher wrote: "Say Plato did not discover the forms, he invented them- and they dominated philosophy for 2,000 years (and the transition from paganism to Christianity). That's a powerful invention."

Powerful, yes, but according to Nietzsche, a capital offense of a diseased mind in error of the truth:

We should not be ungrateful for it, even though we must also certainly concede that the worst, most protracted, and most dangerous of all errors up to now has been the error of a dogmatist, namely, Plato’s invention of the purely spiritual and of the good as such.. . .To speak of the spirit and the good in this way, as Plato did, was, of course, a matter of standing truth on its head and even of denying the fundamental condition of all life, perspective. Indeed, one could, as a doctor, ask, “How did such a disease get to Plato, the most beautiful plant of antiquity? Did the evil Socrates really corrupt him? Could Socrates have been a corruptor of youth, after all? Did he deserve his hemlock?��

David wrote: "What should they have realized about who Epicurus was? Someone who proposed a different highest good that might have more value than the other higher good being proposed by other philosophers?"


Epicurus was the Hobbit-master of Greeky Shire, wasn’t he? From wiki

For Epicurus, the purpose of philosophy was to attain the happy, tranquil life, characterized by ataraxia—peace and freedom from fear—and aponia—the absence of pain—and by living a self-sufficient life surrounded by friends.

But Nietzsche claims he’s actually a resentful little nobody who was driven by envy and resentment against Plato to philosophize. There’s what he wrote as his doctrine (anti rage, resentment, envy etc), and there’s what he does (Nietzsche’s diagnosis that he’s snarking Plato venomously.) He preaches peaceful calm but practices (concealed) rage.

The question is: we have what Nietzsche wrote, but how can we psychoanalyze it to unconceal whatever “truth�� is behind his mask?? (Maybe that’s why he writes these provocative remarks about women. Maybe, secretly, he’s dreaming of ... oh I don’t know, a woman, a whip...)

Christopher wrote: "I kind of dispute this characterization of "what we have so far."

That is fine. How should we characterize what we have so far to carry forward into a greater argument that he will no doubt want to persuade us of eventually? This is still only the first chapter so there may not be many. Since he did not declare at the start what it was he wants to convince us of right away, I am looking for a list of premises, P1, P2, etc., that we can keep in mind with the coming chapters that will go toward his eventual conclusions.

Maybe it is just, as the chapter title says and no more; "philosophers are prejudiced". However, I suspect there are a few more than just that one.

Lia wrote: "But Nietzsche claims he’s actually a resentful little nobody who was driven by envy and resentment against Plato to philosophize."

Thanks for that response Lia. It makes much more sense now. So it is a straw man attack against Epicurus and his philosophy. Therefore every philosopher since Plato can similarly be attacked for having a raging case of Plato-envy®. That would certainly play into his premise that philosophers are prejudiced for one reason or another.

15

. . .But then our organs themselves would, in fact, be—the work of our organs. It seems to me that this is a fundamental reductio ad absurdum [absurd conclusion] provided that the idea of causa sui [something being its own cause] is fundamentally absurd. Consequently, is the exterior world not the work of our organs ��?

Is this a refutation of the "brain in a vat" problem? Why does he end this with a question?

Lia wrote: "David wrote: "What should they have realized about who Epicurus was? Someone who proposed a different highest good that might have more value than the other higher good being proposed by other phil..."

Excellent answer, Lia. Exactly right.

David wrote: "If this is a carefully planned and well organized book, as has been asserted, these first parts should be the beginning of some great argument; full of premises, and even some conclusions to use as..."

I wonder if Nietzsche has chosen this unsystematic, bombastic approach precisely to counter the systematic approach of his contemporaries. To present premises and conclusions would be to follow in the footsteps of those he disagrees with, the "superstitions of logicians."

It may turn out that he has no system to present at all, no specific premises, no specific conclusions. Maybe what he wants is a departure from those things -- as Kerstin says @102, he wants us to get "beyond" good and evil, starting with the reality of that dichotomy.

David wrote: “Powerful, yes, but according to Nietzsche, a capital offense of a diseased mind in error of the truth:

...“How did such a disease get to Plato, the most beautiful plant of antiquity? Did the evil Socrates really corrupt him? Could Socrates have been a corruptor of youth, after all? Did he deserve his hemlock?”��

This one kills me. Which translation is this? Nietzsche called Plato the most beautiful plant. 😂 Plato is vegetable, he’s good for you! (Maybe it’s like Odysseus calling Nausicaa a Palm tree.)

Anyway, I read this as questioning whether Socrates deserved capital punishment (for corrupting the youthful Plato, I suppose.) So Plato-the-beautiful-vegetable is blameless, one way or another. Socrates is the one on trial.

Protracted error implies people keep making this mistake over a long period of time �� I still read this as generations of readers mistaking Plato’s inventive fiction for The Truth.
As for Plato the vegetable, was he fooled (by Soc)? Or was it a noble lie? Was he afraid people cannot become “good�� without believing in some lies?

Thomas wrote: "It may turn out that he has no system to present at all, no specific premises, no specific conclusions..."

That’s exactly what a doubting-Thomas would say!

Lia wrote: "Thomas wrote: "It may turn out that he has no system to present at all, no specific premises, no specific conclusions..."

That’s exactly what a doubting-Thomas would say!"

Well, we're only one chapter in, but if it looks like a mule, and it talks like a mule, then it must be



Francis, the talking mule.

The most beautiful plant..
(haven't checked this..)

Plato is the lotus, and Platonists are lotus-eaters.

Or opium eaters.

Tom, did you just call me an as�� ... a burro?? 😡

@Donut: whoa, I prefer the molis. Maybe Plato is the molis, you need to be “initiated�� into the Hermes-tradition (or hermeneutics?) before you can see through the illusions. (Or else tripping through Hades.)

Lia wrote: "This one kills me. Which translation is this? Nietzsche called Plato the most beautiful plant. "

It is from the prologue.


Beyond Good and Evil (Leipzig, 1900)
Es hieß allerdings die Wahrheit auf den Kopf stellen und das Perspektivische, die Grundbedingung alles Lebens, selber verleugnen, so vom Geiste und vom Guten zu reden, wie Plato gethan hat; ja man darf, als Arzt, fragen: "woher eine solche Krankheit am schönsten Gewächse des Alterthums, an Plato?

Google Translate:
However, it meant turning the truth upside down and denying the perspective, the basic condition of all life, so as to speak of the spirit and the good as Plato did; yes, one may ask, as a doctor, "from where such a disease on the most beautiful plant of antiquity, in Plato?

Thanks David. Mine translates it as growth �� which could mean anything, a phenomenon, a tumor, maybe a “part�� of a community?

Directly calling Plato a plant sounds far more jarring, but maybe it’s more literal/ accurate.

David wrote: "Lia wrote: "This one kills me. Which translation is this? Nietzsche called Plato the most beautiful plant. "

It is from the prologue.
Translated by Ian Johnston, Vancouver Island University, Nanai..."

For other translations:

How could the most beautiful growth of antiquity, Plato, contract such a disease? (Kaufmann)

“indeed, one may ask as a physician: ‘how could such a malady attack this loveliest product of antiquity, Plato?��
(Hollingdale)

“How could such a disease infect Plato, the most beautiful outgrowth of antiquity? (Norman)

According to the (very concise) bilingual dictionaries I've consulted, Gewäsche does have the primary meaning of "plant," but in medical contexts it means "growth" or "excrescence."

I think it more likely that Nietzsche intends the medical meaning, which would follow from the "disease" (Krankheit) metaphor.

But I have no information on late nineteenth-century German use of the word: I would suppose that the meaning of "plant" *could* be picked up by alert readers.

I think that Hollingdale's "product" misses the presumably self-evident association with a symptom of a disease -- which is why I included the part about "a physician" in the citation from him. But Hollingdale might have actual German usage on his side, and in any case didn't see a need to reinforce the medical analogy.